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Extended abstract 
Even though for more than 15 years, deep integration in trade agreements has been a 
recurring topic for politicians, scholars, international institutions, non-governmental 
organizations, industry leaders and journalists; there is no consensus yet on what deep 
integration is, and how it can be assessed. There are continuous news reports about the 
efforts of political leaders to pursue deep integration, and constant mentions about the 
design of new treaties and mechanisms to achieve deep integration between countries. In 
general, the proliferation of trade agreements after the Second World War is widely 
acknowledged in international trade literature and is a trend that will continue in the near 
future. Along this trend, Latin American governments have established numerous trade 
agreements with developing and developed partners in all regions of the world. In 
addition, since the 1950s and 1960s, these governments have acknowledged trade 
integration as a mean to promote economic development, which makes it increasingly 
important to understand the wide differences in the nature and levels of deep integration 
in their trade agreements. Nevertheless, as in other regions, little attention has been paid 
to explain differences in the content of trade agreements. 
This research extends an endogenous trade theory framework, first to analyse 
limited liberalization; and second, to study a group of countries with particular 
characteristics of opacity and discretional decision-making. The framework adapts a 
categorization of deep integration, derives preferences of economic actors from economic 
trade theories, and extends aspects of veto player theory and access point theory to exploit 
further their potential as an integrated structure of analysis. Then, these three aspects are 
studied through a collective action framework. Finally, the insight of previous studies that 
have highlighted the importance of systemic and international variables in the formation 
and design of trade agreements is considered. The importance of systemic and 
international theories and variables is not contested; the domestic-level explanations are 
developed as a complement to the insight that theories of international relations have 
provided. 
Two main arguments are put forward The first one is that the underlying depth 
structure of the trade agreements studied fits a categorization of vertical and horizontal 
margins, which are qualitatively different: vertical policy benefits are broader and more 
excludable than horizontal ones. To test this argument, first, the complete texts of all 
dyadic trade agreements signed by Latin American countries from 1982 to 2010 (256 
dyadic agreements) were manually coded to form a database of depth of provisions (a 
total of 28, 160 data points). To minimize error measurement, entries were compared 
with those of partially overlapping databases (publicly available or accessed by request). 
In the following areas, a total of 110 provisions per agreement were coded and measured: 
antidumping measures and countervailing duties, bargaining position, competition, 
decision power, dispute settlement mechanisms, environment, global and bilateral 
safeguards, government procurement, institutional capacities, investment, labour, 
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legitimacy, permanency, number of members, rules of origin, services, technical barriers 
to trade, type of agreement, and support bodies and mechanisms. To the best of my 
knowledge, this is the most comprehensive and detailed database of the depth of 
provisions of trade agreements established by Latin American countries. 
Next, provisions were analytically assigned to each margin. At the horizontal margin, 
agreements vary in the extent of the areas covered, the barriers removed in each area, the 
limits placed to governments when domestic industries face injury, and the coverage and 
strength of the support and enforcement mechanisms in each area. At the vertical margin, 
agreements vary in type, legitimacy required for entry into force and for amendments, 
permanency, and scope of institutional capabilities. Finally, principal components 
analysis confirmed that each variable aligns in the component to which was analytically 
assigned. As expected, the analysis highlighted the existence of two main components, 
which corresponded to the vertical and horizontal margins. 
The second main argument in this research is that two main domestic aspects 
contribute to explain the wide variations in nature and levels of depth of the trade 
agreements established by Latin American countries after 1982. First, changes in the 
structure of concentration of the export sectors of Latin American countries. Second, the 
degree of political decisiveness and level of access of societal demands determined by the 
institutional settings of these countries. After most of the countries abandoned the 
economic model based in the substitution of imports, in the 1980s, the structure of the 
export sectors of the countries changed. Two forces pulled in different directions: 
unilateral liberalization towards concentration and diversification towards de-
concentration. On the one hand, agreements vary in the extent of barriers removed in 
diverse trade related regulatory activities, and in the inclusion of support and 
enforcement institutions and mechanisms. This research argues that these aspects have 
implications over the economic benefits that different types of exporters are able to 
appropriate, and therefore over their preferences over aspects of deep integration and 
over the intensities of said preferences. Resourceful exporters with scale economies 
and/or fragmented production increased their static and dynamic gains from trade 
through vertical and horizontal integration. 
In addition, this research argues that the different extents of the governments’ 
political decisiveness and access to societal demands have important implications over 
the lobbying costs of levels and forms of deep integration, and therefore over the 
possibilities of different types of exporters to shape trade agreements according to their 
preferences and priorities. Combining the veto players theory and the access points 
theory (extending the former to consider competition from rents from lobbying, and 
extending latter to include settings of imperfect competition), suggests that decreases in 
the costs of lobbying veto players increased the possibilities of resourceful exporters with 
increasing returns to scale and/or fragmented production to achieve vertical integration. 
However, decreases in the costs of lobbying access points without veto power reduced 
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these types of exporters’ advantages of capturing said points, which reflected negatively 
in horizontal depth. In these cases, predictions about deep integration based on of veto 
player theory and on access point theory, became conditional on the concentration of the 
export sector. Cross-sectional regression analysis was performed to test these arguments. 
The main results and those of robustness tests tended to show direct and indirect support 
for the arguments put forward in this research. 
 
Keywords: Trade Agreements, deep integration, endogenous trade theory, economic 
preferences, veto players, access points, Latin America.  
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Abstract 
The proliferation of trade agreements after the Second World War is widely 
acknowledged in international trade literature and is a trend that will continue in the near 
future. Since the 1950s and 1960s, Latin American governments have acknowledged 
trade integration as a mean to promote economic development, which makes it 
increasingly important to understand the wide differences in the nature and levels of deep 
integration in their trade agreements. Nevertheless, little attention has been paid to 
explain differences in the content of trade agreements. This research extends an 
endogenous trade theory framework, first to analyse limited liberalization; and second, 
to study a group of countries with particular characteristics of opacity and discretional 
decision making. The framework includes an extended categorization of deep integration, 
preferences of economic actors derived from economic trade theories, and influence of 
the political setting through an integrated structure of veto players and access points. 
Then, these three aspects are studied through a collective action framework. Two main 
arguments are put forward. First, that the underlying depth structure of the trade 
agreements studied fits a categorization of vertical and horizontal margins, which are 
qualitatively different: vertical policy benefits are broader and more excludable than 
horizontal ones. Second, after inward oriented economic models were abandoned, the 
structure of the export sectors of the countries changed. Two forces pulled in different 
directions: unilateral liberalization towards concentration and diversification towards 
de-concentration. Resourceful exporters with scale economies and/or fragmented 
production increased gains through vertical and horizontal integration. Decreases 
(through competition) in the costs of lobbying veto players increased the possibilities of 
these types of exporters to achieve vertical integration. However, decreases in the costs 
of lobbying access points without veto power reduced these types of exporters’ advantages 
of capturing said points, which reflected negatively in horizontal depth. In these cases, 
predictions about deep integration based on theories of veto players and access points 
became conditional on the concentration of the export sector. This study used principal 
components, cross-sectional regression, and an original hand-coded database of 28, 160 
data points (which covers 256 dyadic agreements). To the best of my knowledge, this is 
the most comprehensive and detailed database of the content of trade agreements 
established by Latin American countries. The main results and those of robustness tests 
tended to show direct and indirect support for the arguments put forward in this research. 
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1  Introduction 
Background 
Trade is crucial for the world economy and, thereby, for Latin American countries, 
which makes it increasingly important to understand the design and characteristics 
of trade agreements. The proliferation of trade agreements after the Second World 
War is widely acknowledged in international trade literature and is a trend that will 
continue in the near future. Trade agreements increasingly mediate larger 
proportions of international trade and influence the volume and direction of trade 
flows (Mansfield and Milner, 2012: Kindle location: 199-5825). Trade policy has been 
acknowledged as a tool for development of Latin American countries since the 1950s 
and 1960s. Over the last decade, there has been increased interest in Latin America 
about the origins of different trade policies implemented in countries of the region 
(Sáez, 2005: 7). 1  Thus, the proliferation of divergent trade agreements in Latin 
America during the last two decades has raised several analytical and policy issues in 
academic debate (Salazar-Xirinachs, 2004: 127).2 Nevertheless, as in other regions, 
little attention has been paid to understanding and explaining differences in the 
content of trade agreements.3 
Even before the trade integration attempts of the 1950s and 1960s, the region 
viewed trade agreements favourably. In Latin America, trade agreements emerged, 
at least in part, from a deeply ingrained idea of integration. Salazar-Xirinachs (2004: 
123) explains that since colonial times, aspirations for integration have been constant 
in the region. In this way, ‘ideas of political integration and common destiny continue 
to appeal to Latin Americans and to reappear intermittently in different contexts up 
to the present.’ In response to the economic crises of 1930–1950, the notion of 
                                                        
1 The interest to know and understand the way in which decisions on trade policy are made in 
Latin America has also increased (Sáez, 2005: 7). 
2 Salazar-Xirinachs (2004: 127) mentions diversion of trade, interaction with multilateral 
process, consequences of the overlapping of trade agreements, interaction with policy reform, 
and contributions to create a more open trading system. 
3  Scholars have pointed out that more detailed knowledge about the content of trade 
agreements is needed. For example, Teh, Prusa, and Budetta (2009: 166-167) mention that 
variations in trade remedy provisions have not been acknowledged in academic literature. 
Smith (2000: 137) states that neglect in the study of content of trade agreements is ‘curious’ 
given their wide variation, and the implications which such differences may have for 
‘academic debates regarding sovereignty, globalization, and interdependence.’ 
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economic liberalism was challenged4 by those of nationalism and communism as 
more viable paths to increase industrialization and, therefore, economic 
development. 5  As a result, Latin American countries implemented protectionist 
public policies with the objective of promoting industrialization through an economic 
model based on the substitution of imports and in which the state played a central 
role as the motor of the economy, while restrictions were placed on private initiatives 
and hefty regulations were applied to markets. However, during the 1950s and 1960s, 
Latin American governments created trade agreements that were incompatible with 
protectionist economic interests. 
Latin American governments believed that their economic models required scale 
economies and, thus, larger markets to continue expansion. The industrialization 
model based on import substitution did not produce the economic growth expected; 
furthermore, the model underperformed in delivering employment and reducing 
inflation and economic instability. The objective of conforming trade agreements was 
to create regional scale economies through institutions that would in turn coordinate 
state intervention, reduce or eliminate trade barriers between members while 
increasing protectionist measures against other countries, and regulate flows of 
foreign direct investment (IADB, 2002: 31). Thus, many Latin American countries 
embarked on creating trade agreements to develop economic integration.6  These 
attempts were not successful because they required the fulfilment of the logical 
prerequisite of changing the import substitution model in favour of a model based on 
promoting exports and market liberalization (Frankel, 1997: 7). In general, the 
incipient initiatives failed to achieve trade and investment liberalization due to 
                                                        
4 The governments of the region were pessimistic concerning the external terms of trade for 
commodity exporters; sceptic about the entrepreneurial vocation of the private sector; 
hopeful about the effectiveness of public enterprise and state planning; fearful of dependence 
on foreign firms; and marginally interested in the multilateral trading system (IADB, 2002: 
31). 
5 Free trade was not considered a viable alternative for developing countries. Because the 
unevenness in the exchange of terms of trade overrated technological goods (produced by 
industrialized countries) over agricultural goods (produced by developing countries), and 
technological transmission between developed and developing countries is limited, it was 
considered that free trade was biased towards favouring developed countries over peripheral 
ones (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979). 
6 According to the IADB (2002: 32), several agreements, such as the Latin American Free 
Trade Association (LAFTA, after 1960 the ALADI), the Central American Common Market 
(CACM), the Andean Group (after 1969 the Andean Community), and the Caribbean Free 
Trade Association (after 1973, the CARICOM) were partially created to achieve scale-
economies within protectionist economic strategies. 
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several complications 7  derived from the inherent protectionism of the Latin 
American economic model and lack of complementarities among the productive 
sectors of the region’s economies. 
During the last half of the 1970s, the collapse and subsequent transformation of 
the protectionist economic model alongside global changes fostered liberalizing 
economic interests and with this the establishment of trade agreements. The 
economic and debt crises of Latin America that began in 1982 were perceived to result 
from the failure of the import substitution model. Countries of the region transferred 
large amounts of resources to developed countries in order to pay their previous 
obligations, while commercial banks and international financial institutions denied 
further credit to Latin American countries. Thus, the region’s countries reoriented 
their economic models from those based on import substitution directed by the state 
to those based on outward export promotion schemes driven by the private sector.8 
Liberalization enabled the emergence of new forms of cooperation and boosted 
efforts to enact trade agreements as a main component of the new ‘open regionalism’ 
wave (Frankel, 1997; Ethier, 1998; Haggard, 1998; Smith, 1999; Rigozzi, 2013) giving 
trade agreements more opportunities for success. 
Between 1990 and 1994, Latin American countries signed more than 30 bilateral 
trade agreements. The focus shifted from South–South trade agreements to more 
ambitious and institutionally more sophisticated North–South schemes. The main 
objectives of these trade agreements were to increase the costs of policy reversal by 
locking in economic structural reforms, signal credible liberalization commitments 
to the private sector, decrease protectionist barriers, promote institutional 
modernization, and enhance countries’ competitiveness (Haggard, 1994; Salazar-
                                                        
7 The IADB (2002: 32) points out several complications in the process of achieving economic 
integration while pursuing an imports substitution strategy faced. First, liberalization was 
pursued through narrow positive lists. Second, it aggravated the tension between public 
intervention and protectionist uses of the private sector. Third, it exacerbated macroeconomic 
instabilities by requiring large amounts of capital and imports of intermediate goods without 
generating exports in a context of unstable commodity prices and financial flows. Fourth, the 
imbalanced allocation of benefits between members of economic agreements created tensions 
between them. Fifth, poor infrastructure limited the potential of trade. Sixth, the 
authoritarian governments of the region encouraged political and border conflicts, limited the 
creation of regional institutions and limited the exchange of productive factors. Finally, the 
U.S. was more interested on the development of the multilateral trading system than on 
regional initiatives and did not support them. 
8 The main objectives of the reform process were achieving macroeconomic stability and 
overcoming the foreign debt problem (Sáez, 2005: 9). 
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Xirinachs, 2004: 123).9 In pursuit of these objectives, trade agreements proliferated 
in the region during the 1990s. After the first decade of the 2000s, when a large 
number of left-oriented parties and political leaders took power in several countries 
of the region (Panizza 2009; Panizza and Philip 2013), other agreements with 
political and economic mandates also emerged.10 
The puzzle and research question 
The main reason for selecting Latin America as the analysis case is the following 
puzzle: its trade agreements established under open regionalism vary widely in the 
level and nature of deep integration. As mentioned, these agreements have been 
plagued by continuous disagreement regarding their breadth, speed, and content 
(Haggard, 1998; Aggarwal and Espach, 2004). The reasons are not self-evident since 
Latin American countries have broadly similar political institutions, and face similar 
ideational context and external conditions. First, regarding political regime, most 
countries in Latin America have presidential systems, bicameral congresses, and 
proportional representation. Thus, in terms of institutional configuration, there 
seems to be no substantive variation which, from a purely institutionalist perspective, 
could explain the wide variation of depth of trade agreements established by each 
country. 
Second, at the beginning of the 1980s, all countries experienced the same global 
changes and an international drive towards regional integration. Schiavon (2001) 
points out five changes in the international context which influenced the desirability 
of economic structural reforms, such as trade liberalization, in the region. First, the 
Chilean and East Asian experiences showed the economic growth potential from 
                                                        
9 The IADB (2002) mentions that the economic transformation required an environment of 
certainty. Trade agreements would secure enlarged markets providing more information 
flows, and opportunities for exports and diversification. This would lead to greater 
specialization, product differentiation, and inter-industry trade. In addition, higher value-
added manufactures and products in which the region has a comparative advantage such as 
textiles, dairy goods, meat, and food processing are more competitive through interregional 
trade than in extra-regional trade. In the end, this process would increase productivity, 
competitiveness, employment and growth. In a similar idea, Devlin and Estevadeordal (2001), 
and Salazar-Xirinachs (2004) mention that trade agreements also work towards 
distinguishing partner countries placing them in a better position to attract foreign direct 
investment; and strengthen their bargaining power in international negotiations. Finally, 
Devlin, Estevadeordal and Krivonos (2003) mention that trade agreements can also work as 
a point of departure for functional cooperation on economic, social and political areas. 
10 For example, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). The study of these new 
non-trade agreements falls beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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economic liberalization. Second, international financial institutions, such as the 
World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IADB), put pressure on countries of the region to liberalize. 
Third, the socialist path to development was not an option after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. Fourth, the successful expansion of the European Community, now the 
European Union, in terms of depth, scope, and geographical area encouraged 
imitation by other regional initiatives. Fifth, the United States changed its 
multilateral focus to a regional one11 due to European resistance to a new round of 
multilateral negotiations at a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
conference in Geneva. 
After the economic crises of the 1980s, Latin American countries reoriented their 
economies towards an outward export promotion model led by the private sector. At 
the beginning of the 1990s, a liberal regional consensus emerged within the West, 
sustained on three pillars: the spread of democracy, neo-liberal economic reforms, 
and increasing interdependence of countries in and outside the region. These 
elements fostered the idea of trade integration and free trade as factors of a 
reciprocally beneficial relationship among countries which would lead to an increase 
in economic growth (Peceney, 1994). In this way, the idea of trade policy as one of the 
pillars of economic development persisted in the region. Within this context, the 
following research question guides this work: What explains the wide differences in 
the nature and levels of deep integration between trade agreements signed by Latin 
American countries? In addressing this question, this work analyses the way in which 
different configurations of economic interests in export sectors and domestic 
institutional settings combine to explain differences in the extent and nature of deep 
integration achieved in trade agreements. In the case of vertical integration, which is 
relevant to the trade agreement as a whole, the focus is on the combination of veto 
players and export oriented producers in concentrated export sectors. In the case of 
horizontal integration, which is relevant to specific trade areas and disciplines 
included in the agreements, the focus is on the combination of access points without 
veto power in de-concentrated export sectors. A review of the theoretical framework 
follows before detailing the arguments that address the research question. 
                                                        
11 Canada was able to reverse the negative attitude towards free trade with the United States 
that had prevailed during the previous 100 years. The Canadian business community was 
eager to establish a free trade area with the United States to exploit scale-economies. This 
situation, in addition to the United States interest in regional trade initiatives allowed the 
establishment of a bilateral agreement between both countries in 1988 (Frankel, 1997: 4-7). 
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Endogenous trade theory as an analysis method 
The international political economy is a ‘substantive area of inquiry’ about the 
‘politics of international economic exchange’ (Lake, 2009: 221). This research fits 
within some of the broader questions at the centre of the study of international 
political economy: ‘how, when, and why do countries decide to open themselves to 
trans-border flows of goods and services, capital, and people.’12 In this research, 
openness13 is limited, as it refers to variation of depth of preferential international 
trade agreements. Domestic politics is the independent or causal variable. An 
approach which takes into account the economic benefits of domestic actors, their 
ability to mobilize towards their preferred policy outcomes, and the influence of 
political institutions as mediators of societal demands seems the most appropriate 
for analysing deep integration. 
The depth of trade agreements is the outcome of a complex process involving 
different combinations of economic interests and political institutions. Trade 
agreements are public policies, which in turn are the output of a process involving 
many different actors interacting in a variety of arenas, rather than being only 
instruments which policy-makers use to maximize the welfare of populations (Spiller, 
Stein and Tommasi, 2008: 2). In this way, trade agreements are a function of the 
trade preferences of domestic actors, their ability to organize collectively, and the 
intervening effects of political institutions in mediating group preferences (Chase, 
2005: 16). An endogenous policy model covers these components and ‘has both 
politics (the parties and the lobbies) and economics (goods markets and factor 
markets) based on maximization by the actors’ (Magee, Brock, and Young, 1989: 31). 
The analytical framework of this research is developed through extending an 
endogenous political economy model to explain variation in the level of deep 
integration reached in trade agreements. 
Endogenous trade theory is the most developed application of public choice 
theory to analyse trade policy outcomes. Lake (2009) points out that interest groups 
have been acknowledged relevant for trade policy in several studies before the decade 
of 1970s (e.g. Schattschneider, 1935; Gourevitch, 1977; Caves, 1976; McKeown, 1984; 
                                                        
12 Lake (2009: 221) mentions that this is one of two integrated question at the centre of studies 
of international political economy (most studies focus in one of them). The other question is 
‘how does integration (or not) into the international economy affect the interests of 
individuals, sectors, factors of production, or countries and, in turn, national policies.’ 
13 From a perspective of international political economy, liberalization is ‘historically rare, 
problematic, and a phenomenon that itself needs to be explained’ (Lake, 2009: 221). 
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Frieden, 1988b; Milner, 1988). In the 1970s and 1980s, economists (e.g. Pincus, 1975; 
Lavergne, 1983; Baldwin, 1985; Magee, Brock, and Young, 1989) developed the 
‘endogenous tariff theory,’ which emphasizes the mobilization of interest groups in 
explaining public policy outcomes. Although public choice theory does not provide a 
general theory of domestic politics, endogenous trade theory provides the most 
developed theoretical framework for understanding trade policy from a domestic 
politics perspective (McGillivray, McLean, Pahre, and Schonhardt-Bailey, 2001: 9). 
The foundation underlying the theory is that the behaviour and interactions of self-
interested economic and political actors (interest groups voters, parties, and 
politicians, among others) are reflected in an endogenous political equilibrium in 
which trade policies are equated with prices (Magee, Brock, and Young, 1989: 31). In 
the leading model developed by Grossman and Helpman (1994, 2002), market actors 
which are expected to profit from a certain policy ‘buy’ protection through campaign 
contributions in order to obtain their preferred policy outcomes. Thus, politicians sell 
tariffs and quotas to the highest bidders. Market actors invest until the marginal 
benefits from the policy are equal to the marginal costs of the political investment.14 
The endogenous trade theory framework has provided useful insight to understand 
how demand for protection and liberalization from market actors is organized, 
mainly in developed countries. 15  In this research, the framework provided by 
endogenous trade theory is adapted to study limited liberalization through trade 
agreements and extended to analyse developing countries as represented in Figure 
1.1, and discussed in the sub-sections below. 
                                                        
14  In contrast, the process through which governments aggregate conflicting interests of 
market actors, and balance it with societal welfare is not made explicit. 
15  McGillivray, McLean, Pahre, and Schonhardt-Bailey (2001) thoroughly surveyed 
endogenous tariff theory. The authors analyse how tariffs vary along three main dimensions: 
goods, country and time. Industries or firms under the following circumstances are more 
likely to lobby for protection: declining or growing slowly, facing increasing import 
penetration, being less competitive internationally, having less intra industry trade, among 
others. On the other hand, the following industries are more likely to lobby for protection: 
textiles, apparel, footwear, chemicals, and highly processed goods, among others. Also, 
countries with the following features have higher levels of protection: are less wealthy or 
developed, have medium sized domestic markets, have smaller gross national product, have 
smaller manufacturing sectors, lack other sources for government revenue, face greater 
export instability, have less diversified exports or imports, among others. Countries with the 
following political characteristics tend to have higher levels of protection: smaller political 
jurisdictions, larger central governments, and greater relative power. Finally, concerning 
variation over time, the authors found that tariffs fluctuate over time with domestic or global 
business cycles, with economic growth, with levels of development, with terms of trade, with 
capital-labour ratios, and after creation of a free trade area. 
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Figure 1-1 Endogenous trade theory as an analysis method 
 
Source: Elaborated by the author. 
Deep integration as policy outcome 
In order to separate variation of trade agreements from surrounding complexity, the 
concept of trade agreements is differentiated from other related terms. In the 
literature on trade integration, regional integration, regionalization, and inter-
dependence often are used indistinctly. As an illustration of the different 
conceptualizations of a same term, the WTO’s definition of regionalism comprises 
‘any trade agreement that involves two or more countries but fewer than all members 
[…] There can be several signatories […] or just two. […] The agreements may involve 
countries that are of close geographical proximity […] or maybe in different parts of 
the globe’ (Carpenter 2009: 13-14). Also Evans, Holmes, Iacovone, and Robinson 
(2004: 2) define regionalism as including ‘preferential trade agreements (PTAs) 
between countries, including those between countries not geographically contiguous 
or even nearby.’ These two studies consider geographic closeness as not necessary for 
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regionalism, and trade agreements as synonyms of regionalism. However, in this 
research, trade agreements, in contrast with regionalization or economic 
interdependence, are the outcome of a political process.16 Since the general objective 
of this research is to understand variation in the design of trade agreements 
established by Latin American countries, the focus is on the outcome of the processes 
of integration, not on the processes themselves. The objective of such processes is to 
create a single market during a transitory period (Ortiz Mena L.N., 2001a, 2001b; 
Mansfield, Milner, and Pevehouse, 2007). Therefore, trade agreements in this study 
are an operational term. 
Because trade agreements are not a unified concept, the specific use of the term 
should be clarified. First, trade agreements that have been signed by two or more 
countries are analysed; other trade policies that fall outside the definition of trade 
agreement,17 such as unilateral liberalization, are not included. Second, agreements 
should aim to cover all trade substantially.18 Third, since the research question is 
about the design of trade agreements, explicit arrangements, rather than tacit 
arrangements, are studied. 19  Fourth, for similar reasons, the study excludes 
agreements that are not ‘concrete’ and have ‘vague’ objectives, and omit specific 
provisions and timing for liberalization (Baccini, Dür, Elsig, and Milewicz, 2011: 12). 
                                                        
16 On one hand, regionalism and regionalization have a clear geographical connotation, but 
while the former refers to trade integration between neighbouring countries, the latter refers 
to an increase in trade between neighbouring countries at a faster pace than with more distant 
countries (Ortiz Mena L.N., 2001a). On the other hand, economic interdependence does not 
have any geographic connotation and refers only to the quantity and depth of financial and 
economic exchanges between countries (Haggard, 1998). Neither regionalization nor 
economic interdependence involves necessarily a political process. Finally, trade agreements 
may involve (or not) countries that are geographically distant. 
17 The focus of this research are trade agreements rather than regimes. Koremenos and Snidal 
(2003: 432-433) explain that the concept of regime includes ‘implicit or explicit principles, 
norms, rules and decision-making procedures’ and does not provide specific guidance for 
theoretical or empirical work. 
18Although other studies (e.g. Mansfield, Milner, and Pevehouse, 2007) have included partial 
scope agreements along with trade agreements such as free trade areas or customs unions, in 
this research they are considered as qualitatively different trade instruments. The reasons are 
that first, partial scope agreements and trade agreements have different objectives. The 
former removes barriers in one or more productive sectors while the second aims to remove 
most trade barriers in the economy. Second, because both instruments pursue different 
objectives, analytical categories such as shallow or deep integration are not applicable to 
partial scope agreements. Because of these reasons, in this research partial scope agreements 
are not considered analytically comparable to trade agreements that aim wider trade 
liberalization. For example, it cannot be considered the same a dispute settlement mechanism 
in an agreement that covers only the automotive sector than the dispute settlement 
mechanism of a trade agreement such as NAFTA. 
19 Other studies also exclude non-formalized agreements (e.g. Koremenos and Snidal, 2003; 
Baccini, Dür, and Elsig, 2011). 
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Fifth, the agreements analysed may be entirely new or a product of less formal 
negotiations.20 Sixth, for the sake of parsimony, trade agreements are considered in 
isolation of other trade institutions, as in other analyses which address variation of 
trade agreements (e.g. Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal D., 2001a, 2001b). Seventh, 
the evolution of trade agreements falls outside the scope of this research, consistently 
with other studies which address cross sectional variation of trade agreements (e.g. 
Hicks and Kim, 2010; WTO, 2011; Baccini, Dür, and Elsig, 2012a). Finally, as in 
previous studies (e.g. WTO, 2011; Hicks and Kim, 2010; Baccini, Dür, Elsig, and 
Milewicz, 2011), the version of the agreement coded is that which was signed in the 
first instance. 
Trade agreements are evaluated, first, to assess their depth (and build dependent 
variables of interest); and subsequently, to assess how different configurations of 
economic interests and political institutions influence the depth of such agreements. 
For these purposes, analysing policy outcomes directly is considered suitable to 
determine the aspects of variation in the depth of trade agreements. One of the 
advantages of this approach is that industry effects are well identified and may be 
targeted in specific trade legislation (Beaulieu, 2002: 101-102). This approach is 
consistent with the work of scholars who analyse policy outcomes directly (e.g. 
Frieden, 1991; Beaulieu, 2002; Mansfield, Milner, and Pevehouse, 2007). 21  This 
study analyses specific pieces of trade legislation: namely, all available trade 
agreements from 1982 to 2010 between Latin American countries and their regional 
and global partners.22 Depth is defined conceptually in Chapter 3 and empirically in 
Chapter 4, by assessing the inclusion of specific areas and provisions which promote 
deep integration directly from the text of the trade agreements. 
In this research, limited trade liberalization, rather than protection, is the object 
of analysis and is considered a quasi-public good. Trade agreements, as other 
                                                        
20 For example, trade agreements signed after the establishment of framework agreements 
are not considered different in terms of depth at the moment of signature from those which 
did not establish a framework agreement previously. 
21 The way in which provisions are formulated ‘reveals its intention and the extent to which it 
declares legal obligations and rights’ (WTO, 2011: 129-130). Trade and investment 
agreements are carefully negotiated by signatories and they deliberately include or exclude 
components according to the problems they face (Allee and Peinhardt, 2010: 8). From these 
perspectives, the legal texts of trade agreements are meaningful to both, governments and 
economic actors (Hicks and Kim, 2010: 17). Focusing on the legal texts of such agreements 
is a sensible approach to study deep integration. 
22 The legal text of 256 agreements established by Latin American countries between 1982 and 
2010 were analysed and 110 provisions manually coded and checked for reliability with 
partially overlapping databases. Details of the sample and data collection method are 
provided in Chapter 4. 
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instruments of trade policy, can be considered quasi-public goods because they 
provide general benefits which are not excludable and non-rivalrous. Free trade 
policy may be considered a public good because, once produced, nobody can be 
prevented from enjoying its benefits (Gowa, 1988; Chase, 2005: 40). For example, 
free trade makes available products and services with decreased prices, increased 
quality, and greater varieties of intermediate and final products (Nielson, 2003: 471). 
From this perspective, trade agreements are ‘transnational public goods whose non-
rivalry and non-exclusive properties extend beyond national borders, but are 
contained in a well-defined set of states or a geographical region’ (Devlin and 
Estevadeordal, 2002: 7). However, depending on different conditions of excludability 
of policy benefits, limited liberalization through trade agreements simultaneously 
produces private benefits for economic groups. This situation gives market actors 
incentives to pressure governments to achieve limited liberalization through trade 
agreements and produce economic gains which they can appropriate. As analysed 
further in Chapter 7, different margins of deep integration have different levels of 
excludability. In this research, it is argued that such differences in excludability 
contribute to explaining the variation in the nature and levels of depth between the 
agreements established by Latin American countries after 1982. 
Preferences for deep integration 
As mentioned, the endogenous trade framework provides useful insight for 
understanding the preferences and organization capacities of market actors to 
demand protection and liberalization. Nevertheless, several authors (e.g. Chase, 
2005; Mansfield and Milner, 2012) have pointed out that the need to better identify 
interest groups and the manner in which they influence trade policy outcomes 
remains to be addressed. In analysing economic interests, endogenous trade theories 
assume that firms choose between an economic or political investment. From this 
perspective, wealth can come from two sources: production and predation (Magee, 
Brock, and Young 1989: 1). Scholars refer mainly to two sets of models: those based 
on trade preferences and those based on collective action costs and government 
institutions (Alt, Frieden, Gilligan, Rodrik, and Rogowski, 1996: 690). Following 
Frieden’s (1999) guidelines, this research first derive the trade preferences of the 
economic actors and, after analysing the institutional setting, refer to models based 
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on collective action costs and institutions. 23  The importance of maintaining 
preferences separate from their strategic setting lies in the fact that preferences may 
be affected by some of the features of the settings. This separation is relevant in order 
to theoretically distinguish between the role of actors’ interests and that of their 
environment. 
Starting with a derivation of actors’ preferences from trade theories is 
advantageous for studying demand for deep integration. Identifying the interests of 
groups in society and their relative influence on trade policy outcomes remains a key 
issue in literature (Mansfield and Milner, 2012). In order to analyse a policy, one 
must first clearly understand the economic interests that are behind it (Frieden, 1991: 
450). The starting point is that, even if preferences cannot be observed, it is possible 
to regard actors as having preferences for outcomes (Frieden, 1999: 40) based on how 
their income is influenced by a policy outcome. The economic link (Mayer, 1984: 983) 
places the economy’s structure as the main determinant of the process through which 
a person’s real income and her interests are affected.24 Using a deductive theory of 
preferences ‘we know features of the actor, and theory predicts that in a determined 
context these will lead to a particular set of preferences […] Preferences then vary 
accordingly to a pre-existing theory’ (Frieden, 1999: 61). According to Frieden, this is 
the most desirable approach to derive preferences and it has two main advantages. 
First, the preference is not assumed, but derived. Second, the conditions under which 
preferences vary are more objectively [sic] assessed than the preferences themselves. 
Economic actors are affected in different ways depending on their ‘production 
profile’ (Gourevitch, 1986). Regarding trade preferences, a key division is whether 
trade preferences of domestic market actors follow sector lines or factor lines. In the 
first case, the Ricardo Viner or specific factors theory of international trade is used; 
in the second case, the Heckscher–Ohlin–Stolper–Samuelson theory of international 
trade is applied. There is empirical evidence to support each approach (e.g. Magee, 
1980; Hiscox, 2002a, 2002b). Nevertheless, focusing on only economic investment 
choices overlooks the relationships connecting politics and economics. 
                                                        
23 As mentioned earlier, political economy scholars refer mainly to two sets of models: models 
based on trade preferences and models based on collective action costs and governmental 
institutions. Alt, Frieden, Gilligan, Rodrik, and Rogowski, (1996: 690) mention that these 
models are closely related to their environment. The authors analyse the organization of 
economic interests and how trade preferences are translated to political coalitions to demand 
economic policy outcomes. 
24 As is usual in public choice literature, in this research it is assumed that market actors prefer 
maximizing their economic benefits. Domestic actors prefer deep integration when it 
maximizes their income and wealth. 
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Although the derivation of trade preferences is a powerful predictor of trade 
policy outcomes in its own right (e.g. Rogowski, 1989; Milner, 1988; Frieden, 1991), 
preferences of individuals and groups cannot be translated automatically into 
political pressure for specific trade policies. Policy preferences derive from actors’ 
interests but are not identical to them (Schonhardt-Bailey, 2006: 23). In general, 
moving from trade preferences to policy outcomes is complex. Chase (2005: 43) 
points out that few scholars systematically examine the economic interests and 
political institutions which intervene in trade policy because the process entails 
several analytical challenges.25 To answer the question that motivates this research, 
after identifying which economic interests prefer deep integration, it is necessary to 
analyse at least two other aspects of the domestic system: first, constraints which 
institutions may impose in supplying the demanded depth of agreements and how 
they channel societal demands; and second, the feasibility of economic actors 
organizing politically to overcome such constraints. 
Domestic political institutions 
The role of domestic political institutions is usually neglected by endogenous trade 
theory: ‘the literature can be searched almost in vain for issues of state structure, state 
capacity, state autonomy, or state interest to which many political scientists are 
attentive’ (McGillivray, McLean, Pahre, and Schonhardt-Bailey, 2001: 14). 
Furthermore, the analysis of political institutions in Latin America was dismissed for 
some time because of the authoritarian nature of the region’s governments (Geddes, 
2002: 343). However, conditions in the region have changed26 and more serious 
investigation of the influence of institutions in public policies is required (Spiller, 
Stein, and Tommasi, 2008: 2). Moreover, Nielson (2003: 407) points out that ‘under 
common developing country conditions of economic crisis, high policy uncertainty, 
and significant international pressure, supply-side factors may matter more than the 
traditional demand-side variables usually studied in international economics.’ For 
                                                        
25 Chase (2005: 43) for example, mentions that Milner (1988); Rogowski (1989); and Frieden 
(1991) assess market actor’s preferences directly or assume that preferences alone determine 
policy, as indirect approaches to identifying economic interests. 
26 This research acknowledges that, although political institutions have gained relevance in 
the region, liberalization in Latin America started in a context of free market economics that 
was not free of the ‘old politics.’ As Panizza (2000: 738) points out, ‘old politics’ of clientelism, 
patronage and corruption rather than being obstacles, adjusted to operate in the transformed 
and pro-liberalization setting, and were ‘instrumental’ (within certain limits and conditions) 
in achieving economic liberalization. 
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these reasons, an analysis of institutional factors of the region’s countries and their 
influence on public policies is even more important.  
Regarding the influence of political factors on trade policy, the effect of political 
institutions has been overlooked compared with the effect of political interests. 
Institutions influence the ‘roles and incentives of each of the actors, the 
characteristics of the arenas in which they interact, and the nature of the transactions 
they engage in’ (Spiller, Stein, and Tommasi, 2008: 2). In analysing the role of 
institutions in trade policy, two main approaches prevail in the literature: analyses 
which focus on particular institutions and analyses which focus on conceptual 
dimensions (integrating a range of institutions). These approaches are reviewed in 
Chapter 2. This research argues that because most Latin American countries share 
broadly similar institutional characteristics, an appropriate approach is to consider 
more encompassing characterizations of institutional variation. An integrated 
framework combining theories of access points and veto players27 is considered an 
appropriate approach for analysing the role that political institutions play in deep 
integration of trade agreements. 
Overcoming exporters’ collective action costs 
Few studies take into account political institutions and economic interests to explain 
policy outcomes. Often, when the influence of institutions is evaluated, the structure 
of interest groups in each country is not specified and it is assumed instead that the 
preferences of interest groups are already reflected in the position of the political 
institutions studied (e.g. Mansfield, Milner and Pevehouse, 2007: 403). Some 
reasons are that ‘coalition building processes are notoriously difficult to predict, and 
policy making institutions tend to be unique to each country’ (Chase, 2005: 43). This 
step of the analysis comprises first, presenting the framework to study the 
mechanisms that make it possible for increasing export oriented industries to 
mobilize (and overcome what theoretically has been acknowledged as acute free 
riding problems); and second, assessing how they combine with characteristics of the 
institutional setting to channel their demands for deep integration in differentiated 
ways. 
                                                        
27 Access points and veto players are defined and discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. Briefly, 
access points are political actors which have power in a specific policy domain and are 
receptive to lobbying (Ehrlich, 2007, 211). Veto players are individual actors whose consent is 
required to enact legislation that modifies the status quo (Tsebelis 1995, 2002). 
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To assess the feasibility of interest groups organizing and exerting political 
pressure, it is common to use a cost-benefit model to frame the argument (e.g. Pincus, 
1975; Caves, 1976; Pittman, 1977; Godek, 1985; Grier, Munger and Roberts, 1994). 
Following this approach, trade policy outcomes are the result of interest group 
pressure. Structural factors influence the benefits and costs that industries face to 
organize political pressure and achieve their desired policy outcomes (Caves, 1976: 
286). Benefits from influencing the government depend on its role in influencing a 
particular industry (Pittman, 1976: 38). Industries that invest resources compare the 
costs of participation with the benefits derived from trade agreements. Therefore, 
whether an interest group chooses and is able to mobilize depends on the benefits 
potentially available and the costs for participants of the group. According to 
endogenous trade literature, in addition to characteristics of the group (industry), 
characteristics of the environment and the institutional setting are important to 
analyse collective action (e.g. Alt and Gilligan, 1994; McGuire and Olson, 1999; 
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). These characteristics influence how appropriable 
benefits are and how assignable the costs of collective action are. The characteristics 
of the industry (e.g. Olson, 1965; Pincus, 1975; Pittman, 1976; Lavergne, 1983; 
Frieden, 1991; Grier, Munger and Roberts, 1994; Chase 2005; Schonhardt-Bailey, 
2006) and the environment can generate insight into the costs and benefits from 
mobilization and consequently, the predisposition to engage in collective action 
(Olson, 1965; Lavergne, 1983, Baldwin, 1985, 1989; Schonhardt-Bailey, 2006). For 
example, Alt and Gilligan (1994) state that a higher degree of factor specificity in the 
economy influences the costs of collective action by increasing the excludability of 
policy benefits. 
On the other hand, the configuration of political institutions influences how 
societal demands are channelled and is therefore central in determining the costs of 
mobilization of interest groups. Political institutions aggregate divergent societal 
interests and channel the negotiation of their divergent economic interests. In this 
way, the configuration of political institutions influence which economic interests 
prevail over others in a particular domain:  
‘At any moment, institutions serve to define what political power means in a 
particular society, whether the competition over policy will be conducted via 
votes, normally expected to favor labor, via contributions and bribes, often in 
capital’s comparative advantage, or via ideas and argument. In short, 
institutions determine the “currency” used in the political marketplace and 
how different political assets are valued’ (Lake, 2009: 227). 
INTRODUCTION
 
 
34 
From this perspective, no matter how well derived the economic interests which 
benefit from trade agreements, political institutions also influence the level of 
integration achieved in trade agreements. Therefore, to analyse the costs of the 
political institutional setting, this research uses the combined framework of access 
points and veto players described in the previous section. 
Alternative and complementary explanations 
Open economy politics is an approach within the international political economy 
which emerged at the end of the 1990s. Lake (2009: 225) summarizes the foundation, 
development, and areas of opportunity of the open economy politics approach as 
follows. Built on the assumptions of neo-classical economics and international trade 
theory, open economy politics gives substantial weight to domestic material interests 
in trade policy analysis. However, it also aims to account for variables of political 
nature, such as institutions, at the domestic and international levels. Within this 
approach, arguments progress from micro to macro levels of analysis in a linear way: 
first, by deriving preferences from domestic market actors then, by considering how 
political institutions aggregate said preferences, and finally, by considering 
bargaining at the international level. Most scholars focus on one of these three steps, 
treating the other two as exogenous in ‘reduced form.’ 
International and systemic explanations are also considered. Early analyses 
about the formation and depth of trade agreements which considered the situation of 
countries in the international system as independent variables were written mainly 
during the 1990s. Several systemic and international variables are considered 
influential. First, decreasing economic power of the hegemonic country in the 
international system has been one of the most important explanations for the 
formation of trade agreements rather than fostering multilateral trade integration.28 
Second, countries which participate in the multilateral system may form regional 
integration agreements to increase their bargaining power or to respond to the 
stagnation of the multilateral system.29  Third, geographical vicinity and previous 
                                                        
28 Hegemonic stability theory was developed mainly taking into account the pre-eminence of 
Great Britain and the United States, during the second halves of the 19th and 20th centuries, 
respectively. The main proposition of the theory is that the existence of a hegemonic state has 
a strong influence on the promotion of economic liberalization (Gilpin, 1975, 1977; Krasner, 
1976). 
29 Haggard (1997) mentions that his is a well-known argument for explaining the proliferation 
of trade agreements which happened in Latin America after the lack of progress in the 
negotiations of the multilateral Uruguay Round. 
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political relations may increase the possibilities for economic cooperation.30 Fourth, 
countries may sign numerous agreements to locate themselves as hubs in a ‘hub and 
spoke’ agreement.31 Fifth, countries may engage in trade agreements (particularly 
with developed countries) to signal their commitment to economic liberalization.32 
Although systemic and international variables have not been able to fully explain the 
variation in depth of trade agreements, they definitely influence the nature and level 
of depth that agreements are able to achieve. Therefore, in this research, as in other 
studies on the design of trade agreements (e.g. Mansfield and Milner, 2012: Kindle 
location 536-5825), international and systemic level explanations of trade policy are 
considered complementary to domestic level explanations. 
Legalization studies acknowledge variation of design across international 
agreements. Literature on legalization addresses the differences in treaties by 
focusing on the effects of legalization variations on compliance and domestic policies. 
Scholars (e.g. Guzman 2008; Zangl 2008) focus on how specific aspects of 
legalization influence domestic policies or compliance. However, regarding deep 
integration specifically, there are no systematic studies on variation of the 
components of trade agreements, besides some work on dispute settlement 
provisions (e.g. Smith, 2000). Finally, the emphasis of this approach is rather on the 
effects of variation of legalization than on the causes of such variation.  
While a Rational Design approach, like legalization studies, also acknowledges 
variation of design across international agreements, it emphasizes the causes of 
variation and aims to develop general explanations of institutional features. The 
starting point is the observation that ‘major institutions are organized in radically 
different ways’ (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal D., 2001a: 761-762). The reason for 
                                                        
30 Geographic vicinity has been mentioned as a characteristic which may reduce transaction 
costs, increasing the possibilities for economic cooperation. Also, previous political 
relationships, such as colonial relationships or membership in military alliances may facilitate 
also possibilities for economic cooperation. See Mansfield and Milner, 1997; Mansfield, 
Milner and Pevehouse, 2005, Mansfield and Milner, 2012. 
31 In the Americas, Mexico is a country that takes advantage of its geographic location signing 
agreements in which it acts as the ‘hub.’ Wonnacott (1991) explains that ‘hubs’ in ‘hub-and-
spoke’ agreements benefit relatively more from trading with their partners. 
32 Haggard (1997) and Lawrence (1996) have mentioned that trade agreements are used also 
to attract investment. Medium and small countries may engage in these agreements to 
facilitate the operations of multinational firms and to increase the costs of policy reform 
reversal, sending positive signals to other countries and international financial institutions. 
Also, following this idea, Fuentes and Schiavon (2007) have studied how higher degrees of 
economic reform may increase the similarity in the preferences of the countries which 
implement them, facilitating economic convergence in the region. 
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these variations is that states shape institutions to advance their goals;33 institutions 
are not designed randomly. From this perspective, institutions are the outcome of 
rational, purposeful exchanges among states (and, to a lesser extent, interest groups 
and corporations) to address particular issues (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal D., 
2001a: 762). Within this approach, researchers develop conjectures nurtured by 
cooperation theory, game theory, and institutional analysis in which distributional 
and enforcement features and uncertainty and number of actors explain features of 
institutions, such as membership, scope, centralization, control, and flexibility. 
Lake’s (2009: 240) critique of this approach,34 which is relevant to this research, is 
that it lacks clear theories of economic interests, and instead, these ‘are often treated 
in an arbitrary or inductive manner and produce, at best, propositions that are hard 
to falsify.’ 
Main arguments 
The earlier subsections presented the extended endogenous trade theory framework. 
Although, as outlined in the previous sub-section, empirical support for each of the 
approaches reviewed clearly exists, researchers have not yet exploited the potential 
to provide insight about the wide differences existing between the extent and nature 
of deep integration in the trade agreements signed by Latin American countries. In 
this research, two main arguments are put forward to address this issue. First, it is 
argued that provisions usually classified as promoting deep integration in trade 
agreements vary in terms of their excludability at two main levels: the trade 
agreement as a whole, and specific trade areas and disciplines within it. The main 
implication of this distinction is that everything else being constant, the excludability 
of policy benefits is lower in the provisions about the trade agreement as a whole. 
Because there are no consensual guidelines in the academic literature to assess deep 
integration in trade agreements, different conceptualizations of deep integration are 
assessed against a definition of ‘depth.’ As a result, this research uses as a general 
                                                        
33 Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal (2001a: 762) contend that institutions cannot be considered 
only exogenous actors; and that states are concerned about institutional design because 
institutions matter to advance their preferred outcomes. The rational design of institutions 
approach faces critiques from constructivists and realists. The main critique of constructivists 
is that international institutions contribute to propagate global norms. The main critique from 
realists is that institutions are ‘little more than ciphers for state power.’ 
34 Lake (2009: 240) recommends that instead of ‘building ever more sophisticated models of 
institutions per se, scholars [...] may be better served by developing theories of and focusing 
attention on the interests of actors.' 
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baseline the characterization of deep integration from the WTO (2011) and expands 
it to incorporate other compatible categorizations in Chapters 3 and 4. 
The second main argument is that the structure of export oriented interests, their 
capacity for mobilization, and the configuration of political institutions influence the 
ability of such export oriented interests to achieve the trade policies that they prefer. 
Three secondary arguments are required to build on this. First, in this research it is 
argued that exporters in concentrated export sectors prefer deep integration in 
intensive and extensive margins both, while exporters in de-concentrated export 
sectors prefer deep integration mainly at the extensive margin. These preferences are 
derived from standard, ‘new,’ and ‘new new’ trade theories. Concentrated export 
sectors are dominated by resourceful exporters with scale economies and exporters 
engaged in production sharing. For them, deep integration at both margins creates 
dynamic and productivity gains from trade which they are able to appropriate. In 
contrast, in de-concentrated export sectors, a larger proportion of small and medium 
exporters exist. These exporters benefit mainly from static gains from trade created 
by integration at the extensive margin. An additional argument is that because Latin 
American countries are in general closer to the extreme of specificity in the factor 
mobility continuum, and because deep integration as the object of analysis 
corresponds to a setting of high specificity, the Ricardo–Viner model is the most 
appropriate to derive preferences from the creation and appropriation of static gains 
from trade. 
Second, in this research, it is argued that the configuration of political 
institutions,35 sets constraints to the extent of deep integration that can be achieved 
in a trade agreement. The configuration of political institutions is determined by 
specific combinations of veto players and access points without veto power relevant 
to trade agreements According to theories of veto players and access points, the 
existence of more effective veto players in a country and more effective access points 
without veto power, everything else being constant, is expected to decrease the level 
of achievable deep integration. However, by separating the channelling of societal 
demands from the ability of interest groups to capture access points, all else being 
                                                        
35 This research does not consider all factors which may influence trade policy. For example, 
in addition to trade preferences and domestic actors ability to organize, in Latin America there 
are national strategies, different principles, diverse conceptions about which mechanisms 
promote regional integration more effectively, among others (Haggard, 1998). As in other 
studies, with a similar approach (e.g. Chase, 2005), the decision-making policy process is not 
studied in detail, and instead it is examined the extent to which policy outcomes follow the 
variation of the variables analysed. 
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equal, more access points would lead to deeper integration because more interests 
would be represented. A secondary argument is that access point theory (Ehrlich, 
2007, 2011) and veto player theory (Tsebelis, 1995, 2002) can be combined in an 
integrated framework in which veto players are a subset of access points (also subject 
to competition for rents from lobbying). From the perspective of veto players, this 
framework allows for study of the way in which the extent of deep integration is 
decided between the political actors which are able to block the policy. From the 
perspective of access points, the framework allows for study of the way in which 
demands for and against deep integration are channelled. 
Finally, within a collective action analytical framework, it is argued that the way 
in which different configurations of economic interests and domestic institutional 
settings combine contributes36 to explain differences in the extent and nature of deep 
integration achieved in the agreements under analysis. For vertical (or intensive) 
integration relevant to the trade agreement as a whole, the combination of veto 
players and the structure of export oriented interests in concentrated export sectors 
is fundamental. For horizontal (or extensive) integration relevant to specific trade 
areas and disciplines included in the agreement, the combination of access points 
without veto power and economic interests and concentrated export sectors is 
central. 
Methodology and hypotheses 
All else being equal, the conditional hypotheses (1–2), and their constitutive 
hypotheses (1-4), presented below address the question leading this research. These 
hypotheses are assessed through quantitative research methods. Two statistical 
models are constructed, one for the vertical margin of integration and another for the 
extensive margin of integration. The objective of the statistical analysis is to 
empirically examine the conditional hypotheses. The empirical results of the 
constitutive terms and hypotheses are also reported. All else being constant, cross-
                                                        
36 This research does not contend than an extended endogenous trade theory framework can 
account for n exhaustive political economy approach to deep integration in every trade 
agreement signed in Latin America. There is a wide array of reasons why states have deep 
integration in their trade agreements. However the main variables in this research are 
considered to be important in this process. 
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sectional multivariate statistical37 analysis tests whether the independent variables 
are associated with the dependent variables, as hypothesized: 
Conditional hypothesis 1. Latin American countries with the most access points 
without veto power display deeper integration at the extensive margin of their trade 
agreements when the export sector is more de-concentrated and diversified than 
when the export sector is more concentrated and specialized. 
Conditional hypothesis 2. Latin American countries with the most effective veto 
players display deeper integration at the intensive margin of their trade agreements 
when the export sector is more concentrated and specialized than when the export 
sector is more de-concentrated. 
Constitutive hypothesis 1. Latin American countries with more concentrated export 
sectors display deeper integration at the extensive margin of their trade agreements 
than countries with more de-concentrated export sectors. 
Constitutive hypothesis 2. Latin American countries with more concentrated export 
sectors display deeper integration at the intensive margin of their trade agreements 
than countries with more de-concentrated export sectors. 
Constitutive hypothesis 3. Latin American countries with fewer effective veto players 
display deeper integration in their trade agreements than countries with more 
effective veto players. 
Constitutive hypothesis 4. Latin American countries with more access points without 
veto power display deeper integration in trade agreements than countries with fewer 
access points without veto power (considering only the political representation of 
economic interests). 
Main findings 
Deep integration in trade agreements 
This research finds that the underlying depth structure of trade agreements 
established by Latin American countries after 1982 until 2010 fits a categorization of 
intensive and extensive margins. Recent studies and reports about deep integration 
                                                        
37  A ‘partial equilibrium’ or ‘comparative statics’ approach to theory and knowledge, as 
defined by Lake (2009: 225), is followed. As in previous studies (e.g. Mansfield, Milner, and 
Pevehouse, 2007; Mansfield and Milner, 2012; Baccini, Dür, and Elsig, 2012a) which try to 
explain variations in aspects of design of trade agreements from a rationalist perspective 
economic interests and political institutions in each country are considered exogenous. 
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acknowledge there is no accepted international methodology to evaluate deep 
integration in trade agreements (WTO, 2011; Wignaraja, Ramizo, and Burmeister, 
2013). To a certain extent, this issue seems to derive from neglecting to study the 
content of trade agreements. By extending and adapting the categorization developed 
by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2011, which differentiates the intensive 
(vertical) and extensive (horizontal) margins of deep integration, and using an 
original hand-coded database of provisions in trade agreements, this research 
measures the depth of the different provisions and classify them according to their 
corresponding margin: intensive or extensive. Then, this categorization is tested 
using principal components analysis and finds that the underlying depth structure of 
trade agreements established by Latin American countries after 1982 until 2010 fits 
the categorization of intensive and extensive margins. 
This research contributes to the study of trade agreements by providing baseline 
information about areas included in the trade agreements, thus, filling gaps in 
knowledge about content. The most common approach in academic literature is to 
consider trade agreements as ‘either/or’ propositions (Koremenos and Snidal, 2003) 
that are ‘homogenous in both their effects and their provisions’ (Hicks and Kim, 
2010: 2). Several scholars (e.g. Teh, Prusa, and Budetta, 2009; Baccini, Dür, Elsig, 
and Milewicz, 2011; Baccini, Dür, Elsig, 2012a; Kucik, 2012) have pointed out the 
need to analyse the content of trade agreements. Analysing the content of Latin 
American trade agreements requires overcoming issues already pointed out by 
Wignaraja, Ramizo, and Burmeister (2013: 2), including the availability of the 
original agreements, the different languages in which they were written, and the need 
for ‘detailed and often painstaking examination of legal texts of agreements.’ These 
issues are explained further in Chapters 3 and 4. To build the dependent variables in 
this research, intensive (vertical) and extensive (horizontal) margins of deep 
integration, the texts of all available reciprocal trade agreements established by Latin 
American countries and their global and regional partners from 1982 to 2010 were 
gathered, analysed, hand-coded, and checked for reliability with databases which 
partially overlap with the one developed for this research. 
The decision of which trade areas and provisions to include in the analysis is 
based on a wide number of studies (e.g. Piermartini and Budetta 2009; Hicks and 
Kim, 2010; Baccini, Dür, Elsig, and Milewicz, 2011; WTO, 2011) which map the 
variation of provisions in specific areas of trade agreements. The resulting database 
includes 256 dyadic trade agreements with a total of 110 data points collected for each 
agreement (corresponding to the provisions of the different areas and disciplines 
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discussed in Chapters 3 and 4). In this research, the approach to coding uses directed 
dyads because trade agreements often have different provisions for each country 
member. When using undirected dyads, each area of the trade agreement is measured 
by an arbitrary decision which gives the same value to all members of a trade 
agreement or dyad, when this is often not the case. Because the coding is performed 
manually, all entries which overlap with other databases (public or made available on 
request) are compared and checked for errors. To the best of my knowledge, the 
dataset developed for this research is the most extensive and detailed dataset about 
the depth of provisions in trade agreements established by Latin American countries 
and their global and regional partners. 
Decision-making and access as political institutions’ mediation 
This research provides empirical support for the argument that particular structures 
of export oriented interests combine with certain configurations of political 
institutions, influencing in different ways the margins of deep integration which 
differ in the exclusivity of their policy benefits. The research analyses how variations 
in the structure of export sectors create preferences with different intensities for deep 
integration of a certain nature, and how configurations of political institutions create 
settings which restrict or facilitate deep integration by placing limits through veto 
powers, or by channelling particular economic interests in distinctive ways. The 
configuration of veto players influences the way in which the extent of deep 
integration is decided between the political actors which can block the policy, while 
access points also influence the way in which demands for and against deep 
integration are channelled. In this way, the feasibility of export oriented interests to 
overcome obstacles and achieve deep integration depends on the context and settings 
of political institutions. In the case of vertical integration relevant to the trade 
agreement as a whole, the combination of veto players and export oriented producers 
in concentrated export sectors is central. In the case of horizontal integration, 
relevant to specific trade areas and disciplines included in the agreement, the 
combination of access points without veto power in de-concentrated export sectors is 
important. 
Extensions to endogenous trade theory: limited liberalization 
and developing countries 
The endogenous trade theory approach is analytically useful to study demand for 
limited liberalization, such as that existing in trade agreements. This research follows 
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Schonhardt-Bailey (2006: 52-53) in adapting endogenous trade theory to analyse 
trade liberalization. Traditionally, endogenous trade theory has analysed the causes 
of protectionism but more recently has also looked at the causes of liberalization (e.g. 
McGillivray, McLean, Pahre, and Schonhardt-Bailey, 2001; Schonhardt-Bailey, 
2006). Focusing on deep integration in trade agreements as an object of analysis 
allows us to study specific provisions and areas of liberalization. In this research, deep 
integration in trade agreements is the policy outcome of interest. The dependent 
variable is depth of trade agreements established at the national level. Building on 
previous analyses within the endogenous trade theory approach, it is possible to study 
how different combinations of economic interests and political institutions may 
explain the extent and nature of deep integration in trade agreements signed by Latin 
American countries. 
Finally, endogenous trade theory is an approach which can bring insight to the 
analysis of political outcomes of developing countries, in addition to its main 
application to cases of developed countries (e.g. McGillivray, McLean, Pahre, and 
Schonhardt-Bailey, 2001; Schonhardt-Bailey, 2006). In contrast, political 
institutions in the study of public policies Latin America have been neglected in 
favour of economic interests. This emphasis in the academic literature was justified 
during the 1960s and 1970s because of the region’s undemocratic characteristics 
(Geddes, 2002: 343; Spiller, Stein, and Tommasi, 2008: 2). Although comparative 
political institutions, such as party systems, presidential power, and legislative 
politics, in Latin America were analysed after the second half of the 1990s (e.g. 
Shugart and Mainwaring, 1997), further investigation of the influence of institutions 
in the public policies of the region is still necessary (Spiller, Stein, and Tommasi 
2008: 2). There is no study in Latin America that systematically analyses the 
influence of configurations of domestic political institutions over deep integration in 
trade agreements. Geddes (2011: 430) points out that ‘Latin Americanists now use 
rational choice where they find that it helps to explain interesting outcomes, and they 
ignore it when they find it unhelpful.’ In this research endogenous trade theory is 
extended to analyse this aspect of limited liberalization in the region, and the effort 
proves fruitful. Nevertheless, several aspects of the region, such as difficulties in 
tracing political contribution, corruption, and discretional decision making of 
governments, are taken into consideration in this research within more general 
endogenous trade theory and public choice frameworks. 
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Outline 
Chapter 2 presents a literature review, which highlights the gaps in literature relevant 
for this research and correspond to the following four areas. First, the chapter reviews 
several existing concepts of deep integration. Second, theories from which 
preferences of market actors are derived, including standard, ‘new’ and ‘new new’ 
trade theories, are reviewed; the need for studies about Latin America which take into 
consideration the role of economic interests over deep integration is emphasized. 
Third, institutionalism literature, which focuses on either particular institutions or 
conceptual dimensions, is reviewed; the latter are considered to be more appropriate 
for the nature of this research. Finally, collective action explanations are reviewed, 
highlighting the prevalence of studies in Latin America which neglect the study of 
mobilization of economic interests in favour of explanations of trade policy outcomes 
imposed by government officials from top to bottom. 
Chapter 3 explains how deep integration is often used to represent different 
concepts and comprises diverse measures and provisions. This chapter includes two 
main sections. The first conceptualizes deep integration and its vertical and 
horizontal margins. The second provides the rationale for classifying different 
provisions into each of these margins. Chapter 4 presents the operationalization, 
measurement, and empirical analysis, which support the differentiation of both 
margins and the analytical allocation of provisions in each. 
Chapter 5 studies which actors prefer deep integration on the basis of 
maximizing their economic interests. The component of production (Magee, Brock, 
and Young, 1989: 1) in the analysis of the interests which benefit from deep 
integration is discussed. It is argued that exporters, mainly those with scale 
economies and fragmented production, are the main beneficiaries of deep integration 
at both margins because they capture dynamic gains from trade. On the other hand, 
small and medium exporters benefit mostly from integration at the extensive margin 
because they capture static gains from trade. 
Chapter 6 addresses how theories of veto players and access points can be 
combined to analyse the way in which configurations of domestic political 
institutions influence the extent of integration in trade agreements. The integrated 
framework allows this research to address how the demand for deep integration from 
beneficiaries is channelled through domestic political institutions, and how 
institutions control and allocate legislative power, facilitating or creating obstacles to 
limit or expand the extent of integration. 
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Building on the identification of intensive margins, extensive margins, and trade 
preferences, as well as the mapping of institutional settings described above, Chapter 
7 analyses how these elements combine within a collective action framework. The 
analysis considers, first, the production function of deep integration in trade 
agreements; second, the influence of sector (de)concentration in determining the 
capacity of mobilization of members; third, characteristics of the environment, such 
as specificity or mobility; and finally, the selective incentives attached to domestic 
political institutions. Then, these features and the preferences of exporters (derived 
in Chapter 5) are integrated with the combined framework of access points and veto 
players (developed in Chapter 6). In this way, it is possible to assess the ability of 
exporters with different resources to capture veto players and access points and 
achieve their desired nature and levels of deep integration. Chapter 8 presents the 
statistical analyses which tend to provide moderate support for the arguments 
developed in the previous chapters. 
Chapter 9 presents the conclusions of this research. The chapter summarizes 
how the incentives and constraints delineated by the structure of export sectors and 
political configurations in each country combine and contribute to varied levels of 
vertical and horizontal deep integration in trade agreements. The analytical 
framework and arguments are revisited, addressing the contributions and limitations 
of the research. The last section suggests three possible areas for further research. 
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2  Literature review 
This chapter reviews literature which addresses aspects of the main question 
motivating this research: What explains the different nature and levels of deep 
integration in the trade agreements signed by Latin American countries? The 
following sections review endogenous trade theory as an extended general 
framework, of which at least four aspects have been neglected in studies on Latin 
America, or in general. The first section examines the concept of deep integration as 
it is the policy outcome of interest. The different and sometimes divergent concepts 
of what can be considered deep integration in trade agreements are reviewed. Since 
there are very few studies which conceptualize and examine deep integration, studies 
from an eclectic body of literature are included: inter-governmental reports, studies 
within the legalization approach, studies within the rational design approach, and 
studies identifying themselves as within the open economy politics approach, among 
others. 
The second section reviews theories from which preferences of market actors are 
derived. In particular, it reviews the two main sets of complementary trade theories 
used in the political economy literature to explain preferences for trade liberalization 
from market actors: standard trade theories, and ‘new’ and ‘new new’ trade theories. 
As scholars have already pointed out (Mansfield and Milner, 1999: 604; Chase, 2005: 
15), the question of why or under which circumstances some economic interests 
prefer liberalization through trade agreements is a puzzle that has not been explored 
sufficiently:  
‘There is a lack of empirical evidence indicating which domestic groups 
support regional trade agreements, whose interests these agreements serve, 
and why particular groups prefer regional to multilateral trade liberalization’ 
(Mansfield and Milner, 1999: 604). 
The third section reviews institutionalism literature, which studies the effect of 
domestic political institutions on trade policy. Formal political institutions in the 
study of public policies in Latin America have been neglected in favour of economic 
interests, and several scholars (e.g. Spiller, Stein, and Tommasi, 2008: 2; Geddes, 
2002: 343) have pointed out the need to fill this gap in the literature. Two main 
approaches prevail regarding the effect of domestic political institutions on trade 
policy: analyses that focus on particular institutions and those that focus on 
conceptual dimensions (integrating a range of institutions). 
Finally, the fourth section reviews explanations on collective action as to how 
economic interests may overcome problems to achieve their desired trade policy 
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outcomes. As a result of problems of free riding in large groups and collective action 
advantage of protectionist groups, the literature on provision of economic reforms in 
Latin America neglects interests. Instead, it explains economic liberalization as 
implemented from the top (e.g. Haggard and Kaufman, 1992, 1995) by insulated and 
cohesive government elites (Schamis, 1999). Haggard and Kaufman (1992: 157) point 
out that ‘the costs of reform tend to be concentrated, while benefits are diffused, 
producing perverse organizational incentives; losers are well organized while 
prospective winners face daunting collective action problems.’ At the end of the 
1990s, Schamis (1999: 19) pointed out the need to study the way in which ‘interests 
organize and capture decision making arenas to induce governments to withdraw 
from the economy’ in Latin America because this issue was under-theorized. This gap 
in literature has not yet been filled for the study of deep integration. 
Deep integration in trade agreements as policy outcome 
Although Lawrence (1996) coined more than 15 years ago the term deep integration, 
there is still no consensus on or consistency in its use in academic studies. Several 
scholars (e.g. Lawrence, 1996; Evans, Holmes, Iacovone, and Robinson, 2004; 
Shadlen, 2005; Mansfield, Milner, and Pevehouse, 2007; Baccini, Dür, Elsig, and 
Milewicz, 2011; Baccini, Dür, and Elsig, 2012a) have explored the analytical 
distinction between deep and shallow integration in trade agreements, and aim 
mainly to understand the political and economic effects of such arrangements.38 
However, in these analyses, depth represents different concepts and comprises 
diverse measures and provisions, depending on the effects and policy outcomes 
evaluated in each study. 
Few studies conceptually identify what constitutes depth in a trade agreement; 
of those that have, the conceptualization varies widely (e.g. Lawrence, 1996; Evans, 
Holmes, Iacovone, and Robinson, 2004; WTO, 2011; Baccini, Dür, Elsig, and 
Milewicz, 2011; Baccini, Dür, and Elsig, 2012a). Other studies equate depth with type 
of trade agreement (e.g. Mansfield, Milner and Pevehouse, 2007), or with legalization 
and obligation of some of its components, such as enforcement (e.g. Hicks and Kim, 
                                                        
38 For example, Shadlen (2005: 751) explores the ‘perverse’ trade-off between shallow and 
deep integration for developing countries. The argument is that developing countries 
exchange market access for regulatory instruments (such as inward foreign investment and 
intellectual property) that otherwise could be used to promote development. Evans, Holmes, 
Iacovone, and Robinson (2004: 3) evaluate the externalities generated through deep 
integration, to assess trade agreements in terms of welfare creation (or destruction). 
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2010). In other studies, there is no clear definition of what constitutes depth in a trade 
agreement (e.g. Gilligan, 2004). Evans, Holmes, Iacovone, and Robinson (2004: 22) 
provide a checklist of trade related and non-trade provisions which are usually 
associated with deep integration.39 
In addition to analyses of overall depth of trade agreements, other studies 
include partial conceptualization of depth. These approaches can be classified as 
studies which focus on only one component and/or dimension of depth of trade 
agreements, and studies which aggregate several components and/or dimensions of 
depth. Mansfield, Milner, and Pevehouse (2007) and Mansfield and Milner (2012) 
consider types of trade agreements for classification according to depth. Other 
studies characterize depth in an indirect way. For example, Hicks and Kim (2010) 
analyse how the credibility of trade agreements influences trade flows. They 
categorize provisions as contributing to the ‘depth of coverage’ of the trade agreement 
or to the ‘breadth of coverage.’40 A final aspect of variation is whether measures 
outside the borders of countries are related to trade or not. 
It is possible to summarize the different ways in which authors interpret depth 
of trade agreements as different subsets of the following dimensions identified by the 
WTO (2011): intensive (vertical) and extensive margin (horizontal). In the following 
                                                        
39  Evans, Holmes, Iacovone, and Robinson (2004) order aspects about trade agreements 
accordingly to their depth as follows. First, investment protocols and protections that 
facilitate financial and foreign direct investment flows (real and financial capital mobility). 
Second, regulatory harmonization and the elimination of non-tariff barriers to trade. Third, 
movement of labour. Fourth, harmonization of domestic taxes and subsidies. Fifth, 
harmonization of macroeconomic policies. Sixth, creation of institutions to facilitate trade 
integration. Seventh, communications and infrastructure. Eight, harmonization of 
regulations of product and factor markets. Finally, establishment of a monetary union. This 
conceptualization does not distinguish within/outside borders measures, institutional 
characteristics, trade-related measures, or non-trade measures. 
40 Hicks and Kim (2010: 12) analyse how the credibility of trade agreements influences the 
amount of trade flows. As part of the study, the authors categorize provisions of trade 
agreements as contributing to its ‘depth of coverage’ (which would correspond to a vertical 
measure of the depth of some of the extensive disciplines), or to its ‘breadth of coverage’ 
(which corresponds to a combination of within border measures and extensive depth). ‘Depth 
of coverage’ captures ‘the stringency of its enforcement mechanisms.’ The items in this 
category indicate how much room for manoeuvre countries have, and how formalized the 
interactions between the members of the agreement are. This category comprises mechanism 
for solving disputes, escape clauses and dumping clauses. The authors code these provisions 
according to the ‘stringency’ with which they can be invoked, and to how easy it is for a 
government to not comply with the obligations imposed by the agreement. ‘Breadth of 
coverage’ includes ‘the policy requirements [...] on the participant governments.’ In this 
category, the authors include the extent of industrial and agricultural products covered (which 
would correspond to shallow integration as defined previously), and whether technical 
barriers and non-tariff barriers are covered (which would correspond to the extensive margin 
of depth as defined before). 
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sub-sections, each of these categories is discussed and their relevance to the 
intensive/extensive framework of this research is assessed. 
Within/outside border measures 
This research considers whether disciplines and provisions include issues that fall 
within the borders of the members of a trade agreement or outside their borders. 
Along these lines, Lawrence (1996) differentiates shallow from deep integration. 
Deep integration exists when provisions move beyond the removal of border barriers. 
Shallow integration exists when provisions fall within the scope of border measures 
and do not concern domestic policies besides trade liberalization, such as investment 
and international competition (Lawrence, 1996: 8). In some studies, there is no 
differentiation between shallow and deep integration, and instead depth is 
characterized as the aggregated obligations across the following provisions in trade 
agreements: tariffs, services, investments, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, 
public procurement, competition, and intellectual property rights (e.g. Baccini, Dür, 
and Elsig, 2012). 
Regarding within border measures, this research does not analyse variations of 
final levels of tariff liberalization41 for three main reasons. First, the specific policy 
outcome of interest in this research is deep integration. Second, according to the 
provisions of Article XXIV of the WTO, all trade agreements should in general 
significantly liberalize all trade. Finally, and specifically related to Latin America, it 
is widely acknowledged in the literature that Latin American countries have already 
achieved substantial tariff liberalization. Estevadeordal, Shearer, and Suominen 
(2009: 7) explain that trade agreements in the region have not only promoted free 
trade within the region but have also been favourable to the multilateral system. In 
                                                        
41 Estevadoerodal, Shearer and Suominen (2009: 436-437) state that tariff liberalization may 
take place along one of three different regimes (or a combination of them): basket, sectoral 
and preferential tariff approaches. Exceptions and exclusions limit trade liberalization 
irrespective of the regime type of the trade agreement. First, a basket approach assigns all 
products to different categories. Each category has a particular tariff phasing and definitions 
on how to proceed towards their elimination. An appendix includes quantities of tariff rate 
quotas and defines exceptions when they exist. Second, the sectoral approach differentiates 
preferential treatment by using lists of exceptions and separate appendixes or protocols. 
These documents tend to be complex and can include several regimes (such as end-point 
preference margins, residual preferential tariffs, tariff rate quotas, reference quantities, and 
phased reductions of tariffs) simultaneously. Third, the preferential tariff approach uses 
schedules of market access. Products are allocated to the schedules through positive lists. 
Regarding coverage, basket approaches are the most extensive, while preferential approaches 
are the most narrow. 
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addition, regarding trade agreements established by Latin American countries, the 
IADB points out:  
‘The many free trade area and common market agreements have generally 
involved the comprehensive elimination of tariffs on the trade of goods 
among partners, with relatively few exceptions. In effect, regional 
arrangements have established a managed policy environment based on 
reciprocity, within which countries have signalled their commitment to trade 
liberalization by going beyond that which was feasible or desirable at the 
unilateral and multilateral levels. […] Moreover, regional liberalization has 
generally been sustained, even in the face of economic and balance of 
payment problems’ (IADB 2002: 4). 
Distinguishing between within/outside the border measures is relevant for the 
purposes of this research because it refers to the removal of qualitatively distinct 
barriers which therefore may be the outcome of different domestic dynamics, as 
discussed in Chapters 5–8. An additional distinction considered is between trade-
related measures and non-trade ones. 
Trade-related and non-trade measures 
The relevance of this distinction is that tendencies towards liberalization from trade 
and non-trade measures are not necessarily the same. Non-trade measures are often 
included to appease protectionist constituencies. For example, dispute settlement 
mechanisms usually protect the interests of exporters, while non-trade measures, 
such as labour or environmental provisions, usually respond to protectionist efforts 
(Hicks and Kim, 2010). Hicks and Kim identify non-trade issues as provisions 
regarding investment, labour, intellectual property rights, and environment. 
Theoretically and empirically, when analysing depth of trade agreements, the 
literature does not always distinguish between trade and non-trade measures (e.g. 
WTO, 2011; Baccini, Dür, and Elsig, 2012a). Instead, both types of provisions are 
equated and aggregated in general measures of depth. However, since one aim of this 
research is to contribute to understanding how different configurations of interests 
and institutions influence the designed nature and level of depth of trade agreements, 
the qualitative distinction of trade-related and non-trade provisions is relevant and 
is considered in the characterization and operationalization of the intensive and 
extensive margins in Chapters 3 and 4. 
Complementarity with the multilateral trade system 
Depth of provisions of trade agreements are also characterized by their contribution 
to or compatibility with the multilateral system. The studies which follow this 
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approach define depth of provisions by comparing them to provisions existing within 
the multilateral system (e.g. Evans, Holmes, Iacovone, and Robinson, 2004; WTO, 
2011). The objective of these studies is to determine if trade agreements facilitate or 
hamper the further development of the multilateral system. The relationship between 
provisions of trade agreements and the multilateral system is a controversial 
academic debate on its own and falls beyond the scope of this research. 
Exporters’ preferences for deep integration 
Standard trade theories 
Standard trade theories explain that trade occurs as a result of comparative 
advantage in production. Within these theories, two main models prevail. On the one 
hand, in the Stolper–Samuelson version of the Heckscher–Ohlin model, the sources 
of comparative advantage are differences in the intensity of factors and in the 
abundance of factors between countries. Productive factors are very mobile in this 
long-term model. On the other hand, in the Ricardo–Viner model, the sources of 
comparative advantage are productivity differences. This is a short-term model in 
which productive factors are fairly specific. Because these models have distinct 
assumptions about factor mobility changes, they are exclusive as ideal types, but not 
as empirical cases (Ladewig, 2006: 71; Alt, Frieden, Gilligan, Rodrik, and Rogowski, 
1996: 692; Midford, 1993: 562). Is it not surprising then that no consensus exists 
regarding which is the superior model.42 
Factor mobility 
On the extreme characterized by high mobility of factors, the Stolper–Samuelson43 
version of the Heckscher–Ohlin44 model represents a flexible structure of production 
                                                        
42 The Heckscher-Ohlin model has been used to broadly analyse trade policy (e.g. Rogowski, 
1989). The Ricardo-Viner model has been widely used in endogenous tariff literature; and the 
assumptions of this model are also often implicit on literature on tariff setting (Alt, Frieden, 
Gilligan, Rodrik, and Rogowski, 1996: 693). Examples of literature on tariff setting are Pincus 
(1975), Lavergne (1983), Magee, Brock, and Young (1989), Frieden (1991a, 1991b), and 
Grossman and Helpman (1994), among many others. 
43  According to Stolper and Samuelson (1941), assuming constant returns, perfect 
competition and equality of the number of factors to the number of products, an increase in 
the price of a good increases the return of the intensive factor of production, and a decrease 
in the income of the other factor. The implication is that free trade hurts the scarce factor 
owners and free trade benefits them. 
44  The Heckscher-Ohlin or factor proportion theory of trade states that comparative 
advantage arises from differences in factor endowments between countries. Countries’ 
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in which distribution of income and trade preferences for liberalization follow factor 
lines. The model assumes individual factor ownership; in addition, specificity is so 
low that factors of production can move across sectors without cost (Alt, Frieden, 
Gilligan, Rodrik, and Rogowski, 1996: 690). The effects of trade in the distribution of 
real factor rewards are derived from a country’s relative factor intensities (Beaulieu, 
2002: 103). The implication of such high mobility is that factor returns are equalized 
throughout the economy. Trade raises the income of the country’s abundant factor 
and decreases that of its scarce factor. The proprietors of abundant economic factors 
and firms which use such factors intensively in production processes obtain direct 
and indirect benefits from liberalization. With liberalization, income of the abundant 
factor increases directly from the gains from trade and indirectly from the 
redistribution of income away from owners of the scarce economic factor and firms 
that use such factors intensively (Ladewig, 2006: 71). Then, income is distributed 
along factor lines. 
Because income redistribution with individual factor ownership follows factor 
lines, trade preferences follow the same path and trade coalitions form along factor 
or class lines. The standard assumption of factor ownership is that each individual 
owns only one factor of production45 and, therefore, belongs to a defined interest 
group. Membership is dependent on factor ownership and independent of the policy 
outcome (Mayer, 1984: 970). Because trade causes income of the scarce factor to fall 
and that of the abundant factor to rise, the former group prefers to reduce trade, while 
                                                        
abundant factors are cheaper to use in the production of goods, compared to scarce factors. 
Then, capital abundant countries have a comparative advantage in capital intensive goods, 
and countries abundant in labour have an advantage in producing labour intensive goods. 
Therefore, countries export products that are manufactured intensively using their abundant 
factors and import the ones requiring intensively scarce factors. Cohen, Blecker, and Whitney 
(2003: 55-56) claim that the theory requires two very strong assumptions to be logically 
consistent. First, the theory assumes that differences in factor endowments between countries 
are the only economic differences relevant to international trade. Second, the theory assumes 
constant returns to scale. As a result, the Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory predictions are often 
inconsistent with empirical observations. 
45Mayer (1984) demonstrated that, when individuals are allowed to own more than one factor 
of production, trade cleavages form along specific policy outcomes; not along factor lines. 
Mayer relaxes the standard assumption of individual factor ownership by allowing a person 
to own more than one factor of production. Also, factor shares may differ among people. As a 
result, people will not be affected uniformly by a change in tariff. Thus, the number of factor 
owners benefited or disadvantaged by a change of the trade policy instruments is not fixed. 
Each factor owner, depending on her own distribution of factors, will have an optimal 
combination of protection and liberalization. In this way, the structure of factor ownership 
defines the form of competition that each group of factor owners or industries faces. The final 
equilibrium represents the combination of protectionism and liberalization of the median 
factor owner (assuming that the outcome is decided by majority voting). The equilibrium is 
reached when no majority can challenge the final policy outcome. 
LITERATURE REVIEW
 
 
52 
the latter prefers to increase it. As a result, scarce factors demand protection while 
abundant factors demand an increasingly liberal trade environment. In this setting, 
there is empirical evidence that trade policy coalitions form. Rogowski builds upon 
the Heckscher–Ohlin and Stolper–Samuelson theorems and derives a framework of 
trade cleavages based on preferences of market actors along three factors of 
production.46 This model, however, has been criticized for its excessive parsimony, as 
scholars (e.g. Midford, 1993; Ladewig, 2006, Beaulieu, 2002) attribute to it empirical 
anomalies in the analysis of developed countries.47 In response, multi-factor models 
have been developed to improve Rogowski’s model (e.g. Leamer, 1984). When 
detailed mostly extremely, these multi-factor models resemble the specific factors 
model (Midford, 1993). For this reason, this research discusses them with models of 
partial factor mobility. 
Factor specificity 
On the opposite extreme, the Ricardo–Viner model, which is characterized by high 
factor specificity, represents a rigid structure of production in which distribution of 
income and trade preferences towards liberalization follow sector lines.48 This model 
is considered applicable in the short term because factors of production are fixed to 
their particular industry or sector (Beaulieu, 2002: 103) and therefore, cannot move 
towards an economy’s most efficient industries or sectors (Ladewig, 2006: 71; Alt, 
Frieden, Gilligan, Rodrik, and Rogowski, 1996: 690-692). Specific factors act as if 
they are different factors in the Heckscher–Ohlin model (Alt, Frieden, Gilligan, 
Rodrik, and Rogowski, 1996: 692). As a result, trade affects the income of all factors 
                                                        
46 For example, Rogowski (1987, 1989) argues that the expansion of trade and the preferences 
of actors lead to urban-rural conflict in two kinds of economies, and in class conflicts in two 
others. In capital rich economies (abundant in labour and poor in land), the urban sector 
(capitalist and workers) benefit from an expansion in trade, while agriculture remains 
protectionist. In backward economies (land rich, with scarce capital and labour), an 
expansion of trade benefits agriculture, while capital and labour seek protection. In countries 
with low land and labour endowments and abundant capital, class conflict can be expected, 
with labour favouring free trade and landowners and capitalists favouring protection. In 
countries with abundant capital and land, but scarce labour, class conflict can be expected. 
Beneficiaries of liberalization support further free trade policies, while those harmed by free 
trade pursue protectionist measures. 
47  Midford (1993: 536) claims that the ‘simple three-factor model of international trade, 
although offering valuable insight into the political economy of less advanced societies, is 
often confounded by the complex division of labour found in more advanced countries.’ 
Midford also states that the usual methods for measuring factor abundance are not 
appropriate. 
48 Chapter 5 explains in more detail the specific factors model, and argues that this model is 
more appropriate than the mobile factors model for the analysis of Latin American countries 
and the depth of their trade agreements in perfect competition. 
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of an industry (capital and labour) in the same way. Then, conflict arises not between 
factors but between industries: export oriented industries versus industries which 
compete with imports. Because export oriented industries obtain benefits from free 
trade, they favour liberalization; and because import competing industries are 
harmed by free trade, they oppose liberalization. Thus, in a setting of high specificity, 
trade policy preferences follow the lines of export oriented versus import competing 
industries or sectors. 
Partial mobility 
Because countries are located at points between the extremes of high/low factor 
mobility, it is possible that trade preferences are compatible with both models and 
follow both factor and sector lines. Scholars have analysed the implications of 
different variants of partial factor mobility on trade preferences and policy outcomes 
(e.g. Mussa, 1974; Mayer, 1974; Mussa, 1982; Hill and Mendez, 1983; Leamer, 
1984).49 Specific capital follows sector lines towards trade liberalization.50 Regarding 
labour, there is consensus in the literature (e.g. Jacoby, 1992; Alt, Frieden, Gilligan, 
Rodrik, and Rogowski, 1996: 705; Beaulieu, 2001; Beaulieu, 2002: 104; Broz, 2005: 
79; Magaloni and Romero, 2008) that highly skilled workers have greater incentives 
than unqualified workers to support free trade because they have higher degrees of 
specificity to their industries. Regarding mobile factors, some scholars suggest that 
their position is ambiguous and may likely remain inactive, and that their preferences 
depend on consumption patterns or institutional settings. 51  These models 
                                                        
49 A variant of these models (Mussa, 1982; Leamer, 1984) assumes that one of the factors is 
partially mobile between industries and the other factor is completely immobile or completely 
mobile. A second variant (Hill and Mendez, 1983) considers that both factors are partially 
mobile. A third variant (Mayer, 1974; Mussa, 1974) assumes that each industry employs a 
factor that is perfectly mobile and another factor that is immobile. The theoretical existence 
of intermediate specific factors models implies that, empirically, trade policy preferences are 
not necessarily sharply drawn along industries or factors. 
50 Frieden (1991: 430) also noted that high levels of mobility of financial capital tend to 
decrease specific capital by reducing barriers to entry: financial capital can extend funds to 
new firms, decreasing the benefits of pre-existing firms. He also mentions that the role of 
specific capital will never decrease to the point of eliminating completely industry specificity. 
Latin American countries are characterized by recurrent and massive external crises in the 
form of either sudden stops of capital inflows, or large reversals of current account deficits 
(Calvo and Talvi, 2005; Edwards, 2006). Therefore, it seems unlikely that in these countries 
mobile capital can significantly reduce capital specificity. 
51 Concerning mobile factors, scholars suggest that their position is ambiguous and will more 
likely remain inactive. Other authors (Mayer, 1974; Mussa, 1974) argue that preferences 
depend upon consumption patterns. Finally, other scholars (Alt and Gilligan, 1994: 338) 
argue that preferences are also heavily influenced by the institutional setting. 
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undoubtedly suggest that trade preferences of specific factors follow sectors, while 
predictions are less clear for mobile factors. 
Thus, to determine trade preferences towards liberalization and, thereby, 
demand for trade agreements, it is necessary to approximate the location point of the 
analysed countries along the continuum of factor mobility. The empirical implication 
of having a continuum of factor mobility is that different degrees of specificity can be 
compatible with both the Ricardo–Viner and Heckscher–Ohlin models (Alt, Frieden, 
Gilligan, Rodrik, and Rogowski, 1996: 697; Beaulieu, 2002: 104). Then, at different 
gradations of factor specificity, it is possible that trade preferences are compatible 
with both models and follow both factor and sector lines. Unfortunately, specific 
measurements of factor mobility are not available and direct measurement of factor 
mobility can be extremely difficult (Ladewig, 2006). Chapter 5 aims to approximate 
the extreme at which Latin American countries lie within the continuum of factor 
mobility. For this assessment, it is helpful to look first at the characteristics of the 
countries under analysis and to the nature of the trade policy outcome under study. 
Demand for trade agreements 
Even after approximating the position of a country along the continuum of factor 
mobility, standard trade theories do not provide an endogenous rationale for the 
demand for trade agreements over multilateral liberalization. These theories provide 
an endogenous mechanism to derive economic preferences for inter-industry 
liberalization along factor or industry lines to capture static gains from trade. 
However, they provide no explanation as to why market actors would prefer limited 
liberalization (bilateral or mini-lateral) instead of multilateral liberalization. 
According to standard economic theory, in order to maximize economic interests of 
export oriented industries, trade agreements with larger numbers of members are 
better. Because a larger union always produces larger benefits, there is always an 
incentive for export oriented industries to pursue trade liberalization until reaching 
a global scale (Haggard, 1997: 22). Within the theoretical framework, actors 
maximize their economic interests through trade agreements instead of wider 
liberalization under the following situations: first, when producers have a 
comparative advantage regionally but not globally (Chase, 2005); and second, when 
all members of a trade bloc have high comparative costs in an industry (Grossman 
and Helpman, 2002: 208; Chase, 2005). However, in general, from the standard 
trade theories’ perspective, trade agreements can be understood only as a secondary 
alternative to multilateral liberalization. 
LITERATURE REVIEW
 
 
55 
The argument for trade agreements as a secondary alternative to multilateral 
liberalization has been explored widely in the political economy literature (e.g. 
Keohane, 1984; Aggarwal 1985; Oye, 1986; Yarbrough and Yarbrough, 1992; Alt and 
Gilligan, 1994; Haggard, 1997). Two explanations for trade agreements not reaching 
global scale are difficulties in achieving global cooperation and the existence of 
transaction costs. First, trade liberalization at the international level is represented 
in game theory as a prisoner’s dilemma game in which the players have strong 
incentives to defect. In order to provide a theoretical explanation as to why 
multilateral liberalization flourished following the Second World War, despite such 
strong incentives to defect, scholars often point to the existence of a hegemonic 
power, which solves the prisoner’s dilemma game (Yarbrough and Yarbrough, 1992: 
89). Second, it is suggested that high transaction costs hold back wider agreements. 
The theoretical solution to the existence of high transaction costs in global trade is 
the creation of international institutions to solve such costs. However, as the number 
of participants in multilateral negotiations has increased, liberalization has 
stagnated, negotiations have become too complex, and enforcement is poor 
(Haggard, 1997: 22-23). As such, bilateral or mini-lateral trade liberalization is easier 
to achieve because it entails lower transaction costs than the multilateral alternative 
(Schott, 1989: 19-22). Another reason is an irrational preference for regional over 
extra-regional production and rent seeking (Haggard, 1997: 22). For these reasons, 
limited liberalization through trade agreements is sensible as an alternative for 
export oriented industries in several circumstances when multilateral liberalization 
cannot be accomplished. 
‘New’ and ‘new new’ trade theories 
New trade models complement the analysis of standard trade theories, which focus 
on trade between industries of countries abundantly endowed with different factors, 
by focusing on trade within industries of countries abundantly endowed with similar 
factors. The ‘new’ models explain intra-industry trade as an outcome of the existence 
of industries which are able to produce with scale economies, and from the existence 
of a taste for variety in either intermediate products or final goods. In contrast with 
standard trade theories, ‘new’ trade theories cannot predict the direction of trade 
because scale economies are not intrinsic to certain countries (Cohen, Blecker, 
Whitney, 2003: 66). Any country can acquire cost advantages in an industry by 
producing enough output to decrease marginal costs to a competitive level. As a 
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consequence, advantages derived from the exploitation of scale economies can 
change over time. 
During the first half of the 1980s, Helpman and Krugman developed a 
framework which included production with scale returns, taste for variety, and 
comparative advantage based on factor endowments. This enabled a Heckscher–
Ohlin view of inter-industry specialization alongside a scale economy view of intra-
industry trade (Helpman and Krugman, 1985: 132). Although this integrated 
paradigm does not yet have the rigour to replace the standard theories, it is useful as 
an analytical framework for actors’ trade preferences when scale economies exist 
(Chase, 2005: 20), and has already become a typical framework for the study of 
aggregate international trade patterns (Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott, 2007: 
108). The ‘new’ trade models are complementary to standard trade theory in the 
sense that comparative advantage explains specialization between sectors at the 
international level, while scale economies explain specialization between products.52 
As mentioned, product differentiation is one of the assumptions in ‘new’ trade 
theory and can take place in final products or intermediate inputs. The model 
developed by Helpman and Krugman (1985: 132) assumes a demand structure where 
there is taste for variety. Two countries produce different varieties of the product, 
which become imperfect substitutes. Since every variety is demanded in both 
countries, for every pair of countries that produce varieties of the good, we can expect 
intra-industry trade. Differentiated products are not necessarily final products. 
According to Ethier (1979), intermediate products are the inputs in which product 
differentiation is most important. Helpman and Krugman (1985: 212) acknowledge 
the importance of these inputs in the demand for variety: ‘the taste for variety implicit 
in the demand for ever more specialized machine tools, motors, control mechanisms 
and so forth, is a more powerful source of trade and gains from trade than the desire 
of variety by ultimate consumers.’ A relevant difference between the production 
dynamics of intermediate inputs and those of differentiated products is that the first 
give rise to integrated firms (Williamson, 1975). However, because ‘new’ trade models 
                                                        
52  Several conditions in the environment can influence the potential to exploit scale-
economies by industries. Country size has been identified in several studies (e.g. Helpman 
and Krugman, 1985; Milner, 1997; Chase, 2003, 2005), as a variable which influences the 
potential to exploit scale-economies. In smaller countries it is more likely that scale-
economies have not been exploited to their limit. Then, small countries have high incentives 
to realize scale-economies by liberalizing their trade. This explanation seems plausible for 
many Latin American countries, which do not have strong domestic markets (a notable 
exception is Brazil). Therefore, country size is one of the characteristics that are included as 
control variables in Chapter 8. 
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assume identical firms in a monopolistic competitive setting, the models are limited 
in explaining differences in productivity at firm level. 
More recently, ‘new new’ trade theory has introduced heterogeneity in firms’ 
efficiency of integrating differences in productivity between firms. Melitz (2003) 
develops the first and leading model in which trade increases productivity in the most 
efficient firms and improves economic welfare in the two participating countries. 
From an empirical perspective, there is evidence to support significant industry gains 
through inter-firm reallocation and concentration (Falvey, Greenaway, and Yu, 
2011). According to this approach, in a setting of imperfect competition between 
heterogeneous countries and firms, trade liberalization increases the concentration 
of economic benefits in the most productive countries and firms. 
These improvements to ‘new’ trade models do not challenge the analytical 
framework of economic interests because their direction only serves to reinforce the 
argument that larger scale economies obtain more economic benefits from trade 
liberalization. Therefore, from the perspectives of ‘new’ and ‘new new’ trade theories, 
industries with scale economies benefit from trade liberalization as they obtain not 
only the static gains from trade that are acknowledged in standard trade theories, but 
also dynamic gains from trade. Helpman and Krugman mention additional sources 
of gains that benefit industries with scale economies over and above the standard 
gains from trade.53 Own production effects exist when trade leads to an expansion of 
a country’s industries with increasing returns. Increases in scale can be considered 
technological advances that add to the efficiency of the economy. These gains are 
concentrated in industries and, more specifically, in firms that are able to realize their 
scale economies after trade integration expands the market. Recent scholarly work 
on heterogeneous firms suggests that in imperfectly competitive settings, the most 
                                                        
53 Helpman and Krugman (1985) mention three other effects that mainly benefit consumers. 
The first effect takes place at the global level, when country and industry specific external 
economies concentrate production, achieving a larger scale of production worldwide than the 
one that could have been achieved when countries were in autarky. The consequent fall in 
prices is beneficial even for countries that cease their production as a result of trade. The 
second effect is that, assuming free entry and exit, the number of firms decreases and the 
output per firm increases, enhancing competition. These processes lead to consumption 
efficiency (Corden, 1972). The third effect mentioned by Helpman and Krugman consists in 
the benefits that a greater variety of final products provides to consumers. However, mainly 
because of acute collective action problems, consumers’ economic incentives are not a strong 
force for trade liberalization in contrast to producers’ economic incentives. In addition, 
Helpman and Krugman (1985: 263-265) claim that when international competition 
encourages imperfectly competitive firms to reduce their prices and produce more, gains of 
trade also apply at a country level. 
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efficient industries with scale economies accrue further gains from trade 
liberalization. 
Reallocation of steps in productive processes is another dynamic source of gains 
which benefits integrated firms. These firms benefit from even deeper trade 
integration (Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott, 2007). In addition to the profits 
derived from the expansion of the market and from the realization of scale economies, 
such reallocation may increase a firm’s productivity (Falvey, Greenaway, and Yu, 
2011). Integrated firms locate their productive facilities in different parts of the world, 
based on convenience of access to foreign markets, sources of cheap inputs, and other 
competitive reasons (Cohen, Blecker, Whitney, 2003: 69). 
Demand for trade agreements 
The export promotion mechanism explains the apparent contradiction between, on 
one hand, the benefits that industries with scale economies obtain from liberalization 
and, on the other, their demand for limited liberalization through trade agreements 
in a setting of imperfect competition with import protection. Krugman (1984) 
assembled a model in which he demonstrates how import protection can work as an 
export promotion mechanism. In general, the logic of the model is that protection 
provides a domestic industry with greater scale economies while reducing those of its 
foreign competitors. As a result, the domestic industry is more competitive in foreign 
markets because it is able to decrease costs and increase production. Chapter 5 
explains this argument in more detail. 
Political institutions as constraints and channels for deep 
integration 
Models based on particular institutions 
Proportional representation 
Electoral rule is a variable used in several studies to explain trade policy 
outcomes. Rogowski’s (1987) influential argument is that trade dependent countries 
choose proportional representation in order to avoid institutions that can create 
obstacles to trade. 54  The reason is that these institutions maximize the state’s 
                                                        
54 Rogowski (1987: 206) states that ‘the more an economically advanced state relies on 
external trade the more it is drawn to the use of proportional representation, a parliamentary 
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insulation, autonomy, and stability. The logic of the argument is first, that in large 
electoral districts, policy-makers are insulated from interests specific to an industry; 
and second, that high levels of party discipline warrants policy to be controlled by 
party leaders, who are more concerned about national interest that maximize their 
possibilities for re-election or political triumph (Ehrlich, 2007: 573). As a result, 
systems with proportional representation are characterized by higher levels of 
liberalization. McGillivray (2004) analyses how the electoral rule in majoritarian and 
non-majoritarian settings interacts with party discipline, endogenously influencing 
which industries receive tariff protection. Together, ‘the electoral rule and the 
strength of parties affect which industries legislators are able to protect,’ while the 
former only ‘affects which industries legislators want to protect’ (McGillivray, 2004: 
68). 55  Several empirical studies (e.g. Mansfield and Busch, 1995; Grossman and 
Helpman, 2004) support Rogowski’s arguments;56  however, as mentioned in the 
analytical framework, they have been criticized because the causal mechanisms that 
link proportional representation to policy outcomes remains underspecified.  
                                                        
system and large districts, with (presumably) all that that combination entails.’ Ehrlich (2007: 
573) notes that this argument may raise endogeneity concerns since a causal effect may exist 
from trade policy and particular interest groups to domestic political institutions, and from 
the latter to the former. He also points out that Katzenstein (1985) claims that since small 
countries tend to be trade dependent they choose proportional representation systems to 
guarantee trade openness. However, empirical evidence by Boix (1999), demonstrates that 
there is no causal effect between trade openness and the electoral system in a country. 
55 McGillivray (2004) explains that political parties with high discipline levels in majoritarian 
systems offer trade policies that benefit electorally consolidated industries in marginal 
districts. In contrast, political parties with low levels of discipline in non-majoritarian systems 
offer the least favourably trade policies to industries concentrated in marginal districts. Trade 
policies benefit large and electorally dispersed industries. The author finds strong empirical 
support for her arguments by analysing the industry of cutlery, and by studying the cases of 
the United States and Canada. 
56 Mansfield and Busch (1995) analyse the influence of societal and statist variables in cross-
national patterns of nontariff barriers Their findings provide empirical support for Rogowski’s 
arguments that large constituencies and proportional representation systems increase the 
isolation and autonomy of policymakers in democratic countries. First, they find that 
frequency of non-tariff barriers is higher ‘when the imposition of protection is in both the 
national interest and the interest of many pressure groups, and when public officials possess 
the institutional means necessary to advance those interests’ (740). Second, the inclusion of 
the influence of whether the domestic electoral system is a proportional representation system 
or not, has only a substantial effect on tariffs changes. Grossman and Helpman (2004) 
develop a model in which institutional features such as campaigns, elections, and policy-
making are taken into account to determine trade policy. They argue that a protectionist bias 
exists in majoritarian electoral rule. In majoritarian systems where legislators represent 
geographic regions, parties make known policies (either positive tariffs or export subsidies) 
targeting specific factors. Legislators then give disproportionate weight to their constituents 
when setting policy. The role of party discipline is crucial as positions and expected outcomes 
are closer to free trade as party discipline increases. 
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Presidentialism and party discipline 
Another stream of academic work that addresses the influence of specific institutions 
over trade policy outcomes focuses on presidentialism and party discipline. For 
Hankla (2006), the strength of the party (determined by party discipline, 
centralization, and stability) is a central variable which affects the possibilities of 
enactment of free trade policies. 57  In a related line of thought, Nielson (2003) 
explains how strong party leaders and presidents with strong legislative powers are 
able to mediate pressure for protection from domestic interest groups, helping to 
overcome protectionist biases and smoothing the progress of liberalization. 
Nielson argues, first, that both political figures usually pursue public goods, such 
as free trade. Second, delegation to party leaders and executives solves collective 
action problems between political institutions. Third, the executive increases its 
bargaining power at the expense of the legislature, which usually ratifies and 
implements trade policy (Nielson, 2003: 479). The expectations are that presidents 
with more power are able to establish policy outcomes that are closer to their bliss 
points. The less the executive’s power is restricted by the legislature and the more 
substantial authority the executive has, the easier it is to implement the executive’s 
desired policy change without the constraints of societal demands. Nielson presents 
empirical findings in which delegation of legislative power to presidents and party 
leaders is associated with liberalization of trade policy.58 In addition, he presents 
evidence for the effective number of parties and size of electoral districts influencing 
levels of protectionism.  
Political party ideology 
In contrast to developed countries with relatively high mobility of factors, the role of 
political party ideology in long-term trade policy outcomes is not considered as 
relevant in countries with relatively high specificity of factors (such as Latin American 
countries), and short-term policies (such as trade agreements). Milner and Judkins 
                                                        
57 To conceptualize the strength of political parties, besides party discipline, Hankla (2006) 
considers parties degree of organizational centralization and whether it has stable links to the 
electorate. The author explains that centralized parties decrease the likeliness of legislative 
logrolls. As a result, increases in the levels of protection are inhibited. Also, parties with stable 
linkages with the electorate are able to consider long time horizons, and to enact policies with 
long-term benefits, such as trade liberalization. The author finds empirical evidence for his 
arguments in democratic countries from 1995 to 2000. 
58 Nielson (2003) studies 18 developing countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, South Korea, 
Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Uruguay, Venezuela) from 1971 to 1997. 
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(2004) point out that few studies investigate the role of partisanship in liberalization 
of trade. The authors provide two main reasons: first, according to interest-based 
theories, partisanship should have no effect on trade policy outcomes; and second, 
according to international system theories, the country’s trade position is determined 
by the national interest, to which political parties should respond. They find that 
parties positioned on the right of the ideological spectrum pursue more trade 
liberalization positions compared to those positioned on the left. As they explain, 
class cleavages ‘match up with the Stolper–Samuelson division of trade policy 
positions between labour and capital’ (Milner and Judkins, 2004: 98). Nevertheless, 
their findings are based on an analysis of 25 developed countries with high levels of 
factor mobility from 1945 to 1998. This is not applicable to the situation prevalent in 
Latin American countries from 1982 to 2010, in which factor specificity tends to be 
relatively higher because of countries’ level of development. 59  Furthermore, the 
relatively high specificity of the setting is reinforced by the short term nature of the 
effects of trade agreements.60 In the case of relatively high specificity of the setting 
and the policy outcome, parties will not be able to present unified and coherent 
positions towards trade policy (Hiscox, 2002a). Therefore, party ideology seems 
analytically limited to contribute to the analysis of variation in the nature and levels 
of deep integration in the trade agreements of Latin American countries. 
Models based on conceptual dimensions 
Because most Latin American countries share broadly similar institutional 
characteristics (presidential systems and proportional representation) such 
distinctions cannot explain the wide variation of nature and levels of deep integration 
of trade agreements established by each country. In addition, several researchers 
claim that is better to focus on conceptual dimensions than particular institutions 
because the former can characterize a wide range of institutional differences (e.g. 
Lijphart, 1999; Tsebelis, 2002; Mukherjee, Moore, Bejar and Charron, 2006; Ehrlich, 
                                                        
59 For example, following the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, in non-industrialized countries 
parties located towards the left of the political spectrum (representing labour) should be 
relatively more receptive towards demands of liberalization (Ehrlich, 2007: 586-587). These 
expectations contrast with the ones in Chapter 5, which follow the discussion about factor 
mobility in Latin American countries. 
60 The short-term nature of the economic effects of trade agreements, contrasts with the long-
term nature of party ideology. As discussed in further detail in Chapter 5, ‘lobbying on 
particular trade bills should more closely follow the specific factor theorem’ (Ehrlich, 2007: 
586-587). 
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2007: 572).61 In addition, researchers point out that it is very difficult to compare 
interactions in systems with different regimes, legislatures, parties, and party 
systems (Tsebelis, 2002: 1). For the purposes of this research, it seems reasonable to 
look at more encompassing characterization of institutional variation. Two main 
approaches are relevant to analyse the influence of institutions on trade policy 
through conceptual dimensions: access point theory and veto player theory. Both 
approaches are schematically described below, and in more detail in Chapter 6. 
Access points 
As in the analytical framework, access points are defined as actors with power in a 
specific policy sphere; they are susceptible to interest group lobbying. Ehrlich (2007, 
2011) develops a theory about the way in which institutions influence public policy-
making and applies it to explain protectionism. Ehrlich claims that, compared to 
explanations based on the effects of proportional representation and presidentialism, 
access point theory better explains differences in levels of protectionism across 
countries and time. The core argument is that when the number of effective access 
points increases in a political system, competition between them for rents from 
lobbying also increases. This situation leads to a decrease in the costs of mobilization 
for protectionist interest groups, which, because of their assumed collective action 
advantage over liberalizing groups, are able to capture the access points. As a result, 
the level of protectionism increases as well. Ehrlich’s findings support the argument 
that access point theory surpasses theories in which proportional representation and 
presidentialism are the explanatory variables (e.g. Rogowski, 1987; Nielson, 2003), 
because their effects come from their influence over the number of access points in 
the political system.62 
                                                        
61 There are few studies which analyse trade policy using conceptual dimensions, although 
this approach has been fruitful in the analysis of different areas and aspects of public policy. 
For example, Mukherjee, Moore, Bejar and Charron (2006) analyse the influence of time 
horizons of coalition incumbent governments and single party governments over government 
spending, and argue that because the first ones have shorter time horizons they have more 
incentives to increase government spending than the second ones. In turn, Lijphart (1999) 
analyses the dimension of how consensual or majoritarian rules affect policy effectiveness. 
The author finds that there are no significant differences in terms of the performance of both 
systems concerning effective economic policymaking. Nevertheless, he finds that consensual 
systems score significantly higher in terms of democratic quality. The author also places 36 
democracies on a two-dimensional conceptual map of democracy, showing that most of the 
countries occupy stable positions on the map. 
62 Ehrlich’s sample includes post-war developed democracies. The author’s findings are that 
higher tariffs are positively associated with the following aspects: number of effective parties, 
electoral districts; and low levels discipline in the party system. After these variables are 
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Veto players 
Tsebelis’ (1995, 2002) theory of veto player approaches institutional configuration in 
a unified way that allows comparison between different countries and political 
systems. The assumptions of the theory include single peaked preferences, perfect 
information, and no transaction costs. As in the analytical framework, veto players 
are actors whose consent is required to enact legislation that modifies the status quo. 
Therefore, policy stability in general increases as the number, congruence, and 
cohesion of the veto players increase. Empirically, few studies analyse the influence 
of veto players in trade policy. Henisz and Mansfield use veto player theory to explain 
variation in trade policy after deterioration of macroeconomic conditions increase 
protectionist demands from interests groups.63  More specifically, only Mansfield, 
Milner, and Pevehouse (2005, 2007) and Mansfield and Milner (2012), have tested 
the influence of veto players and regime type on the number and scope of trade 
agreements in several studies from 2005. 64  In addition, Mansfield, Milner, and 
                                                        
controlled, proportional representation, does not present an effect over the level of tariffs. 
Lower tariffs are positively associated with presidential systems and right governments. 
63 Henisz and Mansfield (2006) argue that deterioration of macroeconomic conditions leads 
to lower levels of commercial openness depending on the level of institutional fragmentation. 
Also, that macroeconomic factors have a larger effect on trade policy when the analysed 
country is a democracy. The authors test their arguments on 60 countries over the period from 
1980 to 2000 finding strong support for their arguments. More recently, Pelc (2009) analyses 
the distribution of power within the state (measured by the number of veto players in the 
system) to study variation in overhang among states. The author argues that a large number 
of veto players increases uncertainty over how trade policy will evolve after the establishment 
of the agreement. For this reason, executives are willing to sacrifice flexibility and decrease 
the level of bound tariffs. The large number of powerful actors also means that there will be 
more points for lobbying, and this will increase the applied tariff. As a result, the net influence 
of veto players is to decrease binding overhang. 
64  Mansfield, Milner and Pevehouse (2005), and Mansfield and Milner (2012) analyse 
through statistical regressions from 1950 to 2000 all pairs of countries to demonstrate that 
regime type and veto players influence the likelihood of countries to sign trade agreements, 
and the type of agreement in which they engage. The authors argue that veto players tend to 
oppose trade agreements because they may reduce their influence over trade policy. Therefore, 
governments with small numbers of veto players are more likely to sign trade agreements. 
The authors code the type of agreements nominally. This may not be adequate for the Latin 
American reality. This research considers that veto players may agree on the denomination of 
a trade agreement, as long as they are unaffected by its specific provision, leading to 
agreements with lower levels of integration irrespective of their type. The authors use the 
political constraints index developed by Henisz (2002) that ‘measures the presence of 
effective branches of government outside of the executive’s control, the extent to which these 
branches are controlled by the same political party as the executive and the homogeneity of 
preferences within these branches’ as a proxy for veto players (17). However, this is a general 
measure relevant for all policy areas. For example, a large number of veto gates and 
heterogeneous veto players at the judicial or sub-federal branches of government are not 
relevant to the formation of deeper trade agreements, and may obscure the empirical analyses. 
In Chapter 8 an approach inspired in Henisz measure, but which focuses in the veto players 
relevant for deep integration in trade agreements is preferred. 
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Pevehouse (2007) have integrated veto player theory in a two-level game model.65 In 
these studies, the main argument regarding the influence of veto players over trade 
agreements is that a higher number of such players increases the possibility that some 
of their constituents can be damaged by a trade agreement and, therefore, less and 
narrower agreements are formed. 
Overcoming the costs of collective action 
Characteristics of the group 
The first problem that a large group of exporters faces when demanding deep 
integration is that they find it extremely difficult to organize. This explanation is 
provided by Olson (1965), who argues that concentrated industries find it easier to 
engage in collective action because they have small numbers of heterogeneous firms. 
Empirical evidence for the effect of industry concentration on business political 
activities is mixed. For example, regarding the effect of industry concentration on 
business activities in general, Pittman (1977) finds that concentration affects levels of 
industrial contribution; Schuler, Rehbein and Kramer (2002) find that industry 
concentration promotes the diversification of firms’ political approaches and 
methods; Zardkoohi (1985) finds minimal influence of industry concentration on the 
level of campaign contributions. In addition, there is lack of consensus regarding 
industry and geographic concentration. Pincus (1975) finds that industry 
concentration and geographic de-concentration positively influence establishment of 
protectionist measures, while Saunders (1980) also finds that industry concentration 
positively influences protection. In contrast, Caves (1976) finds a negative 
relationship between industry concentration and tariff protection; and Lavergne 
(1983) and Baldwin (1985) find that the influence of market concentration on tariff 
protection is insignificant. 
                                                        
65 Mansfield, Milner and Pevehouse (2007) integrate veto player theory in a two-level-game 
model. The argue that domestic divisions increase the difficulties to form trade agreements at 
international bargaining processes because said agreements require policy changes. Their 
model compares the outcomes that are possible in a given structure of preferences to the 
outcomes that are possible when a veto player is added to that first structure. The probability 
of reaching an agreement decreases with the addition of at least one veto player, in 
comparison to the same scenario with no additional veto players. The authors perform several 
regression analyses over simulated data of random ‘countries’ in which the number of veto 
players varies. Further analyses are developed in data of 194 countries over almost 50 years 
from 1950. The authors' results support the argument that as the probability of reaching an 
agreement decreases, the number of veto players increases. 
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The second problem that inhibits mobilization of interest groups to exert 
pressure towards liberalization is that protectionist groups are considered to have a 
collective action advantage over pro-liberalization groups. Traditionally, in public 
choice theory, protectionist groups are portrayed to find it easier to organize for 
collective action than trade liberalization supporters because costs from liberalization 
tend to concentrate on import competing industries, while benefits are diffused.66 
However, the main argument, that protectionist groups have a collective action 
advantage over pro-liberalization groups, considers only the setting of perfect 
competition. When taking scale economies into account, the argument ‘is turned on 
its head’ (Schonhardt-Bailey, 2006: 50) because industries with scale economies 
benefit from static and dynamic gains from trade. In addition to the expansion of the 
market, industries with larger returns to scale benefit more from their ability to 
realize scale economies through the exploitation of a larger market share 
(Schonhardt-Bailey, 2006: 53). Scholars (e.g. Milner, 1988; Gilligan, 1997; 
Schonhardt-Bailey, 2006) have presented evidence that industry concentration 
contributes to explaining that free traders are able to overcome collective action 
problems and organize to lobby for their desired trade policies. 
Characteristics of the setting 
In addition to industry concentration, geographic concentration has been analysed; 
and its role in solving collective action problems is controversial. On the one hand, 
geographic concentration facilitates solving collective action problems because it 
reduces costs that hamper organization, such as transportation and information 
costs. Therefore, the more geographically concentrated the industry, the greater the 
probability that its firms organize (Olson, 1965). From this perspective, the 
combination of industry concentration and geographic concentration facilitates the 
organization of groups and increases their political effectiveness. On the other hand, 
Pincus (1975) acknowledges that industry concentration facilitates lobbying, but 
                                                        
66 Other arguments not directly related to industries’ characteristics are the following. First, 
Ehrlich (2007: 581) mentions that the incentive for exporters to lobby is weakened by the 
association between domestic and foreign reduced tariffs. Second, Goldstein and Martin 
(2000) explain that exporters do not lobby against protection because they are not aware 
whether they will be targets of retaliation after the country imposes protectionist measures. 
Finally, Pincus (1975) argues that there is no support for liberalization in final goods besides 
consumers, for which is difficult to engage in collective action. Users of a product (particularly 
a finished product) have a negligible influence on trade policy outcomes and generally require 
a higher threshold for action than producers. 
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claims that in a setting with geographical representation, geographic de-
concentration has a political effectiveness effect on legislation that may overshadow 
the difficulties that this characteristic poses for organization. 67  However, 
Schonhardt-Bailey (2006: 52) argues for an alternative68 that allows us to accept 
Pincus’ argument without contradicting Olson. Organization to demand 
liberalization is achieved by the fusion of a core export industry exhibiting both 
geographic and capital concentration, and a broader export sector which is relatively 
geographically de-concentrated. 
In addition to geographic (de)concentration, characteristics of the environment, 
such as factor specificity of the economy and the institutional setting of the country, 
play an important role in influencing the costs of collective action. A setting of high 
specificity of factors increases excludability and decreases free-riding (Alt and 
Gilligan, 1994: 334-336). In an environment with high factor mobility, the gains from 
trade are distributed between all factor owners, regardless of the industry in which 
they are employed. Non-participants cannot be excluded from benefits, which creates 
many opportunities for free-riding. In contrast, when factors are highly specific, the 
gains from a specific trade policy benefit only the specific factors employed in the 
targeted industry. 
Regarding the institutional setting, political institutions and the characteristics 
of the actor that takes decisive actions on trade policy have been studied as factors 
that influence the feasibility of groups to engage in collective action. For example, 
research shows that in countries in which trade policy decisions depend on 
majoritarian institutions, benefits have to be more broadly dispersed than in non-
majoritarian systems to make the policy politically viable (Alt and Gilligan, 1994: 
338). In addition, because democracies have a more encompassing interest in society 
than non-democracies, it has been found that the former generate public policies that 
benefit the interests of the majority and reflect the primacy of citizens in the allotment 
of institutional political power (McGuire and Olson, 1999; Acemoglu and Robinson, 
                                                        
67 According to Pincus’ (1975) perspective, the combination of industry concentration and 
geographic de-concentration facilitate successful lobbying. In a system with geographic 
representation, industries that are geographically more evenly distributed have constituents 
in a larger number of electoral districts. This characteristic reduces the bargaining costs 
among legislators and makes easier the enactment of protection. 
68  Schonhardt-Bailey (2006) explains that the fusion of industry and sector is critical to 
overcoming the problem of organization created by Pincus’ model of geographic de-
concentration. In a setting with geographical representation, the combination of industry 
concentration and geographic de-concentration creates the ideal lobby group towards 
liberalization. 
LITERATURE REVIEW
 
 
67 
2006). The influence of the institutional setting over deep integration in trade 
agreements has not been studied yet. This gap is addressed in Chapters 7 and 8. 
Conclusion 
The literature review offers different paths and lessons for research in the field of 
trade agreements. Here, we recall the main aspects of each area. First, further 
research with a relatively more consensual approach to deep integration is necessary 
to accumulate knowledge and better understand the content of trade agreements. In 
the studies reviewed, it is possible to identify two dimensions of a different concept 
(institutional depth and extensive depth), and two other dimensions which include 
opposing outcomes for the same concept (within/outside border measures, 
trade/non-trade measures). As a first attempt to aggregate this rich knowledge, 
Chapter 3 integrates the relevant overlapping features into a classification of 
intensive and extensive margins to build the dependent variables of this research.  
Second, there is a gap in the literature in analysing which interests and under 
which circumstances deep integration is demanded in trade agreements in Latin 
America. Research on the role of economic interests in trade liberalization has 
focused on different instruments, such as tariffs, quotas, non-tariff barriers, and 
trade agreements, mainly in developed countries. To clarify the preferences of market 
actors of the region towards static gains from trade, it is necessary to approximate 
the approximate location of Latin American countries in the factor mobility 
continuum, and then derive such preferences from the appropriate standard trade 
theory. To understand preferences of market actors towards dynamic and 
productivity gains from trade, preferences should be derived from the ‘new’ and ‘new 
new’ trade theories reviewed. The location of Latin American countries in the factor 
mobility continuum is presented in Chapter 4. In addition, the preferences of small 
and medium exporters towards static gains from trade and the preferences of 
resourceful and ‘large’ exporters towards dynamic and productivity gains from trade 
are derived also in Chapter 4.  
Third, there is no study yet that systematically analyses the influence of 
configurations of domestic political institutions over deep integration in trade 
agreements in Latin America. The main study (Nielson, 2003) about liberalization in 
the region focuses in presidentialism. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this research, 
an approach based on conceptual dimensions seems more appropriate because Latin 
American countries share very broadly similar institutional characteristics. The two 
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main approaches which seem most relevant to analyse the influence of institutions 
on trade policy through conceptual dimensions are access point theory and veto 
player theory. These approaches are discussed and combined into an integrated 
framework in Chapters 6 and 7.  
Finally, the fourth section reviews explanations about collective action, 
specifically how economic interests may overcome their problems to achieve their 
desired trade policy outcomes. Explanations about free-riding in large groups, and 
assumptions about collective action advantage of protectionist over liberalizing 
groups, have prevailed until the development of new explanations, which consider 
imperfect competition and collective action advantage of resourceful key exporters. 
Several characteristics of the environment have been taken into consideration when 
evaluating the conditions that may influence costs of mobilization towards free trade 
for interest groups. As in the analytical framework, the influence of the institutional 
setting to channel societal demands is an area which is usually highlighted as a 
weakness of endogenous trade theory. Accordingly, the way in which the institutional 
setting mediates the demands of deep integration in trade agreements in Latin 
America has not been studied yet. This gap is addressed in Chapters 7 and 8.  
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3  Intensive and extensive margins of deep 
integration 
For more than 15 years, deep integration in trade agreements has been a recurring 
topic for politicians and scholars. There are continuous news reports about the efforts 
of political leaders to pursue deep integration. There are also continuous mentions 
about the creation of treaties and adoption of new mechanisms to achieve deep 
integration. However, there is no clarity on what deep integration is and how it can 
be assessed. In general, despite extensive literature about regional trade integration, 
there is a lack of knowledge about the actual content of trade agreements (Smith, 
2000: 137; Teh, Prusa, and Budetta, 2009: 166-167). Recently, researchers have 
started to study the texts of trade agreements to analyse variations in their provisions. 
Considering the text and not just the existence of a trade agreement provides a 
relatively more comprehensive picture (Hicks and Kim, 2010: 17). Since variation 
across treaties is purposeful, not random (Allee and Peinhardt, 2010: 8),69 focusing 
on the legal texts of such agreements is a sensible approach in this research. 
Lack of understanding about deep integration seems to be a consequence of the 
neglect in the literature of the content of trade agreements. For example, the WTO 
states in a recent report that:  
‘There is no agreed definition of the scope of such deep agreements, and 
indeed the concept is widely used to refer to any arrangement that goes 
beyond simply extending preferential tariff concessions’ (WTO, 2011: 110). 
Conceptualizing deep integration is the first step towards explaining the wide 
variation in the levels of depth of the trade agreements that have been established by 
Latin American countries since the region moved towards ‘open regionalism.’ 
Although depth of trade agreements has been a variable of great interest in academic 
analyses, their conceptual use of depth is inconsistent (as outlined in Chapter 2), 
making aggregation of knowledge problematic. Deep integration is often used to 
represent different concepts and comprises diverse measures and provisions. 
This chapter provides the rationale for dividing deep integration into its vertical 
and horizontal margins, and for classifying different provisions into each of these 
                                                        
69  Allee and Peinhardt (2010) also mention that trade and investment agreements are 
carefully negotiated by signatories and they deliberately include or exclude components (8). 
In the same order of ideas, according to the WTO (2011: 129-130), the way in which provisions 
are formulated ‘reveals its intention and the extent to which it declares legal obligations and 
rights.’ Finally, Hicks and Kim (2010: 17) mention that the legal texts of trade agreements are 
meaningful to both, governments and economic actors. 
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margins. The concept of depth that is used in this research to assess deep integration 
is explained, since there is no consensual guidance which would allow comparisons 
between the levels of depth achieved in the agreements established by Latin American 
countries. Based on academic literature, in the first section of this chapter, the 
variable and its primary dimensions are conceptually identified. Deep integration is 
decomposed into its intensive (vertical) and extensive (horizontal) margins. In the 
second section, the features and provisions relevant to each margin are identified. 
Aspects covered at the intensive margin are trade agreement type, decision power, 
institutional capacities, legitimacy, and permanency. Areas covered at the extensive 
margin are coverage of rules of origin, services, technical barriers to trade, 
competition policy, government procurement, trade defence instruments, and 
discipline-level support and enforcement mechanisms. 
Margins of deep integration in trade agreements 
Deep integration is not a unified concept. To assess variation of depth, an adequate 
approach would be to expand the characterization of depth suggested by the WTO 
(2011), which distinguishes between intensive (vertical) and extensive (horizontal) 
margins. The most important reason for using this classification as a general basis for 
the categorization of depth is that its analytical division reflects the dimensions 
considered in the definition of depth. In general, depth is defined as ‘the distance 
from the top or surface to the bottom of something; or the quality of being intense or 
extreme’ (Oxford Dictionaries, 2014). The quality of being intense or extreme is 
assessed for both margins; and, while the extensive margin corresponds to the 
horizontal distance, the intensive margin corresponds to the vertical distance. 
It is possible to find other characterizations of depth in academic literature, as 
reviewed in Chapter 2, but they seem to consider features which qualify provisions at 
the extensive margin and/or which are not applicable to the intensive one. The 
intensive aspect refers to the institutional depth of trade agreements; the extensive 
aspect refers to the inclusion of additional components beyond the lowering of tariffs 
in a trade agreement (WTO, 2011). In the studies reviewed in Chapter 2, it is possible 
to identify two dimensions which represent a continuum of a different concept 
(institutional depth and extensive depth), and two other dimensions that include two 
opposite outcomes for the same concept (within/outside border measures, 
trade/non-trade measures). For the purposes of this research, as discussed in the 
analytical framework, in addition to the intensive and extensive margins, only outside 
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border measures and trade-related provisions 70  are considered in the margins; 
however, other aspects identified in previous studies are included as control variables 
in Chapter 8. 
The main criterion to classify trade provisions and areas identified in other 
studies as corresponding to either the intensive or extensive margins is whether they 
regulate aspects of the whole agreement or add specific areas and disciplines. As 
detailed in Chapter 4, the emphasis is on substantial provisions, rather than 
principles or best-endeavour initiatives. To assess the depth of each margin, this 
research expands the classification suggested by the WTO (2011) by incorporating 
trade provisions and features identified as promoting trade integration in other 
studies. 71  Figure 3.1 illustrates the aspects which this research considers most 
relevant for each margin. 
At the extensive margin, it is possible to find provisions which expand the scope 
of coverage of the agreement. Assessing the extensive margin is more complex than 
evaluating the intensive one because there are more analytical distinctions to 
consider in specific areas and disciplines than in those applicable to a trade 
agreement as a whole. To evaluate the extensive margin, two main aspects are 
considered. The first is the inclusion and, where applicable, the scope of coverage of 
disciplines and trade-related areas in the agreement. At this point, a distinction is 
made between two types of provisions: provisions designed to reduce obstacles to 
trade flows between members, such as regulations to competition, and provisions 
which limit governments’ capacities to use reactive protectionist instruments, such 
as anti-dumping measures. 72  The second aspect is the inclusion of mechanisms 
                                                        
70 As mentioned in the literature review, disciplines and areas which have been categorized in 
academic literature as not directly related to trade are not included as part of extensive depth. 
Hicks and Kim (2010) classify as non-trade areas investment, intellectual property, labour 
and environment. In this research, these areas were coded and measured to be included as 
control variables in the empirical analysis in Chapter 8. 
71 This research selects areas and provisions which have already been identified in other 
studies. The objective is to avoid bias in the dependent variable, as suggested by King, 
Keohane, and Verba (1994). 
72 In this research, the aspect being measured is the extent to which governments place limits 
to their own capacity for reacting when they face unexpected conditions which harm domestic 
producers. Then, limits to flexibility are also being measured. Therefore, provisions which 
reduce obstacles to trade flows between members, and tighten limits to use reactive 
mechanisms have both the objective of reducing barriers to trade flows. From this perspective, 
both mechanisms follow the same direction. Therefore, if trade agreements score higher in 
one area and less in the other, this does not present problems for the analysis. Nevertheless, 
it does constitute an additional aspect of variation which is an interesting area for further 
research. Teh, Prusa, and Budetta (2009: 167-168) mention that the argument that there is a 
trade-off between flexibility and obligation is based on the idea that including trade remedy 
provisions creates a escape-valve for domestic interests’ pressure over government officials. 
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designed to support, review, and/or enforce the correct implementation of the 
provisions included in the agreement. At the intensive margin, it is possible to find 
mainly provisions related to the institutional framework of the agreement. The 
contribution of these provisions to the intensive margin of an agreement is assessed 
regarding the degree to which they set rules about the institutional scope and 
capacities of the agreement, and the nature of such institutions. Both areas influence 
expectations about the effectiveness of the agreement in achieving substantial trade 
liberalization between the members of the agreement. An implication of this 
characterization is that the benefits of the provisions at the intensive margin are less 
excludable than those at the extensive margin. 
Figure 3-1 General composition of intensive and extensive margins of depth 
 
Source: Elaborated by the author. 
                                                        
The release of pressure may prevent a potential setback of the reductions in trade barriers 
which have been achieved. Nevertheless, empirical evidence to support this argument has not 
been conclusive. 
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Composition of the intensive margin 
The classification of provisions into intensive and the extensive margins is based on 
the applicability of a provision to either the trade agreement as a whole or to specific 
sectors and trade areas, respectively. The contribution of the provisions included at 
the intensive margin is assessed regarding the general capabilities and nature of 
institutions. Therefore, the next sub-sections discuss provisions in these two areas: 
first, type of agreement, decision power, and institutional capacities, which refer to 
the capabilities of the institutions of the trade agreement; second, legitimacy and 
permanency, which refer to the nature of such institutions. 
Type of agreement, decision power, and institutional capacities 
Type of trade agreement is a useful simplification for assessing the general depth of 
trade agreements in previous studies (e.g. Mansfield, Milner, and Pevehouse, 2007; 
WTO, 2011). The type of trade agreement is central in defining the basic framework 
of the scope and level of commitments between its members. The different levels of 
such commitments and scope can be clustered in three categories, depending on the 
institutional requirements placed on country members: free trade agreements; 
custom unions and common markets; and monetary unions and economic unions.73 
As a starting point, type of trade agreement is still a useful categorization because 
agreements with broader mandates contribute more to the intensive margin than 
agreements with narrower mandates. However, trade agreements of the same type 
may differ in the depth at their intensive margin depending on how binding are their 
decision-making prerogatives. Including only type of agreement to evaluate the depth 
of the general institutional framework would be equivalent to considering all 
agreements corresponding to a same type as having the same level of depth. 
Following this line of thought, it is considered that when decisions are binding, they 
add the most to the intensive margin of trade agreements of the same type. 
In addition, the intensive margin is considered to be more profound when 
institutions have a broader scope of institutional capacities, which may range from 
cooperation activities to substantive trade-related decisions. Effectiveness of trade 
institutions and their contribution to the intensive margin increase when the costs of 
trade are reduced and less discretion in decision making exists. These two conditions 
are possible when institutions with strong decision powers are in place (Hicks and 
                                                        
73 A description of each of these different types and their operationalization is presented in 
Chapter 4. 
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Kim, 2010: 14). In addition, the integration process may likely advance more swiftly 
when institutions endowed with more decision powers are in place, compared to a 
situation in which weak institutions exist (IADB, 2002: 88). Therefore, to assess the 
intensive margin, the evaluation of the general institutional framework of the 
agreement should not only include the institutions associated with the type of the 
agreement. Other aspects that should be also considered are legitimacy and 
permanency. 
Legitimacy and permanency 
The legitimacy of an agreement 74  is an attribute which influences the potential 
effectiveness of institutions, and therefore, influences the potential level of the 
intensive margin. Legitimacy of a trade agreement can be understood as ‘the belief 
that an organization rightfully has the authority to make and carry out decisions’ 
(Lynch, 2010: Kindle Locations 622-628). Institutions established with more 
legitimacy are more capable of resisting the pressure of interest groups towards 
deviating from their trade liberalization commitments; therefore, they are more 
effective than other institutions established with less legitimacy (IADB, 2002: 90). In 
addition, when legitimacy enhances institutions’ capabilities to isolate from domestic 
group pressure, this provides credibility and allows trade agreements to function 
better as commitment devices (Hicks and Kim, 2010). Then, trade agreements that 
require ratification by all parties are considered to be deeper than other trade 
schemes that go into effect just after signature. Similarly, clearly specified procedures 
for future amendments which require more legitimacy are interpreted as agreements 
with deeper intensive margins than those which only require, for example, the 
agreement of the executive of each member country. 
Finally, permanency of the agreements influences their degree of depth at the 
intensive margin. Permanency increases the credibility of agreements’ institutions by 
limiting space for discretion; if renewal of agreements was required, political leaders 
could succumb to domestic political pressure or changes in long-term preferences 
(Hicks and Kim, 2010: 16). As discussed, credibility increases the effectiveness of a 
                                                        
74 Hicks and Kim (2010: 40) include decision powers, legitimacy and permanency as part of 
the category of depth of coverage, along with other components of extensive liberalization. 
However, for the purposes of this research, they are considered features which allow 
qualifying intensive depth. The main reasons are that decision powers, legitimacy and 
permanency are characteristics of the institutions of trade agreements, not additional areas 
that extend the coverage of trade agreements (as the areas of extensive liberalization do). 
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trade agreement. Therefore, agreements which clearly state their continuation in 
force until a party withdraws are considered to have the highest level of depth. 
Composition of the extensive margin 
Evaluating the extensive margin is more analytically complex than assessing the 
intensive margin. The next sub-sections discuss, first, the scope of coverage of 
disciplines and trade-related areas in the agreement, and the limits to protectionist 
instruments used by governments when circumstances are not favourable; and 
second, the mechanisms and/or regional bodies created with the objectives of 
providing support or enforcement to the discipline-level provisions included in the 
agreement. The provisions included correspond to areas relevant to all trade 
agreements, such as rules of origin, and to other ‘outside the border’ areas which are 
not always included in such agreements. 
Coverage of trade-related areas 
Three aspects are considered to evaluate coverage of trade liberalization and 
facilitation measures: inclusion of the analysed trade-related area or discipline in the 
text of the agreement; removal of trade barriers between members; and the extent to 
which the relevant area or discipline decreases transaction costs of trade between 
members. In general, in several of the areas discussed below (rules of origin, services, 
technical barriers to trade, competition, and government procurement), transaction 
costs are reduced when the objectives of the provisions included are to reduce the 
specificity requirements and regulations, or to increase flexibility in their application. 
Rules of Origin 
Provisions that regulate the application of rules of origin are included in most trade 
agreements established by Latin American countries. Rules of origin are ‘laws, 
regulations, and administrative procedures which determine a product’s country of 
origin’ (WTO, 2013). Rules of origin are necessary in free trade agreements in order 
to prevent abuse of trade preferences by countries which are not members of the 
agreement (e.g. making a non-substantive change to a product in a country member 
of an agreement and then exporting it to another country member) (Evans, Holmes, 
Iacovone, and Robinson, 2004: 12; Lynch, 2010: Kindle Locations 712-731). Official 
origin is relevant for the application of tariffs and also for the implementation of 
provisions in other trade areas included in trade agreements, such as anti-dumping 
and countervailing duties, safeguard measures, discriminatory quantitative 
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restrictions, tariff quotas, and government procurement (Estevadeordal, Harris and 
Suominen, 2009: 4). Because there are no international regulations on rules of origin, 
these are established at the discretion of the members of a trade agreement (Heydon 
and Woolcock, 2009: 34). Governments’ discretion to establish detailed and specific 
rules of origin is often used for protectionist and discriminatory purposes.75 As a 
result, systems of rules of origin in trade agreements are characterized by extreme 
complexity which increases the transaction costs of trade for businesses and 
governments. 
The complex processes to determine origin also place limitations for measuring 
the influence of product/industry specific rules on the extensive margin. Provisions 
on rules of origin can be designed at the framework/regime level or at the 
product/industry level. Rules of origin can be non-preferential or preferential. 76 
Preferential product/industry level rules are often defined in extreme detail. In some 
cases, rules of origin are established at even higher than six-digit tariff headings and 
with variations in the method to assess that a substantial transformation77 has been 
performed (Heydon and Woolcock, 2009: 36).78 Ideally, to measure the contribution 
                                                        
75 The complexity of rules of origin is more acute when preferential rules are also used as 
instruments of protectionism besides their purpose of guaranteeing that preferences are only 
used by members of the agreement. Lynch (2010, Kindle Locations 712-731) explains that 
having complex regimes of preferential rules of origin allows countries ‘to more effectively 
discriminate against non-members.’ In addition, Evans, Holmes, Iacovone, and Robinson 
(2004) argue that these rules can also be used to shield production linkages between members, 
acting as de facto non-tariff barriers on imported intermediate products. 
76 Preferential rules of origin determine the criteria for considering a product as originating 
in the region and determine its eligibility for preferential treatment. Non-preferential rules 
establish the official origin of the product (Estevadeordal, Harris and Suominen 2009: 4). 
77 ‘Wholly obtained’ and ‘substantial transformation’ are the two standards, recognized by the 
World Customs Organization and its Revised Kyoto Convention, commonly used to assess 
origin. Substantial transformation can require changes in the product’s tariff classification, or 
minimum percentages of inputs, transformations which must originate or take place within 
the members of the preferential agreement (Estevadeordal, Harris and Suominen, 2009: 4; 
Lynch, 2010: Kindle Locations 712-731). 
78 Lynch (2010: Kindle Locations 731-756) exemplifies with auto and textiles provisions in 
NAFTA the complexity of systems of rules of origin in a single agreement. ‘NAFTA’s auto 
provisions use tracing and the net cost of production […] This is dizzying, and this is only one 
portion of one economic sector. Other rules of origin require that certain steps in the 
production process be within the RTA [regional trade agreement] for preferential tariff 
treatment. In NAFTA’s textile and apparel sector, for instance, the general RoO [rule of origin] 
is ‘yarn forward'—requiring textile products to be cut and sewn in North America from fabric 
woven or knit in North America with North American–spun yarn from either North American 
or non-North American fibers. But even this level of specificity is a vast simplification. There 
are significant deviations from this RoO within the textile and apparel sectors, including both 
more stringent requirements to use only North American fibers for some products and more 
lenient requirements for others. And there are numerous other caveats to add to NAFTA’s 
RoO requirements: tariff preference levels (TPLs), which allow a quota of a product to receive 
preferential NAFTA tariff rates while imports beyond this quota face higher MFN [most 
favoured nation] tariff rates. Yet another RoO provision for textiles and apparel production in 
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of rules of origin to the extensive margin, product/industry specific rules and 
regime/framework rules would be analysed. However, the extreme detail of 
product/industry rules makes the collection and systematization of data unfeasible79 
for the number of agreements studied in this research within the existing resources 
and time constraints. Although the material restrictions described place clear limits 
on the analysis of the rules of origin, the analysis of variations of framework/regime 
wide rules can provide valuable insight because of their cross-cutting and wide 
influence on the productive sectors of the countries studied. 
Framework/regime wide variation of rules of origin takes place along three main 
lines: de minimis, cumulation, and certification. This analysis focuses on the extent 
to which complexity of rules of origin is counterbalanced in a trade agreement by 
allowing more flexibility in their application, by encompassing a wider geographic 
scope in the incorporation of inputs, and by requiring a reduced number of instances 
in the process of certification of origin. First, it is considered that the extensive 
margin increases with flexibility of the system of rules of origin in place. De minimis 
and cumulation regulations provide flexibility in the application of product/industry-
specific rules. The de minimis rule gives flexibility in content requirement measures 
by considering the proportion of inputs and processes not originating within the 
preferential agreement in a product (Estevadeordal, Harris and Suominen, 2009: 5). 
Therefore, agreements with higher thresholds of non-member inputs contribute 
more to the extensive margin than agreements with lower thresholds or than 
agreements which do not contain de minimis rules. 
In addition, agreements are considered deeper when they allow extended 
cumulation than when they only allow bilateral cumulation. Through cumulation 
rules producers of countries which are members of the agreement incorporate in their 
products or processes inputs from other members of the agreement (bilateral 
cumulation) or certain inputs from countries which are not members of the 
agreement (extended cumulation) (Estevadeordal, Harris, and Suominen, 2009: 6).80 
                                                        
NAFTA is the de minimis standard. If textiles and apparel products do not otherwise meet 
NAFTA’s RoO, they will still receive NAFTA’s preferential tariff rates if less than 7 percent of 
the weight of a given product is non-North American. Thus, an import could be subject to 
more than one RoO ruling.' 
79  Scholars (e.g. Estevadeordal, Harris and Suominen, 2009) have developed indices of 
stringency of rules of origin at product/sector level. However, these studies cover only few of 
the agreements studied in this research. Also, Lynch (2010: Kindle Locations 731-756) 
mentions that the wide variation in the requirements and flexibility applicable in different 
products and sectors limits the plausibility of generalizations from the restrictiveness indices 
to the whole trade agreements. 
80 Extended cumulation is a mechanism that may contribute to solve the problems produced 
by the spaghetti bowl of rules of origin (Estevadeordal, Harris and Suominen, 2009: 6). 
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Extended cumulation, therefore, provides more flexibility to regimes of rules of origin 
than bilateral cumulation. All else constant, the extensive margin is considered to be 
higher when rules of origin allow more diversified sources of inputs than when they 
only allow inputs from other members of the agreement. 
Finally, the process of certification is also taken into account when analysing the 
contribution of provisions on rules of origin on the extensive margin of an agreement. 
Through fulfilling verification requirements in systems of certification, producers of 
a country document that they comply with the origin requirements to export with 
preferential treatment to other members of the agreement (Estevadeordal, Harris 
and Suominen, 2009: 6). The requirements for verification vary in complexity, 
increasing from self-certification by exporters, sponsored agencies, and government 
authorities. Exporters require more time and resources to cover high administrative 
costs in order to comply with larger numbers of requirements or instances of 
certification than when they can themselves certify the origin of their products 
(Estevadeordal, Harris and Suominen, 2009: 6; Heydon and Woolcock, 2009: 37). 
Therefore, more complicated processes for certification of origin increase the costs of 
trade and are considered to contribute less to the extensive margin than easier and 
simpler methods of certification. 
Services 
The first aspects to verify are the inclusion of services and the principle of national 
treatment in services in the agreement; the next aspect to evaluate is the number of 
sectors substantially covered in the agreement. Trade agreements increasingly 
include trade in services, mainly because the multilateral trade system has only 
achieved limited liberalization in this area (Lynch, 2010: Kindle Locations 866-877). 
The core principles which determine openness of provisions in services are market 
access and national treatment (Roy, 2011: 3-4). National treatment is ‘the principle 
of giving others the same treatment as one’s own nationals. GATT Article 3 requires 
that imports be treated no less favourably than the same or similar domestically-
produced goods once they have passed customs’ (WTO, 2013). The analysis in this 
area focuses on the cross-cutting provision of national treatment and in the number 
of wide sectors with substantial provisions included in the agreement. Although 
negative and positive lists of liberalization81  could be considered a ‘cross-cutting 
                                                        
81 Two main non-exclusive approaches to liberalization of services exist in trade agreements. 
First, positive lists which liberalize only sectors precisely specified. Second, negative lists 
which liberalize all sectors except those clearly excluded. Roy, Marchetti, and Lim (2006: 10) 
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across sectors’ aspect to include in the measurement, most trade agreements combine 
both approaches on a sector by sector basis. Therefore, the measurement of extensive 
margin regarding provisions of services in this research is based on the explicit 
inclusion of the principle of national treatment and in the number of sectors of 
services where substantial provisions exist. 
Despite the limitations of a horizontal approach to measuring depth of the 
extensive margin in provisions about services, this approach can also capture in a 
general manner the restrictiveness/openness of provisions in services. This research 
faces similar material constraints to those of other studies who have analysed trade 
in services (e.g. Roy, Marchetti, and Lim, 2006; Baccini, Dür, Elsig, and Milewicz, 
2011), and is limited regarding developing a detailed sub-sector-by-sub-sector 
approach to measuring services.82 As in the analysis of product/industry specific 
rules of origin, the main problems recognized are the amount of time and resources 
that would be required to identify, measure, and code the wide range of possible 
obligations and restrictions sub-sector by sub-sector (with variations in the modes of 
supply and liberalization, and in the types of barriers). A second issue, which is not 
as limiting as the one stated above, but which also requires consideration, is the lack 
of clear definitions of the terms services and market access in trade literature.83 
Technical Barriers to Trade 
In general, to assess how provisions about technical barriers84  contribute to the 
extensive margin, the focus is on the difficulties removed for accepting other 
                                                        
mention that these two approaches are often combined when countries try to reduce 
incompatibility between different areas of an agreement (e.g. services and investment), or 
within provisions in a specific area (e.g. treatment within services). The first approach is based 
on the GATS framework; while the latter is based on NAFTA. 
82 About the construction of their database of provisions in trade agreements, Baccini, Dür, 
Elsig, and Milewicz (2011) mention that coding each sub-sector in every mode of supply was 
not materially feasible. Roy, Marchetti, and Lim (2006: 5) point out that, in general, academic 
studies about services in trade agreements tend to limit the detail of their analyses to general 
characteristics, such as types of rules and type of lists they contain. 
83 In some studies (e.g. Marconini, 2006), when scholars incorporate a definition of services, 
it has to be constructed from categories of services included and omitted in the articles of the 
GATS. Marconini (2006: 9-10) points out that in Article I, services are defined by their mode 
of supply (cross border, consumption abroad, commercial presence, and presence of natural 
persons) including all services and sectors except those provided by the governments. In 
addition, the author states that a clear definition of the principle of market access in services 
does not exist. 
84 In this research, sanitary and phytosanitary measures are not included because according 
to Heydon and Woolcock (2009: 63), they are ‘broadly similar to that adopted in the TBT 
[technical barriers to trade] provisions in a trade agreement.’ Piermartini and Budetta (2009: 
253) define sanitary and phytosanitary measures as those ‘applied to protect human or animal 
or plant or life or health.’ According to the WTO (2013), trade agreements include such 
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members’ products as the countries’ own products (to different extents). Technical 
barriers to trade may take place regarding standards, technical regulations, and 
conformity assessment processes, which could obstruct trade. Both standards and 
technical regulations ‘specify the technical characteristics of a product or the 
conditions under which it is made’ but only the first ones are not mandatory 
(Piermartini and Budetta, 2009: 250). Conformity assessment rules stipulate the 
testing requirements to evaluate that a product, a process, or a service conforms to 
specified requirements (and fulfils the requirements of standards and/or technical 
regulations) (Piermartini and Budetta, 2009: 250-252). In principle, these 
mechanisms are designed to care for the wellbeing and safety of the population;85 
they are not commonly designed as protectionist mechanisms for trade.86 According 
to Piermartini and Budetta (2009: 257), compared to the costs of domestic producers, 
exporters may require additional steps, such as interpreting regulations and 
guaranteeing compliance (increasing their fixed costs); in addition, compliance may 
reduce their scale economies in production (increasing their marginal costs). To 
reduce this protectionist edge, a wide range of different standard and technical-
related mechanisms are often included in trade agreements. 
First, the contribution of provisions about technical barriers to the extensive 
margin increases when they possess characteristics designed to facilitate compliance 
of exporters at their minimum cost. The principle of transparency is included in the 
provisions to remove trade barriers in trade agreements with the objective of 
facilitating compliance of exporters. Transparency in trade is the ‘degree to which 
trade policies and practices, and the process by which they are established, are open 
and predictable’ (WTO, 2013). Notification is central in giving transparency to the 
different types of technical barriers (Heydon and Woolcock, 2009: 56). From the 
exporter’s perspective, transparency decreases the costs of monitoring the importer’s 
requirements; and from the governments perspective, it is more difficult to impose 
                                                        
measures to reduce barriers by accepting other countries’ measures as equivalent as long as 
they provide the same level of protection (even if they are not the same). 
85) The main objectives of these measures are ‘remedying market failures arising from an 
asymmetry of information between consumers and producers about the quality of a product, 
negative environmental externalities or failure of producers to co-operate and produce 
compatible products because of network externalities’ (Piermartini and Budetta, 2009: 251). 
86 Nevertheless, there have been instances of protectionist abuse. Two examples pointed out 
by Piermartini and Budetta (2009: 251) are the following: ‘The US requirement of a larger 
minimum size on vine-ripened tomatoes (mainly imported from Mexico) than on green 
tomatoes (mainly grown in Florida).’ And ‘the Chilean system for grading meat quality which 
is incompatible with that used in Argentina and the US (big meat exporters). The costs of 
setting up a special system just to export to Chile effectively limits the market access of small 
Argentinean and American beef producers. ‘ 
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protectionist requirements (Piermartini and Budetta, 2009: 254). Although 
preferential trade agreements ‘typically cover all sectors regarding principles such as 
non-discrimination and transparency’ in the area of technical barriers, there are 
divergent approaches in the specific mechanisms included to reduce such barriers 
(Heydon and Woolcock, 2009: 54-56). These mechanisms include recognition or 
harmonization of standards and recognition of conformity assessments. 
Second, the contribution of provisions for technical barriers to the extensive 
margin also increases when they include mechanisms designed to reduce the most 
the costs of exporters’ compliance with the standards and technical regulations of the 
importing country. The central methods are harmonization and mutual recognition. 
Achieving harmonization of products is more complex and costly than achieving 
mutual recognition of regulations or conformity assessment procedures because with 
harmonization of products, common standards are selected (achieving product 
equivalence); while for mutual recognition of regulations or conformity assessment 
procedures, only reciprocal recognition of these regulations and procedures is 
necessary (Piermartini and Budetta, 2009: 252; WTO, 2011: 140). Both mechanisms 
are favourable for exporters because they decrease the need to monitor importers’ 
regulations and provide further information about consumer preferences in the 
importing country; in the case of conformity procedures, the mechanisms eliminate 
the need for double tests (Piermartini and Budetta, 2009: 261; WTO, 2011: 140). 
Therefore, regarding technical barriers, agreements which include harmonization 
and mutual recognition are considered as deeper than agreements which do not 
include such provisions. 
Competition 
To analyse how competition provisions contribute to the extensive margin, the 
analysis focuses on the scope of anti-competitive areas regulated. Although 
competition-related provisions can be found scattered in different areas of the 
agreement, the analysis focuses on specific chapters about competition (when they 
are included).87 The need to include provisions which guarantee fair competition 
                                                        
87  There are two main reasons underlying the decision of focusing in chapters about 
competition. First, Baccini, Dür, Elsig, and Milewicz (2011: 27). mention that the inclusion of 
a chapter about competition reflects the importance that the members of a trade agreement 
give to the issue of competition Second, Teh (2009: 419) found that when related provisions 
in the rest of the agreement (besides the chapter) are included, the relationship between trade 
and competition becomes ‘more nuanced’ than when studies limit their scope to the 
competition chapter. The reason is that competition-related provisions outside the chapter 
are ‘not necessarily subordinated to trade tests or concerns.’ To limit the area of interest 
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arises mainly from the under-development of domestic and multilateral regulations 
in this area (Brusick, Alvarez, Cernat, 2005). The main purpose of including 
competition in trade agreements is to complement trade liberalization in goods and 
services by shielding trade gains from being counterbalanced by anti-competitive 
behaviour and practices (Brusick, Alvarez, Cernat, 2005; WTO, 2011: 142). In 
adopting or applying laws and measures which regulate anti-competitive behaviour, 
trade competition chapters focus on practices primarily from private agents;88 and 
secondly from governments and the implications of their support or subsidies (Teh, 
2009: 472). There is wide variation between the main forms of anti-competitive 
behaviour included and the commitments adopted in preferential trade agreements. 
In this research, it is considered that the contribution to the extensive margin in 
trade agreements is larger when competition chapters regulate a wider number of 
anti-competitive practices than when only few anti-competitive practices are 
regulated, or when a competition chapter is not included in the agreement. Following 
Solano and Sannekamp (2006), and Teh (2009), the main forms of anti-competitive 
behaviour 89  identified prohibited, or regulated in the competition chapters of 
preferential trade agreements are as follows: unfair business practices, abuse of a 
dominant position and monopolization, 90  undertakings with special or exclusive 
rights and state enterprises, state subsidies, and mergers and acquisitions. Therefore, 
                                                        
(extensive margin) from its non-trade related surrounding complexity, this research 
concentrates the analysis in the chapter about competition. 
88 There is widespread concern about the rising power of multinational corporations and the 
limitations of domestic regulations to restrict their anti-competitive practices (Brusick, 
Alvarez, Cernat, 2005: 4). 
89 The inclusion of concerted practices or unfair business practices aims to proscribe business 
activities which may ‘prevent, restrict or distort competition,’ such as ‘anti-competitive 
horizontal arrangements (collusion), vertical restraints and predatory pricing’ (Teh, 2009: 
474). 
90  The authors mention the following aspects. First, about unfair business practices, 
provisions explicitly prohibit the abuse of dominance, or require that members of the 
agreement adopt laws that prohibit such abuse. Government monopolies are not prohibited, 
but the provisions require that they do not expand their activities to areas outside their 
mandate. Examples of the proscribed activities which abuse market dominance are: ‘the 
improper manipulation of prices, limiting production or distribution, applying dissimilar 
conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties and making the conclusion of 
contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which have 
no connection with the contracts’ (Teh, 2009: 475). Second, provisions about the abuse of a 
dominant position and monopolization, either extend the application of competition 
provisions to state enterprises and undertakings; or limit the application of competition rules. 
Third, regulations about state enterprises limit state support to avoid the distortion of 
competition. Fourth, provisions about state subsidies, encourage members of a trade 
agreement to monitor anti-competitive mergers. Finally, few agreements have included 
provisions on mergers and acquisitions. 
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all else being constant, the extensive margin is likely to increase the larger the number 
of anti-competitive practices regulated in the competition chapter of the agreement. 
Government Procurement 
When taking into consideration how provisions about government procurement 
contribute to the extensive margin, first, the inclusion of this area in the agreement 
should be identified and second, the provisions included to eliminate procurement 
discrimination from one country member of a trade agreement against producers 
from other member countries. Procurement discrimination takes place when 
governments ‘favour domestic over foreign suppliers when purchasing otherwise 
similar goods or services’ (Rickard and Kono, 2010: 5). Although there is increasing 
social pressure for states to make efficient use of their financial resources, there are 
also incentives to discriminate against foreign producers, such as development or 
industrialization objectives (protection of infant industries, underdeveloped 
domestic markets, inefficient firms, or protection to state-owned firms) or other 
political or social reasons (Araya, 2006: 35).91 Provisions in the public procurement 
chapters of trade agreements mainly include regulations about the steps and 
processes leading to the award of government contracts (Araya, 2006: 36) and for 
this reason, the analysis focuses on discrimination in this area. 
In this research, it is considered that the extensive margin of trade agreements 
increases when provisions regulate government contracts to increase fair competition 
by being more transparent and minimizing opportunities for corruption. When 
considering competition in government procurement, the following aspects, based on 
the stages of the tendering process identified by Teh (2009: 470-471), are assessed. 
First, in general, information provided about intended procurement should be 
provided without favouring any supplier. This research also considers that technical 
specifications at this stage should be included to avoid spaces for opacity and 
corruption that could lead to discrimination of suppliers. Second, the use of limited 
tendering92 should be regulated and conditioned to specific circumstances93 because 
of the spaces it provides for discrimination of suppliers (Teh, 2009: 470-471). Finally, 
the treatment of requests for information from unsuccessful tenders in the award of 
contracts should be clearly stated, including guarantees that confidential information 
                                                        
91 Original in Spanish (translated by the author). 
92 Limited tendering ‘involves the procuring entity contacting suppliers individually’ (Teh, 
2009: 470). 
93 Teh (2009: 471) mentions circumstances (e.g. lack of appropriate tenders, extreme urgency, 
among others) in which limited tendering is allowed in trade agreements. 
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will not be disclosed without the authorization of the tender (Teh, 2009: 470-471). In 
general, in the case of government procurement, this area contributes more to the 
extensive margin when the process of awarding of contracts is less opaque and more 
neutral. 
Limits to reactive use of protectionist measures 
This section addresses contingent provisions that limit governments’ discretion to 
react to pressure from domestic groups after changes in the domestic or international 
environment. Trade measures are fundamentally skewed towards protecting import 
competing producers. Teh, Prusa and Budetta (2009: 167) mention that after tariffs 
have been almost dismantled or reduced to very low levels, trade remedies are 
included in trade agreements because ‘import competing sectors would continue to 
have an incentive to secure protection through whatever means they can find.’ Trade 
remedies94 allow the temporary relief of trade commitments for domestic industries 
which are being harmed by liberalization because of surges in imports or because of 
unfair trade practices (Prusa and Teh, 2009: 2). Depending on the circumstances in 
which the injury to the domestic industry occurs, different types of measures are 
applied. Trade remedies include anti-dumping provisions, countervailing duties, and 
bilateral and global safeguards. To prevent abuse, regulation of their application has 
been included often in trade agreements.95 However, as in other areas, there has been 
wide variation in the approaches followed and regulations included 96  in trade 
agreements:  
‘Contingent protection provisions vary greatly from one RTA [regional trade 
agreement] to the next. In fact, contingent protection provisions differ for the 
same country across different RTAs. Some RTAs have additional rules; some 
have no rules, and other prohibit the use of these actions. Even if we focus 
just on the RTAs that incorporate additional rules it is hard to characterize 
what happens; there is no consensus set of provisions that are found in all (or 
even most) RTAs’ (Prusa and Teh, 2009: 1). 
In general, trade integration is considered deeper when agreements include 
provisions which tighten and prohibit the application of anti-dumping provisions, 
                                                        
94 The term ‘contingent measures’ is also common in literature. Refers to the requirement of 
a relation between trade volume and trade protection (Prusa and Teh, 2009: 2). 
95  Although there are rules for trade remedies in the multilateral system, countries seek 
guarantees about how these rules will be applied to their exports (Lynch, 2010: Kindle 
Locations 891-908). 
96 In fact, very few agreements explicitly disallow their members to use trade remedies. The 
European Union is the only agreement which explicitly disallows the use of all types of trade 
remedies between its members (Lynch, 2010: Kindle Locations 891-908). 
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countervailing duties, global safeguards, and bilateral safeguards than when no rules 
about the use of trade remedies are included (Lynch, 2010: Kindle Locations 891-
908). In that sense, trade remedies ‘could be seen in a similar light as long transition 
periods, complicated rules of origin, and sensitive sectors […] all of which result in a 
slower process of liberalization for sensitive import competing sectors’ (Teh, Prusa 
and Budetta, 2009: 174). In this research, such logic is followed when assessing the 
contribution of provisions which regulate trade remedies to the extensive margin. 
Each of these measures is discussed below. 
Provisions which regulate the use of anti-dumping and countervailing duties are 
considered to contribute more to the extensive margin when they impose more rigid 
limits to governments’ reactions to exporters’ unfair practices than when they have 
more flexible limits or no limits. Anti-dumping duties are ‘imposed on goods that are 
deemed to be dumped and causing injury to producers of competing products in the 
importing country. These duties are equal to the difference between the goods’ export 
price and their normal value, if dumping causes injury’ (WTO, 2013). Countervailing 
duties refer to the ‘action taken by the importing country, usually in the form of 
increased duties to offset subsidies given to producers or exporters in the exporting 
country’ (WTO, 2013). In both cases, these measures are applied to exporters which 
harm domestic produces through unfair practices.97 The stringency of the regulation 
of these measures in trade agreements vary from agreements which do not include 
additional regulations, agreements which include specific measures which make their 
application more restrictive, and in the strictest cases, agreements which completely 
disallow their use between its members. In this research, it is considered that, all else 
being constant, depth of the extensive margin increases with the stringency on the 
regulation of anti-dumping and countervailing duties. 
Similarly, in the cases of bilateral and global safeguards, provisions are deeper 
when regulations are less flexible in the actions and timeframes allowed for 
governments’ reactions to external circumstances which harm domestic producers, 
than when they are able to impose more flexible actions or transitory periods. These 
measures apply in different circumstances to anti-dumping and countervailing duties 
since no evidence of unfair practices from exporters is required. Safeguard measures 
                                                        
97 Lynch (2010, Kindle Locations 909-938), and Prusa and Teh (2009: 1) mention that the use 
of antidumping measures is usually more regulated than the use of countervailing duties. First, 
considering the global economic impact of subsidies, governments may prefer to maintain 
their capacity of reaction against them. Second, subsidies and state-aid are usually not 
regulated in trade agreements. 
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are actions ‘taken to protect a specific industry from an unexpected build-up of 
imports’ (WTO, 2013). To impose global safeguards, they should be non-
discriminatory and the injury should be serious (Prusa and Teh, 2009: 3). 98 
Nevertheless, several trade agreements include conditions to exempt the members of 
the agreement from global safeguards.99 In contrast, bilateral safeguards apply only 
to delay liberalization between members of the agreement (to allow adjustment of 
import competing producers). Therefore, these measures do not result in more 
favourable treatment for members than for non-members of the agreement (Prusa 
and Teh, 2009: 4). In both cases, restrictiveness in the application of safeguards (and 
their contribution to the extensive margin) is assessed in a broadly similar way to 
anti-dumping measures and countervailing duties. In general, rules are the most 
restrictive (and contribute the most to the extensive margin) when they do not allow 
the application of bilateral safeguards to members of the agreement and exempt them 
from global safeguards. 
Support and enforcement of discipline-level commitments 
The depth at the extensive margin increases when regional bodies and dispute 
settlement mechanisms exist at trade discipline-level because they support and 
enforce the liberalization commitments undertaken in their specific areas. This sub-
section first discusses the responsibilities of regional bodies and other institutional 
mechanisms to support liberalization of the different areas covered in the agreement. 
Second, it discusses the strength and coverage of the dispute settlement mechanism 
of the agreement (when one is included). 
In the case of regional bodies and support mechanisms, it is considered that they 
contribute more towards depth at the extensive margin the more attributes they have 
to guide, support and enforce the correct implementation of the provisions included 
in the agreement. These discipline-level institutions, as other complex international 
economic institutions, ‘have the main purpose and effect of economizing transaction 
costs’ and serve different objectives (Williamson, 1985: 17). In addition to reducing 
transaction costs, these institutions also increase the transparency and credibility of 
trade agreements (Hicks and Kim, 2010: 14). The role of these institutions and 
mechanisms is important, particularly in cases in which least developed members of 
                                                        
98 ‘Global injury’ is a procedure to determine the degree and source of injury to domestic 
producers (Lynch, 2010: Kindle Locations 909-938). 
99 For example, in 2002 US exempted NAFTA partners and 80 developing countries from a 
30% increase on steel imports tariffs (Lynch, 2010: Kindle Locations 183-188). 
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an agreement may not have the technical and/or financial resources to interpret and 
fulfil their commitments. 
For example, in the area of technical barriers to trade, which requires high levels 
of expertise, agreements ‘typically include provisions on cooperation, such as 
committees […] Agreements may also provide for exchanges or twinning of 
regulators, standards bodies or conformance assessment agencies, to promote 
common norms or mutual recognition’ (Heydon and Woolcock, 2009: 57-58). 
Regional institutions and support-level mechanisms at discipline-level may include 
a wide variety of responsibilities and with different degrees of delegation, from 
cooperation, to review and supervision, and finally, enforcement of the commitments 
in their corresponding area. The contribution of these institutions and mechanisms 
to the extensive margin increases with the level of responsibility that members of the 
agreement have delegated to them. 
Dispute settlement mechanisms are considered to contribute relatively more to 
the extensive margin of an agreement the more autonomy from governments they 
possess and the larger the number of areas and disciplines they cover. Dispute 
settlement provisions in trade agreements are mechanisms ‘through which a dispute 
between two or more parties to a trade agreement is settled in a proceeding conducted 
by an impartial outside entity on the basis of substantive standards and principles 
previously agreed to by those parties and stated in the treaty,’ promoting 
transparency and credibility (IADB 2002: 91).100 Although most trade agreements 
contain dispute settlement mechanisms, there is no consistency in their design 
(Chase, Yanovich, Crawford, Ugaz, 20013: 5). Dispute settlement mechanisms vary 
from vague instruments to more sophisticated and highly legalized instruments: 
‘some pacts are diplomatic, requiring only consultations between disputing states, 
but others invest standing judicial tribunals with the authority to issue prompt, 
impartial, and enforceable third-party rulings on any and all alleged treaty violations’ 
(Smith, 2000: 138). Within these instruments, a wide range of variations exists in the 
binding status of the rulings, the ways in which compensation is determined, and the 
mechanisms to guarantee compliance with decisions made. 
In addition, there is variation in the coverage between areas and disciplines 
within a single trade agreement (Lynch, 2010: Kindle Locations 646-659). Strong and 
                                                        
100 For Latin American countries, dispute settlement mechanisms had also the function of 
locking in trade liberalization (IADB, 2002: 91). Lynch (2010: Kindle Locations659-700) 
argues that, in the interaction between developed and developing countries, these 
mechanisms compensate for weak and corrupt legal systems in the developing nations. 
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autonomous dispute settlement mechanisms, which cover commitments in all areas 
of a trade agreement, facilitate solutions to a dispute between members which are 
less influenced by the asymmetry of power between them or by the pressure from 
their respective import competing sectors. Therefore, trade agreements with strong 
dispute settlement mechanisms and which cover a larger number of areas and 
disciplines are considered as having more profound extensive margins than trade 
agreements with weaker mechanisms and/or which cover only few areas of the 
agreement. 
Conclusions 
This chapter presented the first step to build the dependent variables in this research: 
deep integration at the intensive and extensive margins. Because no consensual 
guidelines to conceptualize depth of trade integration exist in previous academic 
literature, the objective of this chapter was to develop a general categorization that 
captures the main general areas of variation of depth of trade integration. The 
definition of depth was used as a baseline to understand the areas of variation of deep 
integration. It was decided that extending the categorization of deep integration at 
the intensive and extensive margins suggested by the WTO was the most appropriate 
avenue to develop measures which would allow comparisons about levels of depth 
achieved in the agreements signed by countries, in this case, in the region of Latin 
America. Then, provisions relevant to the intensive margin were identified: type of 
trade agreement, decision power, institutional capacities, legitimacy, and 
permanency. These features are applicable to the trade agreement as a whole. In 
general, provisions at the intensive margin provide benefits which are less excludable 
than the ones generated by provisions included at the extensive margin. 
Next, the provisions relevant to the extensive margin were identified. It is 
necessary to distinguish between provisions designed to promote regulations that are 
not an obstacle to trade flows, measures which limit governments’ capacities to use 
reactive protectionist instruments when their domestic industries are being harmed, 
and mechanisms to support the implementation of these measures. In the first group, 
rules of origin, services, technical barriers to trade, competition policy, and 
government procurement were included. In the second group, anti-dumping 
measures, countervailing duties, global safeguards, and bilateral safeguards were 
included. In the final group, regional support bodies and coverage of dispute 
settlement mechanisms were included.  
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In Chapter 4, the categorization of the intensive and extensive margins 
analytically selected and extended in this chapter is tested by using principal 
component analysis. Over the analytical map developed in this chapter, the relevant 
provisions of trade agreements are characterized, operationalized, and measured, 
developing an original hand-coded database of 256 dyadic trade agreements and with 
a total of 110 data points (corresponding to the provisions of the different areas and 
disciplines discussed in this chapter). 
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4  Margins of deep integration: measurement 
and assessment 
Assessing the depth of existing trade agreements is not a straightforward task. For 
example, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Mercado 
Comun del Sur (MERCOSUR) are considered the active drivers of trade integration 
in the region. MERCOSUR is the most important agreement between Latin American 
countries because of the size of the Brazilian and Argentinean economies. Although 
the NAFTA is usually considered the deepest agreement because of its high 
standards, the MERCOSUR is more profound in type, although it remains, in fact, an 
imperfect customs union.101 Nevertheless, trade agreements have been traditionally 
analysed as undifferentiated units and only recently have studies begun to 
incorporate aspects of variation in their designs. 
Chapter 3 extended the categories of the intensive and extensive margins of 
depth in trade agreements. However, besides distinguishing between these margins 
analytically, a method to measure their depth is required. The objective of this 
chapter is to present the operationalization, measurement, and empirical analysis 
which support the differentiation between margins and the analytical allocation of 
trade areas and mechanisms in each of them. In the first section, the methodological 
aspects that guided the collection of data, selection of analytical unit (directed dyads, 
rather than undirected dyads), and measurement of depth of the various provisions 
and features of trade agreements are discussed. In the second and third sections, the 
rationale underlying the construction of the templates to code and measure deep 
integration is outlined. The fourth section presents the results of the principal 
components analysis, which provides support for the analytical distinction between 
the intensive and the extensive margins in deep integration and for the allocation of 
the identified trade areas into their corresponding margins. The fifth section presents 
a broad overview of variations in deep integration in trade agreements established by 
Latin American countries. The last section presents the conclusions of this chapter. 
                                                        
101 MERCOSUR includes also more specific objectives, such as the aims of creating a common 
market and coordinating macroeconomic policies, the construction of infrastructure, and the 
harmonization of industrial policy (Haggard, 1999). 
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Methodological approach to measuring deep integration 
Data collection and measurements 
The object of analysis in this research is trade agreements signed between Latin 
American countries and their regional and global partners from 1982 to 2010. There 
are other selection aspects: the schemes analysed are concrete and may be 
established by countries that are geographically related or not. Regarding scope, this 
research focuses on agreements which liberalize, or at least aim to liberalize, most of 
the trade between their members. Finally, trade agreements are analysed in isolation 
of other trade institutions.102 The dependent variables in this research comprise the 
texts of all reciprocal trade agreements established by all Latin American countries 
from 1982 to 2010 towards the liberalization of goods and services for which data is 
available. 
To measure deep integration in Latin American trade agreements, several issues 
must first be addressed. These issues are not exclusive to this research, as they have 
already been acknowledged by Wignaraja, Ramizo, and Burmeister (2013).103 They 
mention the following four problems. First, a significant number of agreements have 
not yet attracted substantive academic attention because they have been signed only 
recently. Second, gathering the texts of the trade agreements can be problematic, as 
parts of the agreements are often unavailable in the public domain. Third, when 
available, the agreements may not be in English. Fourth, ‘detailed and often 
painstaking examination of legal texts of agreements’ is unavoidable (Wignaraja, 
Ramizo, and Burmeister, 2013: 2). Finally, an accepted international methodology to 
evaluate deep integration in trade agreements does not exist. An additional issue 
identified in this research is that often, the signed agreements are replaced by their 
amended or updated versions, making it more complicated to gather the original 
versions of the agreements. 
Although, in practical terms, coding provisions in directed rather than 
undirected dyads increases the effort and time required for this phase of the research 
considerably, it was considered crucial for the purposes of this research. A common 
                                                        
102 In the sake of parsimony, following other studies about design of trade agreements (e.g. 
Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal, 2001a, 2001b), preferential agreements are considered in 
isolation of other trade institutions. 
103  These issues are shared by Wignaraja, Ramizo, and Burmeister (2013), whom have 
provided a measure of deep integration in Latin American agreements established with Asian 
partners. To the best of my knowledge, this is the only study which has attempted to measure 
deep integration in specific Latin American trade agreements. 
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approach to the study of trade agreements is to consider the dyad as the unit of 
observation (e.g. Baccini, Dür, and Elsig, 2012a). Dyads are formed by two countries 
that establish a trade agreement with each other or with other partners.104 In this 
research, directed dyads are chosen because trade agreements often have separate 
provisions for each member country. Therefore, the use of undirected dyads may 
misrepresent depth as unified when in reality it is not. For example, Article 106 of the 
Free Trade Area established between Chile and the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA) allows provisional implementation of the agreement before its ratification for 
the countries of the EFTA but not for Chile. Failure to acknowledge variations in trade 
agreements in a study that intends to explore such variations can create serious 
problems for the validity of the analysis. Furthermore, the arbitrariness in deciding 
which partner’s provisions to generalize and apply to the other members of an 
agreement without any theoretical guidance is problematic and may jeopardize the 
validity of the measurements. 
As explained previously, each of the intensive and extensive margins includes 
measurements of relevant provisions and features that contribute to the removal of 
trade barriers to different degrees between the members of an agreement. To guide 
the collection of data related to provisions which promote deep integration in trade 
agreements, previous studies (e.g. Piermartini and Budetta, 2009; Hicks and Kim, 
2010; Baccini, Dür, Elsig, and Milewicz, 2011; WTO, 2011) that mapped variations 
in specific areas of trade agreements were used as references. Because of the 
amount of resources and time required, the approach here, as in other studies,105 is 
general rather than product/industry specific. Indicators of depth in the different 
aspects relevant to each margin were built and re-scaled.106 To maintain as much 
                                                        
104 A second clarification refers to groups of countries that sign a trade agreement with other 
country or countries. In this research they are considered as a single actor only when the 
countries that belong to the group do not have the possibility (on their own) to veto the 
signature of the agreement or do not require ratification by their respective domestic 
legislatures. There were no cases with these conditions in the sample of dyadic agreements 
studied in this research. 
105  For example, Roy (2011) mentions that this approach does not distinguish between 
partially or fully binding commitments. Nevertheless, in the study of services, it allows a 
straightforward assessment of the number of sectors where commitments exist.  
106 Re-scaling the scores within the range [0,1] facilitates comparing different agreements and 
areas; and it is also a requirement for performing a valid principal components analysis in 
this chapter. The lowest and highest scores correspond to the lowest and highest levels of deep 
integration achieved in each of the measured aspects. 
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variation as possible as in the original data, the scores for each of the margins were 
constructed as factor sum-based scores.107  
Finally, principal components analysis was considered as an appropriate method 
for testing whether the indicators load accordingly to the categorization of the 
intensive and extensive margins developed in Chapter 3. Principal components 
analysis is particularly useful for matching a group of correlated variables with a 
reduced group of variables. The method is also useful for interpreting ‘the underlying 
structure of the data in terms of the most important principal components’ 
(Bartholomew, Steele, Galbraith, and Moustaki, 2011: 117). This second aspect is the 
most relevant for understanding the structure of the data and testing whether such a 
structure is compatible with the characterization of intensive and extensive margins. 
Measurement of depth at the intensive margin 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the main criterion for classifying trade provisions and 
areas that have been identified in other studies as corresponding to either the 
intensive or the extensive margin is to consider whether these provisions and areas 
regulate aspects of the whole agreement or add specific areas and disciplines to it. 
The capabilities and nature of the institutions of a trade agreement influence the 
intensive margin in a trade agreement. Institutions constitute the main structure of 
rules and expectations within which provisions are designed, selected, and 
implemented (IADB 2002: 87). The following features are included: legitimacy 
requirements for entry into force and further amendment; permanency of the 
agreement; type of agreement and decision power, and institutional capacities.108 In 
                                                        
107 To compute factor sum-based scores, all items loading in a factor are added. The drawback 
of this approach is that all scores are added in a factor score giving them equal weight, 
regardless of the weight with which they load in each factor (DiStefano, Zhu, and Mindrila, 
2009: 3). Nevertheless, this drawback was considered outweighed by the following two 
considerations. The first and most important reason refers to the appropriateness of the 
analysis. According to Fidell and Tabachnick (2006) this method is the most desirable to 
maintain the variation in the original data. Since the main motivation of this research is to 
study the reasons of variation of deep integration between trade agreements, preserving said 
variation is important. The second reason is that Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, and Tatham 
(2006: 140) mention that the use of factor sum-based scores is considered to be the most 
adequate when the scales for coding the original data have been newly developed. Also, this 
method is considered appropriate when a simple structure of components exists (DiStefano, 
Zhu, and Mindrila, 2009: 3). 
108 Hicks and Kim (2010: 40) include these administrative and institutional features as part 
of the category of depth of coverage. However, in this research these administrative and 
institutional features are considered to qualify intensive depth. The reason is that said 
features are characteristics of the institutional structure of trade agreements, not additional 
policies that extend the coverage of trade agreements. 
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the rest of this section, building on the categories and features identified in Chapter 
3, the relevant provisions are coded, operationalized, and measured. The score of the 
intensive margin is a factor-based sum score within the range [0,1] in which the 
highest values correspond to the highest values achieved in the trade agreements in 
the sample. 
Agreement types, decision power, and institutional capacities 
As discussed in the previous chapter, considering only type of agreement is a useful 
simplification to evaluate the depth of trade agreements. The measurements in Table 
4.1 show the intensive margin to be deeper in trade agreements with broader 
mandates. This characterization and measurement of depth is based on the standard 
method of measuring the depth of trade agreements according to their type,109 with a 
few modifications to theoretically fit the conceptualization of trade agreements used 
in this research.110 In addition, the existence and nature of follow-up mechanisms to 
the decisions taken by these institutions also influence their level of depth. For 
                                                        
109 Type of trade agreement and its decision power is a composite variable which incorporates 
type of agreement, and how binding its decisions are. To operationalize the depth of different 
types of trade agreements this research uses an arbitrary scale as is usual in academic 
literature about trade agreements (e.g. Tamames, 1995; Rugman and Hodgetts, 2001; 
Mansfield, Milner, and Pevehouse, 2007; Mansfield and Milner, 2012). The minimum value 
is one for the agreements with the least institutional depth, which are free trade agreements. 
The maximum value is four for the agreements with the most profound institutional depth, 
which are economic unions. The value assigned to the rest of types of trade agreements can 
be found in Table 4.1. In the first group, preferential trade agreements and free trade 
agreements have minimal institutional requirements for liberalization. Preferential trade 
agreements are the less ambitious agreements. Members grant mutual preferential market 
access without establishing a program for further integration and the most favoured nation 
clause is not applied. In a free trade area the members eliminate tariffs and border measures 
to each other in all or almost all products remaining autonomous concerning the formulation 
of trade policy and definition of tariffs to third countries. Free trade agreements give members 
access to each other in all or almost all products but retain their independent external tariffs, 
and require the establishment of rules of origin. In the second group, customs unions and 
common markets require the creation of institutions for trade policy coordination. In customs 
unions, partners eliminate all tariffs and rules of origin, define a common external tariff for 
non-members and the qualitative norms applied to them, and define a common mechanism 
for tariff collection and distribution. In common markets, factor mobility (including labour) 
is allowed, trade barriers are eliminated between members, and a common trade policy is 
defined losing individual ability to use it in response to crises. The creation of a common 
market requires the creation of a custom union in first instance. Finally, the third group 
requires the creation of institutions for unification certain economic policies. In a monetary 
union a common currency and a central bank are incorporated while, in an economic union 
members share also economic and fiscal policy. 
110  As discussed in Chapter 3, preferential trade agreements with partial scope are not 
considered qualitatively in the same category as the rest of the agreements in Table 4.1. Also, 
in this research agreements with follow-up mechanisms and agreements which resolutions 
are explicitly binding are considered as having deeper intensive margins than agreements 
which lack such mechanisms. 
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example, it is worth considering whether a customs union with non-binding 
resolutions, such as MERCOSUR, can be considered to have the potential to achieve 
a deeper intensive margin than a free trade area that has more developed (although 
not perfect) mechanisms in place to ensure that the resolutions of its administrative 
bodies are enforced, such as NAFTA. Furthermore, considering only the type of trade 
agreements is too generic111 for assessing variations in the depth of the agreements 
established by Latin American countries and their global and regional partners since 
most of them are free trade agreements (see Appendix A). 
The template used to assess institutional capacities expands their corresponding 
categories in studies of and reports on trade agreements (IADB, 2002: 88; Hicks and 
Kim, 2010: 14). 112  Minimum depth corresponds to agreements in which an 
institution’s mandate includes only the promotion of cooperation, and maximum 
depth corresponds to agreements in which an institution’s powers include that of 
modifying trade-related provisions.113 The values assigned to the rest of the identified 
capacities in academic literature on trade agreements can also be found in Table 4.1, 
below. 
  
                                                        
111 For example, the IADB (2002: 88-89) places several Latin American trade agreements’ 
institutional structures between the intergovernmental and supranational extremes of 
institutionalization, irrespective of their type. NAFTA and MERCOSUR are closer to the 
intergovernmental model; while the AC and the CACM are closer to the supranational model.  
112  Institutional capacities are loosely based on the categorization of ‘formal institutions’ 
developed by Hicks and Kim (2010). The authors divide formality of institutions into four 
categories: no formal institutions, formal institutions, formal institutions with suggestion and 
recommendation powers, and formal institutions with decision powers. Provisions are 
ordered as in Table 4.2. This research adds the following categories. First, whether the areas 
over which decision powers are applied are defined or not. This aspect is important because, 
even when decision power is mentioned, it is not a clear improvement over suggestion or 
recommendation powers when there is no clarity about the areas covered, or about the form 
that decisions can take. Second, institutional capacities may range from general cooperation, 
supervision, and decisions about administrative aspects of the agreement, to decisions over 
trade related aspects (e.g. tariff phasing, rules of origin, etc.). Institutional capacities are 
assessed as relatively deeper when they include administrative and operational aspects, and 
deepest when they also include trade areas. 
113 The measure of institutional capacities is calculated using an additive increasing score. The 
reasons are that when trade related decisions are included, administrative decisions, 
supervision and cooperation are also included. Also, when institutions can take 
administrative decisions, supervision and cooperation are also included. Finally, when 
institutions include supervision, cooperation activities are also included. 
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Table 4-1 Trade agreements’ type, decision power, and capacities 
Which type of trade agreement is in place? 
FTA = 1 
Customs Union=2 
Common Market =3 
Monetary Union =4 
Economic Union =5 
How binding are decisions taken at the highest institutional level of the agreement? 
Not binding (or not mentioned) = 1 
Follow up mechanism/process in place = 2 
Binding decisions explicitly stated = 3 
Institutional capacities 
Do the institutions state the promotion of cooperation? 
Cooperation (Yes = 1; No = 0) 
Can the institutions supervise the agreement? 
Supervision (Yes = 2; No = 0) 
Can the institutions make administrative decisions about the operation of the agreement? 
Administrative decisions (Yes = 3; No = 0) 
Can the institutions make trade-related decisions? 
Trade-related decisions (Yes = 4; No = 0) 
Source: Elaborated by the author. 
Legitimacy and permanency 
Agreements with procedures which require a higher level of legitimacy prior to 
entering into force and being amended are considered as having higher depth in their 
intensive margins.114 As in the previous chapter, institutions which require a higher 
level of legitimacy have more credibility and are better able to execute their functions 
as they face pressure from interest groups (IADB: 2002: 89-90). For example, the 
                                                        
114 Two levels of strength, concerning ratification, are usually considered in literature (e.g. 
Hicks and Kim, 2010): agreements which go into force when signed, and those which require 
previous ratification. This research also considers other procedures which agreements may 
follow before entering into force (distinguishing between levels of legitimacy). Three aspects 
are considered to measure this category: legitimacy for entry into force; legitimacy of future 
amendments; and whether provisional application is allowed. Trade agreements that require 
ratification by all parties are considered deeper than the ones that go into effect just after their 
signature. Also, agreements which require ratification of amendments are deeper than the 
ones that only require the agreement of their members. Finally, compared to agreements 
which do not allow their provisional application (before it is approved or ratified), agreements 
which allow it are consider as having less depth in their intensive margin. The reason is that 
agreements which allow its provisional application also give more discretion in its 
implementation to the executive. 
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IADB defined one of the problems which have prevented the correct operation of 
several of the Central American Common Market’s (CACM) institutional structures115 
as the lack of ‘sufficient legitimacy to override the interests of the countries and 
private players’ (IADB, 2002: 90). The templates used to measure legitimacy have 
been expanded and adapted from measures developed in academic studies to analyse 
credibility in trade agreements and their isolation from interest groups (IADB 2002; 
Hicks and Kim, 2010). A detailed description of the categories and scores is included 
in Table 4.2. In general, the highest scores are given to agreements which require the 
highest level of legitimacy to enter into force and to make amendments;116 they are 
also given to agreements which do not allow provisional application prior to having 
satisfied specific legal requirements.  
The permanency of an agreement also increases its intensive margin. An 
agreement that has to be renewed periodically may call into question the achieved 
depth of the trade agreement, as mentioned in the previous chapter. The template 
used to assess the permanency of a trade agreement was also adapted from Hicks and 
Kim (2010).117 The categories and scores can be found in Table 4.2, below. 
Table 4-2 Legitimacy and permanency 
After signing the agreement, are there additional requirements in place before the 
agreement can enter into force? Are reservations allowed after signing the agreement? 
Agreement goes into force when signed (0) 
After signature, satisfaction of domestic legal procedures is required (1) 
After signature, satisfaction of domestic legal procedures is required and no reservations 
are allowed (2) 
After signature, ratification by the legislature is explicitly required (3) 
After signature, ratification by the legislature is explicitly required and no reservations are 
allowed (4) 
Is provisional application allowed before concluding when legal domestic processes are 
required?  
                                                        
115 The report mentions the CACM’s following institutional structures: Meeting of Presidents 
and Councils of Ministers, the Central American Court of Justice, and the Secretariat of 
Economic Integration. 
116  In this research, the amendment category is also extended. Amendments may require 
domestic ratification (more legitimacy), or they may only need the approval of an 
administrative commission (less legitimacy). Table 4.2 reports the categories and their 
assigned scores. It follows that amendment processes which require relatively more 
legitimacy, may also contribute relatively more to the credibility of the agreement.  
117 Provisions about withdrawal have been considered to influence the strength of a trade 
agreement and its credibility. Hicks and Kim (2010) mention that renewal ‘gives an easy way 
out to politicians’ when fulfilling the agreed commitments is not politically convenient any 
more. In contrast to the measures developed by the authors, in this research, ratification, 
renewal and amendment are considered to be qualitatively distinct aspects and are separated 
into distinct categories. 
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Provisional application allowed (Yes =0; No = 1) 
Are there legitimacy requirements in place to amend the agreement?  
No amendment process mentioned (0) 
Amendments have to be agreed by all parties (1) 
Amendment approved by an administrative commission (2) 
Amendments have to go through domestic ratification process (3) 
Permanency 
Does the agreement requires to be renewed? 
After a given number of years, parties should agree to renew the agreement (1) 
After a given number of years, renewal is automatic unless one party opts out (2) 
Agreement continues in force until one party withdraws (3) 
Source: Elaborated by the author. 
Measurement of depth at the extensive margin 
To analyse the extensive margin of trade agreements, the coverage of different trade-
related measures is considered. The first aspect includes the trade disciplines 
covered, differentiating between provisions which remove obstacles or facilitate trade 
and those which limit the reactive use of protectionist measures by governments in 
response to negative external incentives. The second aspect includes the strength of 
the mechanisms designed to support and/or enforce the implementation of the 
disciplines covered. In this research, the inclusion of these mechanisms is considered 
to likely increase the effectiveness of the measures. 
Coverage of trade areas 
This indicator covers the main provisions of each trade area and/or discipline in 
which members remove obstacles to trade between them. The measurements of 
coverage of trade-related areas and disciplines and the criteria used to assess their 
depth are based on indicators developed in academic literature specific to each 
area.118 In most cases, these indicators were expanded or adapted to capture deep 
integration in that specific area. The measurements and criteria for measuring each 
area can be found in Table 4.3. First, as explained in the previous chapter, regime-
wide variations of rules of origin take place along three main lines: de minimis, 
                                                        
118 In contrast with other studies, number of meetings is not included in this research. Hicks 
and Kim (2010: 14) argue that because regularized meetings decrease transaction costs among 
the members of an agreement, and facilitate transparency, the number of meetings 
contributes to an agreement’s credibility. However, in this research it is considered that with 
no information about the content discussed, or the agreements reached in said meetings (if 
any), their influence over deep integration is unclear.  
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cumulation, and certification. Provisions in this area are deeper as they facilitate 
trade between members.119 Second, the area of services attains the highest level of 
deep integration when most favoured nation and national treatment requirements 
are included, and when all sectors (telecommunications, financial services, cross 
border services, and maritime services) are substantially covered (Baccini, Dür, Elsig, 
and Milewicz, 2011).120 Third, the deeper technical barriers to trade are, the better 
they fulfil the objective of decreasing opportunities for discrimination (Heydon and 
Woolcock 2009; Piermartini and Budetta 2009; Hicks and Kim, 2010; Baccini, Dür, 
Elsig, and Milewicz, 2011). 121  Fourth, provisions in the area of government 
procurement are considered relatively deeper the less space they allow for 
governmental discrimination (Heydon and Woolcock, 2009; Teh, 2009; Rickard and 
Kono 2011).122 Fifth, provisions in the area of competition are considered relatively 
deeper the larger the number of anti-competitive practices they regulate (Solano and 
Sannekamp, 2006; Teh, 2009).123 
                                                        
119 In this research, although restrictiveness indices are not directly used, the logic underlying 
the construction of the index developed by Estevadeordal, Harris and Suominen (2009) is 
maintained. Agreements are considered relatively deeper when they include de miniminis 
rules, extended cumulation, and interested party certification. Existing indexes which 
calculate the stringency of rules of origin (e.g. Estevadeordal, Harris and Suominen, 2009) 
cover a small number of the agreements in this research. Also, Lynch (2010: Kindle Locations 
731-756) points out that the wide variation in the requirements and flexibility applicable in 
different products and sectors limits the plausibility of generalization from a restrictiveness 
index to a trade agreement as a whole. 
120 Provisions about services are not identified at each sector’s level in this research. Baccini, 
Dür, Elsig, and Milewicz (2011: 17) mention that identifying with great detail provisions at 
services’ sector’s level is usually not feasible. The reasons are the existence of a large number 
of sub-sectors (more than 150, according to the WTO) across different modalities (cross-
border supply, consumption abroad, commercial presence, and movement of natural persons). 
The authors also mention that, for said reasons, studies which analyse services in trade 
agreements (e.g. Roy, Marchetti, and Lim, 2006; Heydon and Woolcock, 2009) usually 
restrict their scope to few agreements or few sectors, and specific modes of supply. 
121 Standards, harmonization and conformity assessments are included in this research. It is 
differentiated whether mutual recognition exists, and whether it is in force or it is scheduled. 
Piermartini and Budetta (2009) provide the most comprehensive study about technical 
barriers. The authors study technical barriers in 70 agreements. The provisions mapped refer 
to the integration approach, administration, resolution of disputes, and cooperation. 
122 Agreements are relatively deeper when they include tendering principles (including non-
disclosure of confidential information), information on intended procurements (including 
technical specifications), treatment of tenders, and awarding of contracts. 
123 Competition provisions have different levels of depth (Brusick, Alvarez, Cernat, 2005). 
This research follows Solano and Sannekamp (2006) in emphasizing the (general or explicit) 
inclusion of areas of non-discrimination. Solano and Sannekamp (2006: 8) mention that: 
‘some RTAs checked in this column [anti-competitive practices] may go as far as declaring 
that such anticompetitive arrangements are incompatible with the RTA in question [...] Some 
may only have a general mandate that the parties shall adopt measures to proscribe 
anticompetitive arrangements, while others may include specific examples of anticompetitive 
practices that are to be proscribed.’ Few trade agreements have provisions on mergers and 
acquisitions. Teh (2009: 476) mentions the Canada-Costa Rica trade agreement as one of 
these agreements. 
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Table 4-3 Coverage of trade areas 
Does the agreement include substantive provisions regarding non-tariff barriers? 
Bilateral cumulation (+1) 
Extended cumulation (+1) 
Third party certification (+1) 
Interested party certification (+2) 
Does the agreement include substantive provisions in services? 
Financial services (+1) 
Telecommunication services (+1) 
Maritime transport services (+1) 
Cross border services (+1) 
National treatment (+1) 
Are harmonization/mutual recognition scheduled or in force in the following technical 
barriers to trade? 
Conformity assessment (+1) 
Technical regulations (+1) 
Standards (+1) 
Does the agreement include substantive provisions in government procurement? 
Information on intended procurements includes technical specifications (+1) 
Limited tendering is regulated (+1) 
Treatment of tenders and awarding of contracts is clearly stated (+1) 
Does the agreement include substantive provisions in competition? 
Regulation of concerted practices, unfair business practices (+1) 
Regulation of abuse of market dominance (+1) 
Regulation of undertakings with special or exclusive rights/state enterprises (+1) 
Regulation of state aid/subsidies (+1) 
Regulation of mergers and acquisitions (+1) 
Regulation of monopolies (+1) 
Source: Elaborated by the author. 
Limits to reactive protectionist instruments 
In the case of bilateral and global safeguards and antidumping and countervailing 
duties, provisions are considered deeper the more they limit the use of these 
measures by governments, which face external shocks or damage from unfair trade 
practices. Details can be found in Table 4.4, but in general, in the case of global and 
bilateral safeguards, relatively deeper agreements are those which place more 
restrictions on the use of global and bilateral actions, respectively. In the case of 
antidumping and countervailing duties, relatively deeper agreements are those which 
place more restrictions on their use and require the mutual agreement of their 
ASSESSING DEEP INTEGRATION
 
101 
members (Teh, Prusa, and Budetta, 2009; Hicks and Kim, 2010; Prusa and Teh, 
2010; Baccini, Dür, Elsig, and Milewicz, 2011).124 
Table 4-4 Limits to the use of reactive protectionist mechanisms 
Does the agreement include substantive provisions in regulating antidumping measures? 
Allowed with no specific provisions (0) 
Allowed with specific provisions (1) 
Allowed with specific provisions and mutual acceptable solution (2) 
Disallowed (3) 
Does the agreement include substantive provisions in regulating countervailing duties? 
Allowed with no specific provisions (0) 
Allowed with specific provisions (1) 
Allowed with specific provisions and mutual acceptable solution (2) 
Disallowed (3) 
Does the agreement include substantive provisions in regulating the application of bilateral 
safeguards? 
Allowed with no specific provisions (0) 
Allowed with specific provisions (1) 
Duration of no more than four years is clearly stated (+1) 
Conditions for compensation clearly stated (+1) 
Conditions for retaliation clearly stated (+1) 
Regulation of allowed measures (suspend concessions, tariff reduction or revert to MFN) 
(+1) 
Duration and amount just to the extent to facilitate adjustment stated (+1) 
Mutually acceptable solution stated (+1) 
Allowed only during transition period (+1) 
Allowed whenever there is injury to domestic industry (+2) 
Disallowed (+2) 
No provisional measures allowed (+1) 
  
                                                        
124 As with other areas in this chapter, to the best of my knowledge, no study has classified 
provisions about trade defence instruments according to their contribution to deep 
integration. To build this indicator, mappings in the studies mentioned above were consulted, 
and the relevant provisions to assess each area were coded and measured. 
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Does the agreement include substantive provisions in regulating the application of global 
safeguards? 
Members are excluded from global action under WTO (+1) 
Members are excluded from global action when the share of imports is not substantial  
-Clear definition of substantial share: Joint exports or top five exporters (+1) 
-Clear definition of substantial share: Joint exports definition 80% (+1) 
Members are excluded from global action when the share of imports does not represent a 
serious injury or threat (+1) 
-Clear definition of serious injury (+1) 
Source: Elaborated by the author. 
Discipline-level support and enforcement mechanisms 
Discipline-level support and enforcement mechanisms are considered to increase the 
depth at the extensive margin of trade agreement. Because they support/enforce 
specific disciplines rather than the whole agreement, they are coded separately. Trade 
agreements are deeper when they establish regional bodies or other institutions to 
support the various trade commitments included in a trade agreement. The depth of 
such mechanisms is measured according to their attributions and capacities 
identified in several studies (Ortiz Mena L.N., 2001b; Hicks and Kim, 2010; Baccini, 
Dür, Elsig, and Milewicz, 2011).125 Along similar lines, stronger dispute settlement 
mechanisms are considered deeper than weaker mechanisms.126 In general, these 
mechanisms are considered relatively deeper the more areas they cover and the more 
autonomous they are regarding the governments of the countries participating in the 
agreement. Table 4.5 presents the operationalization of these provisions and the 
values assigned to them. 
  
                                                        
125  In order of depth the attributions and capacities measured are the following: no 
institutions exist; institutions facilitate cooperation; institutions review the implementation 
of the agreement; and finally, institutions have also enforcement capabilities. 
126  In this research, agreements are considered as relatively deeper when there is a clear 
dispute settlement process and when commitments are not restricted to a ‘best endeavour’ 
basis. First, it is considered whether the dispute settlement mechanism is allowed for each of 
the trade areas included in the agreement. Full coverage is assigned with a higher score than 
partial coverage. Second, the selection of sanctions, whether sanctions are binding, and the 
process for determining compensation are coded and measured. 
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Table 4-5 Discipline-level enforcement and support mechanisms 
Are there regional bodies, committees or other mechanisms to support the liberalization of 
the following areas (each area measured separately): services, technical barriers to trade, 
bilateral safeguards, competition, government procurement?  
No existence or not mentioned (0) 
Facilitation of cooperation (1) 
Review of implementation (2) 
Enforcement (3) 
Are there dispute settlement mechanisms to enforce the provisions of each trade area and 
facilitate the solution of controversies among members? 
No coverage (0) 
Partial coverage (0.5) 
Complete coverage (1) 
Are resolutions of the dispute settlement mechanism binding? 
No existence or not mentioned (0) 
Not binding (1) 
Binding with possibility of appeal (2) 
Binding with no possibility of appeal, but no possibility to make comments on the draft of 
the decision (3) 
Binding with no possibility of appeal, but possibility to make comments on the draft of the 
decision (4) 
How is the amount of compensation determined? 
Not mentioned (0) 
Determined by contracting party with no guidelines (1) 
Determined by contracting party with guidelines (2) 
Determined by formal arbiters (3) 
Are there mechanisms to follow up compliance of resolutions? 
Not mentioned (0) 
Follow up of compliance with no guidelines (1) 
Follow up of compliance with guidelines (2) 
Source: Elaborated by the author. 
Margins of deep integration: empirical assessment 
In the previous section, several categories of provisions thought to contribute to deep 
integration were measured. Building on the measurements presented in the previous 
subsection, this section contains two main objectives. First, to extract what is 
common to the different measurements of depth to disaggregate the concept of deep 
integration. Second, to provide support to the analytical allocation of provisions and 
areas in each margin. The aim of this analysis is to test whether the underlying 
structure of the data fits the categorization of deep integration at the intensive and 
extensive margins. As expected, the principal components analysis highlighted the 
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existence of two main components which correspond to the intensive and extensive 
margins of deep integration. 
Principal components analysis was selected as an adequate method for exploring 
the structure of deep integration in the trade agreements signed by Latin American 
countries. The main reasons are based in the work of Pallant (2010: 181) and 
Bartholomew, Steele, Galbraith, and Moustaki (2011: 117). First, it is an appropriate 
method for correlated metric variables. Second, deep integration provisions and 
measures included in trade agreements have complex patterns of interrelationship, 
and principal components analysis can elucidate their underlying structures. Third, 
it provides a basis for building factor-based scores and replacing a large set of 
variables with a relatively more manageable number of them. In addition, compared 
to other approaches which also elucidate the main components of the structure of 
data, principal components analysis has two advantages. It is the most widely used 
approach (Pallant, 2010: 183), allowing comparisons with future studies and 
facilitating the aggregation of knowledge. Second, this analysis allows retaining most 
of the variations in the data (Bartholomew, Steele, Galbraith, and Moustaki, 2011: 
118).127 This reason is particularly important given that this research analyses the 
variation of form and levels of deep integration in preferential trade agreements. 
Prior to performing principal components analysis, the suitability of the data for 
the analysis was assessed. The six indicators constructed in the previous section 
(decision power, scope of decision making, legitimacy, coverage of discipline level 
measures, coverage of limits to the reactive use of protectionist measures, and 
mechanisms to support and enforce discipline-level commitments) were subjected to 
principal components analysis using SPSS version 18. First, the sample size and ratio 
of cases to components128 were verified to be adequate, based on the recommended 
criteria for performing this type of analysis. Second, it was confirmed that the 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olin measure of sampling adequacy 
                                                        
127  Bartholomew (2011: 117) also mentions that in principal components analysis the 
importance of the components is determined by their contribution to explaining variance, 
rather than to their contribution to another statistic (such as the Pearson’s chi-squared 
statistic in correspondence analysis). Another popular approach to understand the structure 
of a set of variables is factor analysis. However, Pallant (2010: 181-182) points out that ‘factors 
are estimated using a mathematical model whereby only the shared variance is analysed’ while 
in principal components analysis, all the variance is used. 
128 The sample size (256 dyadic agreements) is above 150 cases which is considered a small 
sample size. Also, the ratio of cases (256) to components (2) is above the recommendations of 
10 to 1 ratio and 5 to 1 ratio mentioned by Pallant (2010: 181-182). 
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had the appropriate values. 129  Inspection of the correlation matrix revealed the 
presence of many coefficients of a value of 0.3 and above. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olin 
value was 0.643, exceeding the recommended minimum value of 0.5 (Field, 2013), 
and Bartlett’s test of sphericity reached statistical significance at 0.001, also 
exceeding the recommended value of 0.05 (Pallant, 2010: 183), supporting the 
factorability of the correlation matrix. 
Several criteria recommended in literature were followed in the decision to retain 
the first two components: proportion of variance explained, eigenvalues, and 
examination of the scree plot. 130  The objective when selecting the number of 
components is to retain the minimum number of components that explain most of 
the variation in the data. Principal components analysis revealed the presence of two 
components with eigenvalues exceeding one. The two components explain 70% of the 
variance, with Component 1 contributing 42% and Component 2 contributing 28%. 
An inspection of the scree plot in Figure 4.1 revealed a clear break after the second 
component, which supported the decision to retain the two components. 
To help interpret these two components, direct oblimin rotation was performed. 
This oblique (non-orthogonal) 131  rotation method was selected because the 
components refer to aspects of the same concept, deep integration, and it is important 
to maintain the correlation between the components. The rotated solution also 
revealed the presence of a structure of the two components, with both components 
showing a number of strong loadings and all variables loading substantially (above 
0.4) on one of the two components (see Table 4.6 below for the main results and 
Appendix B for the detailed results). 
The two components contrast one subset of the variables with another subset. 
The relative strength with which a variable loads on one component represents its 
relative contribution to that component (Bartholomew, Steele, Galbraith, and 
Moustaki, 2011: 124), and the variables with higher loadings in a component are key 
to their interpretation (Pallant, 2010: 181-182). To interpret these components, it is 
also useful to consider what each subset of variables has in common with another 
(Bartholomew, Steele, Galbraith, and Moustaki, 2011: 118). The first component 
                                                        
129 The Bartlett’s test of sphericity and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olin measure of sampling adequacy 
are generated by SPSS to assess the appropriateness of the data for the analysis. 
130 Bartholomew (2011) also recommends selecting components with eigenvalues larger than 
one; selecting components which explain a large proportion of the variation, and identifying 
the ‘elbows’ in a scree plot which correspond ‘to the point after which the eigenvalues decrease 
more slowly’ and marginally explain more variance (124). 
131  The axes of the components are positioned at right angles in orthogonal rotations 
(Bartholomew, 2011: 119). 
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distinguishes categories of provisions which apply to specific disciplines and trade 
areas from those which apply to the whole agreement, in other words, categories of 
provisions which are applied to the area/discipline level at one end, and categories of 
provisions which are not applied to the area/discipline level at the other. At the 
extreme of high factor loadings, it is possible to find coverage of disciplines and trade 
areas, coverage of limits to reactive mechanisms, and support and enforcement 
mechanisms at discipline level. At the extreme of low factor loadings, it is possible to 
find scope of institutional capacities, decision power, and legitimacy. 
In contrast with the first component, the second component distinguishes 
categories of provisions which apply to the whole agreement from those which apply 
to specific disciplines and trade areas. The second component also explains a large 
degree of variance in scores of deep integration but from a different perspective. On 
the extreme of high factor loadings, it is possible to find scope of institutional 
capacities, type of agreement and decision power, and legitimacy, whereas on the 
extreme of low factor loadings, it is possible to find coverage of disciplines and trade 
areas, coverage of limits to reactive mechanisms, and support and enforcement 
mechanisms at the discipline level. 
The main objective of performing principal components analysis on the set of 
categories of provisions developed analytically in the previous chapter is to verify 
their correspondence to the margin to which they were analytically allocated. 
Nevertheless, to aid interpretation, the signs of the variables were considered in each 
component. In the first component, corresponding to provisions at discipline-level, 
the scope of institutional capacities shows a positive sign, whereas decision power 
and legitimacy have negative signs. Possible explanations are that on the one hand, 
to deal with the inclusion of deeper provisions at the discipline and trade area levels, 
the institutions of a trade agreement must manage more complex tasks, and 
therefore, the scope of their areas of decisions also broadens. On the other hand, it is 
possible that at higher levels of coverage of provisions at the discipline level, more 
economic interests may be affected; therefore, governments prefer to retain more 
autonomy and discretion to face possible problems. 
In the second component, corresponding to provisions at the agreement level, 
coverage of disciplines and trade areas, support and enforcement institutions at 
discipline level, and legitimacy have a negative sign, whereas coverage of limits to 
reactive mechanisms, decision power, and scope of institutional capacities have a 
positive sign. Possible explanations are similar to the ones suggested above. First, 
governments may face a trade-off between building a robust trade agreement with 
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strong decision power and wide coverage of institutional capacities on one hand and 
building one with high legitimacy on the other hand. Although both features 
contribute to building a robust trade agreement, governments may prefer to retain 
some discretion and autonomy in at least one of these areas. For example, when 
signing an agreement which heavily constrains their decision-making powers over a 
trade area, governments may prefer to retain their ability to renew the agreement 
after a certain number of years or to amend it without the need of ratification in case 
their circumstances or preferences change over time. 
Second, governments’ decisions to retain less discretion and autonomy may also 
be reflected in the establishment of limits to their capacity to react and impose 
protectionist measures when their domestic industries are being harmed. Third, 
signing an agreement with a wide coverage of disciplines and trade areas and/or 
creating strong support and enforcement mechanisms at the discipline level requires 
considerable resources. Since governments have limited resources, they may also face 
a trade-off in the allocation of said resources. Finally, when including strong support 
and enforcement institutions at the discipline level, governments may consider it 
unnecessary to create robust institutions at the level of the whole trade agreement. 
Although the study of the relationships between the different categories of provisions 
is beyond the scope of this thesis, these relationships constitute an interesting area 
for further analysis. 
From this analysis, it is possible to conclude that depth may not be captured 
adequately by a single dimension. Furthermore, there is a difference between 
provisions that apply to trade agreements as a whole and provisions that apply to 
specific disciplines and trade areas. First, variables analytically categorized as 
corresponding to the extensive margin (coverage of disciplines, coverage of limits to 
reactive protectionist mechanisms, support and enforcement mechanisms at 
discipline level) loaded strongly on Component 1. Second, variables categorized as 
corresponding to the intensive margin (decision power, scope of decision making, 
and legitimacy) loaded strongly on Component 2. There was a weak positive 
correlation between the two factors (r= 0.07). The number of components and their 
interpretation were consistent with the characterization of the intensive and 
extensive margins in trade agreements suggested in the previous chapter. The results 
of this analysis also support the analysis of intensive and extensive margins as 
different aspects of deep integration, which is presented in the following chapters. 
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Figure 4-1 Scree plot of eigenvalues in components of deep integration 
 
Table 4-6 Pattern and structure matrix for principal components analysis 
with oblimin rotation of two factor solution of depth of provisions items  
Item Pattern coefficients Structure coefficients Commu-
nalities 
Compo-
nent 1 
Compo-
nent 2 
Compo-
nent 1 
Compo-
nent 2 
Discipline coverage 0.936   0.930   0.872 
Discipline support 
bodies/mechanisms 
0.851 
  
0.867 
  
0.728 
Discipline reactive coverage 0.853   0.844  0.792 
Institutional capacities   0.617   0.643 0.532 
Decision power   0.872   0.852 0.798 
Legitimacy  -0.688  -0.688 0.474 
Note: The main results are presented in this table. Only the substantial loadings 
(above 0.4) are included here. The complete results are reported in Appendix B. 
Overview of deep integration in Latin American trade 
agreements 
This section provides an overview of the depth of the agreements signed by Latin 
American countries after 1982 and until 2010, highlighting existing variations of the 
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nature and levels of deep integration at the intensive and extensive margins of each 
agreement and between trade agreements. These variations are illustrated by 
comparing the average proportions of depth at the extensive and intensive margins, 
average overall depth, and patterns and variability of distributions of scores in each 
margin. An overview of the variations is presented in Figures 4.2 to 4.3, and the scores 
can be found in Appendixes C and D. 
The average scores that trade agreements attained at the extensive and intensive 
margins provide an overall picture of the depth of their commitments in each of the 
said margins. This overview allows a broad identification of those agreements that 
best promote deep integration in their legal texts. After adding the average scores of 
extensive and intensive margins for each agreement, the maximum score that each 
agreement can attain is six and the minimum score is zero.132 On one hand, the 
highest extreme of six would correspond to the hypothetical case in which all the 
members of a trade agreement have obtained the highest scores in each margin 
relative to the ones obtained by members in the other agreements analysed. On the 
other hand, the lowest extreme of zero would correspond to the hypothetical case in 
which all the members of a trade agreement have obtained the lowest scores in each 
margin relative to the scores obtained by members of the rest of the agreements 
studied. These agreements would have required stronger commitments, obligations, 
and substantive provisions to attain higher levels of integration at the intensive 
margin. 
Although clear variations emerge when considering deep integration as an 
overall measure, differentiating the contributions of each margin to the overall score 
reveals wider and puzzling variations between the agreements. Figure 4.2 and 
Appendix C show the average scores that each of the trade agreements attained at the 
intensive and extensive margins. The minimum total scores correspond to the free 
trade agreements Bolivia-MERCOSUR (0.81) and Peru-Thailand (0.93), whereas the 
maximum scores correspond to the free trade agreements Mexico-Nicaragua (3.73), 
Canada-Colombia (3.81), and Chile-P4 (4.15). Even from this broad perspective, it is 
difficult to identify clear patterns. For example, Mexico and Chile, countries with the 
largest numbers of trade agreements in the region, have signed agreements with very 
different levels of depth. In these two cases, the ranges of overall depth start below 
two for the agreements between Chile and Turkey and between Mexico and Bolivia. 
                                                        
132 Each margin includes three areas measured within the range [0,1], where the lowest and 
the highest values correspond to the minimum and maximum scores of deep integration 
achieved in each area. 
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In contrast, Mexico and Chile have also achieved overall scores above 3.5 in their 
agreements with Nicaragua and with the other countries of the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership, respectively). 
Furthermore, the contrasting levels of depth in each margin in a single trade 
agreement and through time also seem counterintuitive. First, Figure 4.2 highlights 
the contrast between the proportions corresponding to the extensive and intensive 
margins. The reason underlying trade agreements with robust institutions and 
medium coverage of trade areas is not evident. For example, the agreement between 
Panama and Singapore attained an overall score of less than 1.5, of which more than 
89 per cent corresponds to the extensive margin. In 28 per cent of the trade 
agreements analysed, the average intensive margin is lower than the average 
extensive margin.133 In contrast, although MERCOSUR has an average total score of 
deep integration of 2.76, almost 90 per cent of it corresponds to the intensive margin. 
In only 14 per cent of the agreements is the average intensive margin higher than the 
average extensive margin in more than one point.134 Second, it could be possible to 
expect that over time, increased competition and accumulated knowledge from other 
trade agreements would promote clear trends towards deeper agreements at both 
margins. Figure 4.3 shows the evolution of the average scores of the margins in the 
dyads of the agreements analysed. Although the intensive margin is almost always 
lower than the extensive margin, in general, deep integration does not show a clear 
pattern of evolution.135 
                                                        
133  The agreements are the following: MERCOSUR, Chile-Turkey, CARICOM-Costa Rica, 
Mexico-Japan, Chile-China, MERCOSUR-Israel, Canada-Costa Rica, Costa Rica-China, 
Mexico-Israel, Bolivia-MERCOSUR, Colombia-EFTA, Mexico-EFTA, Chile-Panama, Central 
America-Chile. 
134 The seven agreements are the following: Colombia-Mexico, Peru-South Korea, Canada-
Colombia, Costa Rica-Mexico, Colombia-United States, Panama-Singapore, Chile-United 
States. 
135 Time elapsed is included as a control variable in the analyses in Chapter 8. 
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Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of the text of the trade agreements. 
Figure 4-2 Stacked average scores of extensive and intensive margins in trade agreements signed by Latin American countries (1982 -
2010) 
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Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of the text of the trade agreements (all bars are relative to the total score of deep integration resulting 
from the addition of the intensive and extensive margins). 
Figure 4-3 Share of extensive and intensive margins in total average scores of deep integration in trade agreements signed by Latin 
American countries (1982-2010) 
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Figure 4-4 Dyadic mean scores of depth for the intensive and extensive 
margins over time by number of years after 1991 
 
Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of the text of the trade agreements. 
 
The wide variation of depth at the intensive and extensive margins existing 
between the dyadic trade agreements is illustrated in Figures 4.4 and 4.5 below. The 
overview, given in the form of boxes and whiskers plots, shows the pattern and 
variability of scores. ‘Each distribution of scores is represented by a box and 
protruding lines (called whiskers). The length of the box is the variable’s inter-
quartile range and contains 50 per cent of the cases. The line across the inside of the 
box represents the median value’ (Pallant, 2010: 79). In Figure 4.4, the box and 
whiskers plots show the distribution of scores to be generally wider for the extensive 
margin than for the intensive margin. Nevertheless, in both cases, the distribution of 
scores shows that the data in the middle 50 per cent of the dataset are slightly skewed 
to the left. In addition, in both cases, the longer upper whisker indicates that the 
higher scores are more spread out than the lower ones. 
However, Figure 4.5 clearly shows additional variations in the scores for both 
margins when the choice of developed and developing partners to create North–
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South and South–South agreements, respectively, is taken into account. In general, 
there is wider variation in both the intensive and extensive margins in South–South 
agreements compared to North–South agreements. First, in the case of North–South 
agreements, the distribution of scores at both margins shows that the data in the 
middle 50 per cent of the dataset are skewed to the left, although they are more 
pronounced for the extensive margin than for the intensive one. Comparing the 
length of the lower whisker to the upper one for only the extensive margin shows that 
the lower scores are spread more widely than the higher ones. Second, in the case of 
the intensive margin in South–South agreements, the data in the middle 50 per cent 
of the data is skewed to the left, and it is less dispersed than those for the extensive 
margin. For both margins, the longer upper whiskers indicate that higher scores are 
more spread out than the lower ones. 
Figure 4-5 Distribution of scores of depth in extensive and extensive margins 
 
Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of the text of the trade agreements. 
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Figure 4-6 Distribution of scores of depth in extensive and extensive margins 
by type of trade agreement (North–South/South–South) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of the text of the trade agreements. 
Conclusions 
This chapter presented the operationalization and empirical tests of the 
categorization of depth at the intensive and extensive margins. The main conclusion 
is that there is empirical support for the theoretical classification of provisions at the 
intensive and extensive margins as suggested in Chapter 3. The general approach 
followed in this chapter was, first, to analyse each trade discipline and area 
independently of the others. Second, the various provisions and possible ranges of 
variation (as regards depth) in each trade discipline and area were analysed and 
coded. The provisions corresponding to each trade area and discipline were identified 
by referring to previous literature and by directly analysing the texts of the trade 
agreements. Third, the depths of areas were measured and aggregated to form six 
variables. Fourth, principal components analysis was performed, which confirmed 
that each variable aligns in their corresponding component (intensive or extensive 
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margin), according to the theoretical analysis developed in the previous chapter. 
Factor-based sum scores were calculated for each margin to calculate the dependent 
variables that are used to test the hypotheses presented in the following chapters of 
this research. Finally, a schematic overview highlighting the variations at the 
intensive and extensive margins of each agreement and between trade agreements 
was presented. 
The overview of variations existing at the intensive and extensive margins of each 
agreement and between trade agreements did not show clear patterns in either of the 
two margins of integration, even after considering the level of development of the 
participating countries. Differences in deep integration in the agreements analysed 
in this chapter have the potential to alter the distribution of economic resources 
between interest groups; therefore, the structure of economic interests in the export 
sector of countries contributes to explaining differences in the levels of integration 
achieved in these agreements. In the next chapter, economic actors with incentives 
to prefer deep integration at the intensive and extensive margins as a way to 
maximize their economic interests through capturing static and dynamic gains from 
trade are identified. 
 117 
5  Exporters’ preferences for deep integration 
According to endogenous trade theories, in order for deep integration to take place, 
economically motivated actors in the domestic system must demand this policy 
outcome. The economic link (Mayer, 1984: 983) places the economy’s structure as 
the main determinant of the process through which a person’s real income and 
interests are affected. The starting point in this chapter is the assumption that even 
if preferences cannot be observed, actors may be regarded as having preferences for 
outcomes (Frieden, 1999: 40) based on how their income will be influenced by a 
policy outcome. Political economy approaches to material interests focus on firms, 
interest groups, and consumers/voters (McGillivray, McLean, Pahre, and 
Schonhardt-Bailey, 2001: 6). In accordance with most public choice literature, this 
research assumes that these actors prefer policies that redistribute income in a way 
that maximizes their economic benefits. Domestic actors choose deep integration as 
one mechanism to pursue liberalization if doing so increases their income and wealth. 
To begin by deriving actors’ preferences from trade theories is an adequate 
approach for understanding the economic interests behind the demand for deep 
integration in trade agreements. According to Frieden, this is the most desirable 
approach, since analysing a policy requires first a clear understanding of the 
economic interests that are behind it (Frieden, 1991: 450). These economic interests 
existed in Latin American countries among actors that increased their economic 
gains through deep integration, such as export oriented producers and particularly 
those in industries with scale-economies and those with fragmented processes of 
production. 
In this chapter, to identify the preferences of economic interests, these interests 
are separated from their strategic environments. Political economy scholars refer 
mainly to two sets of models: models based on trade preferences and models based 
on collective action costs and governmental institutions (Alt, Frieden, Gilligan, 
Rodrik, and Rogowski, 1996: 690). Following Frieden’s guidelines, this chapter does 
not refer to models based on collective action costs and institutions. It is important 
to maintain preferences separate from their settings because preferences may be 
affected by some of the settings’ features. This separation is relevant in order to 
distinguish between the role of actors’ interests and that of their environment. For 
these reasons, the discussions on the organization of economic interests and the 
influence of political institutions on trade agreements are analysed separately (in 
Chapters 6 and 7). 
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The chapter is divided into three main sections. In the first section, the economic 
benefits that exporters of final goods obtain from deep integration are identified. This 
analysis is based on standard trade theories and assumes a setting of perfect 
competition. First, whether static gains from trade are created mainly through 
integration at the extensive margin rather than the intensive margin is considered. 
Second, whether the preferences of the relevant economic actors in Latin American 
countries are more likely to follow factor or sector lines is analysed. The objective is 
to identify which groups are better able to capture the static gains from deep trade 
integration. Third, based on the Ricardo–Viner framework, actors whose economic 
interests are maximized by deep integration at the extensive margin of trade 
agreements are identified. Finally, the first hypothesis of the chapter is presented. 
With all else remaining constant, it is expected that countries with export sectors with 
a higher degree of concentration are associated with trade agreements with more 
profound extensive margins than countries with more de-concentrated export 
sectors. 
In the second section, the economic benefits obtained by exporters with scale-
economies and/or those engaged in fragmented production from deep integration are 
identified. The analysis is based on ‘new’ and ‘new new’ trade theories. First, how 
integration through the intensive and extensive margins contribute to creating gains 
from trade for producers with scale-economies and/or those engaged in 
internationally fragmented production is analysed. Second, whether the potential for 
exploiting scale-economies and for engaging in fragmented production existed in 
Latin American countries after the abandonment of the economic model of 
industrialization based on the substitution of imports is assessed. Next, the second 
hypothesis of this chapter, which is that Latin American countries with more 
concentrated export sectors are associated with deeper trade agreements in both their 
extensive and intensive margins, compared to countries with more de-concentrated 
export sectors, is presented. The third section presents the possible outcomes from 
different levels of export sector (de)concentration. The last section concludes the 
chapter. 
Economic benefits in settings of perfect competition 
To explain the extent of trade liberalization and the economic gains derived from it 
in international trade agreements, it is necessary to analyse different sources of gains 
from trade. According to Jacob Viner, at the country level, establishing a trade 
agreement is beneficial when the balance of gains from trade creation and loses from 
EXPORTERS’ PREFERENCES
 
 
119 
trade diversion is positive (Cohen, Blecker, Whitney, 2003: 72). The gains from trade 
theorem, central to trade theory, in general state that ‘if a country can trade at any 
price ratio different from its relative domestic prices, it is better off than if it refrains 
from trade’ (WTO, 2008: xv).136 Gains from trade are ‘the improvement in welfare 
possible as the result of countries being able to trade with one another, as compared 
with having autarkic economies’ (Black, Hashimzade, and Myles, 2009: 193). 
Different trade theories are complementary, and the validity of each one ‘should be 
assessed on the basis of its capacity to explain trade in its limited domain’ (WTO, 
2008: 28). Different economic trade theories provide insight to the different sources, 
allocations, and distributions of gains from trade. 
Static gains from inter-industry trade are explained by standard trade theories. 
These theories consider settings of perfect competition137 and focus on gains from 
trade arising from specialization and relative economic efficiency, based on 
comparative advantage.138 Although they cannot be tested through empirical work, 
the existence of static gains from trade ‘fall[s] into the irrefutable category’ (Leamer 
and Levinsohn, 1994: 2). From the perspective of producers within a country, static 
gains from trade are ‘one-time income effects as prices adjust to the opening of 
regional trade. Endowments are fixed in the short run, comparative costs change 
slowly and benefits from liberalization do not cumulate over time’ (Chase, 2005: 22). 
Because integration at the intensive margin and that at the extensive margins have 
different income effects over producers in the economy, there may also be differences 
between them as sources of static gains from trade. 
Deep trade integration at the extensive margin is more likely to produce static 
gains from trade than deep integration at the intensive margin. As indicated in the 
two previous chapters, integration at the intensive margin includes provisions which 
cover the trade agreement as a whole, whereas integration at the extensive margin 
covers specific trade areas which have an effect on concrete productive sectors of the 
economy. In contrast to integration at the intensive margin, integration at the 
                                                        
136 Standard trade theories’ general propositions about gains from are the following: countries 
are better off with free trade than with restricted trade (including small countries); and they 
are better with restricted trade than with autarky (WTO, 2008: 27). 
137 Perfect competition ‘is a market situation in which buyers and sellers are so numerous and 
well informed that each can act as a price taker, able to buy or sell any desired quantity without 
affecting the market price’ (Black, Hashimzade, and Myles, 2009: 349). 
138 Countries have comparative advantage ‘relative to another country or the rest of the world, 
if the relative cost of producing the good, that is, its opportunity cost in terms of other goods 
foregone, is lower than it is abroad’ (Black, Hashimzade, and Myles, 2009: 369). 
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extensive margin produces one-time income effects on the productive sectors that are 
benefitted by liberalization in the areas covered by the agreement. Therefore, static 
gains from economic efficiency and specialization through comparative advantage 
are created by integration at the extensive margin, rather than at the intensive margin 
in a trade agreement. 
Beneficiaries of specialization through comparative advantage differ, depending 
on the assumed sources of comparative advantage and levels of factor specificity.139 
Venables (2003) pointed out that specialization in both the Ricardian and the 
Heckscher–Ohlin models is associated with a decrease in trade barriers, since 
economies specialize according to their regional comparative advantage. In the 
Ricardo–Viner model, the sources of comparative advantage are productivity 
(technology) differences. In the Heckscher–Ohlin–Stolper–Samuelson models, the 
sources of comparative advantage are the differences in factor intensity and the cross-
country differences in factor abundance (Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott, 
2007: 106). According to these theories, changes in exposure to trade influence 
relative factor rewards. 
The models predict different distributions of these rewards because each of them 
assumes opposite levels of flexibility in the structure of production, leading also to 
contrasting predictions of the trade preferences of domestic actors. In the 
Heckscher–Ohlin–Stolper–Samuelson model, preferences follow factor lines; in the 
Ricardo–Viner model, preferences follow sector lines. To identify which groups 
benefit from deep integration agreements, the first step is to assess which model is 
more convenient for analysing trade agreements and Latin American countries after 
the adoption of the economic model based on the promotion of exports. 
Deep integration in Latin America in the factor mobility 
continuum 
Determining which model is more appropriate for the Latin American cases is neither 
a direct nor a straightforward task, since both models are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive, despite their assumptions about factor specificity. The Heckscher–Ohlin–
Stolper–Samuelson model assumes a flexible structure of production with high 
mobility between factors. The Ricardo–Viner model assumes a relatively more rigid 
                                                        
139 Factors of production are land, labour, and capital. Factor specificity is ‘the costliness with 
which factors move from their current use to an alternative one’ (Alt, Frieden, Gilligan, Rodrik, 
and Rogowski, 1996: 690). 
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structure of production with high specificity of factors. Even if their assumptions are 
mutually exclusive, since factor mobility cannot be high and low at the same time 
(Ladewig, 2006: 71), the two models are mutually exclusive only as ideal types. 
Mobility of factors is not constant and can be considered a continuous variable in 
which each model would be placed on one of the extremes with different gradations 
of factor specificity in between (Midford, 1993: 562; Alt, Frieden, Gilligan, Rodrik, 
and Rogowski, 1996: 692; Ladewig, 2006: 71).140 The importance of the assumptions 
about factor mobility is that they lead to contrasting inferences about the distribution 
of static gains from trade between economic actors (firms and workers). In turn, these 
inferences also lead to contrasting implications about the economic interests of the 
said actors and their trade preferences. 
Therefore, to determine which economic interests maximize their static gains 
through deep integration, it is useful to approximate at which point of the factor 
mobility continuum are the analysed countries and the objects of analysis (trade 
agreements). As mentioned before, countries are more likely to be located at a point 
between the extremes of total or null factor mobility. Unfortunately, specific 
measurements of factor mobility are not available, and a direct measurement of factor 
mobility can be extremely difficult (Ladewig, 2006). In order to establish which 
theory provides a relatively more adequate framework for analysing the Latin 
American cases, an exact estimate of factor mobility in each country is not necessary. 
Instead, for the purposes of this research, the extreme in the continuum at which the 
Latin American region is placed can simply be approximated. To deduce which model 
better predicts the economic interests of the region that benefit from deep 
integration, first the characteristics of the countries of the region and, second, the 
nature of the object of analysis (the trade policy output) are analysed. 
In terms of the analysed region, since Latin American countries are classified in 
the middle-income range (WB, 2013), 141  the Ricardo–Viner model seems more 
appropriate for the analysis. The optimal number of factors depends on the stage of 
development of the countries being studied (Midford, 1993; Hiscox, 2002a). Midford 
(1993: 562) argued that a parsimonious model is more appropriate for economies 
                                                        
140 For example, Beaulieu (2002: 104), considering a two factor model, explains that there are 
four potential factor markets. On the extreme of perfect factor mobility, corresponding to the 
Stolper-Samuelson model, there would be two factors. Inter-industry elasticities of 
substitution would decrease along the continuum until reaching the opposite extreme in 
which with perfect immobility there would be four factors, as in the Ricardo-Viner model. 
141 The only exception is Haiti, classified in the range of low income. Economies are classified 
accordingly to their gross national income (GNI) per capita. 
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that are just starting to develop, but as an economy becomes more advanced, its 
factors of production, such as the division of labour, will likely become more complex 
and require further specification. Hiscox (2002a) systematically analysed levels of 
inter-industry factor mobility in six developed economies (United States, France, 
Sweden, Canada, and Australia) of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and 
concluded that variations in factor mobility correspond with different levels of 
regulation and different periods of industrialization in those countries:  
‘Early stages of development have typically produced a sharp rise in inter-
industry mobility, as innovations in transportation lowered the costs of factor 
movement and innovations in production gave rise to the factory system and 
increased demand for unskilled workers and basic forms of physical capital. 
Later stages of development, however, have generally been associated with a 
decline in inter-industry mobility, as new innovations have generated more 
specific forms of human and physical capital and far greater complementarity 
between technology and labor skills’ (Hiscox, 2002a: 10). 
Empirical analyses of factor mobility in Latin American economies have not been 
specifically developed. However, other analyses that infer factor mobility from trade 
preferences support the use of the Ricardo–Viner model as an appropriate 
framework for analysing the region. For example, Magaloni and Romero (2008) 
analysed attitudes towards free trade in 18 Latin American countries and concluded 
‘our findings disconfirm the Hecksher–Ohlin–Samuelson model: there is no 
evidence that poorer Latin Americans support free trade […] The results reveal that 
support for free trade decreases among lower-income individuals and the middle 
class’ (Magaloni and Romero, 2008: 126). In addition, the fact that countries in the 
medium stages of development may follow sector lines can also shed light on the 
paradox that, within a standard theory approach, ‘exporters in developing countries 
are also more capital and skill intensive, which are likely to be abundant in unskilled 
labour’ (Alvarez and Lopez, 2005). A final consideration that supports the use of the 
Ricardo–Viner framework is the argument of Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott 
(2007: 108), which states that if exporting firms in labour abundant countries 
specialized in goods consistent with comparative advantage, they would be labour 
intensive rather than capital-skilled intensive. 
Regarding factor specificity from the perspective of the policy output, different 
degrees of factor specificity can also be explained by its timeframe. The Heckscher–
Ohlin model is considered a long run model since ‘in the long run there are no assets 
that are specific to anything’ (Alt, Frieden, Gilligan, Rodrik, and Rogowski, 1996: 
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698).142 Analyses that focus on long-term periods (e.g. Rogowski, 1989) should use 
the Heckscher–Ohlin model (Alt, Frieden, Gilligan, Rodrik, and Rogowski, 1996: 
698). In contrast, the Ricardo–Viner model is considered a short-run model, since in 
the short term, very few assets can be transferred without costs. Therefore, according 
to Frieden (1991: 436), relative to the long-term, the short-term, is a more adequate 
timeframe for a political analysis of international trade and capital movements 
Consistent with Alt, Frieden, Gilligan, Rodrik, and Rogowski (1996) and Frieden 
(1991), this research considers trade agreements as short-term policies. Specifically, 
trade preferences regarding trade agreements focus on the short run (Alt, Frieden, 
Gilligan, Rodrik, and Rogowski, 1996: 698).143 The argument is that (leaving political 
interests aside and focusing on economic interests) the redistribution of income 
between import competing and export oriented industries takes place in the short 
term. The reason is that preferential trade agreements, in general, have short-term 
liberalization schemes. The short-term redistribution of income does not leave 
enough margins for long-term adjustments and creates strong incentives to demand 
or oppose trade agreements. Since trade agreements are considered a short run policy 
for the purposes of this research, the Ricardo–Viner model seems appropriate for 
considering which economic interests benefit from static gains and prefer trade 
agreements with deep extensive margins.144 
Exporters’ preferences towards deep integration 
As mentioned in the literature review, industries in the export oriented sector prefer, 
if available, multilateral rather than bilateral or plurilateral trade agreements, which 
are only secondary alternatives to multilateral liberalization. Countries, frustrated 
                                                        
142 Alt, Frieden, Gilligan, Rodrik, and Rogowski (1996) also mention that in the long term 
factors of production also have costs of adjustment (distributed over a long period of time). 
143  Beaulieu (2002) claims that trade agreements should be analysed with a long term 
framework since they are long term commitment devices for governments. However, this 
characterization is based in political, rather than in economic interests. The author’s empirical 
evidence supports a model of partial factor mobility which is consistent with trade agreements 
either as long term or short term policies. 
144 Along factor or industry lines, the differences in factor endowments that are central to 
these theories have implications concerning the choice of partners in trade agreements. For 
example, the economic drive for inter-industry trade should lead towards the formation of 
trade agreements (when the multilateral option is not available) between countries with 
complementary endowments, rather than similar endowments. Developing countries (usually 
abundant in labour) may be more likely to form an agreement with developed countries 
(usually abundant in capital). Differences in factor endowments contribute to explain trade 
agreements between Latin American countries and developed partners. 
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with the slow progress and problems of the multilateral system, see regionalism trade 
agreements as an alternative route (Krugman, 1993: 73). In the case of the Latin 
American and Caribbean countries, it is acknowledged in literature (e.g. Haggard, 
1997) that frustration with the multilateral process contributed to the establishment 
of numerous trade agreements. Bilateral and regional trade agreements were an 
alternative to multilateralism.145  
Based on the Ricardo–Viner framework, it is possible to identify which actors’ 
economic interests are maximized through trade agreements with deep extensive 
margins of integration when the multilateral alternative is not available. The 
Ricardo–Viner model represents a fairly rigid structure of production, in which 
distribution of income and trade preferences towards liberalization follow sector 
lines. As explained previously, the model is considered a short-run model, in which 
both labour and capital inputs are specific to their industry. According to this model, 
trade preferences of specific factors follow sector lines. 
Regarding labour, there is consensus in literature that highly skilled workers 
have greater specificity and are more likely to favour liberalization than unskilled 
workers. In industrial relations literature, it has been well established that skilled 
workers have greater specificity (Alt, Frieden, Gilligan, Rodrik, and Rogowski, 1996: 
705). Therefore, their trade preferences should be aligned towards either import 
competing industries or export promoting ones. Several studies of developed and 
developing countries (e.g. Beaulieu, 2002: 104; Broz, 2005: 79; Magaloni and 
Romero, 2008) found that skilled workers are more likely than unskilled workers to 
support policies that encourage globalization and factor market integration, such as 
financial rescues (Broz, 2005: 79) 146  and trade liberalization (Beaulieu, 2001; 
Magaloni and Romero, 2008). The implications of the existence of a large proportion 
of unskilled workers in the regional economies’ non-formal sector are analysed 
below. 
Several reasons support the argument that it is not necessary to modify the 
framework of analysis because of the large proportion of workers in the non-formal 
                                                        
145  Haggard (1997: 23) claims that frustration with multilateralism partially explains that 
trade agreements (US–Canada FTA, NAFTA, APEC, and EAEG) were negotiated during GATT 
‘pre-negotiations’ (1982–1986) and the Uruguay Round negotiations. 
146 Broz (2005: 493) studies the effect of private actors’ interests on voting towards financial 
rescues in the United States. His findings support the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem. Districts 
with relatively larger proportions of less educated and low skilled workers are more likely to 
oppose financial rescues. 
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productive sector147 of Latin American countries. First, although trade increases the 
proportion of ‘informal employment’ (Bachetta and Bustamante, 2009: 66-67) the 
increase in number of these workers after the implementation of trade agreements 
does not influence the design of such agreements. 148  Second, there is no clear 
evidence that redistribution after trade liberalization affects the income of workers in 
the non-formal sector.149 A third, but not least, important reason is that these workers 
are usually employed in the non-tradable sector:  
‘The idea of informal sector output being traded violates the raison detere of 
informal production because it opens up all sorts of possibilities of taxation 
and subsidies which by definition do not apply to the informal sector’ 
(Bachetta and Bustamante, 2009: 80). 
Based on these scholarly works, it is possible to argue that the existence in Latin 
American countries of a large informal non-tradable sector in which workers are non-
skilled does not require modifications in the analytical framework. Analysing the role 
of workers in the non-formal sector would appear to be more appropriate when 
analysing the implementation stage of trade agreements. However, this stage of the 
policy process falls beyond the scope of this research. 
As with specific labour, the preferences of specific capitals also follow sector 
lines. Firms and individuals that hold diversified assets (in terms of activities and 
locations) are considered more mobile than those that hold an asset that is completely 
specific to an industry (Frieden, 1991: 439; Milner, 1988).150 The latter situation is 
                                                        
147 The non-formal, ‘informal, or unorganized sector’ includes ‘economic activities which are 
not conducted through legally incorporated bodies and are not reported to the tax and social 
security authorities.’ (Black, Hashimzade, and Myles, 2009: 487). 
148  Most academic literature about the non-formal sector has focused on analysing the 
mechanisms by which trade increases the proportion of ‘informal employment’ (Bachetta and 
Bustamante, 2009: 66-67). Also Kar and Marjit (2001), explain that the effect of trade 
liberalization on the proportion of workers on the non-formal sector and their wages depends 
on the mobility of capital between the formal and the non-formal sectors. In a setting where 
capital is not mobile between said sectors, the numbers of workers that can be re-absorbed by 
the formal sector are limited. In developing countries, capital tends to be less mobile between 
the formal and non-formal sectors. In such cases, the wages of the workers in the non-formal 
sector decrease as a consequence of the limits of the formal sector to reabsorb the workers 
displaced from import competing industries. In contrast, with more capital mobility between 
both sectors, trade liberalization increases the capital to output ratio, rising, as a consequence, 
employment in the non-formal sector and the wages of the workers employed in the non-
formal sector (Kar, Marjit, and Sarkar, 2003). 
149 Bachetta and Bustamante (2009: 23-67) claim that comparing economic models of the 
influence of trade liberalization over the non-formal economic sector is difficult. Models tend 
to differ in their assumptions and predictions about non-formal sector wages and general 
welfare implications. 
150 Frankel (1990) classifies capital according to its mobility. International financial capital is 
highly, but not fully, mobile across borders; country and currency risks limit its mobility. 
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the most vulnerable, since it is costly to move an asset from its existing use to an 
alternative one. As in the case of labour, trade preferences also follow sector lines, 
with owners of more mobile assets on one side of the financial sector and firms with 
high specificity regarding activities and locations on the other side (Frieden, 1991: 
442). The latter group has more incentives to demand supportive governmental 
policies (Frieden, 1991: 443). As in the case of labour, their economic interests are 
expected to be aligned with either import competing or export-promoting industries. 
Considering that in a trade agreement, the source of static gains from trade is 
integration at the extensive margin (along shallow integration), export oriented 
industries and sectors are likely to prefer deep integration in this margin. On the one 
hand, labour and capital employed in comparatively disadvantaged industries (i.e. 
those that use society’s scarce factors) lose from trade. These groups are referred to 
as the import competing sector. On the other hand, labour and capital that are 
employed in comparatively advantaged industries (i.e. those that use society’s 
abundant factors) gain from trade. These groups are referred to as the export oriented 
sector. Thus, trade policy preferences are expected to follow along the lines of export 
oriented versus import competing industries or sectors (Alt, Frieden, Gilligan, 
Rodrik, and Rogowski, 1996: 692). Therefore, export oriented industries and sectors 
are likely to prefer deep integration at the extensive margin because they benefit from 
the static gains from trade generated in this margin. Benefits are larger for export 
oriented industries and sectors in which less trade barriers are maintained. In 
contrast, import competing industries harmed by liberalization in the areas covered 
by the trade agreement oppose integration in the said margin. 
All exporters covered in the agreement benefit from static gains from trade, 
although larger exporters receive a larger proportion of the gains. In general, Latin 
American countries have numerous small and medium exporters151 and few large 
export oriented firms. Despite the large number of small and medium exporters in 
the region, their participation as a proportion of total exports (relative to larger 
exporters) is still limited (ECLAC, 2011: 18). From the characterizations (high 
                                                        
Financial bonds have an intermediate degree of mobility. Finally, firm or industry specific 
capital is the less mobile and its markets are nationally segmented. High levels of mobility of 
financial capital tend to reduce specific capital by reducing barriers to entry: financial capital 
can extend funds to new firms decreasing the benefits of pre-existing firms. However, specific 
capital will never be reduced to a point in which sector or industry specificity is eliminated 
(Frieden 1991: 429). 
151 Small and medium sized enterprises account for more than 90 percent of the enterprises 
in Latin America (ECLAC, 2011: 1). 
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specificity policy outcome, highly specific policy setting, and frustration with the 
multilateral process) and the arguments developed above, the expectations would be 
that, with all else remaining constant, exporters in countries with more concentrated 
export sectors have higher economic incentives to establish trade agreements with 
deeper extensive margins than those in countries with more de-concentrated export 
sectors. This reasoning leads to the following constitutive hypothesis:  
Constitutive hypothesis 1. Latin American countries with more 
concentrated export sectors display deeper integration at the 
extensive margin of their trade agreements than countries with 
more de-concentrated export sectors. 
Economic benefits from scale and fragmented 
production 
In settings of imperfect competition, some exporters increase their production and 
reduce their costs by realizing scale economies or relocating some stages of their 
production processes to foreign countries. Both cases result in increases in the output 
of final goods and additional gains from trade to only static gains from trade. 
Complementing standard trade theories, ‘new’ and ‘new new’ trade theories suggest 
that gains from trade may not only arise from relative differences in technology and 
factor intensity between countries. The ‘new’ models explain intra-industry trade in 
settings of imperfect competition through a combination of scale economies and 
intermediate products or consumer preferences for variety. In ‘new new’ trade 
models, firms 152  are heterogeneous. Unlike the explanation of standard trade 
                                                        
152 Although the role of firms is theoretically taken into consideration in this research, the 
independent variable is the export-sector. Sector and industry level analyses are consistent in 
general with how endogenous trade theory has looked at industry characteristics. Empirical 
evidence shows high coherence between characteristics of sectors and industries (Milner, 
1988). Moreover, this approach is widely used in the literature on international political 
economy of market reforms in developing countries, where constrains in the availability of 
data exist. Particularly in the case of Latin American countries ‘conceptualizing business as 
sector is often a useful first cut’ (Schneider, 2009: 6). The reasons are that sectoral cleavages 
in Latin America are emphasized, and that many policies have uneven distributions of costs 
and benefits across sectors. Ideally, firms would be the units of analysis since individual firms 
with scale-economies and production sharing, not the sector as a whole, are the ones that reap 
a higher proportion of the benefits from trade agreements. The rest of smaller firms in the 
sector also obtain benefits from expanded markets, but benefits are not proportional to the 
ones of larger firms. However, data is not available for the region. Even if data on firms were 
available, theoretically it is difficult to distinguish when firms or industries exert political 
pressure (Chase, 2005: 41). Therefore, to characterize economic interests, this research 
follows Frieden’s (1991) deductive approach based on asset specificity which operationalizes 
business as sectors. 
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theories, gains from trade arise from specialization and productivity gains in 
intermediate inputs and ‘tasks’153 instead of final goods. ‘New’ and ‘new new’ trade 
models provide insight into intra-industry trade between countries endowed with 
similar factors and intra-industry or inter-industry trade where internationally 
fragmented production exists. 
The industries deriving additional gains from trade in settings of imperfect 
competition are those with scale economies in which exists a taste for variety or are 
those internationally integrated. According to the model of monopolistic competition 
(Krugman, 1979), the existence of scale economies in production and differentiated 
products explains the existence of intra-industry trade. Scale economies arise when 
the structure of production allows producers to reduce unit costs as output 
increases. 154  The existence of similar and differentiated products responds to a 
demand for variety from consumers or for intermediate inputs from integrated firms. 
As explained below in more detail, when scale economies exist, decreases in costs of 
trade reduce the need to concentrate the production of all varieties in one country. 
When scale economies and demand for variety (in either final or intermediate 
products) exist, decreases in costs of trade lead to intra-industry trade. For 
differentiated final products, the model of monopolistic competition assumes that 
consumers demand variety. Each country produces different varieties of the product, 
                                                        
153 Increases in the relative importance of fragmentation of production in trade flows imply 
increases of interdependence between countries (Yeats, 1999: 1).The reallocation of stages of 
the process of production of a good or service ‘has variously been called fragmentation, 
unbundling, offshoring, vertical specialization, slicing-up of the value-added chain or trade in 
tasks’ (WTO, 2008: 37). In general, these activities are defined as the internationalization of 
productive activities, with different countries participating, specializing, and adding value in 
different stages of the process of production of a specific good (Yeats, 1999: 1; Yi, 2003: 53; 
Deardorff, 2005: 1). Importing activities include intermediate goods to produce export goods; 
exporting activities can include both, intermediate and final goods (Yi, 2003: 53). 
154 For example, overhead costs are independent of the output produced and therefore will 
relatively decline with output increases. External benefits to the industries come from 
localization economies or urbanization economies. Internal scale-economies arise when the 
larger size of a plant allows a relatively more efficient exploitation of fixed costs. Localization 
scale-economies arise by concentrating production in the same industry and the same place. 
Urbanization scale-economies arise from a larger number of different industries located in 
the same place (World Bank, 2009: 127-128). The general assumption is scale-economies at 
national level, where ‘external economies arise from scale-economies in the production of 
intermediate goods, and if these intermediaries are (cheaply) tradable, we should think of 
scale-economies as applying at the international rather than the national level’ (Helpman and 
Krugman, 1985: 36). Determining the industries in which scale-economies exist is an 
empirical matter; in general, ‘scale economies range from negligible or low among light 
industries, to high among heavy and high-technology industries’ (World Bank, 2009: 129). 
The existence of scale-economies in the process of production of a proportion of exporters is 
central in understanding why certain economic interests are maximized through the 
combination of liberalization and protection provided by trade agreements. 
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which become imperfect substitutes. Since both countries demand every variety, 
intra-industry trade is expected for every pair of countries that produce varieties of 
the good (Helpman and Krugman, 1985: 132).155 On the other hand, Ethier (1979, 
1982) presented a variant of the framework of monopolistic competition which 
analyses product differentiation in intermediate inputs. The model considers a 
product whose costs decrease the larger the number of varieties in intermediate 
inputs. When trade barriers exist, firms can only produce at the same cost when all 
varieties of inputs are produced in the country where the final good is produced 
(WTO, 2008: 46). In general, when high levels of intra-industry trade exist between 
two countries, they are considered to have high levels of production sharing (ECLAC, 
2013: 93). Nevertheless, by considering all firms within an industry to face the same 
demand and cost functions, the ‘new’ trade theory has limitations in explaining which 
types of producers within an industry receive economic benefits after trade is 
liberalized. 
After re-localizing stages of their production processes some firms reduce their 
costs obtaining additional gains from trade (to the static gains from trade). The ‘new 
new’ trade theories explicitly model the microeconomic link between trade 
liberalization and the firms’ productivity (Baldwin and Forslid, 2010: 161). The basic 
and leading model of Melitz (2003) demonstrates that trade openness improves 
efficiency and welfare by increasing productivity in industries. Baldwin and Robert-
Nicoud (2004: 2) mention that such increases in productivity are ‘via a selection 
effect (lowering the maximum marginal cost of active firms) and via a production re-
allocation effect (production shifts to the most productive firms).’ When differences 
in efficiency between countries are allowed, trade opening and the resulting import 
driven or export driven forces benefit the most efficient firms and increases industry 
productivity in both, the less efficient and the more efficient countries (Falvey, 
Greenaway, and Yu, 2011). In settings of imperfect competition with heterogeneous 
firms, two main analytical approaches explain the firms’ trade gains from 
international fragmentation of production. 
Approaches explaining product sharing focus on decreases in the costs of 
production to explain gains from trade. Under the first approach, specialization in 
                                                        
155 Williamson, (1975) points out that firms have incentives to produce their own inputs in 
settings where technology determines that few firms concentrate the production of highly 
specific inputs. This production structure may lead to a costly bargaining game (‘horrors of 
bilateral monopoly’) between the price and demand of these highly specific inputs. Then, 
these firms may fail to reach an efficient agreement and even any agreement at all. 
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intermediate goods (or services) takes place through comparative advantage, 
according to standard trade theories. Within this framework, Deardorff (2005) 
equated fragmentation in production to technological advancement. As a result, 
product specialization and fragmentation increase the output of final goods and their 
consumption and create static gains from trade. 156  Under the second approach, 
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) explained a model in which heterogeneous 
offshoring costs for different tasks existed. Firms decide how to organize their 
production geographically, based on the said costs and on the price of factors of 
production in foreign countries. As a result, these firms will choose to perform a task 
in a foreign country when doing so reduces their costs of production and create 
productivity gains (in addition to the static gains from trade from comparative 
advantage). 
Preferences of exporters with scale-economies and/or 
fragmented production 
In general, producers from export oriented industries with scale-economies and/or 
fragmented production prefer trade liberalization to protectionism because it 
maximizes their economic benefits through gains from trade. Trade liberalization 
allows industries with scale-economies and with internationalized production to 
obtain static gains from trade through market expansion. These industries also obtain 
additional gains from trade through their own production effects when trade leads to 
the expansion of a country’s industries with scale-economies and the reallocation of 
their steps of production to increase access to foreign markets, cheap input sources, 
or other competitive reasons (Falvey, Greenaway, and Yu, 2011). From this 
perspective, for these types of industries, deep integration at the intensive margin 
creates additional gains from trade. To assess the extensive margin additional 
characteristics must be considered. 
Integration in both the intensive and extensive margins in trade agreements is a 
source of gains from trade. In the presence of internationalized production, 
integration in trade agreements must reflect the agreements’ ‘member-specific 
idiosyncratic needs,’ rather than general rules (e.g. reciprocity or national treatment) 
applicable without distinction across different sectors (Antràs and Staiger 2012: 
3144). These arguments are also applicable to export oriented producers with scale-
                                                        
156 Deardorff (2005: 18) concludes that within this framework gains from fragmentation are 
similar to the conclusions of trade theory about the gains from trade. 
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economies, which also require the removal of specific trade barriers relevant to their 
industries to realize increases in scale with their production. One example is the 
adoption of mutual recognition of conformity assessments between members of a 
trade agreement. A second example is the decrease in costs of imported inputs for 
producers which use them intensively (Yi, 2003). From this perspective, the extensive 
margin promotes integration in trade areas affecting the production of certain 
industries with internationalized production or scale economies, providing economic 
benefits for the exporters in these sectors of the economy. 
Although integration at the intensive margin is less targeted at removing specific 
barriers, it is also necessary in trade agreements to create gains from trade for 
producers which engage in intra-industry trade and those whose production is 
internationally fragmented. Producers which engage in intra-industry trade and 
other exporters with fragmented production face high costs in controlling 
international aspects of production. Therefore, these exporters require better 
instruments of coordination and governance to manage the costs associated with the 
‘international coordination of production facilities via the continuous two-way flow 
of goods, people, ideas and investments’ (Baldwin, 2011: 9). In addition, ‘formal 
regional trade arrangements’ provide security and certainty against the increased 
risks of ‘disruption’157 from a fragmented production process (Yeats, 1999: 10). As a 
result, exporters that engage in intra-industry trade and/or internationalization of 
production obtain dynamic gains from trade from both the extensive and intensive 
margins in an agreement. 
The profits from deep trade integration are captured by industries and firms that 
have economic incentives to pursue limited rather than global liberalization. First, 
‘new’ trade theories provide first order endogenous mechanisms to derive trade 
preferences for deep trade agreements from the economic interests of exporters in 
settings of imperfect competition. Unlike the perfect competition setting, in which 
benefits increase with liberalization and limited liberalization is a secondary 
alternative to multilateral liberalization, in the imperfect competition setting, 
producers with scale economies benefit from limited rather than global liberalization. 
The distribution of monopoly profits is earned by firms, unless they are eliminated 
by entry (Helpman and Krugman, 1985: 40). Further liberalization is 
counterproductive when it allows external competition to erode the scale economies 
                                                        
157 According to Yeats (1999: 32) ‘disruption of component supplies is apparently perceived 
[...] as the primary risk’ by internationally fragmented producers. 
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of domestic firms (Milner, 1997). Because of these reasons, exporters with scale 
economies prefer limited rather than global trade liberalization. 
On the other hand, exporters that engage in internationalized production would 
also benefit from limited integration with their trading partners rather than from 
multilateral liberalization. First, the costs of trade barriers for this type of exporters 
increase as a product enters the borders of each of the countries involved in its 
production (WTO, 2011: 111). Therefore, removing barriers in the countries where the 
different stages of production are localized decreases the costs of production. Second, 
considerable and relation-specific ‘lock-in effects’ are applicable to importers and 
exporters engaged in a fragmented process of production that shield their own 
positions and the trade relationships (WTO, 2011: 111; Antràs and Staiger (2012: 
3141). 
‘Differentiated intermediate inputs are frequently customized to the needs of 
their intended buyers and hence embody a disproportionate amount of 
relationship specific investments, which may be hard to recoup when 
transacting with alternative parties. Moreover, offshoring often involves the 
costly search for suitable foreign suppliers or foreign buyers, which makes 
separations costly and thereby provides another source of lock in. Because 
contracts involving international transactions are especially hard to enforce, 
the cross-border exchange of intermediate inputs cannot generally be 
governed by the same contractual safeguards that typically accompany 
similar exchanges occurring within borders’ (Antràs and Staiger, 2012: 3141). 
Thus, exporters whose productions are fragmented also have economic 
incentives to demand limited rather than global or unilateral trade liberalization. 
However, these industries’ preferences over the degree of liberalization of specific 
trade areas (e.g. rules of origin) may differ depending on whether their main incentive 
is to realize and protect their scale economies from competition, or to facilitate 
production sharing without losing preferential treatment (Chase, 2008). Export 
oriented industries that have scale-economies and/or that are engaged in fragmented 
production have no incentives for further liberalization beyond the point of realizing 
their scale-economies or securing their product-sharing network. 
In addition to limited liberalization, an element of protection is also needed to 
reduce the entry of competitors. Trade agreements provide an element of protection 
that works as export promotion when scale economies are present in the production 
structure of a country.158 Protection is provided through a mechanism that Krugman 
                                                        
158 For example, country size has been acknowledged as a variable that influences the potential 
to realize scale-economies. With imperfect competition, a relatively larger country has a larger 
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(1984, 1992) labelled ‘protection as export promotion.’ The logic of the model is that 
in monopolistic, oligopolistic, and segmented markets, protection provides a 
domestic firm with greater scale economies, while reducing those of its foreign 
competitors. Protection allows the domestic firm to reap the benefits coming from 
output to marginal cost to output, thereby decreasing its costs: ‘protecting the 
domestic firm in one market increases domestic sales and lowers foreign sales in all 
markets’ (Krugman, 1992: 80). This situation increases production efficiency and 
may even make firms more competitive in foreign markets, thereby increasing the 
efficiency of the firms’ production until they reach a level of efficient scale.159 In each 
of these steps, industries with scale economies obtain higher profits (Milner, 1997: 
81-82); therefore, exporters with the potential to realize scale economies gain 
economic benefits from reduced competition. 
In addition to limited liberalization, an element of protection by limiting the 
entrance of competitors is also needed to secure fragmented production 
relationships. By limiting the scope of countries with which to integrate, producers 
‘lock in’ their relationships with buyers or sellers in other countries, thereby shielding 
their own position and the trade relationship (WTO, 2011: 111). As a result, industries 
with scale economies and exporters with fragmented production have economic 
incentives to demand trade agreements: they prefer limited liberalization in order to 
maximize their profits through exclusive access to the regional market and/or 
productive network. 
Nevertheless, to capture economic benefits from deep integration, a favourable 
context which allows the realization of scale economies and production sharing must 
also exist. 160 In the next section, it is argued that the potential for exploiting scale 
economies and for engaging in production sharing existed in Latin America after 
most of the countries abandoned their economic models of industrialization based on 
the substitution of imports in the 1980s. 
                                                        
market size that increases the possibilities for exploiting scale-economies (Helpman and 
Krugman, 1985: 152). As a result, relatively smaller countries have incentives to form trade 
agreements to expand their markets and increase their opportunities to exploit scale-
economies. Country size is a control variable in the empirical analyses in Chapter 8. 
159 In addition, when international competition encourages imperfectly competitive firms to 
reduce their prices and produce more, this can be also considered a source of gains at a 
country level (Helpman and Krugman, 1985: 263-265). 
160 The potential to exploit scale-economies increases inversely to the point they already have 
been exploited (Helpman and Krugman, 1985). 
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Potential of exploiting scale economies and production sharing 
Latin American countries had the potential to realize scale economies and, to a lesser 
extent, engage in production sharing after they abandoned the economic model of 
industrialization based on the substitution of imports in the 1980s. Academic 
literature on the characteristics of the imports substitution model that prevailed in 
Latin American countries after the Great Depression and until the economic crisis of 
1982 provide insight for assessing whether industries and firms had the possibility to 
realize scale economies in their processes of production. On the other hand, an 
economic model based on the substitution of imports does not, by definition, allow 
the existence of strong internationalized processes of production. Since Latin 
American industries and firms were unable to realize scale economies or 
internationalize their production during the imports substitution phase, these types 
of exporters had economic incentives to demand deep integration.  
Indeed, the protectionist model that prevailed in Latin America after the Great 
Depression and until the economic crisis of 1982 created obstacles for realizing scale 
economies and internationalizing production. In any imports substitution process, 
the starting point is the manufacture of finished consumer goods, moving on to the 
production of intermediate goods and machinery through backward linkage effects. 
In contrast to that of developed countries, 161  industrialization in Latin America 
followed a sequential process on the basis of imported inputs and machines 
(Hirschman, 1968: 6). The industrial structure that developed in Latin American 
countries was virtually isolated from the rest of the world (Prebisch, 1963: 71). This 
situation was particularly critical for industries that required large-scale output to 
reduce their high fixed costs (such as the steel and automobile industries) to be 
internationally competitive (Bauer, 1972: 102). The staged process created obstacles 
to training in technological innovation as well as resistance to backward linkage 
investments and to exporting:  
‘New industries have been set up exclusively to substitute imports, without 
any export horizon […] the foreign branch plants and subsidiaries, which 
have taken an important part in the process, often are under specific 
instructions not to compete abroad with the products of the parent company 
[…] the new industries, set up behind tariff walls, usually suffer from high 
                                                        
161 The industrialization based on the substitution of imports that took place in Latin America 
had different characteristics from the one that took place earlier in developed countries. 
Instead of the gradual import substitution that took place in United States and Europe, the 
application of said model in Latin America was part of a deliberate development policy in 
response to the growth of domestic markets (Hirschman, 1968: 6). 
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production costs in countries that are, moreover, permanently subject to 
strong inflationary pressures -hence there is no real possibility of these 
industries competing successfully in international markets even if they were 
disposed to do so’ (Hirschman, 1968: 25). 
The establishment of inefficient and costly industries in countries with small 
domestic markets and no access to foreign markets took place in a setting with no 
possibilities of backward linkages. Moreover, in an effort to increase competition, 
governments allowed numerous firms to create domestic competition, further 
decreasing any possibility of realizing scale economies (Scitovsky, 1969). These 
characteristics of industrial growth prevented the realization of scale economies and 
the competitive internationalization of the processes of production:  
‘The criterion by which the choice was determined was based not on 
considerations of economic expediency, but on immediate feasibility, 
whatever the cost of production […] As is well known, the proliferation of 
industries of every kind in a closed market has deprived the Latin American 
countries of the advantages of specialization and scale-economies, and owing 
to the protection afforded by excessive tariff duties and restrictions, a healthy 
form of internal competition has failed to develop, to the detriment of 
efficient productions’ (Prebisch, 1963: 71). 
Fragmentation of production in international networks and value chains has 
gradually gained relevance in international trade. According to Yeats (1999), the 
international fragmentation of production is a phenomenon which started in the 
1960s. 162  Fragmented processes increased in complexity as industries needed to 
increase productivity and remain competitive. Nevertheless, it was only after the 
international communications revolution,163 which began in the late eighties, that 
coordinating extremely complex processes across distances became possible and 
radically transformed international trade (Baldwin, 2011: 4-5). Simultaneously, after 
the economic crises in the 1980s, Latin American countries reoriented their economic 
patterns towards an export promotion model led by private initiatives. 
By the beginning of the 1990s, a liberal consensus on the spread of democracy, 
neoliberal economic reforms, and an increase of interdependence had been achieved 
                                                        
162 The process involved vertical integration in manufacturing industries (such as electronic 
components, and chemicals) between developing and developed countries. The stages of 
production were allocated according to comparative advantage, for example transferring to 
developing countries the stages of production which were intensive in labour; and also 
considering the trade barriers to scale-economies in developed countries (Yeats, 1999: 1). 
163 Technological advances and their diffusion in the areas of telecommunications, computing, 
optic fibre, and the internet, increased the reliability and reduced the costs from sharing 
information across space. These changes prompted innovations in the management of 
information and working systems to facilitate the control and coordination of production 
processes across borders (Baldwin, 2011: 4-5). 
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in the region. This consensus promoted trade integration as a necessity for achieving 
economic growth (Peceney, 1994; Haggard, 1998) and trade policies as a pillar of 
regional economic development. The withdrawal of the state unlocked the possibility 
for export oriented producers to realize scale economies, engage in fragmented 
processes of production, and maximize their economic interests through deep 
integration at the intensive and extensive margins in trade agreements. 
Therefore, after Latin American countries abandoned the economic model of 
industrialization based on imports substitution, some exporters had economic 
incentives to demand integration at the intensive and extensive margins of trade 
agreements. Unlike gains from trade analysed in standard trade theories, which 
benefit all exporters covered by a trade agreement, gains from trade within the ‘new’ 
and ‘new new’ trade theories are concentrated more in the resourceful industries and 
firms that can realize their scale economies after trade integration has expanded the 
market, or in those industries and firms that can relocate the steps of their 
production. As per the arguments presented in the previous section, these types of 
exporters are present in concentrated export sectors (in contrast with de-
concentrated export sectors, which include many small and medium exporters). 
Maintaining all else constant, exporters with scale economies and/or those engaged 
in fragmented production may benefit from the removal of additional trade barriers 
in extensive margin areas which affect their processes of production and from 
stronger provisions at the intensive margin. These reasoning and arguments lead to 
the second constitutive hypothesis of this chapter:  
Constitutive hypothesis 2. Latin American countries with more 
concentrated export sectors display deeper integration at the 
intensive margin of their trade agreements than countries with 
more de-concentrated export sectors. 
Exporters’ preferences for deep integration 
The possible outcomes for different levels of export sector concentration are 
represented in Table 5.1. 164  The rows represent the  depth at the extensive and 
intensive margins in a trade agreement. The columns represent the 
(de)concentration of a country’s export sector. In a highly concentrated export sector, 
few resourceful large industries dominate, whereas in a highly de-concentrated 
                                                        
164 The first section of this chapter argues that Latin American countries are closer to settings 
of high specificity of factors. Therefore, the setting of high mobility of factors is not included. 
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export sector, many average industries are in place. The upper right corner represents 
the situation that maximizes economic benefits from integration at the intensive 
margin of trade agreements; the lower left corner represents the situation that 
maximizes economic benefits from integration at the extensive margin of trade 
agreements. 
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Table 5-1 Exporters’ economic benefits from deep integration for countries 
with (de)concentrated export sectors 
Export sector (de)concentration Deep integration 
Extensive Margin Intensive Margin 
High concentration 
(Industries/firms with scale-economies and/or 
fragmented production) 
Medium Deep 
Low concentration 
(Many small/medium exporters) 
Medium Shallow 
Source: Elaborated by the author. 
Industries with scale economies and/or fragmented production receive the 
largest economic benefits from deep integration at the intensive margin because they 
require mechanisms to coordinate and ensure their production processes. These 
conditions are more likely matched with deeper trade integration at the intensive 
margin of trade agreements than when a de-concentrated export sector exists. 
Accordingly, as shown in the lower right corner, small and medium exporters also 
receive benefits in terms of security from trade agreements that have more robust 
and capable institutions, but they do not need them to materialize the economic 
benefits arising from their processes of production. 
The situations which maximize economic benefits from the extensive margin in 
trade agreements are relatively less straightforward. The upper-left corner shows the 
existence of a concentrated export sector with industries with scale economies and/or 
fragmented production. In this case, the economic incentives to demand trade 
agreements with deep extensive margins of integration derive from the increased 
potential to realize scale economies and production sharing from removing policy 
obstacles. Because only a few of these types of exporters exist in concentrated sectors, 
the potential to receive economic benefits is concentrated only in the specific areas 
which affect their process of production. Nevertheless, since limited liberalization is 
the first-order preference of such exporters, they could reach deeper agreements than 
if only small and medium exporters exist. The lower left corner depicts conditions 
under which industries do not have scale economies, but a large number of small and 
medium exporters exist. In this case, the latter benefit from an expansion in market 
size, but incentives to demand trade agreements may be weaker, as multilateral (and 
not limited) liberalization is the first preference of these exporters. Therefore, these 
conditions may lead to trade agreements with medium extensive margins of 
integration. 
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Conclusions 
This chapter identified exporters, particularly those with scale economies and those 
engaged in fragmented production, as the domestic economic interests which prefer 
deep integration at the intensive and extensive margins. The main objective was to 
bring insight to the issue of wide variations in the depth of the trade agreements 
established by Latin American countries since from 1982 to 2010. To identify the 
preferences of economic interests, these were separated from their strategic 
environments. Accordingly, within the endogenous trade theory framework, these 
economic actors were shown to prefer deep integration because they can capture 
economic benefits from it. 
Standard, ‘new,’ and ‘new new’ trade theories were used as the analytical basis 
for identifying which economic interests derive benefits from deep integration in its 
extensive and intensive margins. In each case, the economic benefits produced by 
deep integration, as defined in Chapter 3, were analysed. First, based on standard 
trade theories, it was argued that integration at the extensive margin reduces trade 
barriers which expand the size of the market for exporters of final goods and produces 
static gains from trade which benefit all of them. It was also argued that static gains 
from trade are created mainly through integration at the extensive rather than the 
intensive margin. 
Second, based on ‘new’ and ‘new new’ trade theories, it was argued that 
integration at the extensive margin is also likely to reduce trade barriers which affect 
the production process of exporters that are able to engage in fragmented production 
and realize scale economies. Along the same lines, integration at the intensive margin 
reduces the costs of coordinating and controlling the foreign aspects of the 
production process for exporters which engage in horizontal intra-industry trade or 
in vertical fragmentation of production. The decrease in the marginal costs for these 
types of exporters creates additional gains from integration at the extensive and 
intensive margins. To identify potential beneficiaries of deep integration at the 
intensive and extensive margins of trade agreements, characteristics of the policy 
output were analysed, and features of the countries in the region were taken into 
consideration. 
From the analysis based on standard trade theories, it was argued that Latin 
American countries are characterized by its closeness to a setting of high specificity 
of factors in the factor mobility continuum. In addition, it was considered that trade 
agreements favour the redistribution of resources according to a highly specific policy 
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setting. For these reasons, it was argued that the identification of economic interests 
that derive economic benefits from deep integration under perfect competition 
should be done within the Ricardo-Viner framework. According to this framework, 
export oriented economic interests maximize their benefits when they can 
appropriate static gains from trade through trade agreements (as a second alternative 
to multilateral liberalization). Export oriented industries that derive benefits from 
free trade favour integration; import competing industries that are harmed by free 
trade oppose integration. Thus, we would expect preferences for deep integration to 
follow along the lines of export oriented versus import competing industries or 
sectors. The first constitutive hypothesis in this chapter stated that, maintaining all 
else constant, countries with more concentrated export sectors are expected to 
display trade agreements with more profound extensive margins than countries with 
more de-concentrated export sectors. 
The analysis based on ‘new’ and ‘new new’ trade theories complemented the 
analysis based on standard trade theories. In this case, the economic benefits that 
exporters with scale-economies and/or those engaged in fragmented production gain 
from deep integration were identified. In addition to static gains produced only by 
market expansion, under settings of imperfect competition, some exporters are able 
to achieve dynamic gains from trade. As a consequence, the potential for exporters 
with scale economies and/or those engaged in fragmented production to derive 
economic profits from deep integration increased. Furthermore, after the 
abandonment of the model of industrialization based on the substitution of imports, 
the context of Latin American countries liberated the potential of export oriented 
producers to exploit scale economies or to engage in fragmented production. Based 
on these arguments, the second constitutive hypothesis of the chapter was developed.  
Based on the derivation of preferences of export oriented producers towards 
deep integration at the intensive and extensive margins, it is expected that Latin 
American countries with more concentrated export sectors will be associate with 
trade agreements that have deeper margins, compared to countries with more de-
concentrated export sectors. However, an aspect to bear in mind is that, although 
concentrated exporters have clear economic incentives to prefer deep integration at 
both margins, the limited number of such exporters in a concentrated export sector 
may end up restricting deep integration (because  this type of exporters will only be 
interested in achieving deep integration in the specific areas and mechanisms which 
affect their production processes). 
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6  The influence of political access and veto 
power 
The main objective in this chapter is to analyse how domestic political institutions 
influence variations in depth of trade agreements established by Latin American 
countries. Trade agreements are usually considered in literature as public goods and 
a form of international cooperation. Nevertheless, they are also policy outputs, and 
the extent of the integration trade agreements promote has redistributive 
consequences on the income of the domestic groups of the countries which establish 
them. In the previous chapter, export oriented producers, particularly the ones in 
industries with scale economies and those engaged in production sharing, were 
identified as the main economic beneficiaries of limited and deep integration through 
trade agreements. Nevertheless, these interests cannot be simply transposed to 
public policy outcomes. An analysis of the institutional settings and features of the 
regional countries and their influence on the extent of deep integration in trade 
agreements is required. Moreover, although ‘old politics’ persist in the region 
(Panizza, 2000: 738), the need for further research on domestic political institutions 
and their influence on public policy in developing countries, particularly in Latin 
America, has already been raised (Geddes, 2002; Nielson, 2003; Spiller, Stein, and 
Tommasi, 2008).165 Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to help fill this knowledge 
gap by analysing two ways in which configurations of domestic political institutions 
may influence deep integration in Latin American countries. 
Combining veto player theory and access point theory, this chapter addresses 
two ways in which configurations of domestic political institutions influence the 
extent of integration in trade agreements: the way in which the demands for deep 
integration on the part of its beneficiaries are channelled through domestic political 
institutions and the way in which institutions control and allocate legislative power 
over trade agreements. To analyse the influence of institutions in trade policies, 
scholars refer mainly to two sets of models: one based on particular institutions (e.g. 
Rogowski, 1987; Nielson, 2003) and the other based on conceptual dimensions (e.g. 
Tsebelis, 1995, 2002; Ehrlich, 2007, 2011). In Chapter 1, it was argued that the most 
appropriate approach to analysing the influence of domestic institutions over deep 
integration in trade agreements is the latter set of models. The most important reason 
                                                        
165  As mentioned in Chapters 1 and 2, the analysis of institutions in Latin America was 
dismissed for a certain period because of the authoritarian nature of the governments in the 
region (Geddes, 2002: 343).  
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is that most Latin American countries share broadly similar specific institutional 
characteristics, such as presidential systems and proportional representation. 
Therefore, to develop the analysis, the two models—veto player theory and access 
point theory—are combined in the following four sections of this chapter. 
The first section explains how veto player theory and access point theory can be 
combined to analyse the influence of domestic institutional setting characteristics on 
variations in the depth of trade agreements in Latin American countries. First, the 
differences and areas of similitude and complementarity of both theories are studied. 
Second, one way in which both theories can be combined is suggested. The main 
objective is to create an integrated framework for access points both with and without 
veto power to analyse two areas of the political process of determining varying 
degrees of integration in trade agreements. The second section develops a way in 
which access points with and without veto power influence deep integration. The 
analysis considers the trade agreements established by Latin American countries 
after the adoption of the economic model of exports promotion in the region. Five 
subsections address the following political actors and features: (1) the executive 
branch as agenda setter; (2) the number of veto players in the executive branch; (3) 
the number of veto players in the legislative branch; (4) the nature of the veto players, 
and (5) the role of access points without veto power. Throughout these subsections, 
the implications for deep integration of each aspect are discussed.  
Next, the two constitutive hypotheses of the chapter are presented. First, 
maintaining all else constant, Latin American countries with fewer effective veto 
players are associated with trade agreements with deeper integration than countries 
with more effective veto players. Second, with all else being equal, countries with 
more access points without veto power are associated with deeper integration in trade 
agreements than those with fewer access points without veto power. The second 
constitutive hypothesis focuses only on the possibilities of representation of access 
points, leaving aside for now assumptions about which interest groups are better able 
to capture the access points. These aspects are addressed in the next chapter, within 
a collective action framework. 
In the third section, the effects of different configurations of institutional settings 
over the depth that trade agreements may reach are analysed. Considering different 
combinations of access points with and without veto power and different degrees of 
coherence and congruence, the possible outcomes are discussed. The final section 
presents the conclusion that although veto player theory and access point theory 
provide a suitable basis for analysing the influence of different configurations of 
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institutions on deep integration, these theories are limited in explaining more 
specifically the extensive and the intensive margins of integration. 
Combining access point and veto player theories 
Complementarities between veto player theory and access point 
theory 
Veto player theory and access point theory, together, provide an adequate framework 
for analysing the ways in which different institutional settings in Latin American 
countries influence the levels of deep integration in their trade agreements. To 
explain how domestic institutions influence variations in the depth of trade 
agreements based on the definition of deep integration, how these institutions 
influence the ‘intensity’ and horizontal and vertical ‘distances’ given by the magnitude 
of integration must be considered. The horizontal and vertical distances of 
integration correspond to the intensive and extensive margins, as discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 3. Therefore, in order to explain variations in the degree of 
liberalization of trade agreements, how domestic institutions influence departures 
from the status quo and the magnitude and direction of the policy change must be 
addressed. 
Veto player theory and access point theory complement each other in analysing 
deep integration in Latin America. From the perspective of veto player theory, it is 
possible to study how the configuration of veto players influences the way in which 
the extent of deep integration is decided between the political actors which have the 
power to block the enactment of a trade agreement. From the perspective of access 
point theory, we can analyse how the number of access points influences the ways in 
which societal demands are channelled regarding the extent of deep integration. 
Table 6.1 summarizes the main distinctions between the two theories regarding their 
selection of the conceptual dimension across which they aggregate institutions, their 
focuses of analyses, and their predictions. 
In terms of their focuses of analyses, both theories are useful for explaining the 
magnitude of policy change and, therefore, the depth of the trade agreements. Veto 
player theory (Tsebelis 1995, 2002) explains the feasibility of departures from the 
status quo, whereas access point theory (Ehrlich, 2007, 2011) focuses on explaining 
the direction and magnitude of the policy change. Because the liberalization and 
approval of trade agreements cannot be considered as occurring separately, veto 
POLITICAL ACCESS AND VETO POWER
 
 
144 
players are likely to influence both instances of policymaking (Mansfield and Milner, 
2012: Kindle locations: 486: 5825). 166  From this perspective, the feasibility of 
departures from the status quo also provides a range for the extent of liberalization 
that can be achieved within a trade agreement, further exploiting the potential of veto 
player theory. Finally, although veto player theory has been considered limited for 
explaining the direction and magnitude of policy change because it requires 
additional assumptions about the preferences of veto players (Ehrlich, 2007: 576), in 
this research these assumptions were derived directly from the nature of the object 
of analysis.167 
More specifically, both theories are useful for understanding the influence of 
configurations of different political actors over the depth that a trade agreement can 
reach. On the one hand, veto player theory focuses on the number of actors (i.e. veto 
players), who are ‘individual or collective actors [which] have to agree to the proposed 
[legislative] change’ (Tsebelis 2002, 2). The configuration of domestic veto players168 
and their sequence in the enactment of a particular policy output create incentives 
and restrictions which influence the extent of possible departures from the status 
quo. The theory predicts that a large number of veto points decreases the feasibility 
and extent of policy change. On the other hand, access point theory focuses on the 
number of actors (i.e. access points), who should have power over the specific policy 
output, and they should react to the pressure of the domestic interest groups that are 
affected by the said output (Ehrlich, 2007: 572). The number of domestic access 
points influences the costs of lobbying of interest groups, which also influence the 
magnitude and direction of possible departures from the status quo. Access point 
theory predicts reductions in the costs of lobbying and a protectionist bias in trade 
legislation when numerous access points exist. 169  Therefore, from separate 
                                                        
166 Mansfield and Milner (2012: Kindle locations: 486: 5825) explain that ‘veto players are 
likely to have an impact [over design] because of the transaction costs they can impose on 
executives at the ratification stage.’ 
167 The direction of policy change is already determined for the trade agreements established 
by Latin American countries after the adoption of the economic development model based on 
the promotion of exports. Said agreements were designed within an open regionalism 
approach. Open regionalism trade agreements are, by definition, established to achieve more 
liberalization and do not allow movements towards more protectionism. Therefore, there is 
no ambiguity concerning the direction of the policy change. 
168 The configuration of veto players is given by ‘a certain number of veto players, with specific 
ideological distances among them, and a certain cohesion each’ (Tsebelis, 2002: 2). The 
contribution of each of these features to the extent of deep integration is discussed in the next 
section of this chapter. 
169 Ehrlich (2007: 580-583).develops this argument in two stages. First, relatively more access 
points reduce lobbying costs. With the reduction in costs of lobbying, groups that could not 
POLITICAL ACCESS AND VETO POWER
 
 
145 
perspectives, veto player theory and access point theory are useful for understanding 
the influence of configurations of different political actors over the depth that a trade 
agreement can reach. Considering their focus of analysis, selection of conceptual 
dimension, and predictions, both theories can bring insight into deep integration. In 
the following subsection, a possible way for combining and adapting the two theories 
is suggested. 
Table 6-1 General comparison between conceptual models of institutional 
dimensions 
Dimension Theory of Veto Players Theory of Access Points 
Tsebelis (1995, 2002) Ehrlich (2007, 2011) 
Focus of 
analysis 
Feasibility of policy change. 
Decisiveness of a political system. 
Direction and magnitude of policy 
change. 
Conceptual 
dimension 
Veto players: individual or 
collective actors whose agreement is 
required to change the status quo. 
Access points: any relevant 
policymaker who is also either 
independent or serves a distinct 
political constituency. 
Predictions The potential for departures from 
the status quo decrease with the 
number of veto gates and their veto 
players, the lack of congruence and 
the cohesion of such players. 
More access points are able 
represent larger numbers of 
different political constituencies. 
The costs of lobbying decrease as 
the numbers of access point 
increase. The group that is able 
(because of collective action 
advantage) to capture the access 
points influences the direction and 
magnitude of policy change. 
 
Combining access point and veto player theories 
Combining access point theory and veto player theory allows us to characterize 
interested actors in a policy according to the following categories: first, veto players, 
access points without veto power, and relevant actors. Figure 6.1 presents these 
actors in the groups and subgroups in which they belong. The categorization of these 
actors in the groups of relevant actors, access points, and veto players is explained in 
the rest of this subsection. 
                                                        
afford lobbying can then influence policy makers. The second part of the argument is that 
protectionist groups capture the access points because they have an advantage in organizing 
compared to liberalizing groups. The result is a protectionist bias in legislation about trade 
policy, expressed in higher tariffs  
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Ehrlich (2007: 577) defines access points as ‘any relevant policymaker who is 
also either independent or serves a distinct political constituency.’ The policymakers 
are characterized as ‘relevant’ when they have actual or potential power over a specific 
policy. In turn, a veto player is ‘an individual or collective actor whose agreement (by 
majority rule for collective actors) is required for a change in policy’ (Tsebelis, 1995: 
301). Tsebelis distinguishes between several categories of veto players but focuses on 
two: institutional veto players, who are specified by the constitution, and partisan 
veto players, who exist in multiparty parliamentary systems and are members of a 
government coalition. In most Latin American countries, which have mainly 
presidential systems, only institutional veto players can block the legislation of a 
policy output. 
Actors interested in a certain policy output are not necessarily access points, and 
access points may have veto power or not. Interested actors are the relevant actors, 
and they form the group to which veto players and access points belong. Ehrlich 
(2007) exemplifies general relevant actors as all the members in a parliament. He 
explains that these actors are relevant but not independent. Parliamentary members 
are considered relevant because they can vote on aspects of the policy output under 
consideration. However, they are not independent from their party leaders. Access 
points form a second and separate group, and they are relevant and independent 
actors. The third group is a subgroup of access points. They are the independent and 
relevant actors positioned at the institutional gates that can decide over policy 
changes, since their consent is necessary to modify the status quo. Finally, a fourth 
group is the subgroup of veto players with agenda setting power. These actors have 
more influence over policy outcomes than the other actors which also have veto 
power because agenda setters can influence the policies that replace the status quo 
through their ability to present ‘take-it-or-leave-it initiatives’ to other veto players.170 
Ehrlich identifies policymakers as relevant when they have actual or potential power 
over the policy. Therefore, a political actor with the power to veto a policy and set an 
agenda is then in the same logical continuum at the extreme of relevance. 
Both theories also consider certain characteristics of the political system and 
institutional features to possibly affect the final count of access points and veto 
                                                        
170  Tsebelis (1995, 2002) explains that agenda-setters are able to choose between all the 
possible results the one that they prefer. This ability is restricted to satisfy the condition that 
the initiative has to be acceptable to the rest of the veto players. Otherwise, the initiative will 
be rejected and the status quo will remain. The power of the agenda setter is inversely related 
to the status quo, the smaller the size of the win-set of the status quo (and the larger policy 
stability) the smaller will be the power of the agenda setter. 
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players in specific ways. Ehrlich identifies these characteristics as relevance, 
independence, and distinctiveness, whereas Tsebelis identifies them as congruence 
and coherence. For Ehrlich, distinctiveness describes the policymakers’ capacity to 
exercise their relevance based on their own preferences among access points. Tsebelis 
takes into account the distance between them (determined by their location and 
indifference curves) in the policy space and categorizes them as (in)congruent, 
depending on the (dis)similarity of their policy positions. Ehrlich identifies 
independence as the capacity of policymakers to exercise their relevance based on 
their own preferences among the constituent units of each access point, whereas 
Tsebelis, again, considers the distance between them (determined by their location 
and indifference curves) in the policy space and categorizes them as (in)coherent 
depending on the (dis)similarity of their policy positions.  
Figure 6-1 Veto players as a subgroup of access points 
 
Source: Elaborated by author. 
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After combining the actors, focuses of analysis, and predictions of both theories, 
it is possible to argue that, maintaining everything else constant, countries with fewer 
veto gates are more likely to have fewer obstacles in decision making to depart from 
the status quo. On the other hand, in the first instance, without taking into account 
the capacity of mobilization of interest groups (which is analysed in Chapter 7), more 
access point have, by definition, more capability to represent more interests in a 
society. Therefore, more access points without veto power couldcover more areas of 
integration and achieve deeper integration in trade agreements. 
Nevertheless, an integrated model of veto players and access points presents 
additional aspects to consider. Combining both theories, the focus still rests on the 
two veto gates which have the power to establish or block trade agreements and, 
therefore, whose approval of the agreements’ design must be sought. These are the 
executive and the legislature. In both theories, the numbers of units are independent 
variables in the analyses of the magnitude of policy change. Both theories also 
consider that certain characteristics of the actors in the political system (relevance, 
independence, distinctiveness, congruence, and coherence) may alter the effective 
number of access points and veto players. In the next section, the influence of these 
aspects over deep integration is discussed, using the Latin American region after it 
adopted the economic model based on the promotion of exports as reference. 
The influence of veto players and access points without 
veto power  
In Latin America, the executive and the legislature are the relevant political 
institutions with veto power over legislation concerning trade agreements and the 
extent of their liberalization. Although both institutions are relevant in the area of 
trade policy,171 they do not share their power over the process of establishing trade 
agreements. Instead, the model of differentiated powers prevails between them.172 
Constitutions give both institutions specific powers over the establishment of trade 
                                                        
171 For the purposes of this research, the predominant weight of either the executive or the 
legislature over the other does not affect the analysis because both institutions have clear and 
differentiated veto powers over the legislation of trade agreements. According to Nielson 
(2003: 480), the executive is predominant in Brazil, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Honduras, Mexico, and Peru. And the legislature is predominant in Argentina, Bolivia, 
Colombia, Philippines, Uruguay, and Venezuela.  
172 Depending on the way in which domestic institutions allocate power, it is possible that 
domestic actors share control over policy making or that they have differentiated powers 
(Mansfield, Milner and Pevehouse, 2007: 405). 
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agreements. In general, the executive has the authority to make initiatives to establish 
trade agreements,173 whereas the legislature has ratification power over the proposed 
initiative. 
This section discusses the influence of the configurations of veto players and the 
number of access points without veto power over deep integration. Based on the 
theories of access points and veto players, Table 6.2 broadly summarizes the effects 
of the institutional features174 which are considered most relevant to the analysis of 
deep integration. The next subsections develop each of the aspects summarized in the 
tables, using the institutional setting of Latin American countries as reference. 
Table 6-2 Influence of institutional features over the extent of policy change  
Dimension 
Veto player theory Access points theory 
Tsebelis (1995, 2002) Ehrlich (2007, 2011) 
Presidentialism Increases veto players when 
president has veto powers. 
Having a president as a separate 
executive may create an 
additional access point, in 
addition to all of the access points 
in legislature. 
Bicameralism Effective bicameral systems 
increase the number of veto 
players. 
Effective bicameralism introduces 
additional access points to a 
system. 
Divided 
government 
(presidential 
systems) 
Increases effective number of veto 
players. 
Increases access points by 
increasing the number of relevant 
policy makers.  
Number of 
parties in 
government 
More parties in government 
increase the possibilities of 
reductions of the win-set. 
More parties in government 
increase the numbers of relevant 
access points. 
In parliamentary systems, only 
parties in government are 
relevant. 
In presidential systems minority 
parties also retain significant 
policymaking powers. 
Source: Elaborated by the author. 
                                                        
173  Mansfield, Milner and Pevehouse (2007: 405) mention that in several parliamentary 
systems ‘only the executive initiate proposals, and she cannot veto a proposal once the 
legislature amends and ratifies it.’ 
174 Concerning party ideology, from the perspective of veto player theory, polarized ideologies 
increase the size of the winset and increase policy stability. From the perspective of access 
point theory, party ideology influences receptivity, not the number of access points. In both 
cases it has been considered not relevant for the analysis of particular trade-bills. 
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The executive branch as agenda setter 
In terms of veto player theory, the executive and the legislature are the two veto gates 
for establishing deep integration agreements. In general, the constitutional system 
and the structure of the legislature175 are the political institutions which determine 
the number and position of the veto players in democratic political systems. The 
constitutional system determines whether regimes are presidential or parliamentary, 
and the legislative structure determines whether legislatures are bicameral or 
unicameral (Schiavon, 2001). In this and the following four subsections, the role of 
the executive and legislative branches of government as veto players over the extent 
of liberalization in trade agreements is analysed. In the last subsection, the role of the 
legislature’s access points that do not have veto over deep integration in trade 
agreements is also studied. 
As stated above, the executive branch of government in Latin American countries 
are the key actors that initiate trade agreements. The agenda setter has a considerable 
advantage as she can choose her preferred point from the win-set176 of the status quo. 
Since presidents have agenda-setting power for trade agreements, it is important to 
understand incentives and motivations affecting their preferences and behaviour.177 
In line with public choice literature, it is assumed in this research that the executive 
is a rational actor which prefers to maximize its power. In order to maximize their 
power, politicians should stay in office and maximize the possibilities of re-election 
or of transcending (Schiavon, 2001). 178  Therefore, for deep integration trade 
agreements to take place, the executive must perceive these agreements as desirable 
and as more favourable than shallow or no agreements. 
In academic literature, one can identify three main sources that influence the 
executive’s preference for deep integration in Latin America: exogenous economic 
                                                        
175 Courts of justice and other actors may also be relevant depending on the policy domain, 
but as above in the case of legislation about trade agreements the executive and the legislature 
are the relevant domestic institutions which should be under consideration. 
176 The agenda setter’s advantage decreases when the win-set of the status quo is small because 
many veto players exist. Other situations in which significant departures from the status quo 
are not likely are when the positions of the veto players are divergent and when they are 
cohesive (Tsebelis, 2002: 2). 
177 This research follows the work of scholars (e.g. Tsebelis, 2002; Mansfield, Milner and 
Pevehouse 2005, 2007; Ehrlich, 2007) in not making specific claims about the preferences of 
the rest of domestic actors. The assumption is that some of these actors favour deep 
integration, while others oppose it. 
178 Transcending is defined as ‘transferring power to someone who shares the same or similar 
goals (normally someone from the same political party)’ (Schiavon, 2001). 
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and international changes, democratization, and pressure from interest groups. First, 
exogenous economic and political shocks fostered the dissemination of neoliberal 
economic ideas. These shocks challenged the ideas of the politicians of that moment, 
who considered the import substitution model a suitable path toward development 
(Prebisch, 1950).179 Most politicians and scholars believed that the crisis resulted 
from the economic model of substitution of imports. Politicians followed the new 
‘economic policy roadmap’ through the promotion of exports, which seemed the most 
feasible alternative for economic development (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993). 
Furthermore, several external developments may have also reinforced the beliefs of 
politicians in the direction explained above: the successful experiences with 
liberalization in Chile and East Asia, the collapse of the Soviet Union (Edwards 1995); 
and pressure from financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, which 
conditioned structural adjustment loans to trade liberalization (Williamson, 1994; 
Haggard and Kauffman, 1995). Deep integration and liberalization agreements, as 
components of the economic structural reform (IADB, 2002), also became desirable. 
Second, it is plausible that the process of democratization that started in Latin 
American countries before the 1990s may have contributed to the executive’s positive 
perceptions towards deep integration after the start of the economic structural 
reform in the region. Compared to non-democratic systems, democratic ones do not 
necessarily have more veto players,180 but they do have more access points.181 During 
several decades, most Latin American countries moved frequently back and forth 
between undemocratic and democratic governments to progressively return to 
                                                        
179 The most important structural factor that challenged these beliefs was the economic and 
debt crisis of the decade of 1980. However, economic crises only opened the door to reform; 
they did not determine the content or guaranteed the success of reform (Panizza, 2000).  
180 Regime type and veto players are different concepts, and as in other studies (Mansfield, 
Milner and Pevehouse, 2007), in this research they are treated as distinct. In general, 
democracies have a larger number of veto players than non-democratic countries. It is likely, 
but not necessary, that the number of veto points and veto players is larger in democratic 
regimes than in authoritarian ones. In non-democratic systems, the executive needs the 
approval of the military or other actors over her initiatives (Mansfield, Milner and Pevehouse, 
2007: 405). Democratic and non-democratic veto players are different mainly in the 
competition leading to setting the agenda: in the former, it is placed closer to the median voter 
than in the latter (Tsebelis, 2005: 14). In Latin America, the institutional veto players and 
gates of non-democratic regimes were similar to the ones in democratic systems because the 
former maintained the division of powers (with varying degrees of formality) between the 
executive and the legislative powers (Schiavon, 2001). 
181 In authoritarian countries voting restrictions, restraints on assembly, or the weakness of 
parties and intermediate associations, increase the likeliness that there will be a fewer number 
of access points relative to the ones in democratic countries (Ehrlich, 2007, 2011). 
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democratic rule in the 1980s (Spiller, Stein, Tommasi, 2008: 2).182 Scholars argued 
that in democratic countries, politicians prefer trade liberalization over 
protectionism because the former enlarges consumer surplus, enhances the welfare 
of voters, and improves the politicians’ prospects for re-election (e.g. Mansfield, 
Milner and Pevehouse, 2007). Since democracies have a more encompassing interest 
in society than non-democracies, the former generates public policies that benefit the 
interests of the majority and reflect the citizens’ primacy in the allotment of 
institutional political power (McGuire and Olson, 1999; Acemoglu and Robinson, 
2006). Moreover, because the desire of Latin American presidents to be re-elected or 
to transcend is linked to their individual national constituencies, they prefer to 
pursue public goods such as trade liberalization (Nielson, 2003: 473). Then, the 
presidents may also use deep integration to reward the groups that can contribute to 
the possibility of their re-election or transcending. 
Finally, because of interest group demands, the executives in Latin America have 
a preference for liberalization through trade agreements rather than through 
unilateral liberalization. The arguments above explain the preferences of the 
executives for deep liberalization. However, they do not explain the reason why the 
executives would opt for limited liberalization through trade agreements instead of 
wider multilateral liberalization. Specifically, some arguments indicate that political 
leaders prefer minilateral or bilateral agreements that allow them to increase the 
consumer surplus, while maintaining mechanisms to extract rents from special 
interest groups, as opposed to generalized liberalization (e.g. Milner, 1997; Milner 
and Kubota, 2005). An important source of demand for deep integration exists in 
countries that have producers in industries with scale economies. As discussed in 
Chapter 5, after the collapse of the economic model based on the substitution of 
imports, a large potential to exploit scale economies and fragmented production 
existed in Latin America. These producers would benefit from limited deep trade 
liberalization, such as the one provided by trade agreements (and, in fact, be harmed 
by wider multilateral liberalization that could erode their scale-economies or 
international production networks). Although these three aspects explain the 
incentives of the executives to present initiatives of deep integration agreements to 
                                                        
182 The issue of how democratic are Latin American countries is controversial. Following 
Schiavon’s (2001) study about economic structural reforms in Latin America, in this research, 
the degree of democratization achieved is not central to explain deep integration. Instead, the 
central concern is the institutional restrictions of the executive to achieve deep integration. 
However, the degree of democratization of the countries members of a trade agreement is 
included as a control variable in the empirical analysis developed in Chapter 8. 
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the legislature, they cannot explain the differences in nature and levels of integration 
across the agreements signed by countries in the region. 
The number of veto players in the executive branch 
The number of veto players positioned at the veto gates inversely influences the 
extent to which deep integration can be achieved. There are one or two veto players 
in the executive gate, depending on whether there is separation of purpose between 
the legislature and the executive. When separation of purpose exists, the system is 
presidential; when there is no separation, the system is parliamentary. Latin 
American countries have chosen mainly presidential regimes. 183  In presidential 
systems, the separation of purpose between the legislature and the executive is 
guaranteed because presidents have both independence of origin and independence 
of survival.184 In presidential systems, the powers of the president185 determine the 
actions that she can take and her capacity to enact her preferred policy. In contrast, 
in parliamentary systems, the executive is responsible to the legislature and its 
survival is tied to the legislature (Shugart and Mainwaring, 1997: 15). Furthermore, 
in presidential systems, it is possible to find two veto gates:186 one in the executive 
and one in the legislature. Maintaining all else constant, the number of veto players 
is higher in presidential systems than in parliamentary systems.  
The number of veto players in the legislative branch 
One of the characteristics of legislatures that influences the number of veto players 
in a domestic system is their number of chambers. The number of veto gates within 
the structure of the legislature can be one or two, depending on the constitutional 
powers of each chamber over trade agreements. Unicameral systems tend to be more 
                                                        
183 Belize and Suriname have parliamentary systems. 
184 Presidentialism has four main components: popular election (independence of origin); 
fixed terms (independence of survival); executive appoints cabinet members; executive has 
certain authority in law making (Shugart and Mainwaring, 1997: 14-15). 
185 In presidential systems, the power of the executive can be constitutional (legislative or non-
legislative) or partisan (Shugart and Mainwaring, 1997: 14-15). Also, according to Samuels 
and Shugart (2001), and Shugart and Carey (1992), a president’s power increases with the 
scope of her veto powers, attributions to introduce specific legislation, or when she has 
executive decree authority. In trade agreements, the relevant presidential power is proactive 
constitutional legislative power (Nielson, 2003: 480). For the purposes of this research, this 
power refers to the presidents’ prerogative of presenting initiatives to establish trade 
agreements with a certain degree of deep integration to the legislature. 
186 These access points are supplementary to the ones existing in the legislature. However, 
when the legislature delegates all trade policy making powers to the executive, the number of 
access points is reduced to one (Ehrlich, 2007: 586). 
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decisive than bicameral ones, since they have only to agree with the president. In 
contrast, bicameral systems increase policy stability because some parts of what 
would be the win-set of the status quo are not valid anymore (Tsebelis, 2002: 182). 
However, bicameral systems do not always have at least three veto points by default. 
To determine the number of veto gates in the legislative system, one must consider 
the specific policymaking roles of each chamber, depending on the policy output 
under analysis. 
Constitutional powers determine the role of each chamber in the policymaking 
process, the power that is allocated to each of them, and the policy areas in which 
they are relevant. According to veto player theory, when both chambers are relevant 
to the legislation of a certain policy output, the existence of the additional veto gate 
in bicameral legislatures is considered a feature that makes departures from the 
status quo more difficult. In contrast, in the situation where one of the chambers is 
subordinate to the other one, there is no increase in the number of veto players. 
Similarly, from the perspective of access point theory, the methods used to select the 
representatives of each chamber and the basis of their representation also influence 
the effective chambers (and the final count of access points) in the legislation of a 
certain policy output. In some countries, members of both houses are elected in the 
same way. In other countries, members of both houses are elected in different ways. 
When the members of both houses are elected differently, the composition of their 
members is different, and they are considered to ‘effectively’ represent different 
interests. In this case, both chambers are considered access points with influence over 
the legislation of the policy output under analysis (Ehrlich, 2007: 585). In Latin 
America, most countries have bicameral legislatures.187 These legislatures have been 
classified as strong or medium-strong in academic literature (Llanos and Nolte, 
2003: 58).188 For this reason, bicameral systems in the region increase the count of 
veto players when both chambers are symmetric, relevant, and distinctive regarding 
legislation over trade agreements. 
                                                        
187 Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Mexico, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela have bicameral legislatures. 
188 In empirical studies about bicameralism in Latin America there is no consensus over the 
exact degree of strength of each system (Llanos and Nolte, 2003: 58). The lack of consensus 
over this matter does not represent a major problem for the analysis in this research. The 
symmetry of both chambers, rather than on the specific degree of strength of their separation 
is the most relevant aspect for the purposes of this research. 
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Although the executives in Latin American countries have agenda-setting powers 
in legislation concerning trade agreements, they need the approval of the other veto 
players in the legislature. For this reason, the executive must present an initiative that 
is acceptable for them. This requires the executive to foresee the other veto players’ 
positions concerning the extent of liberalization in the agreement and to adjust the 
depth of liberalization accordingly;189 otherwise, the status quo remains (Mansfield, 
Milner and Pevehouse, 2007: 407; Mansfield and Milner, 2012: Kindle locations: 
486: 5825).190 
An increase in the number of veto players can reduce the extent of liberalization 
in a trade agreement for two main reasons: first, when more veto players exist in a 
system, there is more possibility that one of these actors’ constituencies is harmed by 
liberalization through a trade agreement and demands exclusion or the removal of 
fewer barriers to trade (Mansfield and Milner, 2012: Kindle locations: 519-530: 
5825). Second, deeper trade agreements may also reduce the veto power over trade 
policy of the veto players which are relevant to the legislation concerning a trade 
policy (Mansfield and Milner, 2012: Kindle locations: 3110-3121: 5825). The first 
aspect is more likely to affect only the extensive margin, whereas the second may 
affect both the extensive and intensive margins, as explained below. 
An increase in the number of veto players is likely to have a negative effect on the 
extent of integration at the extensive and intensive margins in a trade agreement. 
First, at the intensive margin, provisions are related more to the power and 
attributions of the institutions of the trade agreement as a whole than to specific trade 
barriers and productive sectors. The provisions at the intensive margin correspond 
to areas of autonomy and authority delegated from the legislature and the executive 
to a supranational entity. When more veto players exist in a system, it is more likely 
that some of them may not want to reduce their leverage by losing control over the 
areas liberalized in the agreement (Mansfield and Milner, 2012). Second, at the 
extensive margin, depth is more profound when an agreement highly liberalizes a 
larger number of trade areas and when governments renounce, to a larger extent, 
their capacity to use reactive protectionist measures when domestic producers are 
harmed. Including a larger number of trade areas likely leads a larger number of 
domestic interest groups to experience the costs of trade liberalization. Nevertheless, 
                                                        
189 The alternative would be offering the other veto players a bribe to accept the extent of 
liberalization (Mansfield and Milner, 2012: Kindle locations: 486: 5825). 
190 The authors assume that complete information exists, and therefore failure of ratification 
is not a possible outcome (Mansfield, Milner and Pevehouse, 2007: 414). 
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in contrast to liberalization at the intensive margin, veto players also delegate power 
and attributions at the extensive margin but over specific areas of trade. Therefore, 
compared to the intensive margin, at the extensive margin it is easier to exempt some 
contested areas in which the political actors prefer to retain authority and agree to 
extensive liberalization in the other trade areas. As a result, it is expected that an 
increase in the number of veto players in a system may negatively influence both the 
intensive and the extensive margins in a trade agreement. 
Nature of veto points 
The nature of veto players may also affect their effective number and, consequently, 
influence the feasibility and magnitude of departures from the status quo in a certain 
policy domain. According to veto player theory, when divided governments exist, the 
number of points which can veto the enactment of a certain policy output increases. 
The reason is that in these governments, the executive’s party and the legislature’s 
majority party are different or incongruent. Because they are considered to 
‘effectively’ represent different interests, the number of veto players increases in the 
system (although the number of veto gates does not change). In presidential systems, 
unified governments are more congruent than divided governments, and in 
parliamentary systems, majoritarian governments are more congruent than 
coalitional governments (Schiavon, 2001). In contrast, in unified presidential 
systems, where particularly centralized parties that are capable of ruling for 
themselves exist (Haggard and Webb, 2000), the number of veto players in the 
system remains unchanged. Therefore, the nature of veto players may divide or 
cancel some of them, affecting their effective total number. The implication is a 
negative net effect over the feasibility and magnitude of policy change when divided 
governments exist. 
A second aspect in which the nature of veto players may affect the feasibility and 
magnitude of departures from the status quo is its possible influence on the size of 
the win-set of the status quo. Three characteristics of the veto players are relevant to 
determine the feasibility of policy change: ‘their number, their congruence (the 
difference in their political positions) and their cohesion (the similarity of policy 
positions of the constituent units of each veto player)’ (Tsebelis, 1995: 301). Each of 
these characteristics affects the results that can replace the status quo (win-set of the 
status quo). From the conditions that prevailed in Latin America after the crisis of the 
imports substitution model, it is possible to infer that the status quo was located far 
from the veto players. Moreover, the win-set of the status quo was large (and policy 
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stability low). As the status quo approached the veto players, policy stability 
increased. More incoherent and incongruent players reduce the size of the win-set of 
the status quo or the core (the space in between the veto players), making departure 
from the status quo more difficult. In divided governments, the policy preferences of 
veto players are more likely to be incongruent. On one hand, there is more possibility 
that their ideological positions may locate them far from each other, reducing the size 
of the win-set and decreasing the possibility of significant departures from the status 
quo (Tsebelis, 2002: 2). Maintaining all else constant, from the arguments above, the 
first constitutive hypothesis in this chapter is formed:  
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Constitutive hypothesis 3. Latin American countries with fewer 
effective veto players display deeper integration in their trade 
agreements than countries with more effective veto players.  
Access points without veto power 
Access points without veto power cannot determine whether a certain legislation 
about a policy output is enacted or not; nevertheless, access points without veto 
power can still influence the direction and magnitude of the policy output. In this 
research, access points without veto power are independent and relevant; they are 
not located directly at the veto gates and, therefore, do not have power to block a 
policy. As stated above, the relevant and independent actors in the area of trade policy 
are the executive and the legislature in a country. Within these institutions, parties in 
the legislature are the access points which without having the possibility of blocking 
legislation over the trade agreement may affect the extent of liberalization. 
From the perspective of veto player theory, the number of parties in a political 
system per se does not affect the possibility of reaching an agreement; however, from 
the perspective of access point theory, it directly influences the number of access 
points in the system. The number of parties and their size influence whether the party 
system in a country can be considered fragmented, in which case more than two 
parties without majority must exist in the legislature.191 According to veto player 
theory, maintaining all else constant, party fragmentation192 is not considered to 
affect the number of veto players, as it is a feature of the system which, on its own, 
does not impede the reaching of an agreement (Tsebelis, 2002: 183). Nevertheless, 
the number of parties has a direct effect on the number of access points. 
More fragmented party systems provide more access points, decreasing the costs 
of lobbying and affecting the extent and direction of policy change. The effect of the 
fragmentation of party systems on access points differs for presidential systems and 
for parliamentary ones. In presidential systems, minority parties are considered 
access points because they can influence the costs of lobbying and the magnitude of 
the policy change. In contrast, in parliamentary systems, only the parties in 
government are considered access points because, unlike opposition parties, they are 
                                                        
191 Therefore, there is no fragmentation in systems with pure two party systems or with many 
parties of which one has majority (Karvonen, 2011). 
192 Nevertheless, party fragmentation is expected to ‘complicate executive-legislative relations, 
increase the transaction costs of obtaining policy agreements, and limit policy adaptability’ 
(Scartascini, 2008: 63). In addition, fragmented party systems also increase uncertainty, 
making more difficult to reach agreements (Nielson, 2003: 475). 
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the only ones that can influence the costs of lobbying, and therefore, the magnitude 
of the policy change, as well. In the first instance, without making assumptions about 
which market actors are able to capture the access points in the political system, more 
access point are, by definition, more capable of representing more interests in a 
society. Therefore, more access points without veto power would be able to cover 
more areas of integration and achieve deeper integration in trade agreements. With 
all else being equal, these arguments give way to the second constitutive hypothesis 
in this chapter:  
Constitutive hypothesis 4. Latin American countries with more 
access points without veto power display deeper integration in 
trade agreements than countries with fewer access points 
without veto power (considering only the political 
representation of economic interests).  
However, according to access point theory, average protectionist groups benefit 
more from cheaper access to lobbying. This second phase of the theory is integrated 
in Chapter 7, where the capacity of mobilization of interest groups is studied within a 
collective action framework which also considers other aspects of the political setting, 
characteristics of the interest groups, and characteristics of the policy outcome. 
Briefly, assuming that more access points in a system increases the possibility that 
they are more easily captured by protectionist groups, a negative effect on the extent 
of deep integration in the trade agreements signed is expected. An increase in the 
number of access points reduces the costs of collective action, and protectionist 
groups can better capture these points. In doing so, they increase congruence in the 
collective veto players because their preferences are more similar (and better 
represented by the yolk, which is the definition of congruence).  
Theoretically, congruence should facilitate the reaching of an agreement; 
however, the protectionist bias brought in by the reduced lobbying costs offsets any 
advantage produced by congruence in the collective veto players. Legislative 
institutions are collective veto players that decide on policymaking by a majority 
(Tsebelis, 2002: 80). In contrast to individual veto players that decide by unanimity, 
collective veto players apply either simple majority or a qualified majority for their 
decisions.193 According to veto player theory, the types of majorities required have 
implications for cohesion of the collective veto players and affect the final count of 
the number of veto players. In the case where a simple majority applies, political 
                                                        
193  For analytical purposes it is possible to replace collective veto players with fictional 
individual players and use their win-sets to study policy change (Tsebelis, 2002: 80). 
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stability decreases with cohesion. If the decision requires a qualified majority, policy 
stability increases with cohesion. Latin American countries require de jure or factual 
qualified majorities to approve or reject a trade agreement presented by the executive.  
As stated above, because of democratization, the adoption of the economic model 
based on the promotion of exports, and exogenous economic and international 
changes, the executives in Latin America had incentives to establish deep trade 
agreements. On the other hand, because of increases in the number of access points, 
which decrease the costs of lobbying and allow their capture by protectionist groups, 
the legislature acquired a protectionist bias. As a result, there was an increase in the 
ideological distance between both players, making it more difficult to make 
significant departures from the status quo. In this scenario, if the players are able to 
reach an agreement, deep integration is not expected to take place. At this point, it is 
not possible to derive the implications of different effective numbers of access points 
and veto players more specifically over each margin of deep integration. These issues 
are addressed in the next chapter. 
Influence of political access and veto power over deep 
integration 
As discussed above, increases in the number of veto players generally influence the 
extent to which deep integration can be achieved in a trade agreement negatively. 
Increases in the number of access points, in the first instance, are likely to have a 
positive influence over the extent of deep integration in a trade agreement. 
Accordingly, Table 6.3 summarizes the possible outcomes of the influence of the 
number and alignment of veto players and access points over the depth of trade 
agreements. The vertical axis specifies the number and coherence of access points. 
The horizontal axis specifies the number and congruence of veto players. In the 
lower-right corner and in the bottom of the third column, deep integration is not 
likely. In contrast, the upper-right first and second combinations have the best 
conditions for achieving deep integration. In the other cases, only trade agreements 
with medium depth (high or low) can be achieved, and in seven of the 16 scenarios, 
the outcomes are uncertain. 
Table 6-3 Influence of numbers of access points and veto players over extent 
of deep integration 
Number of veto Access points without veto 
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players Few and 
coherent 
Few and non-
coherent 
Many and non-
coherent 
Many and 
coherent 
Few and 
congruent 
Uncertain 
 
Deep 
Many and 
congruent 
Deep 
Few and non-
congruent 
Medium-low Medium-low Medium-high Medium 
Many and non-
congruent 
Shallow Shallow Shallow Shallow 
Source: Elaborated by the author. 
The ideal combination of the number and nature of veto players and access 
points without veto power is one that has few or many congruent veto players and 
many coherent access points (cells in the upper-right corner in Table 6.3). Few or 
many congruent veto players means that the executive has the capacity to establish 
its preferred policy (in this case, deep integration in trade agreements), without being 
blocked by other institutional actors with veto power. In the case where there are 
many veto players, but they are congruent with the executive, the same outcome of 
the deepest trade agreements holds. The reasoning is that the introduction of another 
veto player,194 as long as she does not have different preferences, will not decrease the 
feasibility (Mansfield, Milner and Pevehouse, 2007: 412) or depth of a trade 
agreement. Many coherent access points means that they are able to channel the 
demands of more interests, increasing the coverage of provisions which promote 
deep integration in a trade agreement (in this chapter, there are no inferences yet 
about which interest groups capture the access points or veto players). Their 
coherence may facilitate departures from the status quo and promote deep 
integration in trade agreements.  
On one hand, few or many congruent veto players facilitate deep integration. On 
the other hand, few access points without veto power are likely to channel the 
demands of few interest groups. These groups are likely to focus on provisions which 
affect them particularly, and this may influence the extent of deep integration 
                                                        
194 Although the net influence of adding veto players depends on their preferences, it is not 
likely that the additional actors can increase the possibilities of reaching a deep trade 
agreement. This result holds even considering the possibilities of giving bribes. Mansfield, 
Milner and Pevehouse (2007: 14) explain that, if bribery is allowed, executives can transfer a 
proportion of its benefits to the veto players to buy their veto power. However, executives can 
only transfer as much resources as they get from the agreement. If more incongruent and 
incoherent players are added, then even larger bribes will be necessary, until the point in 
which there are not more resources to make the bribe effective. This argument does not 
consider that the costs of bribes may decrease through competition when the numbers of veto 
players increase.  
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negatively. When these access points are non-coherent, they increase the possible 
representation of interests but may make departures from the status quo more 
difficult. For these reasons, the final outcomes are uncertain in the overlapping cells 
in the first and second rows of the horizontal axis corresponding to veto players and 
the first three columns of the vertical one corresponding to access points without veto 
power.  
In the situation in which an incongruent veto player is added, the possibility that 
the executive can enact her preferred policy is reduced. The possibility that the 
additional veto players will not agree to reduce their powers over a trade policy or 
that their constituents will be damaged by the adjustments necessary to 
implementing the agreement increases. Therefore, when there are few but 
incongruent veto players, the executive may achieve, at most, trade agreements with 
medium depth. The possible outcomes of scenarios with few and incongruent veto 
players are only medium (high or low, depending on the number and coherence of 
access points, the effects of which were described above). Finally, many and non-
congruent veto players have a low possibility of reaching any level of deep integration, 
which is reflected in the possible outcomes in the last row of the table.  
Conclusions 
In this chapter, the influence of various configurations of domestic political 
institutions (aggregated in conceptual dimensions) over the extent of deep 
integration in trade agreements was analysed. The main objective is to contribute 
insight to the issue of wide variations in the depth of trade agreements established by 
Latin American countries. In working towards this objective, first, it was established 
that to understand how institutions influence deep integration (as defined in Chapter 
2), one must address their influence over the ‘intensity’ and horizontal and vertical 
‘distances’ of integration. The differences and areas of similitude and 
complementarity of veto player theory and access point theory were examined to 
integrate them within one framework. 
Both theories are considered useful in explaining the magnitude of policy 
changes. Veto player theory provides insight into how the configuration of veto 
players influences the way in which the extent of deep integration is decided between 
the political actors which are able to block the establishment of the trade agreement. 
Access point theory shows how the number of access points influences the way in 
which societal demands concerning the extent of deep integration are channelled 
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differently. Next, the implications of the number and nature of veto players and 
access points in a system were assessed. It was argued that the executive in Latin 
American countries had the incentive to pursue deep integration through trade 
agreements after the collapse of the economic model based on the substitution of 
imports. Maintaining all else constant, the capacity of the executive to achieve deep 
integration in trade agreements is constrained when numerous veto players exist, 
and/or they are not congruent. Regarding the number and coherence of access points, 
the more access points there are, the greater the possibility of channelling the 
demands of diverse interest groups, thereby increasing the possibility of covering 
more provisions which promote deep integration in a trade agreement. Inferences 
about which interest groups capture the access points or veto players are 
incorporated in the analysis in the next chapter. Furthermore, the coherence of access 
points may facilitate departures from the status quo and deep integration in trade 
agreements. 
From the perspective of the combined veto player theory and access point theory, 
it is possible to understand how different configurations of institutions influence 
deep integration in a trade agreement. Based on the combined theories and 
maintaining all else constant, two constitutive hypotheses were developed. First, 
countries with fewer effective veto players are associated with more profound trade 
agreements than countries with more effective veto players. Second, countries with 
more access points without veto power are associated with more profound trade 
agreements than countries with fewer access points.  
Together, veto player theory and access point theory provide a suitable basis for 
analysing how different institutional settings influence deep integration. 
Nevertheless, these theories, combined or separately, are limited when considering 
differences in the depth between the extensive and the intensive margins of 
integration. The specific influence of the institutional configurations over the 
intensive and extensive margins becomes more evident in Chapters 7 and 8, which 
consider how different configurations of access points with and without veto power 
in a country combine with (de)concentrated export interests, where exporters have 
preferences of different intensities for integration in each margin, depending on the 
preferences that they are able to extract from them. 
 164 
7  Overcoming collective action costs 
This chapter investigates how the economic interests identified in Chapter 5 engage 
in collective action to demand trade agreements by varying the intensive and 
extensive margins and how they combine with the different institutional settings 
discussed in Chapter 6. According to the endogenous trade literature (Olson, 1965; 
Lavergne, 1983, Baldwin, 1985, 1989; Schonhardt-Bailey, 2006), using a cost–benefit 
model (e.g. Pincus, 1975; Caves, 1976; Pittman, 1977; Godek, 1985; Grier, Munger 
and Roberts, 1994) it is possible to infer the costs and benefits of the mobilization of 
industries.195 From this model and analysis of the characteristics of the export sector, 
it is also possible to determine the predisposition of exporters to organize for 
collective action. Following this approach, trade policy outcomes are the result of 
interest group pressure and the structural factors that control the benefits and costs 
of industries’ mobilization (Caves, 1976: 286). These characteristics determine how 
appropriable are the benefits and how assignable are the costs of collective action. 
Industries investing resources compare the costs of their participation with the 
benefits derived from the trade agreements. This chapter contributes to explaining 
how different configurations of export interests combine with the configurations of 
political institutions to explain the wide variation in the depth of the trade 
agreements established by Latin American countries. 
This chapter is structured in three main sections. In the first section, the 
characteristics of the policy outcome, interest groups, and setting are analysed to 
assess their influence over deep integration at the intensive or extensive margin. 
First, Marwell’s and Oliver’s (1993) suggestions are followed to approximate the 
production function of deep integration in trade agreements. Second, the 
predisposition of interest groups with different characteristics to engage in collective 
action is taken into consideration. Third, environmental characteristics, such as 
specificity or mobility, and selective incentives attached to domestic political 
institutions are also taken into account. 
In the second section, the combined institutional framework developed in 
Chapter 6 is applied by further extending access point theory to consider the settings 
                                                        
195 As discussed in Chapter 5, this research follows Frieden’s (1991) deductive approach based 
on asset specificity which operationalizes business as sectors. Sectoral analyses are consistent 
in general with how endogenous trade theory has looked at industry characteristics to 
understand the propensity of collective action. This approach is widely used in the literature 
on international political economy of market reforms in developing countries because of 
limitations in the availability of data (Schneider, 2009). 
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of imperfect competition and by extending veto player theory to include competition 
for rents from lobbying. After combining the veto player and access point theories 
and including imperfect competition, the predictions of veto player and access point 
theories regarding the extent of deep integration in trade agreements are conditional 
on the number and power of export oriented producers. Based on the arguments 
developed in this and the previous section, all else being equal, two conditional 
hypotheses are put forward. The first is that Latin American countries with relatively 
more access points without veto power are expected to be associated with more 
profound trade agreements when the export sector is more de-concentrated and 
diversified than when it is more concentrated and specialized. The second is that 
countries in the region with relatively more effective veto players are expected to be 
associated with deeper trade agreements when the export sector is more concentrated 
and specialized than when it is more de-concentrated and diversified. 
In the third section, different combinations of levels of export concentration and 
political institutions’ predictions and their possible outcomes regarding deep 
integration are presented. The most important finding is that countries with 
combinations of a concentrated export sector and numerous veto players are 
associated with agreements with deeper intensive margins. A second important 
finding is that countries that have a combination of a relatively more concentrated 
export sector and numerous access points without veto power are associated with 
agreements with lower levels of integration at the extensive margins. The general 
conclusion of this chapter is that different equilibriums of export sector concentration 
and diversification and their combination with different settings of access points with 
and without veto power in the region are systematically associated with different 
levels of deep integration at the intensive and extensive margins. 
Collective action costs of the outcome, group and setting 
Several aspects related to policy outcome, group characteristics, and setting may 
influence the costs of mobilization associated with deep integration at the intensive 
or extensive margins. These aspects should be considered when studying the 
feasibility of interest groups to mobilize towards deep integration. Several 
characteristics which are relevant in the analysis of deep integration are discussed 
below. 
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The productive function of deep integration 
An explanation for how large groups of exporters overcome the costs of collective 
action to demand trade agreements is provided by the ‘critical mass’ theory (Marwell 
and Oliver, 1993). This theory further extends Olson’s argument that the 
heterogeneity of members within large groups increases opportunities to achieve 
groups’ goals. 196  One aspect to consider is that according to Olson, the business 
community is segmented into industries of different sizes, and therefore, there are 
different incentives for participation. When heterogeneity exists in large groups, the 
more powerful members are likely to be exploited by smaller and weaker members. 
The reason is that resourceful members are more likely to make significant 
contributions towards achieving the common good. As a result, collective action in 
large heterogeneous groups can be explained by ‘a relatively small cadre of highly 
interested and resourceful individuals [mobilizing agents], rather than by the efforts 
of the average group member’ (Marwell and Oliver, 1993: 2). This theory also 
considers strategic interaction between members of a group, in which one person’s 
actions affects others. The smaller members are thus more likely to contribute 
towards achieving the public good once the resourceful members have made the most 
significant contributions. 
It is possible to consider the productive functions for achieving deep integration 
in trade agreements in a similar manner to modified step functions. From Marwell’s 
and Oliver’s typology of the possible productive functions of public goods, it follows 
that deep integration cannot be captured by the traditional representation of public 
goods as S-shaped productive functions. 197  In the S-shaped function, ‘a small 
                                                        
196 Olson (1965) argues that collective action problems are more acute in large groups because 
contributions are less visible and significant than in smaller groups. Anonymity is connected 
to the problem of enforcement. considering fixed transaction costs per person, larger groups 
have smaller stakes and contributions per person. Members of a large group may suppose that 
their contributions are not definitive in achieving the political outcome and therefore their 
incentives to contribute decrease. In contrast, members of smaller groups (for example where 
monopolistic or oligopolistic competition exists) have larger stakes and contributions are 
more significant per person, increasing the relevance of their contribution towards achieving 
the group goal. For this reason, in small groups to assume the costs of political participation 
is rational. In addition, with fixed transaction costs per person, it is more costly to organize a 
large group than a small group (Olson, 1965: 3; Alt and Gilligan, 1994: 329). In large groups 
it is difficult to identify and enforce contributions from all of its members; or restrict them 
from receiving the benefits of collective action. 
197 Productive functions are the relationship between inputs and outputs. They indicate the 
‘relationship between how many resources are contributed to or invested in purchasing the 
collective good by the group, and the amount of collective good that is realized or provided by 
the level of contribution.’ (Marwell and Oliver, 2003: 24). 
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demonstration is expected to have a little impact up to a certain size, and again, large 
numbers beyond a certain size would not make much difference either, whereas in 
the middle range, additional numbers increase visibility and impact’ (Oberschall, 
1980: 48). The dynamics of the costs and benefits of deep integration in trade 
agreements are not adequately captured by this productive function. For example, a 
small demonstration at the beginning provides no depth in trade agreements. In the 
first phase, depth in trade agreements, whether at the extensive or the intensive 
margins, could be considered as lumpy goods (such as bridges). In this case, the one 
contribution that changes the outcome from a shallow trade agreement to a deep 
trade agreement is of crucial importance. This first phase is then represented by a 
step function.198 In the second phase, when the lumpy good is achieved, the depth of 
trade agreements is represented by an accelerative production function in which 
returns are smaller for initial contributions and increase afterwards. 
The intensive margin requires that the critical mass of resourceful exporters 
reach a higher threshold in comparison to the extensive margin because of the lower 
excludability and higher uncertainty of its benefits. 199  This type of excludability 
refers, for example, to the fact that competitive exporters and intensive importers 
obtain disproportionate benefits from free trade in comparison to the rest of 
society.200 In general, more concentrated benefits mean a larger group-to-effect ratio 
(Pincus, 1975: 759), as explained in Chapters 3 and 4, and the intensive margin 
provisions are less industry-specific. In contrast, integration at the extensive margin 
covers specific trade areas that have an effect on concrete industries. Therefore, 
mobilization in this margin may be considered as being segmented in these sectors. 
As a result, contributions in each area are easier to identify (since they are more 
                                                        
198 The analysis of step functions is complicated, they are ‘neither general, nor tractable for 
formal analysis of collective action and tend to be relegated to the status of ‘special cases’ 
(Marwell and Oliver, 1993: 60). 
199 Non excludability and non-rivalry create collective action problems, particularly free riding, 
in the provision of public and common goods. Each member of a group can consume the 
political pressure supplied by the other members of a group. Consequently, members receive 
less benefits from the political pressure that they pay; and buy less than they would if they 
could not benefit from the political pressure that the other members buy (Alt and Gilligan, 
1994: 329). Free-riding is central to collective action problems, since individuals prefer to 
depend on the efforts of others instead of paying the costs to achieve the goal from which they 
obtain benefits (Sandler, 1992). It is rational for individuals to promote their own interest 
instead of the interest of the whole group. 
200  This characteristic is common to other public policies and it does not affect the 
characterization of trade liberalization as a public good. The knowledge that public policies 
such as defence or education have relatively more benefits for certain groups such as the 
military and teachers, respectively, is a familiar idea (Nielson, 2003: 472). 
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visible and significant) than at the intensive margin which includes provisions 
covering the trade agreement as a whole. From this perspective, the condition of 
anonymity is also more difficult to overcome at the intensive margin than at the 
extensive one. 
Secondly, uncertainty is a related aspect that also increases the threshold at the 
intensive margin. At the extensive margin, benefits are more concrete and therefore 
less uncertain. Outcomes that are more certain are also more likely to promote the 
mobilization of interest groups in comparison with outcomes that are dubious (Alt 
and Gilligan, 1994: 329). 201  According to theories of collective action, these 
characteristics make free riding in integration at the intensive margin more likely 
than at the extensive margin. 202  In addition to the productive function of deep 
integration, the characteristics of the groups and the setting (such as factor specificity 
and political institutions) also influence the likeliness of the mobilization of interest 
groups towards their desired outcome. 
Characteristics of groups: export sector (de)concentration 
The natural tendency of Latin American countries towards industry concentration 
has been strengthened by the implementation of unilateral trade liberalization, which 
has facilitated the mobilization of concentrated export oriented industries towards 
demanding deep integration. 203  Although several Latin American countries have 
institutional systems that use electoral districts, the region has an historical tendency 
for businesses to concentrate in a small number of cities and regions (Schneider, 
2004: 45).204 Their natural tendency towards imperfect markets and concentration is 
rooted in a long history of the unequal distribution of income and wealth (Dijkstra, 
                                                        
201  Uncertainty of political outcomes increases the significance of having a decisive 
contribution, and gives another advantage to members of smaller groups which are more 
likely to change the political outcome with their contribution (Alt and Gilligan, 1994: 329. 
202 Free-riding is the central collective action problem in the demand for trade agreements: 
once economic interests have exerted political pressure and achieved their desired policy 
nobody can be prevented from sharing its benefits. Individuals prefer to depend on the efforts 
of others instead of paying the costs to achieve the goal from which they obtain benefits 
(Pincus, 1975: 758; Sandler, 1992; Alt and Gilligan, 1994: 329). 
203  In a setting of geographic representation, geographic dispersion of export oriented 
industries also contributes to solve the collective action problem to achieve trade 
liberalization by decreasing lobbying costs, enhancing the prospects for collective action 
(Pincus, 1975; Schonhardt-Bailey, 2006). 
204 Schneider (2004) also mentions that data about geographic concentration and political 
action in Latin America is too incomplete and inconsistent to be incorporated in a solid 
systematic analysis. 
OVERCOMING COLLECTIVE ACTION COSTS
 
 
169 
2000: 1570). Trade liberalization was one of the reforms implemented in Latin 
America after the debt crisis in the 1980s and early 1990s that included broader 
economic adjustment policies and some stabilization measures.205 As mentioned in 
Chapter 5, according to standard, ‘new’ and ‘new-new’ trade theories, trade 
liberalization leads to increased concentration and specialization of the export sector 
according to countries’ comparative advantages.206 These predictions are supported 
by empirical evidence, which is discussed below. 
Trade liberalization increased absolute manufacturing production specialization 
in Latin American countries during the 1980s and 1990s. Academic literature has 
extensively documented the dynamic transformation of specialization patterns over 
time and the evolution towards specialization during periods of liberalization in 
developed countries; however, this relation has been empirically tested for 
developing countries only recently (Samen, 2010). Volpe and Estevadeordal (2009) 
studied how trade liberalization influenced specialization in several Latin American 
countries during the 1980s and 1990s. 207  They find that trade liberalization 
(measured in terms of most favoured nation tariffs) led the structures of the analysed 
countries’ production to become more and differently specialized. The phenomenon 
of concentration was stronger in sectors that are intensive in natural resources. A 
second finding is that preferential liberalization led to relative specialization between 
countries in the region and produced wider dissimilarities in their manufacturing 
production structures. Although unilateral liberalization moved the export sectors of 
Latin American countries towards specialization and concentration, other public 
policy directed them towards de-concentration at the same time. 
The transformation of the economic development model from import 
substitution to export promotion also encouraged the efforts of Latin American 
countries towards diversification. 208  Specialization has been acknowledged by 
influential economists since the 1950s as a force that fosters the dependence of 
                                                        
205 Chile initiated its process of structural reform much earlier during the decade of 1970, and 
implemented its trade reform during 1974-1978. 
206  For natural resources and agricultural products, comparative advantage is given and 
unchangeable; in contrast for industrial, technological and services goods, it can be induced 
(Samen, 2010: 10). 
207 The sample includes ten Latin American countries over the period 1985-1998. 
208 According to Volpe and Estevadeordal (2009: 257) ‘a country is relatively specialized if its 
structure is different from that of some reference benchmark.’ There are two main definitions 
of export diversification: ‘the change in the composition of a country’s existing export product 
mix or export destination [...] or as the spread of production over many sectors (Samen, 2010: 
4). The latter is the definition used in this research. 
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developing countries on industrialized countries and maintains a structure of exports 
in which developing countries export primary products and import investment goods 
(e.g. Prebisch, 1950; Singer, 1950). Samen (2010: 3-6) points out that this trade 
pattern increases uncertainty and instability, as the concentration of exports in a few 
primary commodities could increase the probability of volatility and instability in 
foreign exchange, unpredictable declining terms of trade, and deteriorating 
governance. In addition, Samen observes that during the 1980s, an important 
motivation for diversification efforts was research which linked this process to 
stability in terms of income from exports and economic growth and considered it to 
be a source of increasing employment levels in the economy. The rationale is that 
diversification and trade openness policies in general increase the competitive 
advantage of various industries by augmenting their efficiency, technological 
innovation, and export opportunities. As a result, by diversifying their export 
products and markets, Latin American countries can achieve more productive export 
structures and progress towards developing their economies. 
Methods of promoting the diversification of the export sector were affirmed by 
the Washington Consensus, several associated development funds that emerged 
during that time, and policy initiatives.209 Empirical data about the diversification of 
Latin American countries after the adoption of the export promotion economic 
development model is still scarce. To assess to what extent countries in the region 
effectively diversified their export structures, Taylor (2003: 123-124) examined their 
patterns of exports to the United States during the 1990s. The results of the study 
show that all countries diversified their exports to the United States, increasing ‘the 
number of products in which they specialized and the share of exports attributable to 
these products.’210 Export supply responses after unilateral liberalization efforts have 
been mixed, but expanding and diversifying exports is still a priority for many Latin 
American policy makers (Samen, 2010: 3). As a result, policy makers’ efforts to 
expand and diversify their exports have contributed to increasing the number of 
exporters and to the de-concentration of the sector. 
The particular equilibriums reached between the concentration and 
diversification forces in each country created heterogeneous export sectors with 
                                                        
209 Taylor (2003) mentions as examples the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, and 
the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act. 
210 The countries and organizations included in the study are Mexico, Central America, 
Barbados, Guyana, Belize, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Haiti, Dominican Republic, and the 
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States. 
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varying degrees of concentration, with implications for the possible mobilization of 
their members. All else being equal, according to Olson’s theory, it is more costly to 
organize larger groups of exporters, which would benefit from deep integration than 
smaller ones. In non-concentrated industries, average members are likely to calculate 
that they will collect the benefits derived from policy regardless of whether they 
assume their corresponding share of the costs (Pittman, 1977: 39). From this 
perspective, export oriented interest groups mobilize towards deep integration more 
easily in countries with more concentrated export sectors than do groups in countries 
with more de-concentrated export sectors. Furthermore, the existence of a critical 
mass —which is required in the production function of deep integration in trade 
agreements, particularly at the intensive margin— is also met more easily in countries 
with concentrated export sectors that facilitate their mobilization. 
Factor specificity of the setting and the excludability of benefits 
The position of Latin American countries towards high specificity in the factor 
mobility continuum likely increases the excludability of benefits from deep 
integration and facilitates the mobilization of export oriented producers that obtain 
economic benefits from this integration. In an environment with high factor mobility, 
the gains from trade are distributed among all factor owners regardless of the 
industry in which they are employed. In this setting, opportunities for free riding 
arise from the fact that non-participants cannot be excluded from enjoying the policy 
benefits. On the other hand, when factors are highly specific, the policy benefits are 
concentrated in the factors that are employed in specific industries. All else being 
equal, it is more difficult for factors to mobilize a lobbying campaign than for sectors 
because of free riding (Alt and Gilligan, 1994: 183-185). Then, as factor specificity 
increases, the excludability of policy benefits rises, and it is easier for economic 
interests to organize to exert political pressure and demand deep integration in trade 
agreements. As discussed in Chapter 4, Latin American countries are closer to high 
specificity in the continuum of factor mobility. This environment may likely increase 
the opportunities of export oriented industries to organize political pressure towards 
deep integration in trade agreements. 
With imperfect competition, the same logic described above applies, but the 
excludability of policy benefits is even higher. The effect is amplified for industries 
with scale economies in which fragmented production exists because of three main 
reasons. First, as mentioned in Chapter 5, incentives are higher for these types of 
export oriented industries and firms because limited liberalization is their preferred 
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mechanism for liberalization (this contrasts with industries in settings of perfect 
competition, for which trade agreements are a second-best option). Second, trade 
policy benefits are even more excludable since scale economies and entry barriers 
tend to coexist (Stigler, 1968; Caves and Porter 1976). As Gilligan (1997: 456-464) 
explains, trade policy in industries with scale economies can be considered ‘virtually 
a private good’ since its benefits ‘are highly concentrated on single firms.’ Then, it is 
more likely for industries with scale economies and fragmented production to 
mobilize and demand deep integration. 
Opaque channels of political influence as selective incentives 
A widely used approach in studies on how economic interests engage in collective 
action to exert political pressure in developed countries is to analyse how industries’ 
characteristics of (de)concentration match political inputs in order to achieve a 
desired policy outcome. Industries and corporate political activities encompass a 
wide array of activities (Hansen, Mitchell and Drope, 2005). Political pressure 
typically involves ‘lobbying, organization of votes in hypothetical referendum, or 
campaign contributions’ (Nielson, 2003: 471). Other types of political pressure 
include deliberative or consultative councils, corporatist tripartite bargaining, and 
‘party finance, networks and appointments to government positions, and corruption’ 
(Schneider, 2005: 2). Economic interests can combine a variety of these channels to 
exercise pressure for the implementation of their desired policy. The three most 
prevalent and visible political tactics are ‘making political contributions, the use of 
staff lobbyists, and hiring outside lobbyists’ (Schuler, Rehbein, Cramer, 2002: 660). 
Some of these methods to influence the political system are difficult for outsiders to 
detect (Pittman, 1977: 37). The difficulty of tracing these and other business activities 
that aim to influence policy depends on their own opacity and that of the countries 
that are being analysed. 
After the abandonment of the model of economic development based on the 
substitution of imports, the usual channels of political influence, such as corruption 
and clientelism, changed the direction of their political pressure towards 
liberalization. Observers expected that the dismantling of state-led development 
would deprive interest groups of channels of communication and political access to 
government officials (Schamis, 1999). However, after the implementation of market 
reforms in Latin America, the old channels of clientelism, patronage, and corruption 
were not eliminated; they adapted to the new export promotion model and were 
instrumental to its reforms (Schamis, 1999; Panizza, 2000; 738). Interest groups 
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responded to incentives to secure economic benefits in the same way as they had 
previously done to demand protectionism (Schamis, 1999: 267-268), contacting the 
government over trade agreements, subsidies for export sectors, and programs for 
technological development (Pages, 2009). In addition, these channels of political 
influence act as selective incentives for business mobilization. 
In Latin America, the privileged access that business groups obtain from the 
government contributes to explaining why groups organize to achieve deep 
integration despite the issue of free riding. According to Olson’s ‘by-product theory 
of pressure groups,’ large groups can obtain contributions from their members by 
providing them with non-collective benefits (selective incentives) in addition to the 
successful achievement of the common good. In this way, trade agreements produce 
multiple goods. Cornes and Sandler describe these as joint products: ‘Each 
individual, in addition to consuming a pure private good, can contribute toward, or 
acquire, units of a second good, the public good. Each unit thereby acquired adds to 
the sum total of the good, which is available to all. But in addition the subscriber 
derives utility from his or her contribution alone’ (Cornes and Sandler, 1996: 114). In 
this case, in addition to their benefits at the international level,211 deep integration in 
trade agreements provides private benefits for certain groups and public benefits for 
society. In the case of trade agreements in Latin America, states that seek to gain 
political support and minimize opposition to their policies provide business 
representatives with access to governmental decision makers. Schuler, Rehbein, and 
Cramer (2002) explain the value of this access for export oriented groups:  
‘Is government policy, which determines the rules of commerce; the structure 
of markets (through barriers to entry and changes in cost structures due to 
regulations, subsidies and taxation); the offerings of goods and services that 
are permissible; and the sizes of markets based on government subsidies and 
purchases. Consequently, gaining and maintaining access to those who make 
public policy may well be a firm’s single most important political goal’ 
(Schuler, Rehbein, and Cramer, 2002: 659). 
Furthermore, opacity and corruption in the region facilitate the use of this access 
to government officials as a selective incentive. In Latin America, ‘there is a wide use 
of personal networks, which ‘involve very small numbers and are often largely 
invisible, even to other participants in policy-making’ (Schneider, 2005: 1). Case 
studies in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico find that ‘collusion between political and 
economic power and the formation of distributional coalitions have been the driving 
                                                        
211 This issue falls beyond the scope of this research; it is part of the debate of trade agreements 
as stumbling or building blocks towards multilateralism. 
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forces behind the policy reform process in Latin America’ (Schamis, 1999: 268). On 
the one hand, it is not possible to obtain records from campaign or party finances or 
lobbying activities because of the opacity and unreliability of these processes in Latin 
American countries. A study published by Transparency International and the Carter 
Centre at the end of the analysed period, 2010, reported ‘deep flaws in the standards 
and practices governing transparency and accountability in party and campaign 
financing systems’ (Transparency International and The Carter Center, 2010)212 On 
the other hand, it is not possible to obtain systematic data from business 
organizations. A main problem is the underdevelopment of these associations:  
‘A cursory glance at the full range of business associations in the major 
countries of Latin America reveals a bewildering array of hundreds of 
associations and larger business belong to several of them. The vast majority 
of these associations are similar across Latin America: they are small and 
narrow, and often consist of a letterhead and a telephone’ (Schneider, 2009: 
6). 
From a different perspective, the difficulty in tracing political input is the first 
challenge to systematically analysing how interest groups organize to exert political 
pressure to their desired policy in Latin American countries. Although political 
pressure on trade liberalization exists, the problem for analysis is that the usual 
research approaches to obtain data on interest groups’ political input from either 
government or business organizations are not feasible in Latin America. In general, 
the body of literature on business politics in Latin America is very limited (Schneider, 
2009). Also, the opacity of the political processes described above makes it 
impossible to gather systematic data on the political input of market actors to achieve 
deep integration. 
Capturing access points and veto players to achieve deep 
integration 
In the previous chapter, it was argued that the combination of veto player theory and 
access point theory provides an adequate approach for analysing the influence of 
domestic political institutional configurations over the extent of deep integration. In 
this section, the potential of the combined theories is further exploited by extending 
                                                        
212 The countries included in the study are the following: Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay and Peru. According to the study, the most 
prevalent issues are the following: lack of oversight for private donations, scarce 
accountability by candidates, unreliable data delivered by parties, and lack of public 
information about political financing. 
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this combination to settings of imperfect competition and by considering the 
differences in the lobbying costs of veto players and the costs of access points without 
veto power. Interest groups are likely to target access points and veto players 
depending on the influence these political actors have over the interest group’s 
desired outcome and the ability of the group for capturing those points. 
First, the lobbying costs of veto players must be higher than the cost of access 
points without veto power because their number is smaller and their influence more 
determinant. Veto players and access points without veto power have different levels 
of influence over deep integration. Veto players are determinant over the intensive 
and extensive margins in trade agreements. As discussed in Chapter 6, the executive 
and legislative branches of government are the relevant political institutions with 
veto power over legislation about trade agreements and the extent of their 
liberalization. These institutions have differentiated constitutional powers, which can 
be summarized generally as follows: executives have the authority to undertake 
initiatives to establish trade agreements, while legislatures have ratification powers 
over these initiatives. The parties in the legislature are the access points without veto 
power that are relevant to influencing deep integration in trade agreements. These 
access points without veto power are not determinant, since they cannot decide 
whether legislation is enacted or not. 
Second, extending Tsebelis’ framework to include competition for lobbying rents 
has implications for the analysis and predicted outcomes of veto player theory. As 
stated above, larger numbers of access points reduce the costs of lobbying through 
competition between the access points. When the number of veto players in the 
system increases, the costs of lobbying decrease. In this context, the likeliness of pro-
liberalization interest groups capturing the veto players also increases, and trade 
agreements with deeper integration are expected. This prediction contrasts with the 
expectations from veto player theory in which, after an increase in the number of veto 
players, shallow trade agreements (which would be closer to the status quo) are 
expected. Furthermore, when there is an increase in the number of access points 
without veto power and pro-liberalization groups capture these access points, the 
collective veto player becomes more coherent and congruent with the individual veto 
player (which, as in the previous chapter, has a preference towards trade 
liberalization). In this situation, the establishment of trade agreements with deeper 
integration could be expected. 
Third, extending Ehrlich’s (2007, 2011) framework to derive the costs of lobbying 
access points to consider imperfect competition has implications for the analysis and 
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predicted outcomes of access point theory. First, in addition to the average 
protectionist and free trade groups, a group of resourceful and concentrated 
exporters with powerful incentives to lobby for deep trade integration in agreements 
also exists, as discussed in Chapter 5. The underlying reasoning of Ehrlich’s argument 
that increasing the number of access points reduces the costs of lobbying and 
increases the level of protection is that if all groups have the same costs of lobbying, 
there should be no effect on the final policy. This argument then builds on the 
assumption that liberalization groups obtain fewer benefits relative to the costs of 
lobbying than do protectionist groups. Because of the assumed collective action 
advantage of protectionist groups over pro-liberalization groups, it is predicted that 
they are able to capture the access points. In this setting, it is possible that trade 
agreements will have less profound levels of integration. Nevertheless, with imperfect 
competition, resourceful and concentrated export oriented producers are introduced, 
and it is possible that they have an advantage over protectionist groups in engaging 
in collective action. In this new setting, pro-liberalization groups would be able to 
capture access points, and trade agreements with more profound levels of integration 
could be expected. Therefore, after combining the veto player and access point 
theories and including imperfect competition, the predictions of veto player and 
access point theories regarding the extent of deep integration in trade agreements are 
conditional on the number and power of export oriented producers. 
To assess the costs of capturing access points and veto players to achieve deep 
integration at the intensive and extensive margins, it is necessary to include other 
aspects related to the policy outcome, group characteristics, and setting which 
influence the costs of mobilization associated with each margin. As identified in the 
previous section, integration between these margins has different thresholds in their 
production functions, the degree of excludability in the policy benefits that they 
produce, the types of exporters to which they provide substantive economic benefits, 
and the existence of attached selective incentives. These aspects, framed by the costs 
of capturing access points and veto players developed in this section, are analysed 
below. 
Mobilization of small and medium exporters 
Although resourceful and specialized exporters obtain the most benefits from deep 
integration at both margins, all else being equal, the existence of numerous small and 
medium exporters in de-concentrated export sectors would have a positive influence 
on the extensive margin. First, as discussed in Chapter 5, they obtain concrete 
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economic benefits from integration at the extensive margin derived from static gains 
from trade proceeding from expanded markets. Second, compared to the intensive 
margin, benefits derived from provisions at the extensive margin are more excludable 
because they are more specific to concrete industries. Third, these exporters would 
mainly obtain economic benefits from the extensive margin of integration in trade 
agreements, and concrete economic benefits from the intensive margin of integration 
would be uncertain. Finally, as argued in the first section of this chapter, integration 
at the extensive margin requires a lower threshold of contributions to achieve the first 
phase of the step productive function than the threshold of contributions necessary 
for deep integration at the intensive margin. All else being constant, countries with 
more de-concentrated and diversified export sectors are expected to be associated 
with trade agreements with more profound extensive margins. The more diversified 
the export sector is in terms of industries, the greater the likeliness that a trade 
agreement covers a larger proportion of the productive sectors of an economy (and 
therefore has deeper extensive margins). 
Although small and medium exporters mobilize more easily towards integration 
at the extensive margin than at the intensive one, they are unlikely to achieve 
profound integration at the extensive margin. The main reason is that they are 
unlikely to be able to afford the costs of veto players. Furthermore, in settings of 
perfect competition, protectionist groups have an inherent advantage in organizing 
towards collective action compared to pro liberalization groups. In this scenario, it is 
more likely that protectionist groups will capture more access points. In terms of 
trade agreements, this translates to lobbying for exceptions or avoiding specific 
provisions or areas; this results in relatively lower levels of integration at the 
extensive margin but does not have a substantial influence on the intensive margin, 
where provisions are less specific. Even in the case in which a critical mass is present, 
it is unlikely that small and medium exporters will able to achieve profound 
integration at the extensive margin. 
According to the critical mass theory (Marwell and Oliver, 1993), smaller 
exporters have incentives to contribute once a core of resourceful and concentrated 
export oriented industries (the critical mass) has already made a considerable 
contribution. The economic motivation for smaller exporters to contribute to the 
trade agreement is that they also benefit from the expanded markets, although to a 
lesser degree than the large concentrated industries. However, because benefits from 
the extensive margins tend to be more excludable and specific to particular industries 
than those at the intensive margin, resourceful and concentrated exporters lack 
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economic incentives to contribute; their incentives are restricted to the specific 
provisions from which they derive economic benefits at the extensive margin. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, since there are few concentrated and resourceful exporters, 
even when they are present, trade agreements with deep extensive margins are 
unlikely when numerous access points exist. 
In sum, after the regional movement towards export promotion during the 
1980s, governmental strategic policies towards export diversification in Latin 
America promoted the existence of numerous exporters. The effect of de-
concentrated and diversified export sectors over deep integration at the intensive 
margin is not straightforward. Deep integration at the intensive margin has unclear 
benefits for small and medium export oriented producers, and it is unlikely that they 
will have characteristics or conditions that would allow them to reach the threshold 
required by the productive function of integration in the margin. Numerous access 
points will probably be captured by protectionist groups, decreasing the depth to 
which trade agreements may reach (by reducing the costs of lobbying, increasing the 
coherence of the collective veto player with a protectionist bias, and locating it further 
away from the pro-liberalization individual player). Considering deep integration at 
the extensive margin, less diversified and more concentrated export sectors have 
fewer exporters to compete with protectionist groups, which may decrease 
integration at the extensive margin of the agreement. From these arguments and the 
explanations above, the first conditional hypothesis is presented below:  
Conditional hypothesis 1. Latin American countries with 
the most access points without veto power display deeper 
integration at the extensive margin of their trade agreements 
when the export sector is more de-concentrated and diversified 
than when the export sector is more concentrated and 
specialized. 
Mobilization of concentrated and specialized exporters 
As discussed in Chapter 5, after the abandonment of the model that aimed at 
industrialization based on the substitution of imports, there was potential for 
exporters to develop scale economies and engage in production sharing. Later, 
unilateral trade liberalization processes, which started after the adoption of the 
economic model of export promotion, increased the specialization and concentration 
of the export sector. In addition to static trade benefits derived only from the 
expansion of markets, in settings of imperfect competition, trade produces additional 
dynamic gains. Static gains from trade benefit all export oriented producers (in 
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different proportions). Additional gains from trade benefit export oriented producers 
with scale economies and those engaged in product sharing. 
Concentrated export oriented producers with scale economies or fragmented 
production obtain economic benefits from both the extensive and the intensive 
margins of integration. Large and concentrated industries, in contrast to small and 
medium exporters, require a stronger institutional structure to support their 
processes of production and to realize the scale economies or production sharing 
required in such processes. Economic benefits from the intensive margin derive from 
reducing the costs of coordination and giving security and increasing certainty to 
production processes. Mobilization of resourceful exporters towards achieving 
integration at the intensive margin faces numerous problems. Although they are 
important, economic benefits obtained by integration at the intensive margin are less 
concrete and excludable than those achieved from integration at the extensive 
margin. In addition, the productive function for deep integration at the intensive 
margin requires a higher threshold than integration at the extensive margin. 
Regarding deep integration at the extensive margin, although concentrated exporters 
also have economic incentives to pursue integration, they may limit their 
contributions only to the specific areas which affect their production processes. Then, 
concentrated industries may have a more influential role in the degree of deep 
integration at the intensive margin than at the extensive one. 
In contrast to small and medium exporters, concentrated export oriented 
producers are able to afford the high costs of collective action imposed by a setting 
with few access points or veto players. It is easier for firms with scale economies to 
internalize the benefits of their political activity, and this situation increases their 
incentives to lobby (Chase, 2005: 41). Because of the existence of selective incentives, 
in countries with concentrated export sectors, exporters may be better able and more 
eager to capture veto players in comparison to access points without veto power. 
There is empirical evidence (e.g. Schmitter and Streeck, 1999: 25; Rettberg, 2000; 
Schneider, 2004: 45) that the owners of the largest firms with high levels of 
concentration (such as the ones in industries with scale economies or those engaged 
in production sharing) prefer to coordinate informally and have direct individual 
access to top government officials. Furthermore, there is also strong empirical 
evidence (Schneider, 2004; Chase, 2005)213  that producers with scale economies 
                                                        
213 The empirical evidence is inconsistent with Ehrlich’s statement (2007: 583) that ‘at a low 
number of access points […] almost no free-traders lobby, but so do relatively few 
protectionists.’  
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directly and informally lobby high-level policymakers (which would be too costly for 
average interest groups, whether protectionists or free traders). 
In sum, heterogeneity in the costs and stakes from deep integration in trade 
agreements motivates the few resourceful large exporters and the numerous smaller 
exporters to engage in collective action and exert political pressure to achieve deeper 
agreements in their corresponding margins of interest. By definition, the prevalence 
of numerous large exporters in a concentrated specialized export sector is not 
possible. Therefore, there are limits to the contributions that resourceful exporters 
can make towards the extensive margin, restraining their influence to the specific 
areas that affect their processes of production. Because veto players have a more 
determinant influence over deep integration than access points without veto power, 
resourceful exporters are likely to try to capture them. In addition, to pursue gains 
from trade, these export oriented producers aim to benefit from selective incentives 
such as access to and influence over policy makers. From these arguments and those 
above, follows the conditional hypothesis:  
Conditional hypothesis 2. Latin American countries with 
relatively more effective veto players display deeper integration 
at the intensive margin of their trade agreements when the 
export sector is more concentrated and specialized than when 
the export sector is more de-concentrated. 
Overcoming the collective action costs of deep 
integration 
Considering different degrees of sector (de)concentration and the numbers of veto 
players and access points without veto power, the possible outcomes regarding the 
intensive and extensive margins are summarized in Table 7.1. The vertical axis 
specifies two poles in sector concentration. The practical implication of sector 
concentration is that a critical mass of resourceful industries exists; these can provide 
political pressure to achieve profound depth in a trade agreement, particularly at the 
intensive margin. On the other hand, the implication of a diversified and de-
concentrated export sector is that a large number of smaller and medium export 
oriented industries exist and that these can combine their efforts when they have the 
conditions to overcome their collective action problems to achieve deep integration. 
The larger the number of export oriented industries that can mobilize, the larger the 
coverage of industry-specific provisions in a trade agreement and, consequently, the 
deeper its integration at the extensive margin. 
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Table 7-1 Influence of export sector (de)concentration and configurations of 
access points and veto players over margins of deep integration  
Export sector 
Deep integration 
Intensive margin Extensive margin 
Few veto 
players 
Many veto 
players 
Few access 
points without 
veto 
Many access 
points without 
veto 
Concentrated 
and specialized 
Deep 
(critical mass) 
Deep 
(critical mass) 
Outcome 
uncertain  
(critical mass 
coverage 
uncertain) 
Shallow 
(critical mass 
irrelevant) 
De-
concentrated 
and diversified  
Shallow 
(no critical 
mass) 
Shallow 
(no critical 
mass) 
Outcome 
uncertain 
(depends on 
balance of 
protectionist 
and liberalizing 
groups) 
Shallow 
(advantage of 
protectionist 
groups) 
Source: Elaborated by the author. 
Table 7.1 displays two extremes in the configurations of domestic political 
institutions aggregated in conceptual dimensions: few and many veto players and 
access points with and without veto power. In the upper row, collective action is 
possible because of the existence of a critical mass of resourceful and concentrated 
industries. In all cases, deep integration at the intensive margin is achievable. A small 
number of export oriented industries decreases the likeliness of free riding. However, 
the small number of export oriented industries may limit the likeliness of coverage of 
numerous industries in the trade agreements, which may decrease deep integration 
at the extensive margin. For this reason, the outcome is uncertain. On the other hand, 
in the upper right corner, the advantage of the large and resourceful industries is not 
as relevant since it is counterbalanced by the cheaper and accessible costs of lobbying 
as a result of competition from a large number of access points (which are captured 
by domestic protectionist groups). 
In the lower row, a critical mass of resourceful and concentrated industries does 
not exist. In the first two cells, which correspond to the intensive margin, only 
minimum integration is possible. Although small and medium exporters exist, the 
low excludability of the intensive margin creates a situation in which free riding is 
rampant. Moreover, the high costs of lobbying veto players make it unaffordable for 
small and medium exporters to influence depth at the intensive margin. The next two 
cells correspond to the extensive margin, where the situation is only slightly better. 
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It is possible that the small group of export oriented industries engage in collective 
action. However, they can at most achieve liberalization for their industries; they 
cannot achieve profound and substantial coverage of the productive sectors of a 
country. In the first cell, where few access points without veto power exist, the 
situation is uncertain and depends on the balance of power and the feasibility of 
collective action between small and medium exporters and domestic protectionist 
groups. In the lower right cell, deep integration reaches the lowest level. As explained 
by collective action theory (Olson, 1965), a large group of small homogeneous 
exporters is not likely to overcome its collective action problems because of the non-
significance of their contributions, anonymity, and transaction costs. Moreover, the 
high number of access points without veto power makes the costs of lobbying to 
protectionist groups affordable, which in settings of perfect competition have an 
advantage in engaging in collective action over exporters. 
Conclusions 
The objective in this chapter was to investigate how economic interests are able to 
mobilize and demand deep integration in trade agreements in combination with 
configurations of domestic political institutions. Domestic political institutions which 
supply the provisions that determine the depth of such agreements. The objective was 
to contribute to explaining the wide variation in the nature and level of depth in the 
trade agreements established by Latin American countries between 1982 and 2010. 
The general argument developed in this chapter is that after the abandonment of 
the economic model based on the substitution of imports, unilateral trade 
liberalization and governmental policies of diversification led to particular sets of 
demands concerning deep integration at the intensive and extensive margins. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, resourceful and concentrated exporters benefit from deep 
integration at both margins, and small and medium exporters benefit mainly from 
integration at the extensive margins. In combination with the domestic political 
institutional setting in each country, these demands met the productive functions of 
intensive and extensive provisions of trade agreements at different levels. In 
exploring these issues, the question of how different characteristics of the 
(de)concentration of industries and their settings influence their ability to overcome 
collective action problems was addressed. 
After the transformation of the economic model, the economic power of certain 
export oriented industries in Latin America increased, particularly industries with 
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scale economies. These industries are able to afford high costs of lobbying in 
comparison to average domestic protectionist and liberalization groups. The critical 
mass formed by export oriented industries with scale economies may be able to afford 
costly lobbying such as that required to capture veto players. Being highly 
resourceful, such industries are also capable of achieving profound depth at the 
intensive margin (which is more costly than that at the extensive margin). In contrast, 
in a setting of perfect competition, small and medium exporters are not able to 
capture veto players and have a disadvantage against protectionist groups concerning 
lobbying access points without veto power, and they achieve low levels of integration 
at the extensive margin. 
Based on the arguments above, two conditional hypotheses are put forward. 
First, that countries in which there is a combination of a relatively more concentrated 
export sector and large number of veto players are associated with agreements with 
higher levels of integration at the intensive margins. Second, that countries in which 
there is a combination of a relatively more de-concentrated export sector and large 
numbers of access points without veto power are associated with agreements with 
lower levels of integration at the extensive margins. Chapter 8 presents empirical 
evidence in support of the arguments and hypotheses discussed above. 
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8  Empirical examination of the arguments 
This research argues that, in Latin American countries, particular characteristics of 
the (de)concentration of the export sector combined with the institutional settings to 
influence in specific ways the extent of deep integration at the intensive and extensive 
margins in their trade agreements established from 1982 to 2010. After the 
transformation of the model of economic development, the export sectors of Latin 
American countries were changed in different ways as various forces acted upon 
them. Unilateral liberalization led to specialization (Volpe and Estevadeordal, 2009) 
and strengthened the natural tendency (Dijkstra, 2000) of these countries towards 
industry concentration. On the other hand, countries in the region also made efforts 
towards diversification to counterbalance the negative effects of specialization 
(Prebisch, 1950; Singer, 1950; Collier, 2002; Samen, 2010), stimulate economic 
growth, and enhance export earnings stability (Gutierrez de Pineres and Ferrantino, 
1997; Stanley and Bunnagi, 2001; Taylor, 2003). As a result, the process of 
specialization generated few resourceful and concentrated exporters, and the process 
of diversification generated numerous small and medium exporters. Resourceful and 
concentrated exporters and small and medium exporters have different capabilities 
to afford to lobby different institutional actors with distinctive capacities (veto 
players and access points without veto power). They also have different intensities of 
preferences concerning the removal of barriers at the intensive and extensive margins 
according to the benefits they can appropriate and the inherent excludability of policy 
benefits at each margin.  
The objectives in this chapter are to assess the arguments and to empirically 
examine the conditional hypotheses put forward in developed in Chapters 5, 6, and 
7. The empirical results of the constitutive terms and hypotheses presented in the 
previous chapters are also reported. All else being equal, the hypotheses below follow 
the arguments developed in previous chapters: 
Conditional hypothesis 1. Latin American countries with the most access points 
without veto power display deeper integration at the extensive margin of their trade 
agreements when the export sector is more de-concentrated and diversified than 
when the export sector is more concentrated and specialized. 
Conditional hypothesis 2. Latin American countries with the most effective veto 
players display deeper integration at the intensive margin of their trade agreements 
when the export sector is more concentrated and specialized than when the export 
sector is more de-concentrated and diversified. 
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Constitutive hypothesis 1. Latin American countries with more concentrated and 
specialized export sectors display deeper integration at the extensive margin of their 
trade agreements than countries with more de-concentrated export sectors. 
Constitutive hypothesis 2. Latin American countries with more concentrated and 
specialized export sectors display deeper integration at the intensive margin of their 
trade agreements than countries with more de-concentrated export sectors. 
Constitutive hypothesis 3. Latin American countries with fewer effective veto players 
display deeper integration in their trade agreements than countries with more 
effective veto players. 
Constitutive hypothesis 4. Latin American countries with more access points without 
veto power display deeper integration in trade agreements than countries with fewer 
access points without veto power (considering only the political representation of 
economic interests). 
In the first section, the characteristics of the original hand-coded dataset and the 
statistical methods are discussed. The coding and operationalization of the 
dependent, independent, and control variables are explained. The rationale of 
including each variable in the analyses is also discussed. The second section presents 
the results and a discussion of the empirical analyses. Robustness analyses are also 
included in this section. The main results are congruent with the arguments 
developed in previous chapters.214 Concentrated export sectors in combination with 
relatively more veto players are associated with relatively higher levels of deep 
integration at the intensive margin; while concentrated export interests in 
combination with relatively more access points without veto power are associated 
with relatively lower levels of depth at the extensive margin. The final section 
presents the conclusions of the chapter. 
Data and variables 
A statistical analysis of the level of deep integration at the intensive and extensive 
margins is performed to estimate separate models for each margin. Studies that 
address aspects of the design of trade agreements face the issue that governments 
approve most provisions and features of a trade agreement simultaneously. This 
creates two main problems for the analysis. First, detailed information about the 
provisions included and omitted in trade agreements is not readily available. As 
                                                        
214 The main results are also statistically significant (with a 95% to a 99% degree of confidence). 
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discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, to perform the empirical analysis, an original, hand-
coded dataset of the measurements of the intensive and extensive margins of 256 
directed dyads is used. The trade agreements analysed are all the agreements signed 
from 1982 to 2010 between Latin American countries and their regional and global 
partners for which data is available. As detailed in Chapter 4, a total of 110 data points 
for each dyadic trade agreement were coded. Because the coding was performed 
manually, all entries that overlap with other databases (whether public or accessed 
by request) were compared and checked for errors in measurement. To the best of my 
knowledge, the dataset developed for this research constitutes the most extensive and 
detailed one for the depth of provisions in trade agreements established by Latin 
American countries and their global and regional partners. 
Second, endogeneity issues in the models are common in research about trade 
agreements.215 Scholars interested in assessing levels of deep integration mainly opt 
for one of two main alternatives. First, scholars focus on one aspect of design, such 
as the type of trade agreements (e.g. Mansfield, Milner, and Pevehouse 2007; 
Mansfield and Milner, 2012), or second, they aggregate a certain number of 
provisions in analytical categories, such as flexibility (e.g. Baccini, Dür, and Elsig, 
2012a; Kucik, 2012; Haftel, 2013; Johns, 2013). This research follows the second 
approach, and also includes several features in the design of trade agreements as 
‘proxy controls.’216 As in studies that analyse formation, features and provisions in 
trade agreements, the main challenge regarding the empirical estimation is the 
problem of endogeneity. In this research, the intensive and extensive margins are two 
                                                        
215 A common problem in the study of trade agreements is the issue of self-selection. Trade 
agreements are not exogenous random variables. Countries self-select into forming trade 
agreements ‘for reasons that may be unobservable and/or correlated with levels of trade’ 
(Kono and Rickard, 2010). Baier and Bergstrand (2007) recommend using panel data instead 
of cross-sectional data to address this issue. According to King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) 
self-selection is not a problem for analyses such as the ones developed in this research. The 
reason is that the focus of this research is the study of variation of deep integration in a 
population of observed trade agreements, not the formation of said instruments. The next 
section discusses the appropriateness of reporting statistical significance, considering that 
this research studies the nature and levels of deep integration in the population of dyadic trade 
agreements established by Latin American countries after 1982 until 2010 (instead of 
employing random sampling). 
216 Because of the nature of the data, it is not possible to run a controlled experiment. The 
inclusion of control variables is necessary to limit (as much as possible) that the observed 
effects of the variables of interest are attributable to other factors (Wooldridge, 2010: 1). Proxy 
controls ‘may partially control for omitted factors but are themselves affected by the variable 
of interest’ and they are an improvement on ‘no control[s] at all.’ (Angrist and Jörn-Steffen, 
2008: Kindle edition: 1229-6582). Following this recommendation, relevant features of the 
trade agreement (such as the inclusion of protocols about environment/labour, intellectual 
property, and investment, among others) are included in the analyses of the intensive and 
extensive margins of deep integration. 
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widely encompassing but different dimensions of the same concept. It is not feasible 
to find strong instruments to implement an instrumental variables model.217  
To test the arguments in this research, it is important that the direction of the 
effects of the variables be estimated as accurately as possible; the magnitude of the 
coefficients is of secondary importance. For the purposes of this research, excluding 
the features of the agreement carries the risk of replacing endogeneity problems for 
omitted variables, which can affect the direction and significance of the results (King, 
Keohane, and Verba, 1994). On the other hand, maintaining the endogenous 
variables in the models generates biased estimates. Therefore, as in recent studies 
which face related concerns, 218  this research adopts a cross-sectional estimation 
using OLS219 with robust standard errors220 to estimate the following equations,221 
where the intensive and extensive margins are the dependent variables in equations 
(1) and (2), respectively, and each is one of the control variables in the other equation. 
The dyads are formed by the main country i (where i = 1, 2… ni for country i) and the 
                                                        
217 Avoiding the use of weak instrumental variables is a usual recommendation in literature 
(e.g. Baier and Bergstrand, 2007; Neumayer and De Soysa, 2012) because when instruments 
are many and are too weak the estimator is most biased (Angrist, Pischke, Jörn-Steffen, 
Kindle Locations 3465-3468). Based in Wooldridge (2010), to correctly use instrumental 
variables in this research, it would be necessary to identify instruments that are a good 
predictor of deep integration in one margin, and that are theoretically uncorrelated with the 
error term of deep integration in the other margin. In addition, the instrumental variables 
must be strongly partially correlated with the independent endogenous variable, and have 
only an indirect effect (through the instrumental variable) on the dependent variable. 
218  For example, Kucik’s (2012) study about flexibility of trade agreements faces similar 
dilemmas. The author acknowledges possibilities of unaccounted variables as there is no 
measure for rigidity in the study. In this case it is not possible to use instrumental variables 
for the co-determined rigidity. The chosen method of estimation is also OLS to assess 
separately only flexibility. This approach is not exclusive to the study of trade agreements. 
Neumayer and De Soysa (2012) also include several dependent variables which measure 
different aspects of child-labour, facing potential endogeneity of one of their main 
independent variables, foreign direct investment. The authors estimate the analysis using 
OLS with robust standard errors for each of their dependent variables separately. 
219  Chase (2008: 520) suggests the use of a censored regression model (Tobit model) to 
analyse the limited dependent variables, such as a measure of the restrictiveness of rules of 
origin in NAFTA. The author explains that the models were not estimated in Probit because 
rules of origin in NAFTA is not measured by integer values. This research follows the 
recommendation of Angrist, Pischke, and Jörn-Steffen (2008: Kindle edition: 1862-6582) 
whom suggest the use of OLS regression models, even in the presence of limited dependent 
variables, to improve the interpretation of the results. In this research, there were no 
differences in the results of the analyses using censored regression models relative to the 
results obtained from using of OLS regression models. 
220 Robust standard errors are also clustered bypair of countries forming a dyad. 
221 The equations are estimated using SPSS and Stata 12. In all variables where a logarithmic 
transformation is performed and the value of the variable is 0, 0.001 is added to the original 
value to retain all observations. 
EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF THE ARGUMENTS
 
 
188 
trade partner j (where j = 1, 2… nj for country j). The coefficients α1 and α2 are 
constants, and ε1 and ε2 are the error terms. 
 
Intensive = α1 + β1AccessPointswithVetoi + β5Concentrationi + β7Concentration and 
AccessPointswithVeto + Independent Variables + ControlVariables+ ε1 (1) 
 
Extensive = α1 +β3AccessPointswithoutVetoi + β5Concentrationi + β7Concentration 
and AccessPointswithVeto + Independent Variables + ControlVariables+ ε1 (2) 
 
Based on the arguments developed in Chapters 5, 6, and 7, when performing a 
multivariate regression analysis for equation (1), the expectations are to obtain 
positive values for the interaction effect between the number of veto players and the 
export sector (de)concentration in the main country. That is, the more concentrated 
the export sector, the more the negative effect of larger numbers of veto players over 
the intensive margin decreases. For equation (2), the expectations are to obtain 
negative values for the interaction effect between the number of access points without 
veto power and for export sector (de)concentration in the main country. This is, the 
larger the number of access points without veto power and the more concentrated the 
export sector, the lower the level of deep integration at the extensive margin.222 The 
next section discusses the operationalization of the dependent variables, main 
explanatory variables, and independent and control variables. 
Dependent variables 
As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, when analysing deep integration in international 
trade agreements, the intensive and extensive margins are differentiated. 223  The 
                                                        
222 Vogt, Vogt, Gardner, and Haeffele (2014: 242) claim that a probability based approach is 
inappropriate in studies over populations because these studies do not employ random 
sampling or random assignment. The authors warn that the use of inferential statistics when 
studying populations is common, although it is erroneous. They suggest reporting p-values 
and other measures, when studying populations, keeping in mind that said measures have 
almost null value. This research follows the suggestion of the authors. 
223 At the intensive margin, type of agreement, decision power, legitimacy, and permanency, 
and institutional capacities were included. At the extensive margin, coverage of non-trade 
barriers, technical barriers, services, competition, public procurement, trade remedies, and 
enforcement and support mechanisms for certain trade areas were included. The existence of 
substantive provisions on intellectual property, investment, and labour and environment 
were also coded. Other features, such as choice of developed or developing partners, 
bargaining strategy, number of member, and tariff phasing out period were also coded. 
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intensive margin refers to a relatively more vertical dimension at the trade-agreement 
level. These provisions tend to be less excludable than horizontal provisions. In 
Chapter 4, this variable is measured using a factor-based sum score of the depth of 
provisions in each relevant area in the trade agreement signed by the two countries. 
The score’s range is [0,3], where the lowest and highest values correspond to the 
minimum and maximum levels of deep integration at the intensive margin, 
respectively. Accordingly, an agreement with the lowest score is a free trade 
agreement with no additional substantive commitments with respect to the intensive 
margin. The maximum level of integration at the intensive margin is achieved by a 
customs union, which must also have the deepest provisions as regards decision 
power, institutional capacities, legitimacy, and permanency. 
The extensive margin refers to the horizontal dimension of depth, which includes 
the coverage and scope of discipline-level provisions. Economic benefits are more 
specific to particular industries and are therefore more excludable than benefits 
corresponding to the intensive margin. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, to measure 
this variable, factor-based sum scores of the depth of provisions in each relevant area 
in the trade agreement signed by the two countries were built. The score’s range is 
[0,3], where the lowest and highest values correspond to the minimum and 
maximum levels of deep integration at the extensive margin, respectively. An 
agreement with a score of zero is a trade agreement with no substantive commitments 
with respect to the extensive margin. The maximum degree of the extensive margin 
is achieved by an agreement which also has the deepest coverage and discipline-level 
mechanisms to support the liberalization of services, public procurement, technical 
barriers to trade, and competition policies. Also, the deepest provisions in the 
removal of barriers to governments’ capacity to impose contingent measures such as 
antidumping and countervailing duties and global and bilateral safeguards. 
Main explanatory variables 
Concentration of export interests 
The variables Concentrationi and Concentrationj aim to capture the 
(de)concentration of the export sector in the countries that form a dyad in a trade 
agreement. As discussed in Chapter 5, countries with de-concentrated export sectors 
are more likely to have a larger number of small and medium exporters than 
countries with more concentrated export sectors. These exporters obtain concrete 
economic benefits from static gains from liberalization at the extensive margin rather 
EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF THE ARGUMENTS
 
 
190 
than from uncertain benefits from liberalization at the intensive margin. On the other 
hand, in more concentrated export sectors, it is more likely that a few specialized 
resourceful exporters exist. These types of exporters benefit from static gains, the 
reduction of costs, and increased output in their production processes. These 
specialized exporters obtain economic benefits from dynamic gains from trade 
consequent to liberalization at the extensive margin. Because the scale and 
internationalized organization of their production requires coordination and 
certainty, these producers also derive economic benefits from integration at the 
intensive margin. From the perspective of preferences derived from economic 
benefits, maintaining everything else constant, the expectations are that countries 
with more concentrated export sectors are associated with agreements with deeper 
intensive and extensive margins than countries with more de-concentrated export 
sectors. 
As discussed in Chapter 7, groups of specialized, concentrated, and resourceful 
exporters are more likely to have to overcome fewer obstacles than groups of small 
and medium exporters to mobilize towards deep integration in their areas of interest 
at the intensive and extensive margins. From the perspective of collective action, 
considering only the capacity of mobilization derived from the characteristics of the 
groups, the expectations are that countries with more concentrated export sectors are 
associated with trade agreements with deeper extensive and intensive margins than 
countries with more de-concentrated export sectors. Additional information 
regarding how the political institutional setting influences the costs of mobilization 
of export oriented producers is taken into account in the next subsections. 
The Hirschman–Herfindahl index is the most commonly used indicator of 
export concentration. 224  However, based on the work of Parteka (2010), Samen 
(2010), and Cadot, Carrère, and Strauss-Kahn (2011), for the purposes of this 
research, the use of the export diversification/concentration index 225  is more 
appropriate than the use of the Hirschman–Herfindahl index. Three aspects are 
                                                        
224 The Hirschman–Herfindahl index adds the squared shares of each product relative to the 
total of exported products. The range of the index is [0,1], where the largest values reflect the 
highest levels of concentration. Data was compiled from the UNCTAD TRAINS database 
(World Bank, 2014b). 
225  The export diversification/concentration index is a measure related to the Hirschman 
Herfindahl index. The export diversification/concentration index is an adaptation of the 
Finger-Kreinin index (1979) which measures similarity in trade. The index is defined as the 
share of commodity i in the total exports of country j (hij), discounting the share of the 
commodity in world exports (hi), divided into two: DXj = (sum |hij – hi|)/2 (Amjadi, Schuler, 
Kuwahara, and Quadros, 2011). Data was compiled from the UNCTAD TRAINS database 
(World Bank, 2014b). 
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relevant for selecting the export diversification/concentration index. First, larger 
values of the index reflect larger deviations of a country’s export structure relative to 
the world’s average structure. While the export diversification/concentration index 
considers as a reference the average structure of world production, the Hirschman–
Herfindahl index measures export concentration regardless of how it compares to 
other countries’ export structures (Parteka, 2010). The range of both indexes is [0,1]. 
The export diversification/concentration index’s lowest value reflects an export 
structure identical to the world’s average structure. The interpretation of the largest 
values of this index is not unified across academic studies, the differences in 
interpretation seem to reflect different underlying conceptualizations of 
diversification.226 Second, large values also reflect that exports tend to have relatively 
low international demand (Bernatonyte, 2011). Third, large values also are a sign that 
the exports also tend to be specialized. Because of these characteristics, the index also 
provides insight into a country’s export dependence on specific products considering 
world exports. A possible implication that is relevant for this research is that 
exporters of products on which a country is highly dependent may have more power 
than if they were exporters in a country with an export structure identical to the 
world’s average structure. The Hirschman–Herfindahl index is included when 
assessing the robustness of the statistical results in the third section of this chapter, 
and further details about its construction are provided there. 
Veto players 
Empirical studies about trade agreements have analysed the role of veto players in 
the formation of trade agreements. Previous studies (e.g. Mansfield, Milner, and 
Pevehouse, 2007: 416-417; Baccini, Dür, and Elsig, 2012a) have taken into 
consideration the role of veto players in the extent of liberalization in different 
aspects of a trade agreement, such as the type of agreement and provisions related to 
flexibility and obligations. Consistent with these studies, in this research, the 
inclusion of the effective number of veto players in the models has the objective of 
capturing the influence of the extent and alignment of institutions with veto power 
over the extent of deep integration in trade agreements. According to Chapter 6, as 
the effective number of veto players increases, the possibility that a larger number of 
                                                        
226 Scholars interpret differently high values of the export diversification/concentration index. 
Samen (2010) considers that because high values reflect large deviations of the world average 
export structure, this reflects a more diversified export structure relative to the world’s 
structure. Contrastingly, Bernatonyte (2011) considers that because high values reflect a more 
specialized structure relative to the world structure, this reflects a less diversified export 
structure relative to the world’s structure. 
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the constituents of the veto players are threatened by deep integration also increases. 
Therefore, maintaining everything else constant, from the perspective of veto player 
theory, the expectations are that countries with fewer veto players are associated with 
trade agreements with deeper integration than countries with numerous veto players. 
The specific effects on the intensive and extensive margins remain analytically 
unclear. However, as argued in Chapter 7, in the presence of resourceful concentrated 
exporters, it is possible that veto players are captured by such concentrated exporters. 
In this situation, it would be possible to achieve greater depth in trade agreements. 
Therefore, the interaction effect between the export concentration and the number of 
effective veto players over deep integration is expected to be positive, particularly at 
the intensive margin. 
The measure of veto players used in this research is inspired by Henisz’s (2002) 
veto players index;227 it accounts for the specific veto players that are relevant for the 
designed depth in trade agreements. In this research, the variables Veto Playersi and 
Veto Playersj are additive measures of the effective number of veto gates in a system 
within the range [0,4].228 The lowest score corresponds to a hypothetical situation in 
which there are no effective veto players, while the highest score corresponds to the 
case of a presidential system with two non-aligned legislative chambers which 
balance the executive’s power. Henisz’s veto players index has been used in most 
studies which account for the effect of veto players on trade agreements (e.g. 
Mansfield, Milner, and Pevehouse, 2007; Baccini, Dür, and Elsig, 2012a; Peterson 
and Thies, 2012) because it has several advantages, as pointed out by Mansfield, 
Milner, and Pevehouse (2007: 417).229 These include comparability across countries 
and focus on one policy dimension (which is appropriate for studies of trade 
agreements since they focus on trade policy as the policy dimension); it also allows 
                                                        
227 Henisz’s (2002) index accounts for the constraints to change public policies by measuring 
the branches of government outside the control of the executive, their alignment to the 
executive’s party, and their heterogeneity/homogeneity of preferences.  
228 The measure for veto players is calculated using an arbitrary scale which assigns the value 
of one to parliamentary systems and the value of two to presidential systems. An additional 
unit is assigned to non-aligned unicameral legislatures, and two additional units are assigned 
to non-aligned bicameral legislatures. Primary data to calculate this variable was taken from 
the Polity IV Project (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr, 2011). Missing data were completed based 
0n the relevant country reports from the Economist Intelligence Unit. 
229 Mansfield, Milner, and Pevehouse (2007) claim that, in the cases where samples overlap, 
there is substantive agreement between Henisz’s (2002) veto players index and the other 
measures of veto players developed in literature (e.g. Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, and Walsh, 
2001). The latter are based on aspects of political systems, such as electoral rules, electoral 
competition, and partisan differences. 
EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF THE ARGUMENTS
 
 
193 
the preferences of the veto players to vary in the space (from protectionist to free 
trade in the case of trade agreements). 
However, for the purposes of this research, it is unclear whether a measure of 
veto players for trade agreements should be the same as that for one applicable to 
other policies. First, the establishment and negotiation of trade agreements is the 
purview of two branches of government, the executive and legislative branches, and 
there is no theoretical justification for incorporating other branches of government 
that may be relevant for other policy areas. Second, some trade agreements require 
different ratification/approval processes than other policies. For example, some 
agreements require only executive approval, while others require ratification. In 
addition, to focus on the interaction between particular institutional features as 
mediators of economic interests in their demand for depth at the intensive and 
extensive margins, it is more appropriate to limit the scope to avoid capturing the 
influence of other institutions and policies. The objective is to isolate, as much as 
possible, the relevant institutions from their surrounding complexity. 
Access points without veto power  
In Chapter 6, access points without veto power were defined as actors that cannot 
block policy change, although they can still affect the magnitude and direction of 
policy change (Ehrlich, 2007, 2011). The executive and legislative branches are the 
individual and collective veto players, respectively. It was also argued that within the 
legislature, political parties are access points, which can also influence the extent of 
integration without having veto power. As the effective numbers of parties increase, 
access becomes cheaper and more affordable for protectionist groups. The 
expectations in Chapter 7 were that, maintaining everything else constant and 
considering the mobilization dynamics of interest groups, more access points without 
veto power may be captured by average protectionist groups, and therefore export 
oriented producers may see their lobbying advantages reduced. 
It is also expected that this negative effect will be magnified when the export 
sector is highly concentrated. In this situation, it is more difficult to achieve greater 
depth in trade agreements at both margins, and particularly at the extensive margin. 
The reason is that, as discussed in Chapters 3, 5, and 7, at the extensive margin, 
benefits are more easily appropriable than at the intensive margin. Therefore, 
concentrated exporters can be more selective than at the intensive margin regarding 
the provisions that they require, and no clear incentives exist to invest resources in 
lobbying for the removal of barriers which do not directly affect their production 
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processes. Therefore, the interaction effect of export concentration and access points 
over deep integration is expected to be negative, particularly at the extensive margin. 
Empirical studies in comparative politics literature usually account for the 
number of parties in the legislature using one of two measures: the effective number 
of parties index and the Hirschman–Herfindahl index of party fragmentation.230 
These two measures account for the relative weights of the parties. Larger values 
reflect higher and lower party fractionalization in the effective number of parties 
index and in the Hirschman–Herfindahl index of parties, respectively. The variables 
Access points without vetoi and Access points without vetoj measure the number of 
access points without veto power that have influence over deep integration.231 To 
limit the problems derived from the two indexes resulting from similar but inverse 
formulas, the effective number of parties index is based on proportions of seats, and 
the Hirschman–Herfindahl index of parties is based on proportions of votes. In 
addition, the two measures were compiled or calculated from different datasets. 
Independent and control variables 
The empirical analyses include a number of variables that were considered in 
previous studies relevant to the formation of or to specific features of trade 
agreements. Few studies have considered features and characteristics of the trade 
agreement as dependent variables. Among these, the studies by Mansfield, Milner, 
and Pevehouse (2007: 418) and Mansfield, and Milner (2012) are comprehensive in 
terms of the independent and control variables included. Below, the possible effects 
                                                        
230 The Hirschman–Herfindahl index of party fragmentation (or Government Hirschman–
Herfindahl index) is calculated using the following formula: HIG=∑ (pi2). The effective 
number of parties index, developed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979), is calculated using the 
following formula ENP=1/[∑ (pi2)]. In both cases, p is the party, and i its seat/vote share in 
the legislature. Literature about party fragmentation uses versions of the Hirschman–
Herfindahl index of party fragmentation (e.g. Rae, 1971; Taylor and Herman, 1971), and of the 
effective number of parties (e.g. Laakso, Taagepera, 1979; Schiavon, 2001). Dalton (2008) 
reviews the measures of party fragmentation and suggests alternative ones. 
231 For the main analyses in this research, the variables Access points without vetoi and Access 
points without vetoj are calculated by using the logarithmic transformations of the effective 
number of parties index in the lower or single house of the main country and its partner in 
each dyad, respectively. Because the effective number of parties is highly correlated with the 
existence of divided (or unified) governments, this research follows other studies (e.g. Jones, 
1995; Schiavon, 2001) in which the latter is not included in the explanatory models that 
include party fragmentation. Data about the effective number of parties index was generously 
provided by Schiavon (2001). Primary data to calculate the The Hirschman–Herfindahl index 
of party fragmentation was taken from the Polity IV Project (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr, 
2011). Missing data were compiled from the relevant country reports of the Economist 
Intelligence Unit. 
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of most of these variables are discussed, in addition to the possible effects of other 
variables considered appropriate to this specific research. 
Political and economic conditions and relations 
Similar political preferences and political relations may create incentives for 
countries to seek membership together in a trade agreement (Mansfield, Milner, and 
Pevehouse, 2007: 420). Such preferences and relations may also influence the depth 
of trade agreements and should therefore be taken into account. Democracyi and 
Democracyj are essential control variables to ensure that the variables intended to 
measure the numbers of effective veto players and access points without veto power 
are not just capturing the general features of democratic regimes. 232 In previous 
studies (e.g. Henisz, 2000; Jensen, 2003), scholars considered domestic institutional 
constraints on the executive branch to give more credibility to commitments made to 
multinational enterprises. Other analyses (Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff, 2002) 
have found that democratic regimes are more likely to enter into trade agreements 
with other democracies. Expectations, therefore, are not straightforward, as less 
democratic governments may prefer deeper agreements to counterbalance their lack 
of credibility. On the other hand, countries with similar democratic levels are likely 
to share close preferences, which may facilitate the achievement of deep agreements. 
The variable North/South partner aims to capture the economic development 
asymmetry of the dyad. In literature about international agreements (e.g. Poulsen, 
2010), it is widely acknowledged that North–South agreements tend to be 
qualitatively different to South–South and North–North agreements. Because 
economic asymmetry increases the possibilities for countries with high economic 
power to extract deeper concessions in their preferred areas, North–South partners 
may achieve more profound agreements than South–South partners. Therefore, the 
analyses include a dummy variable that takes a value of zero in the case of North–
South agreements and one for South–South agreements.233 The robustness analyses 
                                                        
232 To control for the level of democratization in the countries forming each dyad, this research 
uses the logarithmic transformation of the democracy indicator from the Polity IV Project 
(Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr, 2011). This indicator is an additive eleven-point scale within the 
range [0,1] where the lowest and highest values correspond to the least democratic states and 
the most democratic ones, respectively. The indicator measures the level of democracy in a 
country by taking into account the following aspects: competitiveness of political participation, 
openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief 
executive (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr, 2011: 15).  
233 Members of a trade agreement are coded as belonging to the South or North based on the 
income classification of the World Bank (2014a). Countries with high income are coded as 
North, and countries with medium and low income are coded as South. The World Bank 
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include the income gap (irrespective of the development level of the partners) and the 
income levels in each country, both separately and taken together. 
Military conflicts, political alliances, and former colonial relationships have also 
been included in previous studies (e.g. Gowa, 1994; Mansfield, Milner, and 
Pevehouse, 2007), as indicators of dissimilar and similar preferences. The variable 
Allianceij takes a value of one if the countries in the dyad have been involved in a 
military alliance 234  in the year prior to the signing of the agreement and zero 
otherwise. There is empirical evidence (Baccini, Dür, and Elsig, 2012a) that countries 
may be more likely to reach agreements with more obligations with partners with 
which cooperation is already in place. Therefore, a measure for joint membership in 
non-economic organizations is calculated and included in the robustness analyses. 
None of the countries in the sample was involved in a serious military dispute from 
1982 to 2010.235  In addition, none of the countries in the sample had a colonial 
relationship that ended after the World War II. Therefore, the variables Military 
Hostilitiesij and Colonial Relationshipsij are not included in the empirical analysis. 
Systemic and international conditions 
According to theories of hegemonic stability, the decline of hegemonic power in the 
international system may create incentives for countries to join trade agreements 
(Bhagwati, 1993; De Melo and Panagariya, 1993; Krugman, 1993; Mansfield, Milner, 
and Pevehouse, 2007: 424; Mansfield, 1998). It is then also likely that lower values 
for the variable Hegemonic power236 are associated with increasing levels of depth in 
such trade agreements. This variable has the same value for all countries in a given 
year. In a related line of thought, scholars (Mansfield and Reinhardt, 2003; 
Mansfield, Milner, and Pevehouse, 2007: 420) have suggested that member states of 
the GATT/WTO may prefer joining also alternative agreements more than non-
                                                        
classifies countries according to their GNI per capita (2011): $1, 025 or less; lower middle 
income, $1, 026-$4, 035; upper middle income, $4, 036-$12, 475; and high income, $12, 476 
or more.  
234 Data about political alliances were taken from the Correlates of War Project (Gibler and 
Sarkees, 2004). Information about missing years and countries were compiled from the 
relevant country reports of the Economist Intelligence Unit. 
235 According to the Militarized Interstate Dispute Database (Bremer and J. David Singer, 
1996; Faten and Palmer, 2003); and the Economist Intelligence Unit Country reports for 
countries and years not included in the databases. 
236 The variable Hegemonic power is calculated by averaging the GDP per capita produced by 
US, the state with the largest GDP, and then subtracting the average from the GDP per capita 
produced during the year previous to the signature of the agreement. Primary data to calculate 
this variable was compiled from the World Development Indicators database (World Bank, 
2014c). 
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member states. Members of the organization are expected to establish more 
minilateral and bilateral trade agreements than non-members. In addition, member 
countries have access to alternative provisions that may act as incentives to increase 
the flexibility of the agreements (Baccini, Dür, and Elsig, 2012a). Although 
membership in the GATT/WTO is considered an important variable, it is not included 
in the analysis because all Latin American countries in the study were already 
members of the organization before 1982. Geographic distance, language differences, 
and competition are also included in the robustness analyses. Geographic distance 
and language differences have traditionally been considered to increase transaction 
costs of forming trade agreements (Baccini, Dür, and Elsig, 2012a). Competition is 
included because countries are likely to take into consideration trade agreements 
signed by their competitors because of strategic interaction (Fernandez and Portes, 
1998; Mansfield, Milner, and Pevehouse, 2007; Baccini, Dür, and Elsig, 2012a). 
Details about the construction of these variables are provided in the section on the 
robustness analysis. 
Other features of the agreements 
To control that margins of deep integration do not just capture the effects of other 
features of a trade agreement, the following variables are included in the analysis. 
The variables Investment, Labour/environment, and Intellectual property are 
dummy variables with a value of one when the agreement includes such provisions 
and zero otherwise. Although these features are not directly classified as aspects of 
international trade (Hicks and Kim, 2010), and may or may not be approved at the 
time of the agreement, their inclusion is often decided before negotiations about 
trade provisions begin. Tariff phasing237 is also coded and included to capture part 
of the variation in shallow liberalization, as it may influence the extent of deep 
integration that an agreement may reach (WTO, 2011). 
The variable Bargaining position captures the degree of control that countries 
have over the negotiating process on an arbitrary scale from one to four; it increases 
as the complexity of negotiating an agreement increases from bilateral to hub–spoke 
to spoke–hub to plurilateral schemes. In the same line of thought, the variable 
                                                        
237 Tariff Phasing does not capture the speed of tariff liberalization; it captures the longest 
time of adjustment given to an issue or a group of issues. To measure this variable, in this 
research the maximum length of the phasing out period for each country in a dyad was coded. 
The minimum value is zero, when all tariffs are liberalized at the moment of entry into force, 
and the maximum value is twenty years. This variable is re-scaled to be within the range[0,1]. 
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Number of previous agreements238  captures the number of previous agreements 
signed by a country. More previous agreements may facilitate achieving depth in the 
new ones because of previous experience. Nevertheless, it is also possible that 
because countries have limited resources, countries that have signed a large number 
of agreements have limitations in entering into new deep agreements. Finally, 
consistent with previous studies about the role of veto players in the formation of 
trade agreements (Mansfield, Milner, and Pevehouse, 2007), the dummy variable 
European Union239 is included to control for specific influences of the large number 
of members (and their particular characteristics) in agreements signed with the 
European Union. Although Bargaining Position and European Union may indirectly 
capture the effect of number of members in a trade agreement, there is empirical 
evidence (Gilligan, 2004; Baccini, Dür, and Elsig, 2012a) that the number of 
members has an indirect negative effect on the scope in a trade agreement. For this 
reason, it is included and discussed in the robustness analyses. 
  
                                                        
238  The variable Number of Previous Agreements is calculated as the square root 
transformation of the total of previous preferential trade agreements that a country has signed 
from 1982 to the previous year to the one in which the agreement is signed. 
239 The dummy variable European Union takes the value of one in all dyads where one of the 
members of a dyad is a member of the European Union; and the value of zero in the rest of 
the dyads. 
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Intensive and extensive margins: results and discussion 
This section begins by presenting the results for the analyses of the intensive and 
extensive margins. The descriptive statistics of the dependent, independent, and 
control variables can be found in Appendix E. Tables 8.1 and 8.2 below show the 
results of the empirical analyses for the intensive and extensive margins, respectively. 
The findings generally tend to support the conditional hypotheses presented 
previously, and are generally in line with their constitutive hypotheses. In addition, 
the statistically significant variables (with a 95% to a 99% degree of confidence) have 
the expected sign. As discussed in the previous section, factors that are likely to 
underlie the differences in preferences and capacities to establish agreements with 
varying extents of extensive and intensive margins between countries were held 
constant. In this way, it is possible to improve confidence about the effect of the main 
variables and the interactions studied. The main objective is to assess the influence 
of the particular aspects of domestic politics in each margin, identified in Chapters 5, 
6, and 7. 
Throughout the empirical analysis, four main models are assessed. The first two 
are restricted models which include the variables which, according to the previous 
section, are considered most relevant for each margin: veto players and their 
interaction with concentration are only included in the models that assess the 
intensive margin, while access points without veto power and their interaction with 
concentration are only included in the models that assess the extensive margin. In 
the robustness analyses section, veto players and their interaction with concentration 
are included in the model that evaluates the extensive margin, while access points 
without veto power and their interaction with concentration are included in the 
model that evaluates the extensive margin. As mentioned before in this chapter and 
in Chapters 3 and 4, both dependent variables measure margins of the same 
analytical concept, and for this reason, the rest of the independent and control 
variables included are the same.  
The second and third models are extended versions that include the variables 
Democracyi and Democracyj, which are essential control variables to ensure that the 
variables intended to measure the numbers of effective veto players and access points 
without veto power do not just capture the general features of democratic regimes. 
The fact that the coefficients for the interactions and most of the simple effects 
remain statistically significant (with a 95% to a 99% degree of confidence) and have 
the expected direction in the four models increases confidence in the results 
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presented in Tables 8.1 and 8.2 below. In the last sub-section, the results of the 
robustness tests are presented and discussed. 
Table 8-1 Deep integration at the intensive margin 
Variable Extended Model Restricted Model 
Veto playersi 
-0.15 
(0.14) 
-0.18 
(0.12) 
Veto playersj 
0.15*** 
(0.04) 
0.14*** 
(0.0320797) 
Concentrationi 
-0.98 
(0.58) 
-0.71 
(0.52) 
Concentrationj 
0.27 
(0.18) 
0.62*** 
(0.15) 
Veto playersi and Concentrationi 
0.59*** 
(0.25) 
0.61*** 
(0.21) 
Democracyi 
-0.26 
(0.13)  
Democracyj 
-0.32** 
(0.13)  
Investment 
0.22** 
(0.08) 
0.30*** 
(0.07) 
Intellectual property 
-0.13 
(0.07) 
-0.07 
(0.07) 
Labour 
0.20 
(0.15) 
0.09 
(0.14) 
Number of previous agreements 
-0.10*** 
(0.03) 
-0.09*** 
(0.02) 
European Union agreements 
-0.07 
(0.09) 
0.01 
(0.09) 
Bargaining position 
0.13*** 
(0.03) 
0.13*** 
(0.03) 
North/South partner 
0.23 
(0.16) 
0.01 
(0.13) 
Hegemonic power 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Political alliance 
-0.52*** 
(0.14) 
-0.4177785*** 
(0.1354587) 
Tariff phasing 
-0.07 
(0.12) 
-0.1321584 
(0.0895936) 
Extensive margin 
0.10 
(0.06) 
0.06 
(0.06) 
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Variable Extended Model Restricted Model 
Constant 
1.41*** 
(0.45) 
0.90** 
(0.44) 
Observations 218 256 
R-squared 0.40 0.39 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
*** p ≤ 0.01, ** p ≤ 0.05, * p ≤ 0.1 
 
Table 8-2 Deep integration at the extensive margin 
Variable Extended Model Restricted Model 
Access points without vetoi 
1.29** 
(0.64) 
0.91 
(0.59) 
Access points without vetoj 
-0.50*** 
(0.16) 
-0.54*** 
(0.14) 
Concentrationi 
1.86*** 
(0.59) 
1.61*** 
(0.54) 
Concentrationj 
0.61** 
(0.24) 
0.52** 
(0.21) 
Access points without vetoi and 
Concentrationi 
-2.75*** 
(1.06) 
-2.31*** 
(0.97) 
Democracyi 
0.20 
(0.12)  
Democracyj 
0.23 
(0.12)  
Investment 
0.21 
(0.12) 
0.02 
(0.10) 
Intellectual property 
0.57*** 
(0.11) 
0.70*** 
(0.09) 
Labour 
0.25 
(0.13) 
0.38** 
(0.15) 
Number of previous agreements 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
European Union agreements 
0.29 
(0.15) 
-0.03 
(0.12) 
Bargaining position 
-0.13*** 
(0.04) 
-0.13*** 
(0.04) 
North/South partner 
-0.44*** 
(0.13) 
-0.29** 
(0.11) 
Hegemonic power 
0.01** 
(0.01) 
0.01*** 
(0.01) 
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Variable Extended Model Restricted Model 
Political alliance 
0.41** 
(0.13) 
0.17 
(0.13) 
Tariff phasing 
0.13 
(0.12) 
0.37*** 
(0.10) 
Intensive margin 
0.21*** 
(0.07) 
0.16** 
(0.07) 
Constant 
-0.82 
(0.43) 
-0.21 
(0.38) 
Observations 218 256 
R-squared 0.64 0.63 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
*** p ≤ 0.01, ** p ≤ 0.05, * p ≤ 0.1 
Main variables: Export (de)concentration, veto players, and 
access points without veto power  
Intensive margin 
First, for the intensive margin, the unstandardized coefficient estimate of the 
interaction between Concentrationi and Veto playersi is positive and statistically 
significant (with a 99% degree of confidence), and is the second largest in the model. 
For a 10% increase in the interaction between Concentrationi and Veto playersi, the 
differences in the expected levels of deep integration at the intensive margin are  
approximately 22 per cent in the extended model (0.66 units) and in the restricted 
model (0.68 units). Consistently with the theoretical predictions, when the 
concentration of the export sector increases, the negative simple effect of the effective 
number of veto players decreases. This effect is represented in Figure 8.1, where, in 
the presence of highly concentrated export sectors, the negative effect of an increased 
number of veto players decreases. As a result, for countries with more concentrated 
export sectors, it is possible to achieve higher scores on the deep integration at the 
intensive margin of their agreements relative to countries with more de-concentrated 
export sectors. The simple effects of the variables Concentrationi and Veto playersi 
are non-statistically significant, although Veto playersi shows the expected negative 
sign. 
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Figure 8-1 Interaction effect of the number of veto players and the 
diversification/concentration index over the predicted values of depth at the 
intensive margin 
 
The results are consistent with the argument in Chapter 6 that it is easier for the 
exporters in the most concentrated export sectors (often specialized exporters with 
scale economies or exporters that are engaged in fragmented production) to capture 
the veto players than for the exporters in most de-concentrated export sectors. 
Furthermore, as access points, veto players may also compete for rents from 
lobbying. From this perspective, exporters in concentrated export sectors seem better 
able to influence the design of trade agreements towards their preferred outcomes 
(which, as discussed in Chapter 4, are trade agreements with deep integration in their 
intensive margins). 
Regarding the controls for the partner country, the coefficient of Concentrationj 
is positive and statistically significant (with a 99% degree of confidence) only in the 
restricted model. As shown in Table 8.1, an increase of the variable by one unit 
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increases the expected intensive margin in a trade agreement by 20 per cent (0.62 
units). Concentrated export interests in partner countries may also pressure their 
own governments for more profound intensive margins in trade agreements because 
this may provide them with a relatively more secure environment in which to pursue 
dynamic gains from trade associated with production. On the other hand, the variable 
Veto Playersj is positive and statistically significant (with a 99% degree of confidence) 
in both models. An additional effective veto player in the partner country increases 
the intensive margin in a trade agreement by approximately five per cent in the 
extended model (0.15 units) and in the restricted one (0.14 units). A possible 
explanation is given by the Schelling conjecture, according to which domestic 
constraints give an advantage to international negotiators. These results are also 
consistent with the arguments presented in Chapter 5. Political systems with a larger 
number of effective veto players are more likely to cover larger constituencies than 
systems with lower numbers of effective veto players. Therefore, in the first case, 
partner countries may pressure their counterparts towards higher levels of deep 
integration in their intensive margins, as this brings to their own constituents higher 
levels of certainty and better guarantees of security in their trade exchanges. 
An interesting result is that, consistent with the arguments in Chapter 7, the 
interaction effect between Concentrationi and Acces points without vetoi is non-
statistically significant when included in the model of deep integration at the 
intensive margin in the robustness section. Two aspects that are also considered 
when performing the robustness checks are the results of re-estimating the models 
using different calculations of veto players and of (de)concentration of the export 
sector. The main results of the analyses in the robustness section are consistent with 
those reported above. 
Extensive margin 
In the case of the extensive margin, the results of the coefficient of the main variables 
are also reasonably consistent with the arguments and hypotheses developed in 
Chapters 5, 6, and 7. The unstandardized coefficient estimate of the interaction 
Concentrationi and Access points without vetoi is negative and statistically 
significant (with a 99% degree of confidence), and is the largest in the model. For a 
10% increase in the interaction between Concentrationi and Access points without 
vetoi, the decreases in the expected mean levels of deep integration at the extensive 
margin are approximately 90 per cent in the extended (2.75 units) and in the 
restricted (2.5 units) models. This result indicates that the simple positive effect of a 
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highly concentrated export sector in a country tends to decrease as the number of 
access points without veto power in the country increases. This effect is represented 
in Figure 8.2. As argued in Chapter 7, when more access points without veto power 
exist, they are more likely to be captured by protectionist producers, than when fewer 
of them exist, decreasing deep integration at the extensive margin. More access 
points without veto power may reduce the costs of lobbying, decreasing the advantage 
of exporters in more concentrated export sectors in capturing those access points. 
Because these access points are more likely to be captured by protectionist interests, 
they are able to influence the extent of deep integration of the trade agreement 
towards their preferred outcome. All else equal, the result is that when numerous 
access points exist in a country with a highly concentrated export sector, trade 
agreements will tend to have relatively lower levels of deep integration at their 
extensive margins. 
Figure 8-2 Interaction effect of the number of access points above and below 
the mean and the diversification/concentration index over the predicted 
depth at the extensive margin 
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Taking into account the negative effect of the interaction between Concentrationi 
and Access points without vetoi, the simple effects of these constitutive variables are 
also generally in line with the arguments and hypotheses presented in Chapters 6 and 
7. When Access points without vetoi, are at their minimum, the simple effect of 
Concentrationi is positive, large, and statistically significant (with a 99% degree of 
confidence) in both the extended and restricted models. On the other hand, when the 
export sector is the most de-concentrated, the simple effect of the variable Access 
points without vetoi is positive in both the extended and the restricted model. 
However, this variable is only statistically significant (with a 95% degree of 
confidence) in the extended model, which includes controls for the level of democracy 
in the main and partner countries.  
The coefficients of the control variables of the (de)concentration of the export 
sector and access points without veto power in the partner country also tend to be 
congruent with the arguments presented previously. Concentrationj, is positive and 
statistically significant (with a 95% degree of confidence) in both models. As shown 
in Table 8.2, a one-unit increase of the variable increases the intensive margin in a 
trade agreement by approximately 20 per cent (0.61 units) in the extended model and 
by approximately 17 per cent (0.52 units) in the restricted model. As argued in 
Chapter 5, exporters in more concentrated export sectors tend to be more specialized 
and may prefer more profound intensive and extensive margins of deep integration 
in trade agreements. The reason is that this may provide their exporters with larger 
gains from trade in the form of reductions in their marginal costs of production. On 
the other hand, the effect of Access points without vetoj is negative and statistically 
significant (with a 99% degree of confidence) in the extended and restricted models. 
For a 10% increase in the variable Access points without vetoj, the decrease in the 
expected average levels of deep integration at the extensive margin is approximately 
18 per cent (0.55 units) in the extended model, and approximately 20 per cent (0.60 
units) in the restricted one. 
It is also interesting to note that the interaction effect between Concentrationi 
and Veto playersi is non-statistically significant when included in the model of deep 
integration at the extensive margin in the robustness section. This result is consistent 
with the arguments in Chapter 7. An additional aspect that is considered when 
performing the robustness checks (besides re-estimating the models with different 
measurements of (de)concentration of the export sector) is re-estimating the models 
with different measurements of access points without veto power. The main results 
of the robustness checks are consistent with those reported above. 
EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF THE ARGUMENTS
 
 
207 
Control and independent variables 
Democracy 
As mentioned above, including a measure of the general level of democracy in the 
main country and its trade partner is extremely important to ensure that the observed 
effects of the domestic variables analysed do not just capture more general aspects of 
democracy.240 In the model that explores the intensive margin, Democracyi is non-
statistically significant, while Democracyj is negative and statistically significant 
(with a 95% degree of confidence). For a 10% increase in the variable Democracyj, 
the differences in the expected level of deep integration at the intensive margin is 12 
per cent (0.38 units). In contrast, in the model that explores the extensive margin, 
Democracyi and Democracyj are non-statistically significant. Previous research (e.g. 
Mansfield, Milner, and Pevehouse, 2007; Mansfield and Milner, 2012) has found 
evidence that democratic countries tend to sign more trade agreements with each 
other than with authoritarian countries. It is possible that the effect of regime type is 
more relevant for choosing a partner in a trade agreement than for the actual content 
of the agreement. Including the variables Democracyi and Democracyj increases 
confidence that the interactions between (de)concentration of the export sector and 
veto players or access points are relevant aspects of domestic politics which also tend 
to influence the depth of a trade agreement at the intensive and extensive margins.  
The extended and restricted models for the intensive and extensive margins of 
deep integration also include control variables that account for political and 
economic conditions and relations between the countries, international and systemic 
aspects, and other features of the agreement. As Tables 8.1 and 8.2 show, most of the 
coefficient estimates for these variables tend to be statistically significant (with a 90% 
to a 99% degree of confidence) and also tend to have the expected sign. In the sub-
sections below, these results are discussed. 
Political and economic conditions and relations 
Since political and economic conditions and relations between the countries in an 
agreement may also influence the depth of the trade agreement, the variables 
North/South partner, Bargaining position, and Political allianceij are also taken into 
                                                        
240 Mansfield, Milner, and Pevehouse (2007) and Mansfield and Milner (2012) also include a 
variable that captures the general level of democracy; although they acknowledge that this 
may generate multicollinearity because of the high correlation between other domestic 
institutional variables and democracy. In this research, a second set of models without 
democracy was also included. 
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consideration in the analyses. Other political nexus such as colonial relations and 
political disputes are not included in the model because, as explained in the previous 
section, their value would remain constant. The variable North/South partner was 
included to capture the asymmetry in the level of development of the dyad. In the 
analysis of deep integration at the intensive margin, the effect of having a South–
South agreement is non-statistically significant. 
In contrast, in the analysis of deep integration at the extensive margin, the effect 
of having a South–South agreement is negative and statistically significant in the 
extended model (with a 99% degree of confidence), and in the restricted model (with 
a 95% degree of confidence). The result that South–South countries in average 
achieve less depth at the extensive margin than South–North countries is consistent 
with the argument that developed countries extract more concessions in the 
regulation of their areas and disciplines of interest from their developing partners in 
a trade agreement in exchange of market access (e.g. Shadlen, 2005).241 Maintaining 
everything else constant, the level of deep integration in extensive margin of Latin 
American countries’ agreements decreases by 14 per cent (0.44 units) in the extended 
model and by approximately 10 per cent (0.29 units) in the restricted model when 
the partner is another developing country. 
Regarding political relations, the effect of Political allianceij is statistically 
significant (with a 95% to a 99% degree of confidence) for the extended models of the 
extensive and intensive margins and for the restricted model of the intensive margin. 
However, there is variation in the direction of the coefficients for each margin. Latin 
American agreements’ intensive margin decreases by 17 per cent (0.52 units) in the 
extended model and by 14 per cent (0.42 units) in the restricted model when the 
partner is a country with which the main country has established a political alliance. 
It is possible that between allies, fewer institutional reassurances are needed because 
there is already an established level of trust between them. On the other hand, Latin 
American agreements’ deep integration at the extensive margin increases by 13 per 
cent (0.41 units) when the partner is a country with which the main country has 
                                                        
241 Previous studies about trade agreements (e.g. Mansfield, Milner, and Pevehouse, 2007) 
have considered that economic conditions in a country are likely to influence forming trade 
agreements. In this research, expectations about the effect of economic conditions over the 
extent of deep integration are not straightforward. Although a country with higher income 
may have fewer incentives to seek expanded markets than a country with lower income 
(Mansfield, Milner, and Pevehouse, 2007: 419), the former may also have more negotiating 
power, and better capacities to achieve agreements with higher levels of deep integration in 
their areas of interest. Therefore, other variables which may capture part of the effect of the 
economic asymmetry between the countries in a dyad are also included. 
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established a political alliance. It is possible that for countries with certain levels of 
trust and similar preferences, it is easier to integrate more trade-related areas into 
trade agreements with partners with which an adequate level of trust has already 
been established. 
Features of the trade agreement 
Additional controls for other features of the agreement, Intellectual property, 
Labor/environment, Investment, Tariff phasing, and Number of partners, are 
included in the model. In the analyses of the intensive margin, the coefficient of the 
variable Investment is positive and statistically significant  in the extended model 
(with a 95% degree of confidence), and in the restricted model (with a 99% degree of 
confidence). In the analyses of the extensive margin the coefficient of the variable 
Investment is non-statistically significant. The link between foreign direct 
investment and international trade is well documented (e.g. Büthe and Milner, 2014). 
Agreements which include substantial provisions on investment may also lead 
partners to engage in fragmented production and require a stronger institutional 
infrastructure to coordinate and manage their production. When agreements include 
a chapter or separate protocol about investment, depth at the intensive margin 
increases by seven per cent (0.22 units) in the extended model and by 10 per cent 
(0.30 units) in the restricted one. The amount of net inflows of foreign direct 
investment in each country are also taken into consideration when performing 
robustness checks, and the results are consistent with those presented above. 
In contrast, the coefficient of Labor/environment is only positive and 
statistically significant (with a 95% degree of confidence) in the restricted model of 
the extensive margin, and the coefficient of Intellectual property is positive and 
statistically significant (with a 99% degree of confidence) in the restricted and 
extended models of the extensive margin. In agreements that are tied to protocols on 
labour and environment, average deep integration at the extensive margin increases 
by 12.6 per cent (0.38 units) for the restricted model. On the other hand, in 
agreements that include protocols on intellectual property, deep integration at the 
extensive margin increases in average by 19 per cent (0.57 units) for the extended 
model and by 23 per cent (0.70 units) for the restricted one. A possible explanation 
could be that inclusion of these protocols appeases protectionist groups. It is also 
possible that these two variables are non-statistically significant in the results of deep 
integration at the intensive margin because they have separate and specific protocols 
rather than being regulated by the general institutions of the agreement. Tariff 
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phasing is positive and statistically significant (with a 95% degree of confidence) for 
the restricted model of the extensive margin. It is possible that countries use longer 
periods of shallow liberalization as a trade-off for including deeper provisions at the 
extensive margins. 
Regarding the margins of deep integration, Extensive margin and Intensive 
margin are included as controls in each other’s equation. Only the variable Intensive 
margin is positive and statistically significant (with a 99% degree of confidence), 
although its coefficient is relatively small. All else being equal, agreements’ average 
deep integration at the extensive margin increases by seven per cent (0.21 units) in 
the extended model and by approximately five per cent (0.16 units) in the restricted 
one when there is a one-unit increase at the intensive margin of the agreement. It is 
possible that this result reflects that agreements which cover more areas require 
stronger institutional structures than agreements which cover fewer areas. These 
results provide additional indirect support for the argument that each of these 
margins captures distinctive aspects of depth in a trade agreement. Therefore, they 
also indirectly support the categorization of deep integration developed in Chapter 3 
and the empirical results obtained using principal components analysis in Chapter 4. 
To control for the capacity of a country to achieve deep integration in its trade 
agreements, the following variables were also included in the analyses. The variable 
Number of previous trade agreements signed by the country is statistically 
significant (with a 99% degree of confidence) for the restricted and the extended 
models of the intensive margin. The coefficient is relatively small and negative, and 
it may reflect the fact that countries have limited resources and therefore cannot 
simultaneously maintain numerous agreements with strong (and costly) institutional 
structures. The variable Bargaining position is statistically significant (with a 99% 
degree of confidence) for both the restricted and the extended models for the 
intensive and extensive margins. The coefficient in the analysis of deep integration at 
the intensive margin is positive, which may reflect the need for stronger institutions 
as the complexity of an agreement increases from bilateral to hub–spoke to 
minilateral schemes. Increasing the strength of the bargaining position of a country 
by one level increases depth at the intensive extensive margin by approximately four 
per cent (0.13 units) in the extended and restricted models. The coefficient in the 
analysis of deep integration at the extensive margin has the same size; but on opposite 
direction. Increasing the strength of the bargaining position of a country by one level 
decreases depth at the extensive margin by approximately four per cent (0.13 units) 
in the extended and restricted models. As mentioned earlier, the difficulty in 
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liberalizing a larger number of trade disciplines and institutional areas in greater 
depth increases with the number of members participating in a trade agreement. It 
may also reflect the fact that the main country has less control over the negotiation 
process. 
The coefficient of the variable Hegemonic power is positive and statistically 
significant in the restricted model (with a 95% degree of confidence), and in the 
extended model (with a 99% degree of confidence) of the extensive margin. The 
literature on economic regionalism has found that when hegemony declines, states 
tend to form preferential arrangements (Mansfield, 1998; Mansfield, Milner, and 
Pevehouse, 2007: 424). However, in a recent study, Mansfield and Milner (2012) 
argue that there are no reasons to expect that the situation of hegemonic power 
affects the extent of integration in trade agreements (considering only the type of the 
agreement). The results of the analyses in this section tend to support their argument. 
The coefficient of Hegemonic power is small (0.001 units) in the analysis of the 
extensive margin, and non-statistically significant in the analysis of the intensive 
margin. Finally, the coefficient of the control variable European Union is included to 
ensure that the results are not driven by the large number of dyadic agreements 
signed with the European Union, as in previous studies (e.g. Mansfield, Milner, and 
Pevehouse, 2007: 424). The coefficient of this variable is non-statistically significant 
in the four models analysed. 
Examination of the robustness of the results 
It is important to examine the robustness of the results discussed above. Taken 
together, the results in this section increase confidence that the results presented 
above are reasonably robust. The main results presented in Tables 8.1 and 8.2 remain 
unchanged in the analyses discussed below. 
Income level, income fluctuations, and differences in wealth 
As in the previous section, economic conditions may influence the extent of 
integration in a trade agreement at the intensive and extensive margins. In the main 
model, the variable North/South partner was included with the objective of 
capturing the economic development asymmetry in the dyad. There are other aspects 
of the economic size and asymmetry of the countries in the dyad that could be taken 
into consideration. First, it is possible that the economic size of a country has an effect 
on deep integration regardless of the economic size of the partner in the dyad. 
Second, it also may be possible that the economic asymmetry of the countries in terms 
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of GDP matters regardless of the levels of development of the countries in the dyad. 
Third, fluctuations in income may also influence the adoption and depth of trade 
agreements, although the direction of their influence is not clear from a purely 
analytical perspective. 242  Therefore, the models were re-estimated to include 
variables which could account for those possibilities. The results of the analyses are 
included in tables F-1 and G-1 in Appendixes F and G. 
First, the variables Incomei and Incomej 243  are included in the models both 
separately and together. Next, the models are also re-estimated including the variable 
GDP differenceij.244 The coefficients of the variables are non-statistically significant 
in any of the models. These results may show that although these variables are 
relevant to the formation of an agreement, once it has been decided other more 
specific measures become more relevant to the extent of deep integration in the 
agreement. Furthermore, as stated above, variables such as North/South partner 
may capture the economic size of both countries. Third, Change of GDPi and Change 
of GDPj are calculated245 and the models are also re-estimated with these variables. 
The effects of these variables are non-statistically significant. These results are 
consistent with studies about the formation of trade agreements.246 Fourth, Change 
in unemploymenti and Change in unemploymentj are calculated and the models are 
also re-estimated with these variables. Again, the effects of these variables are non-
                                                        
242  Expectations about the effect of income fluctuations on deep integration are not 
analytically straightforward. Economic decline may motivate countries to take risks, to accept 
losing sovereignty (Mattli, 1999), and to accept more rigid agreements (Koremenos, 2005). 
Nevertheless, economic growth may also create economic incentives towards free trade 
through trade agreements. The economic expansion may increase the demand for imports 
and supply of exports of a country (Mansfield, Milner, and Pevehouse, 2007: 419). 
243 Incomei and Incomej are measured as the logarithmic transformation of GDP (in current 
2000 US dollars). Data was compiled from the World Development Indicators database 
(World Bank, 2014c). 
244 The degree of economic asymmetry, regardless of the level of economic development, is 
calculated by using the logarithmic transformation of the difference between the GDP (in 
current 2000 US dollars) of the countries forming a dyad. Data were compiled from the World 
Bank Development Indicators Database (World Bank, 2014c). 
245  To calculate Change GDPi and Change GDPj this research uses the logarithmic 
transformation of the average of the GDP per capita produced during the previous three years 
and subtracts the average from the GDP per capita produced during the year previous to the 
signature of the agreement. Change in unemploymenti and Change in unemploymentj are 
calculated following the same steps. Other variables that capture income fluctuation, such as 
frequency of crisis, are not included because agreements are designed to work in normal 
circumstances (Baccini, Dür, and Elsig, 2012b: 11). Primary data to calculate these variables 
was compiled from the World Development Indicators database (World Bank, 2014c). 
246 Mansfield, Milner, and Pevehouse (2007) found that the effect of change in GDP on the 
formation of trade agreements is non-statistically significant. 
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statistically significant. The results of the analyses can also be found in tables F-1 and 
G-1 in Appendixes F and G. 
Trade openness, trade intensity, and trade complementarity 
In several studies about trade agreements (e.g. Mansfield, Milner, and Pevehouse, 
2007; Baccini, Dür, and Elsig, 2012a; Hoffman and Kim, 2012), Trade opennessi247 
has been acknowledged as indicative of internationalized domestic interests. Between 
countries, Trade intensityij,248 and Trade complementarityij249 are also indicative of 
export activities which would benefit from deep integration. For these reasons, the 
models which estimate the extent of deep integration at the intensive and extensive 
margins, were re-estimated including variables which account for these activities. 
Trade complementarityij is non-statistically significant in either margin, while Trade 
intensityij is positive and statistically significant (with a 99% degree of confidence) 
only at the intensive margin. For a 10% increase in the variable Trade intensityij, the 
increase in the expected average levels of deep integration at the extensive margin is 
approximately five per cent (0.14 units). These results are consistent with the 
arguments presented in Chapter 5. Trade intensity is relevant for large exporters, 
which benefit from dynamic gains of trade in which intra-industry trade and 
production sharing is relevant. The results corresponding to these analyses are 
included in tables F-2 and G-2 in Appendixes F and G. 
                                                        
247 Trade opennessi is the sum of all exports and imports as a proportion of GDP. Data was 
compiled from the World Development Indicators database (World Bank, 2014c). 
248 The variable Trade intensityij is the logarithmic transformation of the trade intensity index, 
which measures how intensive is trade within each dyad. Using this measure is advantageous 
because it captures trade flows and it also accounts for their relevance. The index measures 
the extent of the value of the trade flows compared to what would be expected according to 
their importance in world trade. Values larger than one are indicative of bilateral trade flows 
which exceed the expected flows, considering the partner’s relevance in world trade. In 
contrast, values of less than one are indicative of trade flows which are less than expected 
under the same conditions. To calculate the index, the share of one country’s exports (Xit) 
going to a partner (xij) is divided by the share of world exports (Xwt) going to the same partner 
(xwj): Tij = (xij/Xit)/ (xwj/Xwt) (Amjadi, Schuler, Kuwahara, and Quadros, 2011: 84). Data 
was compiled from the UNCTAD TRAINS database (World Bank, 2014b). 
249  The variable Trade complementarityij is the logarithmic transformation of the trade 
complementarity index, which accounts for the match between the exports and imports of a 
pair of countries. The index range is [0,100]. The lowest value corresponds to a situation in 
which no goods are exported by one country or imported by the other. The highest value 
corresponds to a situation where an exact match exists between the imports and exports of 
said countries. The trade complementarity index for countries k and j is calculated as: TCij = 
100 (1 – sum (|mik – xij|/2)), where xij is the share of good i in global exports of country j and 
mik is the share of good i in total imports of country k (Amjadi, Schuler, Kuwahara, and 
Quadros, 2011: 84-85). Data was compiled from the UNCTAD TRAINS database (World Bank, 
2014b). 
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Surprisingly, the results for the coefficient of Trade opennessi are non-
statistically significant in either margin. The expectation was that more open 
countries could have more incentives for export oriented groups to push towards 
deeper intensive and extensive margins. The incentives for export oriented groups to 
mobilize towards deeper integration would be that these groups would have 
increased interest in ensuring that trade relations would not be interrupted in the 
future (Nye, 1988; Mansfield, Milner, and Pevehouse, 2007) or in preventing 
vulnerability to predatory behaviour from foreign governments (Yarbrough and 
Yarbrough, 1992; Mansfield, Milner, and Pevehouse, 2007). However, it is also 
possible that countries with high trade openness require fewer deep provisions to 
manage trade flows which are already intense than countries with low trade 
openness. Another possibility is that other variables such as Tariff phasing and 
Number of previous agreements may also capture part of the expected effect. The 
results corresponding to these analyses are also reported in tables F-2 and G-2 in 
Appendixes F and G. 
Number of members, previous cooperation, and competition 
Agreements with more members are likely to find it more difficult to reach deep trade 
agreements, as there may exist ‘a broader-deeper trade off’ (Gilligan, 2004; Baccini, 
Dür, and Elsig, 2012a). Number of members250 is statistically significant (with a 95% 
degree of confidence) and negative for the extensive margin only, which reflects that 
having larger numbers of members increases the difficulty of achieving deep levels of 
integration in agreements with numerous trade-related areas. This result is 
consistent with well known arguments in the literature on regionalism (e.g. Haggard, 
1997) that larger numbers of participants in a trade agreement increase difficulties in 
negotiation and transaction costs. It is possible that regarding integration at the 
intensive margin, the effect of the number of partners varies more according to the 
bargaining power of the country analyzed rather than to the specific number of 
members, and therefore, this effect may be already captured by the variable 
Bargaining position. Some studies (e.g. Baccini, Dür, and Elsig, 2012a) have also 
suggested that it is easier to reach agreements with deeper obligations in trade 
agreements with partners with which there is increased trust based on a strong record 
                                                        
250 The variable Number of members is calculated as the logarithmic transformation of the 
total number of members in a trade agreement. 
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of cooperation. Therefore, the variable Joint membershipij 251  is calculated and 
included in the models. However, it is non-statistically significant in either model 
even after removing the variable Political allianceij. These results suggest that an 
established cooperative relation between the countries is more important than the 
number of instances in which such cooperation takes place. The results of these 
analyses are reported in tables F-3 and G-3 in Appendixes F and G. 
Competition between countries is likely to affect their actions. Therefore, the 
variable Competition252 was calculated and included in the models. For example, 
Baccini, Dür, and Elsig (2012b: 8-10) report that in interviews, negotiators of trade 
agreements mentioned the importance of agreements signed by competitors or 
neighbours in negotiating the level of obligations in a trade agreement. The authors 
also report that the negotiators mentioned that they rarely take into account more 
specific dimensions of these competing trade agreements such as their degree of 
flexibility. 253  For this research, the expectations are that countries that face 
competition may sign agreements with higher levels of depth, particularly at the 
intensive margin, which tends to be less specific than the extensive margin. As 
expected, the coefficient of the variable Competition is positive and statistically 
significant (with a 99% degree of confidence) only for the analysis of the intensive 
margin in both the restricted and the extended models. According to previous 
findings in literature, countries are likely to take into consideration trade agreements 
signed by their competitors (Fernandez and Portes, 1998; Mansfield,  
  
                                                        
251 Joint Membershipij is the logarithmic transformation of the number of joint memberships 
in international non-economic organizations. Primary data to calculate this indicator was 
compiled from Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke (2004). 
252 Competition measures the number of agreements similar in development (North-South or 
South-South) established by countries in the region during the previous five years to the 
signature of the trade agreement. Primary data to calculate this indicator is compiled from 
agreements notified to the WTO and the SICE. 
253 For example, Baccini, Dür, and Elsig (2012b: 8) mention that in an interview, a Colombian 
negotiator reported that ‘the design of the Colombia-US PTA was influenced by the design of 
the Chile-US PTA and NAFTA.' 
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Milner, and Pevehouse, 2007), with more regard for the general level of obligations 
than for the specific areas or disciplines of the agreements (Baccini, Dür, and Elsig, 
2012b: 8-10). The results for both models can be found in tables F-3 and G-3 in 
Appendixes F and G. 
Distance, language, and time elapsed 
The variable Year count254 is included to test for the existence of potential trends for 
deeper liberalization in trade agreements. This variable is relevant because the design 
of trade agreements has evolved over time, and deeper commitments may be the 
product of a global trend towards greater liberalization. Unsurprisingly, this variable 
is statistically significant (with a 99% degree of confidence) in the models of both 
margins. However, at the extensive margin, the effect is positive, while at the 
intensive margin, the effect is negative. Because Year count has high multicollinearity 
with Number of previous agreements, the models are estimated with and without 
this variable. For a 10% increase in the variable Year count (removing Number of 
previous agreements), the difference in the expected mean level of deep integration 
is a decrease of 30 per cent (0.91 units) at the intensive margin, and an increase of 17 
per cent (0.51 units) at the extensive margin. The main results presented in Tables 
8.1 and 8.2 do not change substantially across the different models. The results of 
these analyses are reported in tables F-4 and G-4 in Appendixes F and G. 
Geographic distance has traditionally been included in previous studies on the 
formation of trade agreements. The main reasons are first, that it captures some of 
the commercial and strategic importance between pairs of countries (Baccini, Dür, 
and Elsig, 2012b: 6), as countries tend to seek membership in trade agreements as a 
medium to increase access to the markets of relevant trade partners. Second, 
monitoring of partner’s activities (Baccini, Dür, and Elsig, 2012b: 6) or transport 
among other transaction costs (Mansfield, Milner, and Pevehouse, 2007: 420) may 
be easier if the partner is closer. Different languages between partners is also 
considered to increase the transaction costs of trade between countries. Countries 
with different languages are considered to have substantially different cultures, 
making it more difficult for exporters to access each other’s markets (e.g. Mansfield, 
Milner, and Pevehouse, 2007: 424). The coefficient for Languageij is statistically 
                                                        
254 Following Blake’s (2010: 125) approach to account for a similar trend in the design of 
investment treaties, in this research, the variable Time is the logarithmic transformation of 
an annual time counter from 1982 to 2010. 
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significant (with a 95% degree of confidence) only at the extensive margin. Countries 
which share the same language have an average increase of approximately six per 
cent (0.19 units) in the expected level of deep integration at the extensive margin. The 
coefficient for Distanceij255 is non-statistically significant in either margin. Because 
North/South partner could capture part of the effect of distance, the models were re-
estimated without this variable, but there was no substantial variation regarding the 
results stated above. These results can be consulted in tables F-4 and G-4 in 
Appendixes F and G. 
Alternative model specification and measurements of 
concentration of export sector, veto players, and access points 
without veto power 
First, in equations (1) and (2), each of the dependent variables measures the levels of 
depth at the intensive and extensive margins that the main country from a pair of 
countries has achieved in a trade agreement. However, there are independent 
variables in the models that are purely monadic, such as Veto playersi, andVeto 
playersj when evaluating the intensive margin, Access points without vetoi, and 
Access points without vetoj, when examining the extensive margin, and 
Concentrationi and Concentrationj when asessing both margins. Following other 
studies with similar concerns (e.g. Mansfield, Milner, and Pevehouse, 2007), to 
eliminate any efficiency gains that stem from including directed dyads instead of 
undirected dyads, the models were re-estimated with clustered standard errors. The 
main results presented in Tables 8.1 and 8.2 do not change, and there is almost no 
variation in the rest of the variables. These results can be consulted in tables F-5 and 
G-5 in Appendixes F and G. 
Second, to examine whether the results depend on the measure of export 
concentration, the Hirschman–Herfindahl index replaces the 
concentration/diversification index. The new variables are ConcentrationIIi and 
ConcentrationIIj. The variables ConcentrationIIi and Veto playersi and 
ConcentrationIIi and Access points without vetoi replace the interaction variables. As 
discussed in the first section of this chapter, the Hirschman–Herfindahl index is an 
alternative measure of export sector (de)concentration. The lower the index, the less 
concentrated a country’s export sector is. The disadvantage of this measure regarding 
                                                        
255  The variable Distanceij is measured as the logarithm of the capital-to-capital distance 
between i and j Data on distance and contiguity are taken from Oneal and Russett (1999). 
Missing data was collected by the author. 
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the concentration/diversification index used in the main analysis is that it does not 
consider the relative weight and specialization of the exported products compared to 
the world average. For this reason, Trade openessi and Relative comparative 
advantageij256 are calculated and included in the models. Specialization relative to 
the rest of the world and the dependence of certain exporters are important aspects. 
In Chapter 5, it was argued that highly specialized exporters in concentrated export 
sectors would obtain the main benefits from deep integration, and in Chapter 7, it 
was argued that highly specialized exporters in concentrated export sectors would be 
able to capture the veto players to influence depth at the extensive margin. 
The results of the analyses with the new variables are consistent with the main 
results presented in Tables 8.1 and 8.2 in the previous section. As in the main analyses 
of the extensive margin, the interaction between ConcentrationIIi and Access points 
without vetoi is negative and statistically significant (with a 99% degree of 
confidence), and the largest interaction in both models. The simple effect of Access 
points without vetoi remains non-statistically significant, while the simple effect of 
Concentration IIi is positive and statistically significant (with a 95% degree of 
confidence). As in the main analyses of the intensive margin, the interaction between 
ConcentrationIIi and Veto playersi is positive, the largest in the model, and 
statistically significant (with a 99% degree of confidence). The simple effects of Veto 
playersi and ConcentrationIIi are non-statistically significant. These results are 
reported in tables F-5 and G-5 in Appendixes F and G. 
Third, to test whether the main results presented in the previous section depend 
on the way in which the main variables and interactions were introduced in the 
statistical model, this research follows how other studies (e.g. Mansfield, Milner, and 
Pevehouse, 2007: 425; Mansfield and Milner, 2012) address similar concerns and 
replace the assumed linear effect with a non-monotonic effect of Veto playersi and 
Veto playersj. Following these studies, this research also examines whether the 
results are driven by collinearity between democracy and veto players, regressing 
Democracyi on Veto playersi and Democracyj on Veto playersj to create the new 
                                                        
256 Relative comparative advantageij was calculated by adding the number of traded tariff 
lines in which the two members of a dyad have a revealed comparative advantage index score 
above one. The revealed comparative advantage index is defined as RCAij = 100(Xij 
/Xwj)/(Xit /Xwt), where country i exports good j, and Xwt is exports by country (or countries) 
w of good(s) t. For good j, scores above one are interpreted as having a relative comparative 
advantage, and values below one are interpreted as having comparative disadvantage (Amjadi, 
Schuler, Kuwahara, and Quadros, 2011). Primary data to calculate this variable, disaggregated 
at the 4 four digit level, was compiled from the UNCTAD TRAINS database (World Bank, 
2014b). 
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variables Residual veto playersi and Residual veto playersj. These new variables 
capture ‘that portion of veto players that is not explained by a state’s regime type’ 
(Mansfield, Milner, and Pevehouse, 2007: 427). The interactions and models are re-
estimated with these new variables. These steps are repeated for the variables and 
interactions of Access points without vetoi and Access points without vetoj, creating 
the new variables Residual access points without vetoi and Residual access points 
without vetoj. As reported in tables F-5 and G-5 in Appendixes F and G, there are no 
important variations from the main results presented in Tables 8.1 and 8.2, which 
remain statistically significant (with a 95% to a 99% degree of confidence), maintain 
a similar relative magnitude to the rest of the variables in the models, and retain the 
same direction. 
Fourth, to examine whether the results depend on the measure of access points 
without veto power, the Hirschman–Herfindahl index of party fragmentation 
replaces the effective number of parties index.257 The new variables are Access points 
without vetoIIi and Access points without vetoIIj. Concentration and Access points 
without vetoIIi replace the interaction variable. The results of the analyses with the 
new variables are also consistent with the main results presented in the previous 
section. Consistent with the main model, the interaction between ConcentrationII 
and Access points without vetoII is now positive instead of negative (since the 
Hirschman–Herfindahl index measures party fragmentation in an opposite direction 
to the effective number of parties index), statistically significant (with a 95% degree 
of confidence), and the largest in the model. The simple effect of Concentrationi is 
non-statistically significant, and the simple effect of Access points without vetoIIi is 
statistically significant (with a 95% degree of confidence) and remains negative. 
These results are reported in tables F-5 and G-5 in Appendixes F and G. 
Finally, both interactions were included in the four models to ensure that they 
are not capturing the effect of the interaction not included in the model. The main 
interaction variables remained statistically significant (with a 95% to a 99% degree of 
confidence), and those not included in the analyses reported in Tables 8.1 and 8.2 
remained non-significant. For the extensive margin, when including the interaction 
between Concentrationi and Veto playersi, this variable was non-statistically 
significant. For the intensive margin, when including the interaction between 
                                                        
257  In contrast with the effective number of parties index, the highest values of the 
Hirschman–Herfindahl index of party fragmentation correspond to the least fragmented 
party systems. 
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Concentrationi and Access points without Vetoi, this variable was non-statistically 
significant. The results of these analyses are reported in tables F-5 and G-5. 
Conclusions 
This chapter explored the influence of domestic economic and political actors on the 
design of trade agreements by separating deep integration into its intensive and 
extensive margins and incorporating veto players, access points without veto power, 
and export sector (de)concentration into the statistical analyses. Because both 
margins are widely encompassing aspects of depth, it is very difficult to find strong 
instruments to implement an instrumental variables model. Therefore, the main 
problem—as in previous studies that analyse features and provisions in trade 
agreements—is the problem of endogeneity. However, this was preferred to having 
omitted variables, which increases the risks of obtaining erroneous statistical 
significance and direction of the effects of the variables studied. A cross-sectional 
estimation using OLS with robust standard errors was used to estimate two separate 
equations for depth at the intensive and extensive margins as the dependent 
variables. The main results were statistically significant (with at least a 95% degree 
of confidence). Moreover, these results did not just capture part of the effects of the 
level of democratization over deep integration. 
The series of statistical tests were performed to provide support for the 
arguments presented in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. The main argument was that specific 
configurations of interests in (de)concentrated export sectors combine in distinctive 
ways with veto players and access points without veto power. Two conditional 
hypotheses were put forward (and their constitutive hypotheses were also stated). 
First, that countries in which there is a combination of a relatively more concentrated 
export sector and a large number of effective veto players are associated with 
agreements with higher levels of integration at their intensive margins. Second, that 
countries in which there is a combination of a relatively more de-concentrated export 
sector and large numbers of access points without veto power are associated with 
agreements with lower levels of integration at their extensive margins. The main 
explanatory variables used to analyse depth at the intensive and extensive margins 
are the interaction of veto players and (de)concentration of the export sector and the 
interaction of access points without veto power and (de)concentration of the export 
sector.  
EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF THE ARGUMENTS
 
 
221 
For the intensive margin, the interaction between concentration of the export 
sector and veto players was positive, statistically significant (with a 99% degree of 
confidence), and the largest in the model. When there were no veto players, the 
simple effect of concentration was non-statistically significant; and when the export 
sector was the most de-concentrated, the simple effect of veto players was non-
statistically significant. These results tend to support the arguments that economic 
interests in concentrated export sectors are able to capture the veto players, reducing 
the negative effect that veto players have over deep integration at the intensive 
margin (which increases according to their number). These results also tend to 
support the arguments that concentrated and specialized export oriented economic 
interests prefer to lobby veto players rather than access points without veto power 
because the former are more decisive and include selective incentives that the 
government provides in the form of access to decision makers.  
For the extensive margin, the interaction between export sector concentration 
and access points without veto power was negative, statistically significant (with a 
99% degree of confidence), and the largest in the model. When there were no access 
points without veto power, the simple effect of concentration was positive and 
statistically significant (with a 95% degree of confidence); and when the export sector 
was the most de-concentrated, the simple effect of access points without veto power 
was non-statistically significant. These results tend to support the arguments that a 
combination of concentrated export interests and large numbers of access points 
without veto power make it increasingly difficult for governments to achieve trade 
agreements with high levels of deep integration at the extensive margin. These results 
also tend to support the arguments that in countries with concentrated export 
sectors, resourceful exporters tend to lose their advantage (over protectionist groups) 
in lobbying for deep integration at the extensive margin when a large number of 
access points without veto power exists. 
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9  Conclusions 
Understanding how the different configurations of interests and institutions in Latin 
American countries contribute to the level of deep integration their trade agreements 
may reach is increasingly important. First, all Latin American countries participate 
in international trade through trade agreements, although to different degrees. 
Second, trade agreements comprise large proportions of world trade. Third, in 
general, while provisions that promote deep integration have increased in 
importance, shallow liberalization has become less important in trade negotiations 
for participating countries. Finally, trade agreements have historical relevance for the 
countries of the region, being considered important since colonial times (Salazar-
Xirinachs, 2004) and being actively used as policy instruments to increase economic 
development since the 1950s. Therefore, the question that motivated this research is 
as follows: What explains the wide differences in the nature and level of deep 
integration that exists between the trade agreements signed by Latin American 
countries? 
This chapter concludes this research by summarizing how the incentives and 
constraints delineated by the concentration of the export sector and the number of 
effective veto players and access points without veto power in each country combined 
and contributed to the varying levels of designed vertical and horizontal deep 
integration in their trade agreements. The objectives of this research are to contribute 
to the understanding of the nature and variation of deep integration in trade 
agreements, how export oriented economic interests benefit from it, how certain 
aspects of political institutions may constrain or facilitate it, and how different levels 
of export sector concentration tend to combine with different aspects of political 
institutions so that interest groups are able to influence the extent of integration in 
trade agreements. In the case of vertical integration, relevant to trade agreements as 
a whole, the emphasis is on the combination of veto players and export oriented 
producers in concentrated export sectors. In the case of horizontal integration, 
relevant to specific trade areas and disciplines included in the agreement, the 
emphasis is on the combination of veto players in de-concentrated export sectors. 
The first section revisits the analytical framework presented in the introduction. The 
second section revisits the arguments developed in Chapters 3, 5, 6, and 7, addressing 
their contributions and limitations. The last section addresses areas for further 
research. 
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The analytical framework revisited 
The general analytical framework of this research adapts endogenous trade theory to 
explain the differences in depth between trade agreements signed by Latin American 
countries. Following Schonhardt-Bailey (2006: 52-53) in adapting endogenous trade 
theory that focuses on explaining protection to analyse trade liberalization, in this 
research, the approach is extended to limited trade liberalization through 
international agreements. In this way, trade agreements are the object of analysis, 
and they are considered a quasi-public good. A direct assessment of policy outcomes 
is chosen. Building on previous analyses within the endogenous trade theory 
approach, it is possible to study how different combinations of economic interests 
and political institutions may explain the differences of deep integration in the trade 
agreements signed. 
The theory is also extended to address policy outcomes in developing countries 
in addition to its main application to cases of developed ones (e.g. McGillivray, 
McLean, Pahre, and Schonhardt-Bailey, 2001; Schonhardt-Bailey 2006). The 
following aspects which are problematic for the application of general public choice 
theories were taken into consideration. Opacity and discretion in the institutional 
settings of Latin American countries258 create problems for tracing political input and 
present difficulties in identifying economic interests directly as well as analysing 
systematically how interest groups organize towards achieving a desired policy and 
the institutional mechanisms over which they exert such pressure. These issues were 
an initial challenge which required the identification and application of alternative 
approaches to those commonly used in the analysis of developed countries, but which 
were consistent with endogenous trade theory analysis.259 For example, given the 
impossibility of systematically tracing political contributions, policy outcomes were 
considered directly (e.g. Beaulieu, 2002; Frieden, 1991). Also, to characterize 
economic interests, this research followed Frieden (1991) in using a deductive 
                                                        
258 Generally speaking and with few exceptions, the state in Latin America tends to be highly 
centralised, clientelistic, exclusive and lacking institutional, constitutional and legal 
infrastructure (Davis, 1999: 585). 
259  As discussed in Chapters 1, 5, and 7, these approaches are feasible in industrialized 
countries, since economic interests’ input tends to be more formal and open than in 
developing countries. Researchers are able to gather data on business political activities input 
from business organizations or political parties. Neither of these approaches are possible to 
be developed systematically in Latin American countries because of the opacity of the 
mechanisms used and because of the characteristics of the institutional settings of Latin 
American countries. 
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approach that is based on asset specificity and that operationalizes businesses as 
sectors.260 
The general framework developed in this research is partially compatible with 
the open economy politics approach. First, domestic politics are central explanatory 
variables in the analysis of deep integration. Second, the research considers the three 
steps followed in open economy politics. Moreover, although international 
bargaining is only included as a control variable, most scholars within this approach 
analyse one of these areas and consider the others in a ‘reduced form’ (Lake, 2009: 
225). Third, this research also suffers from linear accumulation of the analysis from 
economic interests to domestic institutions and international variables (the latter 
only as control variables) without allowing feedback between them. Furthermore, 
this research incorporates such aspects as the existence of industries with scale 
economies, which have been suggested (e.g. Lake, 2009) as an aspect to be addressed 
within open economy politics frameworks. 
The hand-coded original database developed for this research provides detailed 
information about the content of trade agreements. This is a general contribution to 
academic literature about trade agreements. More specifically, the two main 
approaches, legalization studies and rational design, which acknowledge variation in 
design across international agreements could benefit from the detailed information 
contained in the database. ‘Legalization’ and deep integration are different but 
related concepts. In this research, the classification of deep integration does not 
follow the literature on legalization in the sense that it is not divided into obligation, 
delegation, and precision. However, the intensive and extensive margins broadly 
differentiate between obligation and delegation, and in general, provisions scores 
tend to be deeper the more precise such obligations and delegation measures are. 
Nevertheless, the body of literature on legalization mainly considers variations in 
international agreements and the consequences of this variation in legalization, 
compliance, and domestic politics, while in this research, deep integration is not the 
explanatory variable. 
There are also clear differences regarding the analytical framework provided by 
rational design. This approach focuses on the causes of variation in the institutional 
                                                        
260 Chapter 5, reviews standard and new trade theories to confirm that a sectoral rather than 
a factor approach is more adequate to analyse the demand for trade agreements after the 
adoption of economic structural reforms in the region. Moreover, this approach is used in the 
literature on international political economy of market reforms in developing countries, since 
the analysis of this countries presents similar constrains in the availability of data. 
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features of trade agreements but categorizes the data according to membership, 
control, flexibility, centralization, and scope. This categorization is not compatible 
with the one based on the margins of deep integration in this research. The main 
difference is that when provisions about control, centralization, and scope are coded 
in this research, they distinguish between those applicable to the trade agreement as 
a whole and those applicable to specific trade areas and disciplines. In addition, in 
this research, flexibility, measured inversely, is considered to be the removal of 
barriers to trade and is therefore an element that promotes deep integration (along 
other provisions that would correspond to obligations). In addition, membership is 
considered to be a control variable that influences deep integration. The approach to 
trade agreements fits within rational design’s definition of international institutions 
as ‘incentive compatible’ ‘explicit arrangements, negotiated among international 
actors, that prescribe, proscribe, and/or authorize behavior […] and may require or 
prohibit certain behavior or simply permit it’ (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal, 2001a: 
768).261 However, in this research, economic interests and how they combine with the 
institutional setting have the central role in explaining variation in the levels of deep 
integration in trade agreements.262 
Finally, the results in this research are consistent with the results of previous 
studies that have highlighted the importance of systemic and international variables 
in the formation and design of trade agreements. One of the most important 
explanations in the study of trade agreements is hegemonic stability theory. From 
this perspective, hegemonic power exerts influence by coercing or persuading other 
countries to liberalize their trade. Theoretically, the influence of hegemony has been 
considered important for the proliferation of ‘open regionalism’ trade agreements in 
Latin America (Rigozzi, 2013). The coefficient of this variable was statistically 
significant (above a 95% degree of confidence) and positive for both the restricted 
and the extended models of the extensive margin, although the coefficients are 
extremely small. These results are consistent with the expectations of a recent study 
about design of trade agreements (Mansfield and Milner, 2012). In addition, the 
results of the rest of the included systemic and international variables, such as 
distance and economic asymmetry, are consistent with previous empirical studies 
                                                        
261 From this perspective actors create, change, and adhere to institutions because they find 
rational doing it to advance their own interests, which does not necessarily mean that these 
institutions are beneficial to the states that host them (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal, 2001a: 
768). 
262 In contrast to distributional and enforcement features, uncertainty and number of actors, 
which are the main explanatory variables for rational design approaches. 
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and theoretical expectations. The importance of systemic and international theories 
and variables is not contested; the domestic-level explanations are developed as a 
complement to the insight they provide. 
The arguments revisited 
Two main arguments were developed in this research. The first argument refers to 
the nature and broad characteristics of the policy outcome under analysis, deep 
integration in trade agreements established by Latin American countries after the 
economic crises of 1982 and until 2010 with their global and regional partners. For 
the purposes of this research, deep integration is disaggregated into vertical and 
horizontal margins. It is argued that each margin produces benefits with different 
levels of excludability that can be appropriated by export oriented producers, which 
differ in size and resourcefulness. The steps followed to construct the first main 
argument are as follows. First, characterize deep integration into its main 
overarching margins. Second, map the relevant provisions and allocate them to their 
respective margins. Third, operationalize and measure these provisions according to 
their depth in the dyadic agreements (28,160 total data points). Fourth, examine the 
appropriateness of the categorization and allocation of provisions by performing 
principal components analysis. Finally, construct two factor-based sum scores that 
measure integration at the vertical (intensive) and horizontal (extensive) margins. 
The second argument is that the structure of the export sector, the configuration 
of domestic political institutions, and the manner in which they are combined in a 
country are central to the nature and levels of designed depth in a trade agreement. 
The steps followed to construct the second main argument are as follows. First, 
approximate the factor mobility of the policy outcome and the region to characterize 
trade preferences as following sector or factor lines according to standard trade 
theories. Second, identify which market actors prefer deep integration at the 
intensive and/or extensive margin because they obtain economic benefits from them. 
Third, integrate the theories of veto players and access points to determine how 
political institutions may place constraints on deep integration and how they may 
channel societal demands towards deep integration. Fourth, study the way in which 
the identified market actors that benefit from each margin of deep integration may 
overcome problems to mobilize and successfully demand deep integration and how 
they combine with the existing institutional setting to influence the designed extent 
of deep integration in the agreements. Finally, perform a statistical analysis to 
determine the plausibility of the arguments developed above. 
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Intensive and extensive margins 
First, the concept of depth used in this research to assess how deep integration is 
explained since there is no consensual guidance that would allow comparisons 
between the levels of depth achieved in the agreements established by Latin American 
countries. To categorize deep integration into its intensive and extensive margins, it 
was also necessary to integrate conceptualizations developed by other authors. The 
rationale for selecting, extending, and adapting the categorization suggested by the 
WTO is that it seems to most closely capture the dimensions in the definition of depth 
as ‘the distance from the top or surface to the bottom of something; or the quality of 
being intense or extreme’ (Oxford Dictionaries, 2014). The intensive aspect refers to 
the institutional depth of trade agreements, while the extensive aspect refers to the 
inclusion of additional components beyond the lowering of tariffs in a trade 
agreement (WTO, 2011). On the one hand, aspects covered at the intensive margin 
were type of trade agreement, decision power, legitimacy, and permanency. On the 
other hand, areas covered at the extensive margin were rules of origin, services, 
technical barriers to trade, competition policy, government procurement, trade 
defence instruments, and dispute-settlement mechanisms. The operational 
indicators of depth for the identified dimensions were coded and measured as 
detailed below. The appropriateness of such conceptualization and categorization 
was empirically assessed through principal components analysis. 
To study the margins of deep integration of trade agreements in Latin America, 
more than 256 dyadic agreements were gathered and hand-coded in 110 aspects for 
a total of 28, 160 data points. To the best of my knowledge, this is the most detailed 
and comprehensive database to measure deep integration in trade agreements 
established by Latin American countries since the economic crises of 1982 and until 
2010. Although the effort and time required was much greater than if dyads were 
undirected, for the purposes of this research, it was crucial that dyads were directed 
to avoid the risk of masking aspects of variation and reducing the possibilities of 
obtaining misleading results. To not acknowledge the variation of trade agreements 
in a study that intends to explore such variation could create serious problems for the 
validity of the analysis. One limitation is that more detailed coding can always be 
done. Ideally, to measure the depth resulting from the provisions included and 
excluded in a trade agreement, product/industry-specific rules and 
regime/framework rules can be further analysed. However, the extreme detail of 
product/industry rules makes the collection and systematization of data unworkable 
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for the number of agreements studied in this research given the existing resources 
and time constraints. 
The development of this database is relevant for the study of trade agreements 
because most previous research overlooks the variation of design across trade 
agreements, erroneously characterizing the object of analysis, creating practical 
problems for the analysis, and deriving implications that can be improved in accuracy 
(Koremenos and Snidal, 2003; Allee and Peinhardt, 2010: 1; Hicks and Kim, 2010: 
2; Baccini, Dür, Elsig, and Milewicz, 2011: 8). Oversight of the variation of trade 
agreements is a major shortcoming of most previous academic research (Baccini, 
Dür, Elsig, and Milewicz, 2011: 8). Not considering the differences in the content of 
trade agreements may lead to several problems. First, a practical problem is the 
aggregation of knowledge. For example, knowledge generated from studies with an 
either/or approach to trade agreements could be useful in determining why 
governments sign trade or investment agreements, but it is not as useful to explain 
why governments design schemes that include certain components and exclude 
others (Allee and Peinhardt, 2010: 1-2). Second, the characterization of the object of 
analysis may be erroneous. Finally, the mischaracterization of trade agreements may 
also lead to erroneous implications. For example, if we consider that variation in the 
design of trade agreements responds to different margins for discretion on 
governments’ trade policy (Hicks and Kim, 2010: 9), homogeneous trade agreements 
would only be possible where governments have no discretion over trade policy 
(Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare, 2005: 137) or under the very unlikely situation where 
governments have the same structure, incentives, and constraints. 
Preferences of export oriented producers 
It has been argued that deep integration through trade agreements has the potential 
to alter the distribution of economic resources between interest groups in systematic 
and predictable ways. This part of the research touches an important question in 
international political economy concerning the way in which ‘integration (or not) into 
the international economy affect[s] the interests of individuals, sectors, factors of 
production, or countries and, in turn, national policies’ (Lake, 2009: 221).263  To 
identify the preferences of export oriented producers, these were separated from their 
setting (as suggested by Frieden, 1999) and derived from standard, ‘new,’ and ‘new-
new’ trade theories. Analysing the components of production (Magee, Brock, and 
                                                        
263 Lake (2009) explains that, from this perspective, policies are the dependent variables. The 
place of the actor in the global economy is the explanatory variable. 
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Young, 1989: 1), market actors that obtain economic benefits through deep 
integration at the intensive and/or extensive margins were identified. In addition, the 
characteristics of the policy output under analysis and the features of the countries in 
the region were taken into consideration. According to standard trade theories, trade 
preferences mainly follow sector lines rather than factor lines. Furthermore, the 
characteristics of Latin American countries after the abandonment of the model of 
industrialization based on the substitution of imports was taken into account to 
assess the potential for export oriented producers to exploit scale economies or 
engage in fragmented production. 
Dynamic and productivity gains from trade were assessed as the main incentives 
for large and resourceful exporters, which are mainly industries with scale economies 
and those engaged in production sharing, to prefer deeper integration at both the 
intensive and extensive margins. Static gains from trade were assessed as incentives 
for large and resourceful exporters to prefer deep integration (in their areas of 
interest) at the extensive margin. Static gains from trade were also assessed as 
second-order incentives (after multilateral liberalization) for small and medium 
exporters to prefer deep integration at the extensive margin.  
The first constitutive hypothesis was that, all else being equal, countries with 
more concentrated export sectors are associated with trade agreements with more 
profound extensive margins than are countries with more de-concentrated export 
sectors. The second constitutive hypothesis was that, all else being equal, countries 
with more concentrated export sectors are associated with trade agreements with 
more profound intensive margins than are countries with more de-concentrated 
export sectors. A note of caution was that, although concentrated exporters have 
economic incentives to prefer deep integration at the intensive and extensive 
margins, the limited number of such exporters may restrict deep integration (because  
such exporters will only be interested in the specific areas and mechanisms which 
affect their production). The results of the empirical analysis are generally in line with 
the constitutive hypotheses developed in this section of the research. Because 
(de)concentration of the export sector is a constitutive term in both the analysis of 
deep integration at the intensive and the extensive margins, its results are discussed 
in the subsection that also addresses its combination with access points and veto 
players (the last subsection of this section). 
Regarding economic interests and preferences, in addition to the limitations of 
predicting the effect of export sector (de)concentration over depth at the intensive 
margin, two additional limitations of the analysis are reflective of the chosen 
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analytical framework. First, it has been argued that considering interests as 
exogenous ignores re-shaping of economic interests over time.264 Second, Lake (2009) 
mentions that the derivation of preferences from economic trade theories has been 
criticized as materialist and narrow (e.g. Farrell and Finnemore 2009; Katzenstein 
2009; Keohane 2009). In terms of policy preferences, interests are ‘the engine that 
drives preferences,’ but their influence may be ‘mitigated by other factors, including 
ideology, party affiliation and institutional constraints’ (Schonhardt-Bailey, 2006: 
23). Although these aspects of preferences cannot be derived from economic trade 
theories, economic interests capture a concrete element that influences preferences 
towards deep integration. For the purposes of this research, this information should 
be used instead of assuming that economic interests are already represented by the 
positions of political institutions. Deriving preferences from economic trade theories 
is also a feasible alternative for analysing Latin American and other developing 
countries, where systematically gathering complete information about preferences 
presents additional obstacles regarding systematization, transparency, and accuracy. 
Domestic political institutions 
To analyse how the political institution setting influences the depth of trade 
agreements established by Latin American countries, it has been argued that an 
integrated setting of institutions as access points for societal demands and as veto 
players is an appropriate approach. The main reason is that most Latin American 
countries share broadly similar institutional characteristics. Furthermore, most Latin 
American countries share the specific political institutions to which trade 
liberalization is attributed in literature, presidentialism (e.g. Nielson, 2003) and 
proportional representation (e.g. Rogowski, 1987). Therefore, conceptual approaches 
that incorporate multiple institutions and additional areas of variation seem more 
appropriate to understanding the differences in the nature and levels of integration 
of the agreements signed in the region. Access point theory (Ehrlich, 2007, 2011) and 
veto player theory (Tsebelis, 1995, 2002) were discussed, and their areas of 
differences and complementarities were studied to integrate them in a single 
framework. Considering veto players and access points in the same institutional 
framework enables study of two related but distinct areas of influence over the extent 
of deep integration in trade agreements: how the level of deep integration is decided 
                                                        
264 This aspect was mentioned in Chapter 5. Unilateral liberalization and diversification of the 
export-sector promoted by the government transformed the structure of the export-sector in 
Latin America. 
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between veto players and how the level of deep integration is influenced by the cost 
of access points. The approach used is limited in explaining the feedback effects 
between political institutions and domestic interests (e.g. Rogowski 1989). These 
effects can be addressed in case studies, as suggested in the last section, which is 
devoted to further research. 
The arguments developed are that after the transformation of the model of 
economic development, executives in the region had incentives to establish trade 
agreements with deep levels of integration. All else being equal, from the perspective 
of veto player theory, the initiatives of the executive to establish these agreements are 
limited by the number of effective veto players in the system. The number of effective 
veto players increases when they are not congruent or coherent. On the other hand, 
from the perspective of access point theory, numerous access points increase the 
likeliness that the interests of a larger number of groups are represented.265 Based on 
these theories, two constitutive hypotheses were put forward. The first is that 
countries with fewer veto players are associated with trade agreements with more 
profound deep integration. The second is that countries with more access points 
without veto power are associated with deeper trade agreements (considering only 
the aspect of representation). Nevertheless, these theories, whether combined or on 
their own, are limited when trying to analyse the extensive and intensive margins of 
integration. The specific influence of the institutional configurations on the intensive 
and extensive margins becomes clearer after taking into account how different 
configurations of veto players and access points without veto power in a country 
combine with (de)concentrated export interests. The corresponding results of the 
empirical analysis are discussed in the next subsection. 
The analytical focus on domestic political institutions departs from previous 
political economy studies of Latin America that highlight the role of foreign economic 
pressures and interest groups. More generally, several authors have pointed out that 
when endogenous trade theory has attempted to study the influence of political 
institutions, theoretical approaches that endogenize trade protection or liberalization 
have focused on pressure from interest groups over these political institutions 
(Rodrik, 1995). Interests are central, but they cannot provide a complete account of 
how policy outcomes are shaped. Regardless of how clearly specified they are, 
                                                        
265  As mentioned in the next sub-section, from a collective action perspective, numerous 
access points also reduce the costs of lobbying and increase the possibilities of being captured 
by protectionist groups (which are assumed to have a collective action advantage over pro-
liberalization groups). In this case, it is more difficult for executives to establish trade 
agreements with deep integration. 
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‘interests are refracted through political institutions that often have an independent 
effect on policy choices’ (Lake, 2009: 228). This emphasis in academic literature 
(Geddes, 2002: 343; Spiller, Stein, and Tommasi, 2008: 2) is heightened in the study 
of Latin American because the undemocratic characteristics of the region promoted 
lack of analysis of their formal institutions. 
Overcoming collective action problems 
Building upon the categorization of deep integration at the intensive and extensive 
margins, the identification of trade preferences of export oriented producers, and the 
mapping of institutional settings described above, how these elements combine 
within a collective action framework was analysed. This analysis considered the 
differences in the excludability of policy benefits and the thresholds of the modified 
step production functions of deep integration at the intensive and extensive margins 
in trade agreements. It also considered how export sector (de)concentration 
influenced the possibility that groups would demand deep integration following the 
simultaneous processes of unilateral liberalization and export sector diversification. 
Third, the specificity of the setting and its influence over the excludability of policy 
benefits was considered. Fourth, selective incentives attached to lobbying for deep 
integration were analysed. Finally, it was considered how these aspects, combined 
with the costs of capturing veto players and access points, met the productive 
functions of deep integration at the intensive and extensive margins at different 
levels. 
In this part of the research, the costs and benefits that impede or facilitate 
collective action are assessed, as is usual in the literature (e.g. Olson, 1965; Caves, 
1976; Pincus, 1975; Pittman, 1977; Lavergne, 1983; Baldwin, 1985, 1989; Godek, 
1985; Grier, Munger and Roberts, 1994; Schonhardt-Bailey, 2006). The 
characteristics of the interest groups in the export sector, the setting, and the policy 
outcome were considered to analyse how appropriable are the benefits and how 
assignable are the costs of collective action towards deep integration. The 
combination of identifying interested actors and their preferences and the decision 
elements, competition, and channelling of societal preferences of political 
institutions contributes to a more complete understanding of how and when they 
influence deep integration at its different margins than when they are considered in 
isolation. By combining these elements, the objective is to contribute to a better 
understanding of the puzzle that motivates this research: the existence of variation in 
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the nature and levels of deep integration of trade agreements signed by Latin 
American countries. 
After combining the veto player and access point theories and including 
imperfect competition, the predictions of veto player and access point theories 
regarding the extent of deep integration in trade agreements are conditional on the 
number and power of export oriented producers. Two conditional hypotheses were 
put forward. First, countries in which there is a combination between a relatively 
more concentrated export sector and relatively large numbers of effective veto 
players, are associated with agreements with deeper integration at the intensive 
margins. Second, countries in which there is a combination of a relatively more de-
concentrated export sector and relatively large numbers of access points without veto 
power, are associated with agreements with lower levels of integration at the 
extensive margins. The results of the empirical analyses and robustness tests showed 
indirect and direct support for the conditional hypotheses put forward in this 
research, and are generally in line with their constitutive hypothesis. 
The main challenge (and limitation) regarding the empirical estimation (as in 
previous studies hat analyse features and provisions in trade agreements) is the 
problem of endogeneity. Because both margins are widely encompassing aspects of 
depth, it is extremely difficult to find strong instruments to implement an 
instrumental variables model. Using weak instruments would generate the same 
problems the model is intended to correct (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007; Neumayer 
and De Soysa, 2012). On the other hand, while endogeneity biases the estimates, 
omitting the endogenous variables may change the statistical significance and the 
direction of the studied effects, which is central for the purposes of this research 
(King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994). Therefore, as in studies that have faced similar 
dilemmas (Kucik, 2012; Neumayer and De Soysa, 2012) the endogeneity is 
acknowledged and a cross-sectional estimation using OLS with robust standard 
errors is used to estimate two separate equations for the intensive and extensive 
margins as the dependent variables. The size of the coefficients is reported, but it 
should be interpreted conservatively because of the bias. Finally, since the main 
interest in this research is studying deep integration established by countries in the 
Latin American region as a whole, all agreements for which data was available (more 
than 80 per cent) were included in the empirical analyses. 
The different levels of concentration of interests in the export sector influence 
their capacities to mobilize to different extents, and when combined with different 
configurations of political institutions in the region, they contribute to explaining the 
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existence of wide differences in the nature and levels of depth that agreements reach 
in the region. Regarding the intensive margin, the interaction between export sector 
concentration and veto players is positive, statistically significant (with a 99% degree 
of confidence), and the largest in the model; the simple effect of concentration is non-
statistically significant when there are no veto players, and the simple effect of veto 
players is non-statistically when the export sector is the most de-concentrated. 
Predicting the effect of concentration was analytically unclear: on the one hand, large 
and resourceful export oriented producers obtain the most benefits from deep 
integration at the intensive margin, which could lead to deeper trade agreements. On 
the other hand, these types of producers may only target the specific barriers that 
affect their processes of production, which would lead to lower levels of integration 
in trade agreements. Consistent with the predictions from the conditional 
hypotheses, when the concentration of the export sector increases, the negative effect 
of larger numbers of veto players on deep integration at the intensive margin 
decreases. Resourceful exporters in concentrated export sectors form a critical mass 
that is able to capture costly veto players and achieve trade agreements with strong 
institutional structures that facilitate the coordination and management of their 
internationalized processes of production and the realization of scale economies. 
Regarding the extensive margin, the interaction between export sector 
concentration and veto players is negative, statistically significant (with a 99% degree 
of confidence), and the largest in the model; the simple effect of concentration is 
positive and statistically significant (with a 99% degree of confidence) when access 
points without veto power are at their minimum, and the simple effect of access 
points is non-statistically significant when the export sector is the most de-
concentrated. Following only the reasoning that the interest groups with a collective 
action advantage capture the access points, shallow trade agreements are difficult to 
explain when increasing returns to scale and fragmented production are taken into 
consideration. These results tend to support the argument that in countries with 
concentrated export sectors, exporters tend to lose their advantage in lobbying for 
deep integration at the extensive margin when a large number of access points 
without veto power exists. Larger numbers of access points without veto power 
decrease the costs of lobbying through competition and are more easily captured by 
protectionist groups, which reduces deep integration at the extensive margin. 
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Further research 
Research regarding deep integration is very limited, and further study on the matter 
could deepen our understanding of this form of trade liberalization and its causes and 
consequences. One way in which this research can be extended and deepened is by 
separately considering each of the areas aggregated at the intensive and extensive 
margins (type of trade agreement, decision power, legitimacy, permanency, rules of 
origin, services, technical barriers to trade, competition policy, government 
procurement, trade defence instruments, and dispute settlement mechanisms). This 
strategy would make it easier to isolate the specific determinants of each area, to 
identify the concrete industries that obtain benefits from integration in each area, 
and to determine how domestic political institutions mediate these interests. Having 
less encompassing dependent variables would also make it possible to find stronger 
instruments and to reduce the endogeneity problems in the empirical analyses. A 
second area for further research is to incorporate the rest of the regions of the world 
and develop a comparative analysis between them and the Latin American region. 
Finally, qualitative case studies would complement this research and allow 
development of more extensive theory and testing and better measurements, as 
would considering a less linear research design. For the case studies, historical 
institutionalism266 seems to be an appropriate analytical approach to complement 
the extended endogenous trade theory that framed this research. According to Odell’s 
(2001) and Geddes’ (2003) advice on case study selection, choice based on the 
dependent variables should be avoided and the focus should be placed on the 
extremes. Four cases seem interesting: Chile, Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil. 
Geographically, Argentina and Mexico are closer to the economic giants of the region 
(Brazil and the United States, respectively). However, while Mexico’s trade is highly 
concentrated and complementary with the United States, increasing its dependence 
on the United States, Argentina’s trade is more diversified, reducing its dependence 
                                                        
266 Rational choice institutionalism and historical institutionalism agree on a definition of 
institutions; and differ on some of their characteristics. North (1990: 3) defines institutions 
as ‘the humanely devised constraints that shape human interaction.’ According to Pierson and 
Skocpol (2002: 698) rational choice institutionalism and historical institutionalism main 
differences are whether institutions are considered exogenous or endogenous, the importance 
of dynamic processes, and the duration of these processes. Lieberman (2002: 709) refer to 
these dynamic processes as the historical and institutional contexts that determine which and 
how political power is allocated and regulated affecting political outcomes. Schonhardt-Bailey 
(2006: 5) emphasizes that both approaches also differ in their preferred methods of analysis: 
while rational choice research uses more quantitative methods; historical institutionalism 
makes a more extensive use of qualitative analysis. 
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on Brazil. On the other hand, Brazil and Chile pursue different strategies. While 
Brazil’s large economic size acts as a magnet for neighbouring countries in the region, 
Chile’s relative isolation and diversified trade make a multilateral strategy preferable 
to a regional one (Aggarwal, Espach, and Tulchin, 2004: 267-268). The sizes of the 
economy and population are medium in Argentina and Chile and large in Brazil and 
Mexico compared to the rest of the countries in the region. 
Although in terms of broad institutional configuration, there is no variation in 
the numbers of veto points between the cases, there is a high level of variation 
regarding the number and nature of effective veto players and access points. This 
allows different margins of manoeuvre for executives. Historically, while Argentina 
and Brazil have had moderate to weak party discipline, Mexico and Chile have had 
more disciplined parties, which have been more supportive of executive actions. In 
addition, Argentina and Brazil have stronger federal governments than the other two 
countries. As regards the configuration of interests, Brazil’s powerful industrialist 
interest groups and Argentina’s weak export oriented interest groups limit the 
possibilities of achieving deep integration agreements. On the other hand, Chile’s 
political support of export oriented interest groups and Mexico’s political constraints 
on groups opposing trade liberalization may have increased their possibilities of 
achieving deep integration. 
In terms of bargaining strategies, the four countries have pursued different 
approaches. Argentina and Brazil are more focused on the regional level, but in 
different positions, with the former as a follower and the latter as a leader. In contrast, 
Chile and Mexico have established a broad array of trade agreements, with the former 
focusing on the multilateral level and the latter positioning itself as a hub. Further 
research should explore these case studies, comparing them to test the general 
statistical results presented in this research. Doing this would allow improvements in 
the analysis of deep integration in the region through more developed theory (by 
considering feedback effects between economic interests and political institutions), 
testing, and measurements. 
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A  Appendix: Dyads and agreements 
 
Agreement  
Date of 
signature 
Main country Partner 
CARICOM – Costa Rica 2004 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
Costa Rica 
Bolivia-MERCOSUR 1996 Argentina Bolivia 
MERCOSUR 1991 Argentina Brazil 
Chile-MERCOSUR 1996 Argentina Chile 
MERCOSUR - Israel 2007 Argentina Israel 
MERCOSUR 1991 Argentina Paraguay 
MERCOSUR – Peru 2005 Argentina Peru 
Chile - Australia 2008 Australia Chile 
Chile-EU 2002 Austria Chile 
Mexico – EU 1997 Austria Mexico 
CARICOM – Costa Rica 2004 Barbados Costa Rica 
CARICOM - Dominican 
Republic 
1998 Barbados Dominican Republic 
Chile-EU 2002 Belgium Chile 
CARICOM – Costa Rica 2004 Belize Costa Rica 
CARICOM - Dominican 
Republic 
1998 Belize Dominican Republic 
Bolivia-MERCOSUR 1996 Bolivia Argentina 
Bolivia-MERCOSUR 1996 Bolivia Brazil 
Bolivia - Mexico 2010 Bolivia Mexico 
Bolivia-MERCOSUR 1996 Bolivia Paraguay 
Bolivia-MERCOSUR 1996 Bolivia Uruguay 
MERCOSUR 1991 Brazil Argentina 
Bolivia-MERCOSUR 1996 Brazil Bolivia 
Chile-MERCOSUR 1996 Brazil Chile 
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Agreement  
Date of 
signature 
Main country Partner 
MERCOSUR 1991 Brazil Paraguay 
MERCOSUR – Peru 2005 Brazil Peru 
MERCOSUR 1991 Brazil Uruguay 
Chile-P4 2005 Brunei Darussalam Chile 
Canada-Chile 1996 Canada Chile 
Canada - Colombia 2008 Canada Colombia 
Canada-Costa Rica 2001 Canada Costa Rica 
NAFTA 1992 Canada Mexico 
Chile-MERCOSUR 1996 Chile Argentina 
Chile - Australia 2008 Chile Australia 
Chile-EU 2002 Chile Austria 
Chile-EU 2002 Chile Belgium 
Chile-MERCOSUR 1996 Chile Brazil 
Chile-P4 2005 Chile Brunei Darussalam 
Canada-Chile 1996 Chile Canada 
Chile- China 2005 Chile China 
Chile - Colombia 2006 Chile Colombia 
Central America - Chile  1999 Chile Costa Rica 
Central America - Chile  1999 Chile El Salvador 
Chile-EU 2002 Chile Finland 
Chile-EU 2002 Chile France 
Chile-EU 2002 Chile Greece 
Central America - Chile  1999 Chile Guatemala 
Central America - Chile  1999 Chile Honduras 
Chile-EFTA 2003 Chile Iceland 
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Agreement  
Date of 
signature 
Main country Partner 
Chile-EU 2002 Chile Italy 
Chile-Japan 2007 Chile Japan 
Chile-Korea 2003 Chile Korea 
Chile-EU 2002 Chile Luxembourg 
Chile –Mexico 1998 Chile Mexico 
Chile-EU 2002 Chile Netherlands 
Chile-P4 2005 Chile New Zealand 
Chile-EFTA 2003 Chile Norway 
Chile - Panama 2006 Chile Panama 
Chile-MERCOSUR 1996 Chile Paraguay 
Chile - Peru 2006 Chile Peru 
Chile-EU 2002 Chile Spain 
Chile-EU 2002 Chile Sweden 
Chile-EFTA 2003 Chile Switzerland 
Chile - Turkey 2009 Chile Turkey 
Chile-EU 2002 Chile United Kingdom 
Chile- United States 2003 Chile United States 
Chile- China 2005 China Chile 
Costa Rica - China 2010 China Costa Rica 
Peru - China 2009 China Peru 
Canada - Colombia 2008 Colombia Canada 
Chile - Colombia 2006 Colombia Chile 
Colombia - Northern Triangle 2007 Colombia El Salvador 
Colombia - Northern Triangle 2007 Colombia Guatemala 
Colombia - Northern Triangle 2007 Colombia Honduras  
APPENDIX A
 
255 
Agreement  
Date of 
signature 
Main country Partner 
Colombia - Mexico 1994 Colombia Mexico 
Colombia - United States 2006 Colombia United States 
Colombia - EFTA 2011 Colombia  Iceland 
Colombia - EFTA 2011 Colombia  Switzerland 
CARICOM – Costa Rica 2004 Costa Rica 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
CARICOM – Costa Rica 2004 Costa Rica Barbados 
CARICOM – Costa Rica 2004 Costa Rica Belize 
Canada-Costa Rica 2001 Costa Rica Canada 
Central America - Chile  1999 Costa Rica Chile 
Costa Rica - China 2010 Costa Rica China 
CARICOM – Costa Rica 2004 Costa Rica Dominica 
Central America – Dominican 
Republic 
1998 Costa Rica Dominican Republic 
Dominican Republic-CAFTA 2004 Costa Rica Dominican Republic 
CARICOM – Costa Rica 2004 Costa Rica Grenada 
CARICOM – Costa Rica 2004 Costa Rica Guyana 
CARICOM – Costa Rica 2004 Costa Rica Jamaica 
Costa Rica – Mexico 1994 Costa Rica Mexico 
Central America - Panama  2002 Costa Rica Panama 
CARICOM – Costa Rica 2004 Costa Rica St. Kitts and Nevis 
CARICOM – Costa Rica 2004 Costa Rica St. Lucia 
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Agreement  
Date of 
signature 
Main country Partner 
CARICOM – Costa Rica 2004 Costa Rica 
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
CARICOM – Costa Rica 2004 Costa Rica 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
CARICOM – Costa Rica 2004 Dominica Costa Rica 
CARICOM - Dominican 
Republic 
1998 Dominica Dominican Republic 
CARICOM - Dominican 
Republic 
1998 Dominican Republic Barbados 
CARICOM - Dominican 
Republic 
1998 Dominican Republic Belize 
Central America – Dominican 
Republic 
1998 Dominican Republic Costa Rica 
Dominican Republic-CAFTA 2004 Dominican Republic Costa Rica 
CARICOM - Dominican 
Republic 
1998 Dominican Republic Dominica 
Central America – Dominican 
Republic 
1998 Dominican Republic El Salvador 
Dominican Republic-CAFTA 2004 Dominican Republic El Salvador 
CARICOM - Dominican 
Republic 
1998 Dominican Republic Grenada 
Central America – Dominican 
Republic 
1998 Dominican Republic Guatemala 
CARICOM - Dominican 
Republic 
1998 Dominican Republic Guyana 
Central America – Dominican 
Republic 
1998 Dominican Republic Honduras 
Dominican Republic-CAFTA 2004 Dominican Republic Honduras 
Central America – Dominican 
Republic 
1998 Dominican Republic Nicaragua 
Dominican Republic-CAFTA 2004 Dominican Republic Nicaragua 
CARICOM - Dominican 
Republic 
1998 Dominican Republic St. Lucia 
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Agreement  
Date of 
signature 
Main country Partner 
CARICOM - Dominican 
Republic 
1998 Dominican Republic 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Dominican Republic-CAFTA 2004 Dominican Republic United States 
Central America - Chile  1999 El Salvador Chile 
Colombia - Northern Triangle 2007 El Salvador Colombia 
Central America – Dominican 
Republic 
1998 El Salvador Dominican Republic 
Dominican Republic-CAFTA 2004 El Salvador Dominican Republic 
Central America - Panama  2002 El Salvador Panama 
Chile-EU 2002 Finland Chile 
Mexico – EU 1997 Finland Mexico 
Chile-EU 2002 France Chile 
Mexico – EU 1997 France Mexico 
Mexico – EU 1997 Germany Mexico 
Chile-EU 2002 Greece Chile 
Mexico – EU 1997 Greece Mexico 
CARICOM – Costa Rica 2004 Grenada Costa Rica 
CARICOM - Dominican 
Republic 
1998 Grenada Dominican Republic 
Central America - Chile  1999 Guatemala Chile 
Colombia - Northern Triangle 2007 Guatemala Colombia 
Central America – Dominican 
Republic 
1998 Guatemala Dominican Republic 
Mexico- Northern Triangle 2000 Guatemala Mexico 
Central America - Panama  2002 Guatemala Panama 
Dominican Republic-CAFTA 2004 Guatemala United States 
APPENDIX A
 
258 
Agreement  
Date of 
signature 
Main country Partner 
CARICOM – Costa Rica 2004 Guyana Costa Rica 
CARICOM - Dominican 
Republic 
1998 Guyana Dominican Republic 
Central America - Chile  1999 Honduras Chile 
Central America – Dominican 
Republic 
1998 Honduras Dominican Republic 
Dominican Republic-CAFTA 2004 Honduras Dominican Republic 
Mexico- Northern Triangle 2000 Honduras Mexico 
Central America - Panama  2002 Honduras Panama 
Dominican Republic-CAFTA 2004 Honduras United States 
Colombia - Northern Triangle 2007 Honduras  Colombia 
Chile-EFTA 2003 Iceland Chile 
Colombia - EFTA 2011 Iceland Colombia  
Mexico – EFTA 2000 Iceland Mexico 
Peru - EFTA 2011 Iceland Peru  
Mexico – EU 1997 Ireland Mexico 
MERCOSUR - Israel 2007 Israel Argentina 
Mexico – Israel 2000 Israel Mexico 
MERCOSUR - Israel 2007 Israel Paraguay 
MERCOSUR - Israel 2007 Israel Uruguay 
Chile-EU 2002 Italy Chile 
Mexico – EU 1997 Italy Mexico 
CARICOM – Costa Rica 2004 Jamaica Costa Rica 
Chile-Japan 2007 Japan Chile 
Mexico- Japan 2004 Japan Mexico 
Peru - Japan 2011 Japan Peru 
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Agreement  
Date of 
signature 
Main country Partner 
Chile-Korea 2003 Korea Chile 
Peru - South Korea 2010 Korea Peru 
Chile-EU 2002 Luxembourg Chile 
Mexico – EU 1997 Mexico Austria 
Bolivia - Mexico 2010 Mexico Bolivia 
NAFTA 1992 Mexico Canada 
Chile –Mexico 1998 Mexico Chile 
Colombia - Mexico 1994 Mexico Colombia 
Costa Rica – Mexico 1994 Mexico Costa Rica 
Mexico – EU 1997 Mexico Finland 
Mexico – EU 1997 Mexico France 
Mexico – EU 1997 Mexico Germany 
Mexico – EU 1997 Mexico Greece 
Mexico- Northern Triangle 2000 Mexico Guatemala 
Mexico- Northern Triangle 2000 Mexico Honduras 
Mexico – EFTA 2000 Mexico Iceland 
Mexico – EU 1997 Mexico Ireland 
Mexico – Israel 2000 Mexico Israel 
Mexico – EU 1997 Mexico Italy 
Mexico- Japan 2004 Mexico Japan 
Mexico – EU 1997 Mexico Netherlands 
Mexico – Nicaragua 1997 Mexico Nicaragua 
Mexico – EFTA 2000 Mexico Norway 
Mexico - Peru 2011 Mexico Peru 
Mexico – EU 1997 Mexico Portugal 
Mexico – EU 1997 Mexico Spain 
Mexico – EU 1997 Mexico Sweden 
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Agreement  
Date of 
signature 
Main country Partner 
Mexico – EU 1997 Mexico United Kingdom 
NAFTA 1992 Mexico United States 
Mexico-Uruguay 2003 Mexico Uruguay 
Chile-EU 2002 Netherlands Chile 
Mexico – EU 1997 Netherlands Mexico 
Chile-P4 2005 New Zealand Chile 
Central America – Dominican 
Republic 
1998 Nicaragua Dominican Republic 
Dominican Republic-CAFTA 2004 Nicaragua Dominican Republic 
Mexico – Nicaragua 1997 Nicaragua Mexico 
Dominican Republic-CAFTA 2004 Nicaragua United States 
Chile-EFTA 2003 Norway Chile 
Mexico – EFTA 2000 Norway Mexico 
Peru - EFTA 2011 Norway Peru  
Chile - Panama 2006 Panama Chile 
Central America - Panama  2002 Panama Costa Rica 
Central America - Panama  2002 Panama El Salvador 
Central America - Panama  2002 Panama Guatemala 
Central America - Panama  2002 Panama Honduras 
Panama - Singapore 2006 Panama Singapore 
MERCOSUR 1991 Paraguay Argentina 
Bolivia-MERCOSUR 1996 Paraguay Bolivia 
MERCOSUR 1991 Paraguay Brazil 
Chile-MERCOSUR 1996 Paraguay Chile 
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Agreement  
Date of 
signature 
Main country Partner 
MERCOSUR - Israel 2007 Paraguay Israel 
MERCOSUR – Peru 2005 Paraguay Peru 
MERCOSUR 1991 Paraguay Uruguay 
MERCOSUR – Peru 2005 Peru Argentina 
MERCOSUR – Peru 2005 Peru Brazil 
Chile - Peru 2006 Peru Chile 
Peru - China 2009 Peru China 
Peru - Japan 2011 Peru Japan 
Peru - South Korea 2010 Peru Korea 
Mexico - Peru 2011 Peru Mexico 
MERCOSUR – Peru 2005 Peru Paraguay 
Peru - Thailand 2010 Peru Thailand 
MERCOSUR – Peru 2005 Peru Uruguay 
Peru - EFTA 2011 Peru  Iceland 
Peru - EFTA 2011 Peru  Norway 
Peru - EFTA 2011 Peru  Switzerland 
Mexico – EU 1997 Portugal Mexico 
Panama - Singapore 2006 Singapore Panama 
Chile-EU 2002 Spain Chile 
Mexico – EU 1997 Spain Mexico 
CARICOM – Costa Rica 2004 St. Kitts and Nevis Costa Rica 
CARICOM – Costa Rica 2004 St. Lucia Costa Rica 
CARICOM - Dominican 
Republic 
1998 St. Lucia Dominican Republic 
CARICOM – Costa Rica 2004 
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
Costa Rica 
Chile-EU 2002 Sweden Chile 
Mexico – EU 1997 Sweden Mexico 
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Agreement  
Date of 
signature 
Main country Partner 
Chile-EFTA 2003 Switzerland Chile 
Colombia - EFTA 2011 Switzerland Colombia  
Peru - EFTA 2011 Switzerland Peru  
Peru - Thailand 2010 Thailand Peru 
CARICOM – Costa Rica 2004 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Costa Rica 
CARICOM - Dominican 
Republic 
1998 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Dominican Republic 
Chile - Turkey 2009 Turkey Chile 
Chile-EU 2002 United Kingdom Chile 
Mexico – EU 1997 United Kingdom Mexico 
Chile- United States 2003 United States Chile 
Colombia - United States 2006 United States Colombia 
Dominican Republic-CAFTA 2004 United States Dominican Republic 
Dominican Republic-CAFTA 2004 United States Guatemala 
Dominican Republic-CAFTA 2004 United States Honduras 
NAFTA 1992 United States Mexico 
Dominican Republic-CAFTA 2004 United States Nicaragua 
Bolivia-MERCOSUR 1996 Uruguay Bolivia 
MERCOSUR 1991 Uruguay Brazil 
MERCOSUR - Israel 2007 Uruguay Israel 
Mexico-Uruguay 2003 Uruguay Mexico 
MERCOSUR 1991 Uruguay Paraguay 
MERCOSUR – Peru 2005 Uruguay Peru 
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B  Appendix: Factor analysis 
Table B-1 Correlation matrix 
 
Discipline coverage 
Discipline reactive 
coverage 
Discipline support 
bodies/mechanisms Decision power Legitimacy 
Institutional 
capacities 
Discipline coverage 1.000 0.752 0.708 -0.262 -0.038 0.272 
Discipline reactive 
coverage 
0.752 1.000 0.583 0.021 -0.156 0.371 
Discipline support 
bodies/mechanisms 
0.708 0.583 1.000 -0.210 -0.015 0.177 
Decision power -0.262 0.021 -0.210 1.000 -0.408 0.374 
Legitimacy -0.038 -0.156 -0.015 -0.408 1.000 -0.136 
Institutional 
capacities 
0.272 0.371 0.177 0.374 -0.136 1.000 
 
Table B-2 Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy and Bartlett’s Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy. 0.643 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 584.472 
df 15 
Sig. 0.000 
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Table B-3 Communalities 
 Initial Extraction 
Discipline coverage 1.000 0.872 
Discipline reactive coverage 1.000 0.792 
Discipline support bodies/mechanisms 1.000 0.728 
Decision power 1.000 0.798 
Legitimacy 1.000 0.474 
Institutional capacities 1.000 0.532 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
Table B-4 Total variance explained 
Component 
Initial eigenvalues Extraction sums of squared loadings 
Rotation sums of squared 
loadingsa 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total 
dime
nsion
0 
1 2.536 42.274 42.274 2.536 42.274 42.274 2.526 
2 1.659 27.651 69.925 1.659 27.651 69.925 1.688 
3 .832 13.867 83.792     
4 .414 6.895 90.686     
5 .380 6.329 97.015     
6 .179 2.985 100.000     
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance. 
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Table B-5 Pattern matrix and structure matrix 
Item Pattern coefficients Structure coefficients Commu-
nalities 
Compo-
nent 1 
Compo-
nent 2 
Compo-
nent 1 
Compo-
nent 2 
Discipline coverage 0.936 -0.086 0.930 -.016 0.872 
Discipline reactive coverage 0.851 0.203 0.867 0.266 0.728 
Discipline support 
bodies/mechanisms 
0.853 
-0.126 
0.844 
-0.063 
0.792 
Institutional capacities 0.346 0.617 0.392 0.643 0.532 
Decision power -0.269 0.872 -0.205 0.852 0.798 
Legitimacy -0.007 -0.688 -0.058 -0.688 0.474 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.  
Rotation converged in 4 iterations. 
 
Table B-6 Component correlation matrix 
Component 1 2 
1 1.000 0.074 
2 0.074 1.000 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
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C  Appendix: Average deep integration scores 
Date of 
signature Agreement Extensive margin Intensive margin 
1991 MERCOSUR 0.30 2.46 
1992 NAFTA 1.75 1.08 
1994 Colombia - Mexico 2.86 0.41 
1994 Costa Rica – Mexico 2.60 0.97 
1996 Bolivia-MERCOSUR 0.31 0.50 
1996 Canada-Chile 1.17 0.41 
1996 Chile-MERCOSUR 0.71 0.71 
1997 Mexico – EU 1.28 0.84 
1997 Mexico – Nicaragua 2.29 1.44 
1998 
CARICOM - Dominican 
Republic 0.72 0.41 
1998 
Central America – Dominican 
Republic 1.60 1.13 
1998 Chile –Mexico 1.53 1.30 
1999 Central America - Chile  1.52 1.55 
2000 Mexico – EFTA 1.38 1.55 
2000 Mexico – Israel 1.23 1.44 
2000 Mexico- Northern Triangle 1.57 1.22 
2001 Canada-Costa Rica 0.67 1.22 
2002 Central America - Panama  2.08 1.55 
2002 Chile-EU 1.91 1.50 
2003 Chile- United States 2.14 1.08 
2003 Chile-EFTA 1.80 1.00 
2003 Chile-Korea 1.47 1.41 
2003 Mexico-Uruguay 1.16 0.97 
2004 CARICOM – Costa Rica 0.27 1.36 
2004 Dominican Republic-CAFTA 2.12 1.30 
2004 Mexico- Japan 0.54 1.44 
2005 Chile- China 0.91 1.77 
2005 Chile-P4 2.51 1.64 
2005 MERCOSUR – Peru 1.08 0.97 
2006 Chile - Colombia 1.69 1.10 
2006 Chile - Panama 1.19 1.30 
2006 Chile - Peru 1.98 1.33 
2006 Colombia - United States 2.49 1.08 
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Date of 
signature Agreement Extensive margin Intensive margin 
2006 Panama - Singapore 1.23 0.14 
2007 Chile-Japan 1.21 0.81 
2007 Colombia - Northern Triangle 1.58 1.44 
2007 MERCOSUR - Israel 0.46 1.20 
2008 Canada - Colombia 2.73 1.08 
2008 Chile - Australia 2.16 1.44 
2009 Chile - Turkey 0.12 1.44 
2009 Peru - China 1.35 0.74 
2010 Bolivia - Mexico 1.05 0.85 
2010 Costa Rica - China 0.83 1.33 
2010 Peru - South Korea 2.42 0.74 
2010 Peru - Thailand 0.70 0.23 
2011 Colombia - EFTA 1.51 1.69 
2011 Mexico - Peru 1.42 0.97 
2011 Peru - EFTA 1.38 1.21 
2011 Peru - Japan 1.72 0.74 
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D  Appendix: Deep integration scores 
Main country Partner Agreement 
Extensive 
margin 
Intensive 
margin 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
Costa Rica CARICOM – Costa Rica 
0.27 1.49 
Argentina Bolivia Bolivia-MERCOSUR 0.26 0.71 
Argentina Brazil MERCOSUR 0.3 2.46 
Argentina Chile Chile-MERCOSUR 0.71 0.71 
Argentina Israel MERCOSUR - Israel 0.46 1.2 
Argentina Paraguay MERCOSUR 0.3 2.46 
Argentina Peru MERCOSUR – Peru 1.08 0.97 
Australia Chile Chile - Australia 2.16 1.44 
Austria Chile Chile-EU 1.91 1.5 
Austria Mexico Mexico – EU 1.28 0.84 
Barbados Costa Rica CARICOM – Costa Rica 0.27 1.49 
Barbados 
Dominican 
Republic 
CARICOM - Dominican 
Republic 0.72 0.41 
Belgium Chile Chile-EU 1.91 1.5 
Belize Costa Rica CARICOM – Costa Rica 0.27 1.49 
Belize 
Dominican 
Republic 
CARICOM - Dominican 
Republic 0.72 0.41 
Bolivia Argentina Bolivia-MERCOSUR 0.35 0.71 
Bolivia Brazil Bolivia-MERCOSUR 0.35 0.71 
Bolivia Mexico Bolivia - Mexico 1.05 0.85 
Bolivia Paraguay Bolivia-MERCOSUR 0.35 0.38 
Bolivia Uruguay Bolivia-MERCOSUR 0.35 0.38 
Brazil Argentina MERCOSUR 0.3 2.46 
Brazil Bolivia Bolivia-MERCOSUR 0.26 0.38 
Brazil Chile Chile-MERCOSUR 0.71 0.71 
Brazil Paraguay MERCOSUR 0.3 2.46 
Brazil Peru MERCOSUR – Peru 1.08 0.97 
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Main country Partner Agreement 
Extensive 
margin 
Intensive 
margin 
Brazil Uruguay MERCOSUR 0.3 2.46 
Brunei 
Darussalam 
Chile Chile-P4 
2.53 1.64 
Canada Chile Canada-Chile 1.17 0.41 
Canada Colombia Canada - Colombia 2.73 1.08 
Canada Costa Rica Canada-Costa Rica 0.67 1.22 
Canada Mexico NAFTA 1.75 1.08 
Chile Argentina Chile-MERCOSUR 0.71 0.71 
Chile Australia Chile - Australia 2.16 1.44 
Chile Austria Chile-EU 1.91 1.5 
Chile Belgium Chile-EU 1.91 1.5 
Chile Brazil Chile-MERCOSUR 0.71 0.71 
Chile 
Brunei 
Darussalam 
Chile-P4 
2.53 1.64 
Chile Canada Canada-Chile 1.17 0.41 
Chile China Chile- China 0.91 1.77 
Chile Colombia Chile - Colombia 1.69 1.1 
Chile Costa Rica Central America - Chile  
1.52 1.55 
Chile El Salvador Central America - Chile  
1.52 1.55 
Chile Finland Chile-EU 1.91 1.5 
Chile France Chile-EU 1.91 1.5 
Chile Greece Chile-EU 1.91 1.5 
Chile Guatemala Central America - Chile  
1.52 1.55 
Chile Honduras Central America - Chile  
1.52 1.55 
Chile Iceland Chile-EFTA 1.8 1.11 
Chile Italy Chile-EU 1.91 1.5 
Chile Japan Chile-Japan 1.21 0.88 
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Main country Partner Agreement 
Extensive 
margin 
Intensive 
margin 
Chile Korea Chile-Korea 1.47 1.41 
Chile Luxembourg Chile-EU 1.91 1.5 
Chile Mexico Chile –Mexico 1.53 1.3 
Chile Netherlands Chile-EU 1.91 1.5 
Chile New Zealand Chile-P4 2.43 1.64 
Chile Norway Chile-EFTA 1.8 1.11 
Chile Panama Chile - Panama 1.19 1.3 
Chile Paraguay Chile-MERCOSUR 0.71 0.71 
Chile Peru Chile - Peru 1.98 1.33 
Chile Spain Chile-EU 1.91 1.5 
Chile Sweden Chile-EU 1.91 1.5 
Chile Switzerland Chile-EFTA 1.8 1.11 
Chile Turkey Chile - Turkey 0.12 1.44 
Chile 
United 
Kingdom 
Chile-EU 
1.91 1.5 
Chile United States Chile- United States 
2.14 1.08 
China Chile Chile- China 0.91 1.77 
China Costa Rica Costa Rica - China 0.83 1.33 
China Peru Peru - China 1.35 0.74 
Colombia Canada Canada - Colombia 2.73 1.08 
Colombia Chile Chile - Colombia 1.69 1.1 
Colombia El Salvador 
Colombia - Northern 
Triangle 1.67 1.33 
Colombia Guatemala 
Colombia - Northern 
Triangle 1.56 1.33 
Colombia Honduras  
Colombia - Northern 
Triangle 1.56 1.33 
Colombia Mexico Colombia - Mexico 2.76 0.41 
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Main country Partner Agreement 
Extensive 
margin 
Intensive 
margin 
Colombia United States Colombia - United States 
2.49 1.08 
Colombia  Iceland Colombia - EFTA 1.51 1.69 
Colombia  Switzerland Colombia - EFTA 1.51 1.69 
Costa Rica 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
CARICOM – Costa Rica 
0.27 1.22 
Costa Rica Barbados CARICOM – Costa Rica 0.27 1.22 
Costa Rica Belize CARICOM – Costa Rica 0.27 1.22 
Costa Rica Canada Canada-Costa Rica 0.67 1.22 
Costa Rica Chile Central America - Chile  
1.52 1.55 
Costa Rica China Costa Rica - China 0.83 1.33 
Costa Rica Dominica CARICOM – Costa Rica 0.27 1.22 
Costa Rica 
Dominican 
Republic 
Central America – 
Dominican Republic 1.6 1.11 
Costa Rica 
Dominican 
Republic 
Dominican Republic-
CAFTA 2.12 1.3 
Costa Rica Grenada CARICOM – Costa Rica 0.27 1.22 
Costa Rica Guyana CARICOM – Costa Rica 0.27 1.22 
Costa Rica Jamaica CARICOM – Costa Rica 0.27 1.22 
Costa Rica Mexico Costa Rica – Mexico 2.6 0.97 
Costa Rica Panama 
Central America - 
Panama  2.08 1.55 
Costa Rica 
St. Kitts and 
Nevis 
CARICOM – Costa Rica 
0.27 1.22 
Costa Rica St. Lucia CARICOM – Costa Rica 0.27 1.22 
Costa Rica 
St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines 
CARICOM – Costa Rica 
0.27 1.22 
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Main country Partner Agreement 
Extensive 
margin 
Intensive 
margin 
Costa Rica 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
CARICOM – Costa Rica 
0.27 1.22 
Dominica Costa Rica CARICOM – Costa Rica 0.27 1.49 
Dominica 
Dominican 
Republic 
CARICOM - Dominican 
Republic 0.72 0.41 
Dominican 
Republic 
Barbados 
CARICOM - Dominican 
Republic 0.72 0.41 
Dominican 
Republic 
Belize 
CARICOM - Dominican 
Republic 0.72 0.41 
Dominican 
Republic 
Costa Rica 
Central America – 
Dominican Republic 1.6 1.11 
Dominican 
Republic 
Costa Rica 
Dominican Republic-
CAFTA 2.12 1.3 
Dominican 
Republic 
Dominica 
CARICOM - Dominican 
Republic 0.72 0.41 
Dominican 
Republic 
El Salvador 
Central America – 
Dominican Republic 1.6 1.11 
Dominican 
Republic 
El Salvador 
Dominican Republic-
CAFTA 2.12 1.3 
Dominican 
Republic 
Grenada 
CARICOM - Dominican 
Republic 0.72 0.41 
Dominican 
Republic 
Guatemala 
Central America – 
Dominican Republic 1.6 1.11 
Dominican 
Republic 
Guyana 
CARICOM - Dominican 
Republic 0.72 0.41 
Dominican 
Republic 
Honduras 
Central America – 
Dominican Republic 1.6 1.11 
Dominican 
Republic 
Honduras 
Dominican Republic-
CAFTA 2.12 1.3 
Dominican 
Republic 
Nicaragua 
Central America – 
Dominican Republic 1.6 1.11 
Dominican 
Republic 
Nicaragua 
Dominican Republic-
CAFTA 2.12 1.3 
Dominican 
Republic 
St. Lucia 
CARICOM - Dominican 
Republic 0.72 0.41 
Dominican 
Republic 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
CARICOM - Dominican 
Republic 0.72 0.41 
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Main country Partner Agreement 
Extensive 
margin 
Intensive 
margin 
Dominican 
Republic 
United States 
Dominican Republic-
CAFTA 2.12 1.3 
El Salvador Chile Central America - Chile  
1.52 1.55 
El Salvador Colombia 
Colombia - Northern 
Triangle 1.56 1.55 
El Salvador 
Dominican 
Republic 
Central America – 
Dominican Republic 1.6 1.11 
El Salvador 
Dominican 
Republic 
Dominican Republic-
CAFTA 2.12 1.3 
El Salvador Panama 
Central America - 
Panama  2.08 1.55 
Finland Chile Chile-EU 1.91 1.5 
Finland Mexico Mexico – EU 1.28 0.84 
France Chile Chile-EU 1.91 1.5 
France Mexico Mexico – EU 1.28 0.84 
Germany Mexico Mexico – EU 1.28 0.84 
Greece Chile Chile-EU 1.91 1.5 
Greece Mexico Mexico – EU 1.28 0.84 
Grenada Costa Rica CARICOM – Costa Rica 0.27 1.49 
Grenada 
Dominican 
Republic 
CARICOM - Dominican 
Republic 0.72 0.41 
Guatemala Chile Central America - Chile  
1.52 1.55 
Guatemala Colombia 
Colombia - Northern 
Triangle 1.56 1.55 
Guatemala 
Dominican 
Republic 
Central America – 
Dominican Republic 1.6 1.11 
Guatemala Mexico 
Mexico- Northern 
Triangle 1.57 1.22 
Guatemala Panama 
Central America - 
Panama  2.08 1.55 
Guatemala United States 
Dominican Republic-
CAFTA 2.12 1.3 
Guyana Costa Rica CARICOM – Costa Rica 0.27 1.49 
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Main country Partner Agreement 
Extensive 
margin 
Intensive 
margin 
Guyana 
Dominican 
Republic 
CARICOM - Dominican 
Republic 0.72 0.41 
Honduras Chile Central America - Chile  
1.52 1.55 
Honduras 
Dominican 
Republic 
Central America – 
Dominican Republic 1.6 1.11 
Honduras 
Dominican 
Republic 
Dominican Republic-
CAFTA 2.12 1.3 
Honduras Mexico 
Mexico- Northern 
Triangle 1.57 1.22 
Honduras Panama 
Central America - 
Panama  2.08 1.55 
Honduras United States 
Dominican Republic-
CAFTA 2.12 1.3 
Honduras  Colombia 
Colombia - Northern 
Triangle 1.56 1.55 
Iceland Chile Chile-EFTA 1.8 0.88 
Iceland Colombia  Colombia - EFTA 1.51 1.69 
Iceland Mexico Mexico – EFTA 1.38 1.55 
Iceland Peru  Peru - EFTA 1.38 1.21 
Ireland Mexico Mexico – EU 1.28 0.84 
Israel Argentina MERCOSUR - Israel 0.46 1.2 
Israel Mexico Mexico – Israel 1.23 1.44 
Israel Paraguay MERCOSUR - Israel 0.46 1.2 
Israel Uruguay MERCOSUR - Israel 0.46 1.2 
Italy Chile Chile-EU 1.91 1.5 
Italy Mexico Mexico – EU 1.28 0.84 
Jamaica Costa Rica CARICOM – Costa Rica 0.27 1.49 
Japan Chile Chile-Japan 1.21 0.74 
Japan Mexico Mexico- Japan 0.54 1.44 
Japan Peru Peru - Japan 1.72 0.74 
Korea Chile Chile-Korea 1.47 1.41 
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Main country Partner Agreement 
Extensive 
margin 
Intensive 
margin 
Korea Peru Peru - South Korea 2.42 0.74 
Luxembourg Chile Chile-EU 1.91 1.5 
Mexico Austria Mexico – EU 1.28 0.84 
Mexico Bolivia Bolivia - Mexico 1.05 0.85 
Mexico Canada NAFTA 1.75 1.08 
Mexico Chile Chile –Mexico 1.53 1.3 
Mexico Colombia Colombia - Mexico 2.96 0.41 
Mexico Costa Rica Costa Rica – Mexico 2.6 0.97 
Mexico Finland Mexico – EU 1.28 0.84 
Mexico France Mexico – EU 1.28 0.84 
Mexico Germany Mexico – EU 1.28 0.84 
Mexico Greece Mexico – EU 1.28 0.84 
Mexico Guatemala 
Mexico- Northern 
Triangle 1.57 1.22 
Mexico Honduras 
Mexico- Northern 
Triangle 1.57 1.22 
Mexico Iceland Mexico – EFTA 1.38 1.55 
Mexico Ireland Mexico – EU 1.28 0.84 
Mexico Israel Mexico – Israel 1.23 1.44 
Mexico Italy Mexico – EU 1.28 0.84 
Mexico Japan Mexico- Japan 0.54 1.44 
Mexico Netherlands Mexico – EU 1.28 0.84 
Mexico Nicaragua Mexico – Nicaragua 2.29 1.44 
Mexico Norway Mexico – EFTA 1.38 1.55 
Mexico Peru Mexico - Peru 1.42 0.97 
Mexico Portugal Mexico – EU 1.28 0.84 
Mexico Spain Mexico – EU 1.28 0.84 
Mexico Sweden Mexico – EU 1.28 0.84 
Mexico 
United 
Kingdom 
Mexico – EU 
1.28 0.84 
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Extensive 
margin 
Intensive 
margin 
Mexico United States NAFTA 1.75 1.08 
Mexico Uruguay Mexico-Uruguay 1.16 0.97 
Netherlands Chile Chile-EU 1.91 1.5 
Netherlands Mexico Mexico – EU 1.28 0.84 
New Zealand Chile Chile-P4 2.53 1.64 
Nicaragua 
Dominican 
Republic 
Central America – 
Dominican Republic 1.6 1.33 
Nicaragua 
Dominican 
Republic 
Dominican Republic-
CAFTA 2.12 1.3 
Nicaragua Mexico Mexico – Nicaragua 2.29 1.44 
Nicaragua United States 
Dominican Republic-
CAFTA 2.12 1.3 
Norway Chile Chile-EFTA 1.8 0.88 
Norway Mexico Mexico – EFTA 1.38 1.55 
Norway Peru  Peru - EFTA 1.38 1.21 
Panama Chile Chile - Panama 1.19 1.3 
Panama Costa Rica 
Central America - 
Panama  2.08 1.55 
Panama El Salvador 
Central America - 
Panama  2.08 1.55 
Panama Guatemala 
Central America - 
Panama  2.08 1.55 
Panama Honduras 
Central America - 
Panama  2.08 1.55 
Panama Singapore Panama - Singapore 1.23 0.14 
Paraguay Argentina MERCOSUR 0.3 2.46 
Paraguay Bolivia Bolivia-MERCOSUR 0.26 0.38 
Paraguay Brazil MERCOSUR 0.3 2.46 
Paraguay Chile Chile-MERCOSUR 0.71 0.71 
Paraguay Israel MERCOSUR - Israel 0.46 1.2 
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Extensive 
margin 
Intensive 
margin 
Paraguay Peru MERCOSUR – Peru 1.08 0.97 
Paraguay Uruguay MERCOSUR 0.3 2.46 
Peru Argentina MERCOSUR – Peru 1.08 0.97 
Peru Brazil MERCOSUR – Peru 1.08 0.97 
Peru Chile Chile - Peru 1.98 1.33 
Peru China Peru - China 1.35 0.74 
Peru Japan Peru - Japan 1.72 0.74 
Peru Korea Peru - South Korea 2.42 0.74 
Peru Mexico Mexico - Peru 1.42 0.97 
Peru Paraguay MERCOSUR – Peru 1.08 0.97 
Peru Thailand Peru - Thailand 0.7 0.23 
Peru Uruguay MERCOSUR – Peru 1.08 0.97 
Peru  Iceland Peru - EFTA 1.38 1.21 
Peru  Norway Peru - EFTA 1.38 1.21 
Peru  Switzerland Peru - EFTA 1.38 1.21 
Portugal Mexico Mexico – EU 1.28 0.84 
Singapore Panama Panama - Singapore 1.23 0.14 
Spain Chile Chile-EU 1.91 1.5 
Spain Mexico Mexico – EU 1.28 0.84 
St. Kitts and 
Nevis 
Costa Rica CARICOM – Costa Rica 
0.27 1.49 
St. Lucia Costa Rica CARICOM – Costa Rica 0.27 1.49 
St. Lucia 
Dominican 
Republic 
CARICOM - Dominican 
Republic 0.72 0.41 
St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines 
Costa Rica CARICOM – Costa Rica 
0.27 1.49 
Sweden Chile Chile-EU 1.91 1.5 
Sweden Mexico Mexico – EU 1.28 0.84 
Switzerland Chile Chile-EFTA 1.8 0.88 
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Main country Partner Agreement 
Extensive 
margin 
Intensive 
margin 
Switzerland Colombia  Colombia - EFTA 1.51 1.69 
Switzerland Peru  Peru - EFTA 1.38 1.21 
Thailand Peru Peru - Thailand 0.7 0.23 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Costa Rica CARICOM – Costa Rica 
0.27 1.49 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Dominican 
Republic 
CARICOM - Dominican 
Republic 0.72 0.41 
Turkey Chile Chile - Turkey 0.12 1.44 
United 
Kingdom 
Chile Chile-EU 
1.91 1.5 
United 
Kingdom 
Mexico Mexico – EU 
1.28 0.84 
United States Chile Chile- United States 
2.14 1.08 
United States Colombia Colombia - United States 
2.49 1.08 
United States 
Dominican 
Republic 
Dominican Republic-
CAFTA 2.12 1.3 
United States Guatemala 
Dominican Republic-
CAFTA 2.12 1.3 
United States Honduras 
Dominican Republic-
CAFTA 2.12 1.3 
United States Mexico NAFTA 1.75 1.08 
United States Nicaragua 
Dominican Republic-
CAFTA 2.12 1.3 
Uruguay Bolivia Bolivia-MERCOSUR 0.26 0.38 
Uruguay Brazil MERCOSUR 0.3 2.46 
Uruguay Israel MERCOSUR - Israel 0.46 1.2 
Uruguay Mexico Mexico-Uruguay 1.16 0.97 
Uruguay Paraguay MERCOSUR 0.3 2.46 
Uruguay Peru MERCOSUR – Peru 1.08 0.97 
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E  Appendix: Descriptive and collinearity statistics 
Table E-1 Extensive margin: Descriptive statistics 
 N Minimum 
 
Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Access points without vetoi 256 0.00 0.94 0.51 0.19 
Access points without vetoj 256 0.00 0.94 0.51 0.19 
Concentrationi 256 0.25 0.80 0.59 0.16 
Concentrationj 256 0.25 0.80 0.59 0.16 
Concentration and Access points 
without veto 
256 0.00 0.70 0.30 0.15 
Democracyi 237 0.00 1.04 0.36 0.29 
Democracyj 237 0.00 1.04 0.36 0.29 
Investment 256 0.00 1.00 0.55 0.50 
Intellectual property 256 0.00 1.00 0.55 0.50 
Labor 256 0.00 1.00 0.12 0.32 
Number of previous agreements 256 1.73 9.27 6.76 1.64 
European Union 256 0.00 1.00 0.18 0.38 
Bargaining position 256 1.00 4.00 2.28 0.88 
North/South partner 256 0.00 1.00 0.52 0.50 
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 N Minimum 
 
Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Political alliance 256 0.00 1.00 0.59 0.49 
Tariff phasing 256 0.00 1.00 0.47 0.28 
Intensive margin 256 0.14 2.46 1.18 0.45 
Extensive margin 256 0.12 2.96 1.32 0.68 
 
Table E-2 Extensive margin: Collinearity statistics 
 Tolerance 
 
VIF 
Access points without vetoi 0.05 21.44 
Access points without vetoj 0.84 1.19 
Concentrationi 0.09 10.61 
Concentrationj 0.61 1.63 
Concentration and Access points 
without veto 
0.03 33.46 
Democracyi 0.56 1.79 
Democracyj 0.56 1.79 
Investment 0.33 3.07 
Intellectual property 0.47 2.14 
Labor 0.31 3.26 
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 Tolerance 
 
VIF 
Number of previous agreements 0.40 2.50 
European Union 0.31 3.26 
Bargaining position 0.61 1.64 
North/South partner 0.16 6.22 
Hegemonic power 0.60 1.66 
Political alliance 0.16 6.20 
Tariff phasing 0.55 1.83 
Intensive margin 0.75 1.33 
 
Table E-3 Intensive margin: Descriptive statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Veto playersi 256 1.00 4.00 2.17 0.83 
Veto playersj 256 1.00 4.00 2.17 0.83 
Concentrationi 256 0.25 0.80 0.59 0.16 
Concentrationj 256 0.25 0.80 0.59 0.16 
Concentration and Veto players  256 0.25 3.04 1.29 0.61 
Democracyi 237 0.00 1.04 0.36 0.29 
Democracyj 237 0.00 1.04 0.36 0.29 
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 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Investment 256 0.00 1.00 0.55 0.50 
Intellectual property 256 0.00 1.00 0.55 0.50 
Labor 256 0.00 1.00 0.12 0.32 
Number of previous agreements 256 1.73 9.27 6.76 1.64 
European Union 256 0.00 1.00 0.18 0.38 
Bargaining position 256 1.00 4.00 2.28 0.88 
North/South partner 256 0.00 1.00 0.52 0.50 
Political alliance 256 0.00 1.00 0.59 0.49 
Tariff phasing 256 0.00 1.00 0.47 0.28 
Intensive margin 256 0.14 2.46 1.18 0.45 
Extensive margin 256 0.12 2.96 1.32 0.68 
Table E-4 Intensive margin: Collinearity statistics 
 Tolerance VIF 
Veto playersi 0.05 21.31 
Veto playersj 0.63 1.58 
Concentrationi 0.07 14.02 
Concentrationj 0.60 1.66 
 283 
 Tolerance VIF 
Concentration and Veto players 0.03 34.49 
Democracyi 0.54 1.83 
Democracyj 0.56 1.79 
Investment 0.33 3.02 
Intellectual property 0.40 2.49 
Labor 0.31 3.26 
Number of previous agreements 0.41 2.46 
European Union 0.30 3.34 
Bargaining positioni 0.59 1.70 
North/South partner 0.15 6.52 
Hegemonic power 0.66 1.51 
Political alliance 0.16 6.16 
Tariff phasing 0.53 1.87 
Extensive margin 0.40 2.48 
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F  Appendix: Robustness checks for the intensive margin 
Table F-1 Income level, income fluctuations, and differences in wealth 
 GDP 
difference 
Main 
countries’ and 
partners’ GDP 
Main 
countries’ 
GDP 
Partners’ GDP Change GDP Change 
unemploy-
ment 
Foreign direct 
investment 
Veto playersi -0.15 
(0.15) 
-0.16 
(0.15) 
-0.16 
(0.15) 
-0.16 
(0.15) 
-0.14 
(0.15) 
-0.17 
(0.14) 
-0.18 
(0.15) 
Veto playersj 0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.15*** 
(0.04) 
0.15*** 
(0.04) 
0.16*** 
(0.04) 
0.16*** 
(0.04) 
0.16*** 
(0.04) 
0.16*** 
(0.04) 
Concentrationi -0.80* 
(0.60) 
-0.91* 
(0.64) 
-0.91* 
(0.64) 
-0.98* 
(0.59) 
-0.98* 
(0.58) 
-1.03* 
(0.58) 
-1.06* 
(0.58) 
Concentrationj 0.38* 
(0.20) 
0.23 
(0.26) 
0.26* 
(0.19) 
0.25 
(0.25) 
0.27* 
(0.18) 
0.20 
(0.19) 
0.26* 
(0.18) 
Concentrationi and Veto playersi 0.57** 
(0.25) 
0.59** 
(0.25) 
0.59** 
(0.25) 
0.60** 
(0.25) 
0.59** 
(0.25) 
0.62** 
(0.25) 
0.64*** 
(0.25) 
Bargaining positioni 0.16*** 
(0.04) 
0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.14*** 
(0.04) 
Democracyi -0.24* 
(0.14) 
-0.27* 
(0.14) 
-0.26* 
(0.14) 
-0.27* 
(0.14) 
-0.26* 
(0.14) 
-0.25* 
(0.14) 
-0.28** 
(0.14) 
Democracyj -0.30** 
(0.13) 
-0.32** 
(0.13) 
-0.32** 
(0.13) 
-0.32** 
(0.13) 
-0.32** 
(0.13) 
-0.31** 
(0.13) 
-0.34*** 
(0.13) 
European Union -0.06 
(0.10) 
-0.08 
(0.10) 
-0.08 
(0.10) 
-0.08 
(0.10) 
-0.06 
(0.10) 
-0.09 
(0.10) 
-0.10 
(0.10) 
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 GDP 
difference 
Main 
countries’ and 
partners’ GDP 
Main 
countries’ 
GDP 
Partners’ GDP Change GDP Change 
unemploy-
ment 
Foreign direct 
investment 
Extensive margin 0.12* 
(0.07) 
0.11* 
(0.07) 
0.11* 
(0.07) 
0.11* 
(0.07) 
0.10* 
(0.07) 
0.11* 
(0.07) 
0.10* 
(0.07) 
Hegemonic power 0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Intellectual property -0.13* 
(0.08) 
-0.13* 
(0.08) 
-0.13* 
(0.08) 
-0.13* 
(0.08) 
-0.13* 
(0.07) 
-0.13* 
(0.07) 
-0.12* 
(0.08) 
Investment 0.22** 
(0.09) 
0.23*** 
(0.09) 
0.22*** 
(0.09) 
0.23*** 
(0.09) 
0.24*** 
(0.09) 
0.20** 
(0.09) 
0.24*** 
(0.09) 
Labor 0.19 
(0.16) 
0.21 
(0.16) 
0.20 
(0.16) 
0.21* 
(0.16) 
0.20 
(0.15) 
0.19 
(0.16) 
0.19 
(0.16) 
North/South partner 0.24* 
(0.16) 
0.23* 
(0.16) 
0.23* 
(0.16) 
0.23* 
(0.16) 
0.21* 
(0.16) 
0.21 
(0.17) 
0.24* 
(0.16) 
Number of previous agreements -0.09*** 
(0.03) 
-0.10*** 
(0.03) 
-0.10*** 
(0.03) 
-0.10*** 
(0.03) 
-0.11*** 
(0.03) 
-0.10*** 
(0.03) 
-0.11*** 
(0.03) 
Political alliance -0.48*** 
(0.15) 
-0.52*** 
(0.16) 
-0.51*** 
(0.15) 
-0.54*** 
(0.15) 
-0.53*** 
(0.15) 
-0.49*** 
(0.16) 
-0.53*** 
(0.15) 
Tariff phasing -0.19 
(0.15) 
-0.09 
(0.15) 
-0.10 
(0.14) 
-0.07 
(0.14) 
-0.07 
(0.13) 
-0.11 
(0.13) 
-0.06 
(0.12) 
Change GDPi     -0.07 
(0.06) 
  
Change unemploymenti      -0.06 
(0.14) 
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 GDP 
difference 
Main 
countries’ and 
partners’ GDP 
Main 
countries’ 
GDP 
Partners’ GDP Change GDP Change 
unemploy-
ment 
Foreign direct 
investment 
Foreign direct investment       0.06*** 
(0.02) 
GDPi  0.02 
(0.06) 
0.02 
(0.06) 
    
GDPj  -0.01 
(0.05) 
 -0.01 
(0.05) 
   
GDP difference 0.07* 
(0.04) 
      
Constant 0.41 
(0.72) 
1.26 
1.16) 
1.11 
(0.99) 
1.57* 
(0.84) 
1.61*** 
(0.49) 
1.71** 
(0.80) 
0.92** 
(0.45) 
Number of observations 218 218 218 218 218 215 218 
R-squared 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.38 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
*** p ≤ 0.01, ** p ≤ 0.05, * p ≤ 0.1 
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Table F-2 Trade openness, trade intensity, and trade complementarity 
 Trade openness 
 
Trade intensity Trade complementarity 
Veto playersi -0.17 
(0.15) 
-0.10 
(0.15) 
-0.17 
(0.16) 
Veto playersj 0.15*** 
(0.04) 
0.15*** 
(0.04) 
0.15*** 
(0.04) 
Concentrationi -0.97* 
(0.59) 
-0.71 
(0.59) 
-1.01* 
(0.61) 
Concentrationj 0.27* 
(0.18) 
0.24* 
(0.18) 
0.41** 
(0.20) 
Concentrationi and Veto playersi 0.60** 
(0.25) 
0.46* 
(0.26) 
0.62** 
(0.26) 
Bargaining positioni 0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.12*** 
(0.04) 
0.12*** 
(0.04) 
Democracyi -0.25* 
(0.14) 
-0.20 
(0.15) 
-0.22* 
(0.14) 
Democracyj -0.31** 
(0.13) 
-0.27** 
(0.13) 
-0.30** 
(0.14) 
European Union -0.07 
(0.10) 
0.02 
(0.10) 
-0.11 
(0.11) 
Extensive margin 0.11* 
(0.07) 
0.11* 
(0.07) 
0.16** 
(0.08) 
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 Trade openness 
 
Trade intensity Trade complementarity 
Hegemonic power 0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Intellectual property -0.13* 
(0.08) 
-0.17** 
(0.08) 
-0.13* 
(0.09) 
Investment 0.23*** 
(0.09) 
0.27*** 
(0.10) 
0.22** 
(0.09) 
Labor 0.20 
(0.16) 
0.14 
(0.17) 
0.12 
(0.17) 
North/South partner 0.22* 
(0.16) 
0.12 
(0.18) 
0.23* 
(0.17) 
Number of previous agreements -0.09*** 
(0.03) 
-0.09*** 
(0.03) 
-0.12*** 
(0.03) 
Political alliance -0.52*** 
(0.15) 
-0.55*** 
(0.16) 
-0.54*** 
(0.15) 
Tariff phasing -0.11 
(0.13) 
-0.13 
(0.13) 
-0.10 
(0.13) 
Trade complementarity   0.00 
(0.17) 
Trade openness -0.13 
(0.17) 
  
Trade intensity  0.13*** 
(0.05) 
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 Trade openness 
 
Trade intensity Trade complementarity 
Constant 1.58*** 
(0.49) 
1.32*** 
(0.44) 
1.48*** 
(0.52) 
Number of observations 218 218 202 
R-squared 0.37 0.39 0.39 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
*** p ≤ 0.01, ** p ≤ 0.05, * p ≤ 0.1 
 
Table F-3 Number of members, cooperation, and competition 
 Number of partners Competition Joint membership Joint membership (without 
political alliance) 
Veto playersi -0.14 
(0.15) 
-0.15 
(0.15) 
-0.13 
(0.15) 
-0.18 
(0.15) 
Veto playersj 0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.11** 
(0.05) 
0.15*** 
(0.04) 
0.14*** 
(0.04) 
Concentrationi -0.87* 
(0.59) 
-0.72 
(0.58) 
-0.98* 
(0.58) 
-1.08** 
(0.55) 
Concentrationj 0.29* 
(0.18) 
0.30* 
(0.17) 
0.30* 
(0.18) 
0.37** 
(0.19) 
Concentrationi and Veto playersi 0.56** 
(0.25) 
0.49** 
(0.25) 
0.56** 
(0.25) 
0.62** 
(0.26) 
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 Number of partners Competition Joint membership Joint membership (without 
political alliance) 
Bargaining positioni 0.17*** 
(0.04) 
0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.13*** 
(0.04) 
Democracyi -0.27** 
(0.14) 
-0.16 
(0.16) 
-0.30** 
(0.14) 
-0.17 
(0.14) 
Democracyj -0.33*** 
(0.13) 
-0.22* 
(0.15) 
-0.32** 
(0.13) 
-0.19* 
(0.13) 
European Union 0.12 
(0.19) 
0.07 
(0.10) 
-0.08 
(0.10) 
-0.02 
(0.10) 
Extensive margin 0.10* 
(0.07) 
0.10* 
(0.07) 
0.12* 
(0.07) 
0.09 
(0.07) 
Hegemonic power 0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Intellectual property -0.13* 
(0.07) 
-0.09 
(0.08) 
-0.14* 
(0.08) 
-0.08 
(0.09) 
Investment 0.23*** 
(0.09) 
0.21** 
(0.09) 
0.24*** 
(0.09) 
0.16* 
(0.11) 
Labor 0.23* 
(0.17) 
0.10 
(0.16) 
0.26* 
(0.17) 
-0.05 
(0.12) 
North/South partner 0.23* 
(0.16) 
0.15 
(0.17) 
0.23* 
(0.17) 
-0.14 
(0.12) 
Number of previous agreements -0.09*** 
(0.03) 
-0.17*** 
(0.04) 
-0.11*** 
(0.03) 
-0.06** 
(0.03) 
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 Number of partners Competition Joint membership Joint membership (without 
political alliance) 
Political alliance -0.49*** 
(0.15) 
-0.38*** 
(0.15) 
-0.54*** 
(0.16) 
 
Tariff phasing -0.12 
(0.14) 
-0.12 
(0.13) 
-0.12 
(0.14) 
-0.28** 
(0.13) 
Competition  0.64*** 
(0.24) 
  
GDP difference   -0.25 
(0.20) 
-0.38* 
(0.25) 
Number of Partners -0.09 
(0.07) 
   
Constant 1.41*** 
(0.45) 
1.50*** 
(0.45) 
2.65*** 
1.07) 
3.10*** 
1.24) 
Number of observations 218 218 213 213 
R-squared 0.37 0.40 0.38 0.32 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
*** p ≤ 0.01, ** p ≤ 0.05, * p ≤ 0.1 
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Table F-4 Distance, language, and time elapsed 
 Distance 
Distance 
(without 
political 
alliance) Language 
Main 
countries’ 
and 
partners’ 
population 
Main 
countries’ 
population 
Partners’ 
population Year count 
Year count 
(without 
previous 
agreements) 
Veto playersi 
-0.17 
(0.14) 
-0.20* 
(0.15) 
-0.15 
(0.15) 
-0.16 
(0.15) 
-0.16 
(0.15) 
-0.16 
(0.15) 
-0.07 
(0.14) 
-0.12 
(0.15) 
Veto playersj 
0.16*** 
(0.04) 
0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.16*** 
(0.04) 
0.16*** 
(0.04) 
0.16*** 
(0.04) 
0.16*** 
(0.04) 
0.17*** 
(0.03) 
0.17*** 
(0.04) 
Concentrationi 
-1.00* 
(0.58) 
-1.03* 
(0.59) 
-0.95* 
(0.59) 
-0.90* 
(0.65) 
-0.90* 
(0.65) 
-0.99* 
(0.59) 
-0.53 
(0.57) 
-0.83* 
(0.59) 
Concentrationj 
0.31* 
(0.18) 
0.31* 
(0.19) 
0.30* 
(0.18) 
0.25 
(0.24) 
0.27* 
(0.18) 
0.26 
(0.24) 
0.42** 
(0.19) 
0.33* 
(0.18) 
Concentrationi and Veto playersi 
0.62*** 
(0.25) 
0.64*** 
(0.26) 
0.60** 
(0.25) 
0.59** 
(0.26) 
0.59** 
(0.26) 
0.60** 
(0.25) 
0.46* 
(0.24) 
0.55** 
(0.25) 
Bargaining positioni 
0.12*** 
(0.04) 
0.15*** 
(0.04) 
0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.11*** 
(0.03) 
0.11*** 
(0.04) 
Democracyi 
-0.27** 
(0.14) 
-0.15 
(0.14) 
-0.25* 
(0.15) 
-0.28* 
(0.15) 
-0.28** 
(0.14) 
-0.27* 
(0.14) 
-0.42*** 
(0.12) 
-0.36*** 
(0.13) 
Democracyj 
-0.31** 
(0.13) 
-0.22* 
(0.13) 
-0.30** 
(0.14) 
-0.31** 
(0.14) 
-0.31** 
(0.13) 
-0.32** 
(0.14) 
-0.46*** 
(0.12) 
-0.40*** 
(0.13) 
European Union 
-0.06 
(0.10) 
-0.04 
(0.10) 
-0.07 
(0.10) 
-0.08 
(0.10) 
-0.08 
(0.10) 
-0.08 
(0.10) 
-0.03 
(0.11) 
-0.06 
(0.10) 
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 Distance 
Distance 
(without 
political 
alliance) Language 
Main 
countries’ 
and 
partners’ 
population 
Main 
countries’ 
population 
Partners’ 
population Year count 
Year count 
(without 
previous 
agreements) 
Extensive margin 
0.10* 
(0.07) 
0.09 
(0.07) 
0.12* 
(0.07) 
0.11* 
(0.07) 
0.11* 
(0.07) 
0.11* 
(0.07) 
0.17*** 
(0.06) 
0.12* 
(0.07) 
Hegemonic power 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.00* 
(0.00) 
Intellectual property 
-0.14* 
(0.08) 
-0.07 
(0.09) 
-0.12* 
(0.08) 
-0.13* 
(0.08) 
-0.13* 
(0.08) 
-0.13* 
(0.08) 
-0.05 
(0.07) 
-0.12* 
(0.07) 
Investment 
0.24*** 
(0.09) 
0.15* 
(0.11) 
0.23*** 
(0.09) 
0.23*** 
(0.09) 
0.22*** 
(0.09) 
0.23*** 
(0.09) 
0.22** 
(0.09) 
0.26*** 
(0.09) 
Labor 
0.21 
(0.16) 
-0.05 
(0.13) 
0.19 
(0.16) 
0.20 
(0.16) 
0.20 
(0.16) 
0.21 
(0.16) 
0.26* 
(0.17) 
0.24* 
(0.16) 
North/South partner 
0.20 
(0.16) 
-0.05 
(0.15) 
0.24* 
(0.16) 
0.23* 
(0.16) 
0.22* 
(0.16) 
0.23* 
(0.16) 
0.27* 
(0.16) 
0.28* 
(0.16) 
Number of previous agreements 
-0.10*** 
(0.03) 
-0.07** 
(0.03) 
-0.10*** 
(0.03) 
-0.10*** 
(0.03) 
-0.10*** 
(0.03) 
-0.10*** 
(0.03) 
0.40*** 
(0.08)  
Political alliance 
-0.63*** 
(0.17)  
-0.50*** 
(0.16) 
-0.52*** 
(0.16) 
-0.51*** 
(0.15) 
-0.53*** 
(0.16) 
-0.54*** 
(0.16) 
-0.60*** 
(0.15) 
Tariff phasing 
-0.09 
(0.13) 
-0.19* 
(0.12) 
-0.07 
(0.13) 
-0.10 
(0.15) 
-0.10 
(0.14) 
-0.07 
(0.14) 
0.06 
(0.12) 
0.01 
(0.12) 
Distance 
-0.18 
(0.14) 
0.17 
(0.14)       
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 Distance 
Distance 
(without 
political 
alliance) Language 
Main 
countries’ 
and 
partners’ 
population 
Main 
countries’ 
population 
Partners’ 
population Year count 
Year count 
(without 
previous 
agreements) 
Language   
-0.06 
(0.10)      
Populationi    
0.03 
(0.08) 
0.03 
(0.08)    
Populationj    
-0.01 
(0.07)  
-0.01 
(0.07)   
Year count       
-3.14*** 
(0.50) 
-0.83*** 
(0.18) 
Constant 
2.18*** 
(0.72) 
0.50 
(0.74) 
1.33*** 
(0.47) 
1.20 
(0.98) 
1.11 
(0.91) 
1.50** 
(0.73) 
0.66* 
(0.43) 
1.39*** 
(0.43) 
Number of observations 218 218 218 218 218 218 218 218 
R-squared 0.37 0.32 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.41 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
*** p ≤ 0.01, ** p ≤ 0.05, * p ≤ 0.1 
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Table F-5 Alternative model specification and measurements of concentration of export sector, veto players, and access points 
without veto 
 
Veto players and 
access points 
without veto 
Access points 
without veto 
power (without 
veto power 
players) 
Veto players 
(without 
interaction) 
Concentration II Residual veto 
players 
Veto players II 
Veto playersi 
-0.14 
(0.14)  
0.18*** 
(0.04) 
-0.115 
(0.182) 
  
Veto playersj 
0.15*** 
(0.04)  
0.16*** 
(0.04) 
0.150*** 
(0.040) 
  
Concentrationi 
-0.54 
(0.76) 
0.72* 
(0.48) 
0.41** 
(0.18) 
 0.461** 
(0.197) 
-0.471 
(0.431) 
Concentrationj 
0.22 
(0.18) 
0.08 
(0.19) 
0.31* 
(0.18) 
 0.403** 
(0.197) 
0.296 
(0.208) 
Concentrationi and Veto playersi 
0.57** 
(0.25)   
   
Bargaining positioni 
0.13*** 
(0.04) 
0.16*** 
(0.04) 
0.13*** 
(0.04) 
0.155*** 
(0.036) 
0.133*** 
(0.035) 
0.145*** 
(0.035) 
Democracyi 
-0.25* 
(0.13) 
-0.21* 
(0.13) 
-0.28** 
(0.14) 
-0.292** 
(0.115) 
 -0.287** 
(0.116) 
Democracyj 
-0.29** 
(0.13) 
-0.28** 
(0.13) 
-0.32** 
(0.13) 
-0.338*** 
(0.111) 
 -0.338*** 
(0.114) 
European Union 
-0.02 
(0.10) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
-0.02 
(0.09) 
-0.054 
(0.118) 
-0.069 
(0.115) 
-0.053 
(0.115) 
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Veto players and 
access points 
without veto 
Access points 
without veto 
power (without 
veto power 
players) 
Veto players 
(without 
interaction) 
Concentration II Residual veto 
players 
Veto players II 
Extensive margin 
0.13* 
(0.07) 
0.20*** 
(0.07) 
0.11* 
(0.07) 
0.132** 
(0.062) 
0.093 
(0.061) 
0.098 
(0.062) 
Hegemonic power 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Intellectual property 
-0.16** 
(0.08) 
-0.23*** 
(0.07) 
-0.13* 
(0.07) 
-0.138 
(0.085) 
-0.114 
(0.081) 
-0.149* 
(0.081) 
Investment 
0.25*** 
(0.09) 
0.23** 
(0.10) 
0.21** 
(0.09) 
0.203** 
(0.091) 
0.211** 
(0.088) 
0.234*** 
(0.088) 
Labor 
0.18 
(0.16) 
0.18 
(0.15) 
0.20 
(0.16) 
0.228 
(0.136) 
0.170 
(0.130) 
0.161 
(0.132) 
North/South partner 
0.23* 
(0.16) 
0.33** 
(0.17) 
0.22* 
(0.16) 
0.289** 
(0.125) 
0.096 
(0.106) 
0.158 
(0.131) 
Number of previous agreements 
-0.11*** 
(0.03) 
-0.09*** 
(0.03) 
-0.10*** 
(0.03) 
-0.092*** 
(0.026) 
-0.091*** 
(0.022) 
-0.098*** 
(0.023) 
Political alliance 
-0.52*** 
(0.15) 
-0.45*** 
(0.15) 
-0.55*** 
(0.15) 
-0.567*** 
(0.129) 
-0.449*** 
(0.122) 
-0.536*** 
(0.127) 
Tariff phasing 
-0.09 
(0.13) 
-0.08 
(0.13) 
-0.03 
(0.12) 
-0.056 
(0.135) 
-0.151 
(0.124) 
-0.121 
(0.131) 
Access points without vetoi 
0.83* 
(0.52) 
0.92* 
(0.53)  
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Veto players and 
access points 
without veto 
Access points 
without veto 
power (without 
veto power 
players) 
Veto players 
(without 
interaction) 
Concentration II Residual veto 
players 
Veto players II 
Access points without vetoj 
0.16 
(0.17) 
0.22 
(0.18)  
   
Concentrationi and Access points 
without vetoi 
-0.94 
(0.80) 
-1.11* 
(0.81)  
   
ConcentrationiII    
-0.459 
(0.890) 
  
ConcentrationjII    
0.322 
(0.323) 
  
Revealed comparative advantage    
-0.050 
(0.047) 
  
ConcentrationiII and Veto playersi    
0.526* 
(0.387) 
  
Revealed comparative advantage 
and Veto playersi    
0.024 
(0.021) 
  
Trade openness    
-0.202 
(0.143) 
  
Residual veto playersi   
  -0.172 
(0.156) 
 
Residual veto playersj   
  0.170*** 
(0.039) 
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Veto players and 
access points 
without veto 
Access points 
without veto 
power (without 
veto power 
players) 
Veto players 
(without 
interaction) 
Concentration II Residual veto 
players 
Veto players II 
Concentrationi and Residual veto 
playersi   
  0.639** 
(0.266) 
 
Log10veto playersi   
   -0.440 
(0.660) 
Log10veto playersj   
   0.864*** 
(0.203) 
Concentrationi and Log10veto 
playersj   
   2.600*** 
(1.123) 
Constant 
1.00* 
(0.54) 
0.72* 
(0.41) 
0.61* 
(0.32) 
1.640*** 
(0.534) 
1.076*** 
(0.251) 
1.326*** 
(0.358) 
Number of observations 218 218 218 218 218 218 
R-squared 0.39 0.28 0.35 0.362 0.35 0.35 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
*** p ≤ 0.01, ** p ≤ 0.05, * p ≤ 0.1 
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G  Appendix: Robustness checks for the extensive margin 
Table G-1 Income level, income fluctuations, and differences in wealth 
 
GDP 
difference 
Main 
countries’ and 
partners’ GDP 
Main 
countries’ 
GDP 
Partners’ GDP Change GDP Change 
unemploy-
ment 
Foreign direct 
investment 
Access points without vetoi 
1.42** 
(0.66) 
1.38** 
(0.66) 
1.34** 
(0.65) 
1.40** 
(0.63) 
1.27** 
(0.65) 
1.28** 
(0.66) 
1.28** 
(0.66) 
Access points without vetoj 
-0.54*** 
(0.18) 
-0.51*** 
(0.17) 
-0.54*** 
(0.18) 
-0.49*** 
(0.16) 
-0.50*** 
(0.17) 
-0.49*** 
(0.17) 
-0.52*** 
(0.17) 
Concentrationi 
1.84*** 
(0.60) 
1.81*** 
(0.59) 
1.89*** 
(0.60) 
1.81*** 
(0.59) 
1.82*** 
(0.60) 
1.83*** 
(0.60) 
1.88*** 
(0.60) 
Concentrationj 
0.79*** 
(0.29) 
0.63*** 
(0.25) 
0.78*** 
(0.30) 
0.51** 
(0.26) 
0.60** 
(0.25) 
0.64*** 
(0.25) 
0.61*** 
(0.25) 
Concentrationi and Access points 
without vetoi 
-2.92*** 
1.08) 
-2.85*** 
1.07) 
-2.82*** 
1.08) 
-2.88*** 
1.05) 
-2.69*** 
1.07) 
-2.71*** 
1.08) 
-2.74*** 
1.09) 
Bargaining positioni 
-0.14*** 
(0.05) 
-0.15*** 
(0.05) 
-0.13*** 
(0.05) 
-0.15*** 
(0.05) 
-0.14*** 
(0.05) 
-0.14*** 
(0.05) 
-0.14*** 
(0.05) 
Democracyi 
0.22* 
(0.13) 
0.20* 
(0.13) 
0.23* 
(0.13) 
0.19* 
(0.13) 
0.22* 
(0.12) 
0.20* 
(0.13) 
0.19* 
(0.13) 
Democracyj 
0.24* 
(0.13) 
0.23* 
(0.13) 
0.25** 
(0.13) 
0.22* 
(0.13) 
0.23* 
(0.13) 
0.22* 
(0.13) 
0.21* 
(0.13) 
European Union 
0.29* 
(0.16) 
0.30* 
(0.16) 
0.28* 
(0.16) 
0.28* 
(0.16) 
0.30* 
(0.16) 
0.29* 
(0.16) 
0.27* 
(0.16) 
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GDP 
difference 
Main 
countries’ and 
partners’ GDP 
Main 
countries’ 
GDP 
Partners’ GDP Change GDP Change 
unemploy-
ment 
Foreign direct 
investment 
Intensive margin 
0.22*** 
(0.08) 
0.22*** 
(0.08) 
0.22*** 
(0.07) 
0.23*** 
(0.08) 
0.22*** 
(0.07) 
0.22*** 
(0.08) 
0.21*** 
(0.08) 
Hegemonic power 
0.00** 
(0.00) 
0.00** 
(0.00) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.00** 
(0.00) 
0.00** 
(0.00) 
0.00** 
(0.00) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
Intellectual property 
0.59*** 
(0.12) 
0.57*** 
(0.12) 
0.59*** 
(0.12) 
0.57*** 
(0.11) 
0.58*** 
(0.12) 
0.58*** 
(0.12) 
0.58*** 
(0.11) 
Investment 
0.21* 
(0.13) 
0.22* 
(0.13) 
0.20* 
(0.13) 
0.22* 
(0.12) 
0.22* 
(0.12) 
0.22* 
(0.12) 
0.22* 
(0.12) 
Labor 
0.25* 
(0.14) 
0.26* 
(0.13) 
0.25* 
(0.13) 
0.26** 
(0.13) 
0.25* 
(0.13) 
0.26** 
(0.13) 
0.25* 
(0.14) 
North/South partner 
-0.45*** 
(0.14) 
-0.45*** 
(0.14) 
-0.45*** 
(0.14) 
-0.45*** 
(0.14) 
-0.45*** 
(0.14) 
-0.43*** 
(0.14) 
-0.44*** 
(0.14) 
Number of previous agreements 
0.05* 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.06* 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.05* 
(0.03) 
0.05* 
(0.03) 
0.04* 
(0.03) 
Political alliance 
0.44*** 
(0.15) 
0.39*** 
(0.14) 
0.46*** 
(0.14) 
0.38*** 
(0.13) 
0.42*** 
(0.14) 
0.40*** 
(0.14) 
0.40*** 
(0.13) 
Tariff phasing 
0.12 
(0.15) 
0.17 
(0.14) 
0.09 
(0.13) 
0.22* 
(0.14) 
0.14 
(0.13) 
0.16 
(0.13) 
0.15 
(0.13) 
Change GDPi     
-0.04 
(0.06)   
Change Unemploymenti      
0.03 
(0.14)  
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GDP 
difference 
Main 
countries’ and 
partners’ GDP 
Main 
countries’ 
GDP 
Partners’ GDP Change GDP Change 
unemploy-
ment 
Foreign direct 
investment 
Foreign direct investment       
0.05** 
(0.02) 
GDPi 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
-0.04 
(0.05)      
GDPj 
0.05 
(0.05)  
0.05 
(0.05)     
GDP difference    
-0.06* 
(0.03)    
Constant 
-1.13 
(1.09) 
-0.37 
(0.80) 
-1.58** 
(0.82) 
-0.06 
(0.64) 
-0.65* 
(0.49) 
-0.94 
(0.80) 
-1.24*** 
(0.43) 
Number of observations 218 218 218 218 218 215 218 
R-squared 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
*** p ≤ 0.01, ** p ≤ 0.05, * p ≤ 0.1 
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Table G-2 Trade openness, trade intensity, and trade complementarity 
 
Trade openness 
 Trade intensity Trade complementarity 
Access points without vetoi 
1.39** 
(0.64) 
1.32** 
(0.65) 
1.01* 
(0.70) 
Access points without vetoj 
-0.51*** 
(0.17) 
-0.49*** 
(0.17) 
-0.56*** 
(0.16) 
Concentrationi 
1.88*** 
(0.59) 
1.90*** 
(0.60) 
1.76*** 
(0.64) 
Concentrationj 
0.60** 
(0.25) 
0.62*** 
(0.25) 
0.65*** 
(0.24) 
Concentrationi and Access points 
without vetoi 
-2.85*** 
1.05) 
-2.81*** 
1.08) 
-2.37** 
1.13) 
Bargaining positioni 
-0.15*** 
(0.05) 
-0.14*** 
(0.04) 
-0.10** 
(0.05) 
Democracyi 
0.19* 
(0.13) 
0.20* 
(0.13) 
0.10 
(0.12) 
Democracyj 
0.22* 
(0.13) 
0.22* 
(0.13) 
0.28** 
(0.13) 
European Union 
0.29* 
(0.16) 
0.27* 
(0.17) 
0.24* 
(0.16) 
Intensive margin 
0.22*** 
(0.08) 
0.23*** 
(0.08) 
0.25*** 
(0.07) 
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Trade openness 
 Trade intensity Trade complementarity 
Hegemonic power 
0.00** 
(0.00) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
Intellectual property 
0.58*** 
(0.12) 
0.59*** 
(0.12) 
0.62*** 
(0.11) 
Investment 
0.21* 
(0.12) 
0.20* 
(0.13) 
0.15 
(0.12) 
Labor 
0.26** 
(0.14) 
0.27* 
(0.14) 
0.34** 
(0.14) 
North/South partner 
-0.43*** 
(0.14) 
-0.42*** 
(0.15) 
-0.41*** 
(0.14) 
Number of previous agreements 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.05* 
(0.03) 
0.07** 
(0.03) 
Political alliance 
0.41*** 
(0.14) 
0.42*** 
(0.13) 
0.35*** 
(0.14) 
Tariff phasing 
0.18* 
(0.13) 
0.15 
(0.13) 
0.06 
(0.13) 
Trade complementarity   
0.31 
(0.18) 
Trade openness 
0.16 
(0.14)  
 
Trade intensity  
-0.03 
(0.06) 
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Trade openness 
 Trade intensity Trade complementarity 
Constant 
-1.05** 
(0.45) 
-0.87** 
(0.44) 
-1.45*** 
(0.56) 
Number of observations 218 218 218 
R-squared 0.63 0.63 0.65 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
*** p ≤ 0.01, ** p ≤ 0.05, * p ≤ 0.1 
 
Table G-3 Number of members, previous cooperation, and competition 
 
Number of partners Competition Joint membership Joint membership (without 
political alliance) 
Access points without vetoi 
1.26** 
(0.63) 
1.31** 
(0.64) 
1.41** 
(0.64) 
1.30** 
(0.66) 
Access points without vetoj 
-0.50*** 
(0.17) 
-0.50*** 
(0.16) 
-0.52*** 
(0.17) 
-0.52*** 
(0.17) 
Concentrationi 
1.89*** 
(0.58) 
1.89*** 
(0.59) 
2.00*** 
(0.58) 
1.90*** 
(0.59) 
Concentrationj 
0.64*** 
(0.24) 
0.63*** 
(0.25) 
0.58** 
(0.25) 
0.53** 
(0.25) 
Concentrationi and Access 
points without vetoi 
-2.68*** 
1.03) 
-2.76*** 
1.06) 
-2.93*** 
1.06) 
-2.77*** 
1.07) 
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Number of partners Competition Joint membership Joint membership (without 
political alliance) 
Bargaining positioni 
-0.08* 
(0.05) 
-0.13*** 
(0.05) 
-0.14*** 
(0.05) 
-0.13*** 
(0.05) 
Democracyi 
0.19* 
(0.13) 
0.23* 
(0.13) 
0.23* 
(0.13) 
0.13 
(0.12) 
Democracyj 
0.19* 
(0.13) 
0.26* 
(0.13) 
0.24* 
(0.13) 
0.13 
(0.12) 
European Union 
0.63*** 
(0.20) 
0.34** 
(0.15) 
0.25* 
(0.16) 
0.21* 
(0.16) 
Intensive margin 
0.19** 
(0.08) 
0.19** 
(0.09) 
0.24*** 
(0.08) 
0.20*** 
(0.08) 
Hegemonic power 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
Intellectual property 
0.57*** 
(0.11) 
0.59*** 
(0.11) 
0.60*** 
(0.11) 
0.55*** 
(0.12) 
Investment 
0.21* 
(0.12) 
0.21* 
(0.12) 
0.20* 
(0.13) 
0.28** 
(0.13) 
Labor 
0.30** 
(0.13) 
0.22* 
(0.14) 
0.15 
(0.15) 
0.42*** 
(0.12) 
North/South partner 
-0.44*** 
(0.14) 
-0.47*** 
(0.15) 
-0.48*** 
(0.15) 
-0.17* 
(0.11) 
Number of previous 
agreements 
0.07* 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
0.05* 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
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Number of partners Competition Joint membership Joint membership (without 
political alliance) 
Political alliance 
0.46*** 
(0.14) 
0.44*** 
(0.14) 
0.43*** 
(0.14)  
Tariff phasing 
0.05 
(0.12) 
0.12 
(0.13) 
0.20* 
(0.13) 
0.32*** 
(0.13) 
Competition  
0.20 
(0.23)   
Joint membership   
0.18 
(0.22) 
0.28 
(0.21) 
Number of Partners 
-0.16** 
(0.07)    
Constant 
-0.73* 
(0.43) 
-0.77* 
(0.44) 
-1.75* 
1.20) 
-1.86* 
1.23) 
Number of observations 218 218 213 213 
R-squared 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.62 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
*** p ≤ 0.01, ** p ≤ 0.05, * p ≤ 0.1 
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Table G-4 Distance, language, and time elapsed 
 Distance 
Distance 
(without 
political 
alliance) Language 
Main 
countries’ 
and partners’ 
population 
Main 
countries’ 
population 
Partners’ 
population Year count 
Year count 
(without 
previous 
agreements) 
Access points without vetoi 
1.37** 
(0.64) 
1.35** 
(0.64) 
1.29** 
(0.62) 
1.45** 
(0.65) 
1.42** 
(0.65) 
1.33** 
(0.65) 
1.10* 
(0.60) 
1.26** 
(0.64) 
Access points without vetoj 
-0.53*** 
(0.16) 
-0.53*** 
(0.16) 
-0.45*** 
(0.16) 
-0.53*** 
(0.18) 
-0.50*** 
(0.17) 
-0.53*** 
(0.18) 
-0.56*** 
(0.15) 
-0.52*** 
(0.16) 
Concentrationi 
1.98*** 
(0.60) 
1.98*** 
(0.59) 
1.69*** 
(0.59) 
1.83*** 
(0.60) 
1.79*** 
(0.59) 
1.90*** 
(0.60) 
1.61*** 
(0.57) 
1.81*** 
(0.59) 
Concentrationj 
0.67*** 
(0.25) 
0.68*** 
(0.25) 
0.53** 
(0.25) 
0.71*** 
(0.28) 
0.62*** 
(0.24) 
0.70** 
(0.29) 
0.47** 
(0.24) 
0.58** 
(0.24) 
Concentrationi and Access 
points without vetoi 
-2.90*** 
1.06) 
-2.89*** 
1.05) 
-2.63*** 
1.03) 
-2.94*** 
1.07) 
-2.88*** 
1.06) 
-2.81*** 
1.08) 
-2.50*** 
(0.99) 
-2.71*** 
1.05) 
Bargaining positioni 
-0.17*** 
(0.05) 
-0.18*** 
(0.05) 
-0.14*** 
(0.04) 
-0.15*** 
(0.05) 
-0.15*** 
(0.05) 
-0.14*** 
(0.05) 
-0.12*** 
(0.04) 
-0.13*** 
(0.05) 
Democracyi 
0.20* 
(0.13) 
0.16* 
(0.12) 
0.13 
(0.13) 
0.26** 
(0.13) 
0.24* 
(0.13) 
0.23* 
(0.13) 
0.34*** 
(0.12) 
0.27** 
(0.12) 
Democracyj 
0.24** 
(0.13) 
0.21* 
(0.12) 
0.17* 
(0.13) 
0.20* 
(0.13) 
0.22* 
(0.13) 
0.21* 
(0.13) 
0.36*** 
(0.12) 
0.29** 
(0.12) 
European Union 
0.31** 
(0.16) 
0.31* 
(0.16) 
0.28* 
(0.15) 
0.30* 
(0.16) 
0.31* 
(0.16) 
0.29* 
(0.16) 
0.23* 
(0.15) 
0.28* 
(0.15) 
Intensive margin 
0.21*** 
(0.08) 
0.19*** 
(0.07) 
0.21*** 
(0.08) 
0.22*** 
(0.08) 
0.22*** 
(0.08) 
0.22*** 
(0.07) 
0.34*** 
(0.07) 
0.25*** 
(0.08) 
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 Distance 
Distance 
(without 
political 
alliance) Language 
Main 
countries’ 
and partners’ 
population 
Main 
countries’ 
population 
Partners’ 
population Year count 
Year count 
(without 
previous 
agreements) 
Hegemonic power 
0.00** 
(0.00) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.00** 
(0.00) 
0.00** 
(0.00) 
0.00** 
(0.00) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00** 
(0.00) 
Intellectual property 
0.56*** 
(0.12) 
0.53*** 
(0.12) 
0.53*** 
(0.12) 
0.58*** 
(0.12) 
0.57*** 
(0.12) 
0.58*** 
(0.12) 
0.51*** 
(0.12) 
0.58*** 
(0.11) 
Investment 
0.24* 
(0.13) 
0.28** 
(0.12) 
0.22* 
(0.12) 
0.21* 
(0.13) 
0.22* 
(0.13) 
0.21* 
(0.12) 
0.16* 
(0.12) 
0.17* 
(0.12) 
Labor 
0.26** 
(0.13) 
0.37*** 
(0.12) 
0.31** 
(0.13) 
0.26* 
(0.14) 
0.27** 
(0.14) 
0.24* 
(0.14) 
0.17 
(0.16) 
0.22* 
(0.14) 
North/South partner 
-0.48*** 
(0.14) 
-0.38*** 
(0.13) 
-0.46*** 
(0.13) 
-0.44*** 
(0.14) 
-0.43*** 
(0.14) 
-0.46*** 
(0.14) 
-0.49*** 
(0.14) 
-0.49*** 
(0.14) 
Number of previous 
agreements 
0.05* 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.04* 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.05* 
(0.03) 
-0.35*** 
(0.10)  
Political alliance 
0.25* 
(0.16)  
0.29** 
(0.15) 
0.42*** 
(0.15) 
0.39*** 
(0.14) 
0.44*** 
(0.14) 
0.45*** 
(0.14) 
0.48*** 
(0.13) 
Tariff phasing 
0.12 
(0.13) 
0.16 
(0.12) 
0.12 
(0.12) 
0.15 
(0.14) 
0.19* 
(0.14) 
0.10 
(0.13) 
0.03 
(0.14) 
0.08 
(0.13) 
Distance 
-0.29* 
(0.15) 
-0.43*** 
(0.13)      
 
Language   
0.19** 
(0.09)     
 
Populationi    
-0.07 
(0.06) 
-0.07 
(0.06)   
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 Distance 
Distance 
(without 
political 
alliance) Language 
Main 
countries’ 
and partners’ 
population 
Main 
countries’ 
population 
Partners’ 
population Year count 
Year count 
(without 
previous 
agreements) 
Populationj    
0.05 
(0.07)  
0.05 
(0.07)  
 
Year count       
2.53*** 
(0.59) 
0.46** 
(0.19) 
Constant 
0.37 
(0.80) 
1.09* 
(0.61) 
-0.55 
(0.47) 
-0.66 
(0.93) 
-0.24 
(0.73) 
-1.24* 
(0.73) 
-0.44 
(0.47) 
-0.94** 
(0.41) 
Number of observations 218 218 218 218 218 218 218 218 
R-squared 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.65 0.64 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
*** p ≤ 0.01, ** p ≤ 0.05, * p ≤ 0.1 
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Table G-5 Alternative model specification and measurements of concentration of export sector, veto players, and access points 
without veto 
 Veto players and 
access points 
without veto 
Access points 
without vetoi 
(without veto 
power players) 
Concentrationi 
and access points 
without vetoi (no 
interaction) 
ConcentrationiII Residual access 
points without 
veto 
Access points 
without vetoiII 
Access points without vetoi 1.33** 
(0.63) 
 -0.39** 
(0.18) 
-0.267 
(0.746) 
  
Access points without vetoj -0.47*** 
(0.16) 
 -0.45*** 
(0.17) 
-0.392** 
(0.163) 
  
Concentrationi 2.18** 
(0.92) 
0.54 
(0.75) 
0.51** 
(0.24) 
 0.337 
(0.219) 
-0.867 
(0.627) 
Concentrationj 0.69*** 
(0.25) 
0.53** 
(0.25) 
0.57** 
(0.25) 
 0.466** 
(0.219) 
0.359 
(0.238) 
Concentrationi and Access 
points without vetoi 
-2.79*** 
1.05) 
     
Bargaining positioni -0.15*** 
(0.04) 
-0.17*** 
(0.05) 
-0.14*** 
(0.05) 
-0.132*** 
(0.040) 
-0.128*** 
(0.038) 
-0.196*** 
(0.041) 
Democracyi 0.18* 
(0.13) 
0.17* 
(0.13) 
0.19* 
(0.13) 
0.055 
(0.124) 
 0.234* 
(0.131) 
Democracyj 0.19* 
(0.13) 
0.21* 
(0.13) 
0.22* 
(0.13) 
0.106 
(0.123) 
 0.294** 
(0.131) 
European Union 0.31** 
(0.15) 
0.40*** 
(0.15) 
0.28* 
(0.16) 
0.282** 
(0.131) 
0.295** 
(0.126) 
0.292** 
(0.131) 
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 Veto players and 
access points 
without veto 
Access points 
without vetoi 
(without veto 
power players) 
Concentrationi 
and access points 
without vetoi (no 
interaction) 
ConcentrationiII Residual access 
points without 
veto 
Access points 
without vetoiII 
Intensive margin 0.16* 
(0.09) 
0.14* 
(0.09) 
0.24*** 
(0.07) 
0.230*** 
(0.074) 
0.196** 
(0.071) 
0.203*** 
(0.073) 
Hegemonic power 0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.00** 
(0.00) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.001** 
(0.001) 
0.001** 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.000) 
Intellectual property 0.59*** 
(0.12) 
0.54*** 
(0.12) 
0.56*** 
(0.11) 
0.528*** 
(0.088) 
0.555** 
(0.084) 
0.587*** 
(0.088) 
Investment 0.22* 
(0.12) 
0.29** 
(0.13) 
0.23* 
(0.12) 
0.273*** 
(0.101) 
0.250** 
(0.098) 
0.287*** 
(0.099) 
Labor 0.26** 
(0.13) 
0.24** 
(0.12) 
0.27** 
(0.13) 
0.263* 
(0.150) 
0.330** 
(0.143) 
0.346** 
(0.154) 
North/South partner -0.47*** 
(0.13) 
-0.48*** 
(0.14) 
-0.44*** 
(0.14) 
-0.328** 
(0.138) 
-0.279** 
(0.116) 
-0.340** 
(0.147) 
Number of previous 
agreements 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
0.05* 
(0.03) 
0.047* 
(0.028) 
0.029 
(0.024) 
0.016 
(0.027) 
Political alliance 0.34*** 
(0.13) 
0.31** 
(0.13) 
0.39*** 
(0.14) 
0.345** 
(0.143) 
0.311** 
(0.133) 
0.251 
(0.152) 
Tariff phasing 0.15 
(0.13) 
0.15 
(0.13) 
0.14 
(0.13) 
0.279** 
(0.144) 
0.252* 
(0.135) 
0.159 
(0.147) 
Veto playersi 0.12 
(0.16) 
0.09 
(0.17) 
    
Veto playersj 0.10** 
(0.05) 
0.11** 
(0.05) 
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 Veto players and 
access points 
without veto 
Access points 
without vetoi 
(without veto 
power players) 
Concentrationi 
and access points 
without vetoi (no 
interaction) 
ConcentrationiII Residual access 
points without 
veto 
Access points 
without vetoiII 
Concentrationi and Veto 
playersi 
-0.09 
(0.28) 
-0.03 
(0.30) 
    
ConcentrationiII    2.034** 
(0.848) 
  
ConcentrationjII    0.227 
(0.357) 
  
Revealed comparative 
advantage 
   -0.063 
(0.048) 
  
ConcentrationII and Access 
points without veto 
   -3.978*** 
(1.571) 
  
Revealed comparative 
advantage and Access points 
without veto 
   0.134 
(0.087) 
  
Trade openness    0.176 
(0.161) 
  
Residual access points 
without veto power i 
    1.153* 
(0.687) 
 
Residual access points 
without veto power j 
    -0.493*** 
(0.164) 
 
Concentrationi and Residual 
access points without vetoi 
    -2.543** 
(1.090) 
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 Veto players and 
access points 
without veto 
Access points 
without vetoi 
(without veto 
power players) 
Concentrationi 
and access points 
without vetoi (no 
interaction) 
ConcentrationiII Residual access 
points without 
veto 
Access points 
without vetoiII 
Access points without vetoi II      -2.127** 
(0.931) 
Access points without vetoj II      -0.537** 
(0.245) 
Concentration and Access 
points without veto power II 
     3.037*** 
(1.583) 
Constant -1.15* 
(0.61) 
-0.38 
(0.60) 
-0.01 
(0.37) 
0.129 
(0.537) 
-0.071 
(0.289) 
1.172** 
(0.543) 
Number of observations 218 218 218 218 218 218 
R-squared 0.64 0.60 0.62 0.62 0.61 0.61 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
*** p ≤ 0.01, ** p ≤ 0.05, * p ≤ 0.1 
